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Abstract 
Western scholars suggest that social security serves to free people's dependence on 
their family. This position, however, cannot explain the situation in some Asian 
countries where the social security has not replaced the family as the major proyider 
for welfare. This study compares the development of old age income protection 
system in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. In particular this study examines the 
convergence and divergence of old age provision systems in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore; and the relationship between these systems and the de-familisation of 
older people's income. 
Using a comparative approach to research, this study draws on primary and secondary 
data from variety of sources and finds out that only the state-centred approach can 
explain the similarities and differences in old age provision systems in these countries. 
The need for state building is the main reason that Taiwan and Singapore established 
their first old age provision schemes in the 1950s. Hong Kong during the same period 
did not have major social security establishment due to the lack of intention for the 
Colonial government to exercise national building under uncertain political future. 
The need to increase state legitimacy contributed to the expansion of old age 
provision system in Taiwan and Hong Kong on the 1970s. Up to this point, these 
systems in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were well under states' deliberate plan 
and only had limited effect on de-familising older people's income. 
Since the 1980s to the present date, the states in Taiwan and Hong Kong have lost 
their autonomy in policy making due to political refonns. The states could no longer 
maintain their preference for family cohesion and introduced new old age benefits. 
These benefits play stronger role in de-familising older people's income. Singapore, 
on the other hand, remains a one-party state, and the government continues reinforce 
family obligations to look after older people in its policies. 
Analysis based on panel data, from 1989 to 1996, collected in Taiwan, shows that the 
expansion of old age benefits in Taiwan in the 1990s did help to de-familise older 
people's income. However, this expansion would not improve older people's living 
standard unless benefits are provided on a sufficient level. 
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
Population ageing has become one of the most crucial challenges to the industrialized 
countries. Some critics even regard the greying of the developed world's population may 
present more challenges than the proliferation of nuclear weapons, high-tech terrorism, 
the financial, economic, and political aftershocks of globalisation, and violent ethnic 
explosions (Peterson, 1999: 42). Although this point of view might be an overstatement, 
it is not an exaggeration to say that the high and increasing proportion of older people 
has become the most important factor influencing social security system in all industrial 
countries. 
Many countries and international organisations have demonstrated their concern over on 
the increasing older population. For example, early in 1963, the United States 
designated Mayas "Senior Citizens Month", which was then called "Old Americans 
Month" from 1980 onwards, and this has become a tradition. More recently, the 
European Union nominated 1993 as "European Year of the Elderly and of Solidarity 
between Generations"; and the United Nations termed 1999 as "International Year of 
Older People". These series of activities deeply reflect their concerns about the 
well-being of the older people. Along with these actions, the trends of population ageing 
and the debates on ageing and social security of older people have been attracting more 
attention. 
As an introduction, this chapter begins with the process and trends of population ageing, 
then briefly illustrates the emergence of modem social provision for older people. and 
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finally spells out the aims of this thesis. 
1.1 The process of population ageing 
There is a high degree of consensus among demographers about the factors and the 
process of population ageing. The most popular and best-documented perspective on 
population change is the demographic transition model which characterizes the main 
developments that most industrialized countries have experienced. It distinguishes 
several demographic stages which are classified by different combinations of fertility 
and mortality (Johnson and Falkingham, 1992; Kirk, 1996; Creedy, 1998). The initial 
stage is characterized by high fertility and high mortality. The second stage is 
characterized by a fall in mortality, particularly infant mortality, which is associated with 
a rise in the expectancy of life, while fertility levels remain high. In the third stage, 
improved health conditions reduce mortality and increase longevity further, while the 
fertility rate continues to be high. The last stage then experiences a continued reduction 
in fertility and an increase in the expectancy of life. 
Due to the different combination of fertility, mortality and life expectancy, there are 
significant differences in the age distribution of the population between these stages. In 
the first two stages of the demographic transition, since the mortality rates are high and 
the improvement in mortality is concentrated at younger ages, the population has a 
youthful age profile with a high proportion of young people and relatively few older 
people. In the third stage, however, with the decline of mortality and the extension of life 
expectancy, the proportion of the older population begins to increase. According to this 
perspective of demographic transition, the age structure of the population will stabilize 
with a relatively high proportion of older people on account of the equilibrium between 
fertility and mortality in the fourth stage. As the process of population transition has 
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ended in most industrialized countries, a significant feature of the population in these 
countries is the reduction in the population below 15 years of age and an increase in the 
proportion aged over 65 years. Thus, the ageing society has emerged. Moreo\"er, as the 
fertility rates have declined to the levels below the replacement rates in many of the 
advanced countries, the size of the population of older people will be increasing 
continuously instead of stablising, as the demographic transition theory predicts. 
1.1.1 Population trends 
Since the 1960s, fewer children were being born than the first half of the century in 
almost all industrialized countries. In addition, people are living longer, and life 
expectancy at birth has increased in all countries, especially in industrial countries. 
These factors together have contributed to the' greying of the population', which means 
that, in all industrial countries, both the proportion of older people and old age 
dependency have been increasing. From Table 1.1 we can see that for all the selected 
industrial countries, the proportion of the population aged 65 or over has been increasing 
dramatically since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The United Nations suggests that any country with more than 7 per cent of population 
aged 65 and over is an 'aged nation'. As can be seen from Table l.1, France, Norway, 
and Sweden had reached this level early by the tum of the twentieth century, and all 
these countries exceeded this level by the 1950s and so can be classified as aged nations. 
Indeed, from 1900 to 1990, the proportion of the population aged over 65 years has been 
more than double in all these countries. In five of the countries listed below, Austria, 
Germany, the UK, New Zealand, and the US, levels are now more than three times than 
those of 1900. 
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Table 1.1 Trends in the relative size of population over 65 years old (0/0) 
1850 1900 1930 1950 1990 
Austria 5.0 6.8 10.6 15.0 
Belgium 6.2 7.6 10.7 15.0 
Canada 5.1 5.1 5.6 7.8 1l.3 
Denmark 6.7 7.5 8.4 15.4 
France 6.2 8.2 9.4 1l.8 13.8 
Germany 4.9 4.9 7.4 9.3 14.9 
United Kingdom 4.6 4.7 7.4 10.8 15.7 
Netherlands 4.7 6.0 6.2 7.7 13.2 
New Zealand 2.1 6.6 9.6 1l.1 
Norway 7.9 8.3 9.6 16.4 
Sweden 4.8 8.4 9.2 10.3 18.0 
Switzerland 5.8 6.9 9.6 14.9 
USA 4.1 5.4 8.1 12.3 
Source: derived from Myles (1989, Table 1.1, p.10), Johnson and Falkingham (1992, Table 2.1, p21), 
World Bank (1994, Table A.1, p343), and United Nations (1998, Table 6, p17-18). 
The process of the greying of the population is still well under way, especially in western 
industrial countries. Based on the latest projections by the United Nations, the 
proportion of the population aged 65 and over in the world will increase to 10 per cent by 
2025, about the same level as in most European countries in 1950s. In the most 
industrialized areas, including Europe, North America, and Oceania, the proportion of 
population of people aged 65 and over will be increasing rapidly from 13.8 per cent in 
2000 to 24.0 per cent in 2050. On the other hand, by 2050, the size of the population 
aged 65 and over will be 40 per cent larger than those under 15 years of age in these 
regions (United Nation, 1998). 
This changing structure of population means the old age dependency ratio will increase 
dramatically. The so-called "dependency ratio" is defined as the ratio of people \\'ho are 
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not expected to be in the working population to people of working age. The old age 
dependency ratio, which is simply defined as the ratio of people aged over 65 to those 
aged 20 to 65, is often used as an indicator in describing the level of ageing. According 
to the projection by OEeD (OEeD, 1996), for the OEeD countries as whole, the old age 
dependency ratio increased from 14.90/0 in 1960 to 19.3% in 1990. In other words, old 
age dependency has increased 30 per cent in the last three decades. Moreover, the 
increasing trend will be continuing and the rates even speed up. The projected ratio of 
the entire OEeD countries will reach to 20.9% in the year 2000, and in the year 2010, 
2020, and 2030, the ratio will be 23.5%,29.8%, and 37.70/0, respectively. That is to say, 
in the year 2020, if other conditions remain the same, when the generation born today is 
about to begin participating in the labour market, the burden of supporting older people 
in their society will be twice as great as it was in the year 1960. 
The use and calculation of old age dependency solely based on chronological age is not 
a universal accepted measure. Many critics (for example, Townsend, 1981; Jackson, 
1998) argue that old age is not synonymous with economic dependency. They claim that 
the true economic dependency ratio must take account of economic participation 
profiles and informal economic activities. However, it is safe to confirm the rapidly 
increasing trend of old age dependency ratios in the foreseeable future whatever criteria 
employed, and this trend will significantly increase the burden on the working-age 
population in the future. Moreover, the long-term data of labour force participation 
shows a significant and declining trend of old age labour participation rates. As a result, 
the working population will need to bear the heavier cost of the welfare state. 
1.1.2 Employment trends of older people 
Accompanying the rapidly increasing proportion of older people, another important 
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trend regarding the ageing society which deeply affects the social security system is the 
dramatic decrease of the old age labour force participation rate. Figure 1.1 shows that 
the US, British, French, and German series all follow the same long-term trends of 
steadily declining labour force participation rate of older men. 
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Figure 1.1 Labour force participation rates of men aged 60 and over, 1850-1990 
Source: Costa, 1998: 9, Fig. 2.2 
In the 1900s, the labour force participation rates of men aged 65 and over were all above 
50 per cent in United States, Britain, and Germany. However, the level declined to below 
40 in the 1960s in all these countries and has continued to decline more rapidly since. By 
1990, only 18 per cent of men aged 65 or over still participated in the labour force in the 
U.S., and the level was below 10 per cent in Britain, France, and Germany. 
1.2 The emergence and development of modern social provision for older people 
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Unlike the unemployed and lone-parent, older people are usually regarded as 
"deserving" people (Alcock, 1998). As early as 1601, the English Poor La\\" classified 
the "impotent poor" as a separate category from those able-bodied, and deserved relief 
financed by their parishioners (Layboum, 1995). The older people, as well as the sick. 
blind, and lunatic, were then included to this category as proper objects of relief. 
Moreover, one of the main objectives of the enacting of the 1908 Pensions Act in Britain 
was to replace the Poor Law system, and thus excluding all the demographic category 
except for older people as the target of public relief scheme (Macnicol, 1998). 
The history of modem social provision for older people, however, goes back to the late 
nineteenth century. Germany was the first country in the world to introduce national 
compUlsory old-age insurance in 1889, as part of her social security system to provide 
compensation to industrial workers who were forced to withdraw from the labour 
market because of old age. However, the potential clientele was very small since the 
white-collar workers and the self-employed were not included. Moreover, it was payable 
only to those workers who had reached 70 years of age, while the average life 
expectancy at that time was around just 50 years (Scharf, 1998: 26), and only 20 per cent 
of the population would live long enough to reach the eligible age (Williamson and 
Pampel, 1993). The social security system established in Germany soon attracted the 
attention of its neighbour countries. Following the example of Germany, the French 
government introduced a compulsory old-age insurance in 1910. Unlike the German and 
French social insurance system, Denmark introduced, in 1891, non-contributory old-age 
pensions for those over 65 who could prove destitution. Such provision had much in 
common with the old poor law, and a similar means-tested approach was introduced by 
New Zealand in 1898, and Australia and Britain in 1908. Later, in 1938, New Zealand 
became the first country in the world to adopt non-means-tested, non-contributory old 
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age pensions. Similar universal pensions were introduced by Sweden (1946), Holland 
(1947), and Canada (1951). After one century's development, old-age pensions ha\"e 
now become the most important programs in social security system around the world. 
According to "Social Security Programs Throughout the World-1997", published by 
U.S. Department of Social Security Administration, old-age pensions have replaced the 
work injury programs and become the most popular social security scheme around the 
world. By 1997, 166 out of 172 countries or territories which have at least one social 
security scheme have old age, disablement, and survivor pension programs (see Table 
1.2). 
Table 1.2 Number of countries by type of social security program 
1940 1949 1958 1967 1977 1987 1997 
Any type of program 57 58 80 120 129 141 172 
Old-age, disable, death 33 44 58 92 114 130 166 
Sickness and maternity 24 36 59 65 72 84 111 
Work injury 57 57 77 117 129 136 164 
Unemployment 21 22 26 34 38 40 68 
Family allowances 7 27 38 62 65 63 86 
Source: US Dept of Social Security Administration, 1997: xlv. 
Accompanying the popularisation of pensions, the benefits of old-age pensions have 
now, from a modest level in the first decades they were established, reached a decent 
level in all industrial capitalistic countries. Ritter (1983, cite from Scharf, 1998: 26) 
calculates that, at the end of the nineteenth century, pensions represented between 
one-sixth and one-fifth of an average industrial income in Germany. Sweden presents a 
similar picture where old-age pension insurance was legislated in 1913, but provided 
hardly any benefits at all for decades (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Myles (1989) also 
shows that the flat-benefit rates introduced in the British National Insurance Act in 1946 
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were below the public assistance levels that could be claimed on the basis of a means test. 
In fact, in 1939, the replacement rates of pensions after tax were just 13 per cent in the 
UK, 21 per cent in the US, 19 per cent in Gennany, 15 per cent in Italy, and 10 per cent in 
Sweden (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 99). However, since the position of government on 
protecting older people's income security has gained strong public support (European 
Commission, 1998; Walker and Maltby, 1997), the standards of old-age pensions have 
increased enonnously. In 1980s, the maximum replacement rates had reached about 40 
per cent in the UK and the US, 50 per cent in Gennany, and 80 per cent in Italy and 
Sweden (Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995: 8). As a result, expenditure on older people is 
now the largest component of the welfare-state budget in most industrialized countries. 
In the European Union as a whole, old-age pensions accounted for 42.5 per cent of total 
social protection expenditure in 1995, equivalent to 12 per cent of GDP. Actually, 
pensions have accounted for the highest proportion of expenditure on social protection 
in all European Union countries except for Ireland in 1995 (European Commission, 
1998). 
Another outcome of the extension of pension programmes is that pensions have become 
the most important economic resource for older people in West industrialized countries. 
As we can see from Table 1.3, in the middle of 1970s, government transfers are the 
primary source of money income for older people, which represented 42 per cent of the 
total money income of older people in the US, and 56 per cent in Canada. In contrast, the 
contribution of occupational pensions is less than 13 per cent, and the asset income 
accounted for just about 20 per cent. Since the data in the mid 1970s were for the 
popUlation over the age of 65, not for the retired, earnings still accounted for a 
significant proportion of money income of older people, 23 per cent in the US, and 11 
per cent in Canada. By comparing the figures for Britain in 1951, 1985, and 1993, we 
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can see that the proportion of government transfer as money income of older people 
increased by 16 percentage points, from 43 per cent in 1951 to 59 per cent in 1986, and 
then declined by 5 percentage points, to 54 per cent in 1993. 
Table 1.3 Percentage of Aggregate Income Supplied to older people by Source in 
Britain, Canada, and United States 
U.S. Canada Britain 
(1976)a (1975) a (1951) a (1986) a (1993) a 
All social security 42 56 43 59 54 
Occupational pensions 13 12 15 20 25 
Asset income 18 21 
Savings 15 14 16 
Earnings 23 11 27 7 6 
Others 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: derived from Myles, 1989: 20, Table 1.4; and Midwinter, 1997: 58 & 60, Table 5.2 & 5.5. 
a: For the population over the age of 65; 
b F . : or pensIOners. 
On the other hand, the proportion of occupation pensions as percentage of money 
income of older people follows an increasing trend, from 15 per cent in 1951 to 20 per 
cent in 1986, and the rise continued to 25 per cent in 1993. Coincidentally, the 
percentage increase in occupational pension from 1986 to 1993 is precisely the same as 
the percentage decreasing in government transfer over the same period. By contrast, the 
importance of earnings diminished dramatically, from 27 per cent in 1951 to just 7 per 
cent in 1986, and 6 per cent in 1993. The percentage of savings remains at the same 
level. 
Although pensions have become the most popular social security scheme in the West, in 
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countries which originally have a mechanism to provide old people with economic 
support other than through pensions, the expansion of social provision system for older 
people may cause controversial issues. The campaign for an old age social security 
system in the United States in the early twentieth century is a good example of the 
controversy when the public transfer system was going to replace the traditional 
intergenerational support mechanism. As Hareven (1986) argues, in the 19th century, the 
mainstream of society believed that the family, rather than the state, was responsible for 
the well-being of its relatives. As Gratton and Haber points out: "In dealing with their 
own families, as well as in defining the correct welfare policy for the poor, the 
19-century middle class continually espoused the primary importance of family 
responsibility" (1993: 147). Many families then employed a strategy ofa "family fund" 
to protect their older members against impoverishment. Such a strategy was based on 
the children's sense of responsibility and obligation to the family fund. Young workers 
dutifully turned their wages over to their older parents and added to the family's 
financial success. Through the exchange of the family-shared resources, older people 
were able to enjoy economic security in their later life. In the first two decades of the 
twentieth century when the middle class began to object to this intergenerational transfer 
of funds and advocated establishing public transfer system, their criticisms were strident 
as the family-based strategy functioned well in many families (Gratton and Haber, 
1993). 
In most advanced industrialized countries, the private exchanges have already been 
replaced by public flows. However, in many countries especially those which still have 
strong family cohesion, the replacement of family support by public transfer remains a 
controversial issue. 
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1.3 The role of the family in supporting older people's income security 
In spite of being the most important source of money income for older people in \\'estem 
industrial countries, public transfer does not seem to be the primary economic source for 
older people in countries outside Europe, Northern America, and Oceania. Table 1,-+ is 
the result of a project cited by the World Bailie It addressed a common questionnaire to 
more than 20,000 married adults in some countries in the mid-1970s, asking the question 
"Would you expect your son(s)/daughter(s) to support you financially when you grow 
old?" All the Asian countries included in this project except for Singapore had a very 
high percentage of respondents answering yes for sons. In Indonesia, South Korea, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, over 85 per cent of respondents expected financial 
support from their sons when they are old. By contrast, the figure in the United States 
was just 11 per cent respectively (World Bank, 1994). 
Table 1.4 Parents Expecting Financial Help from Sons (S) and Daughters (D) (%) 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Singapore Taiwan Thailand US 
S D S D S D S D S D S D S 
Mothers 85 83 85 46 86 85 39 31 85 39 89 87 12 
Fathers 79 77 78 42 82 80 31 25 76 29 78 75 12 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 1994: 62, Table. 
Table 1.5 further provides a more detailed profile of the difference of economic 
resources between, using the World Bank's terminology, the 'high-income countries', 
the 'middle-income', and the 'low-income countries. More than 90 per cent of people 
over the age of 65 received income from public transfer systems in all the high-income 
countries in 1980s. In the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, the public transfer system 
was available to all their older citizens. Public transfers had even become the only 
economic resource for older people in Sweden. The proportion of older people recei\'ing 
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Income from work was very low in high-income countries, especially in France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, where the levels are less than 5 per cent. As for the family, 
it did not have any position in older people's income component in high-income 
countries. 
Table 1.5 Sources of Income in Old Age, Selected Countries, 1980s (0/0) 
High-income countries Percentage of persons over 65 receiving income from 
Work Family Pension/welfare Savings 
Australia 9 93 
Canada 19 97 
France 4 96 
Germany 2 98 
Netherlands 5 100 
Sweden 0 100 
United Kingdom 13 100 
United States 20 94 
Average 9 97 
Middle-income countries Work Family Pension/welfare Savings 
Korea, Rep. Of 24 64 6 8 
Singapore 18 85 16 37 
Taiwan * 8 61 13 12 
Low-income countries Work Family Pension/welfare Savings 
China 45 34 13 
Urban 15 17 64 
Rural 51 38 5 
Indonesia 46 63 10 4 
Malaysia 34 83 14 11 
Philippines 63 45 13 2 
Ad t d fi W rId Bank 1994' 63 Table 2.3 & Taiwanese Department of Interior Affair, Source: ap e rom 0 , ., 
1997:23. 
*: For people over 65 of age; data of 1989. 
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The picture in Asian countries was extremely different from high-income countries. 
where the informal sector played an important role in supporting older people. Although 
the minimum age of the population of the survey - 65 in Taiwan and 60 in others - \\'as 
equal to or greater than the pensionable ages in all these countries, the proportion of 
respondents receiving public transfer was between 6 and 16 per cent, which is \'ery 10\\', 
A relatively high proportion of respondents were still involved in paid work after 
pensionable age in these countries, especially in low-income countries. Generally 
speaking, family was the most important source of economic support for older people in 
Asian countries. In middle-income countries, including South Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, more than 60 per cent of older people received income from their family. 
The figures for Asian countries in table 1.4 seem consistent with the ones in table 1.5 in 
general. That is, in all these Asian countries, a very high proportion of older people 
received income from their family, and also a very high proportion of adults expected 
financial help from their children, especially from sons, regardless of the differences of 
economic and industrial development between these countries. Among these countries, 
Singapore might be the only exception, where a high proportion of older people enjoyed 
financial support from the family but a relatively low percentage of adults expected 
financial help from sons and/or daughters when they grow old. 
1.4 The ideas of familism and de-familisation in supporting older people 
The difference between western and eastern countries in the role of public transfers, 
familial support, and the peoples' expectations toward the family might be a result of the 
different cultures. Esping-Andersen (1999: 45) used 'de-familialisation' to capture 
policies that "lessen individuals' reliance on the family; that maximise individuals' 
command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities." In 
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his point of view, a high degree of de-familisation is one of the most important 
objectives for welfare regimes to achieve. However, most of the Asian countries are 
familialistic welfare regimes that assign a maximum of welfare obligations to the 
household. Take Chinese society as an example, as Chow (1987: 39) suggests, "the 
Chinese ideal is to draw each member closer to his family through social welfare 
provisions rather than to help him become independent of his home." Furthermore, most 
Chinese are still holding fast to the principle that a person should first seek to have his 
needs met and satisfied within his family. It is only when the family fails to provide 
relief that the state should come in and give its support, but state provisions should never 
grow to the extent of replacing the functions of the family. 
Although Asian countries still want to hold the traditional virtue of family obligation 
and filial responsibility, they are facing many challenges. First, the demographic trends, 
including the increasing proportion of older people and the declining fertility rate, are 
reducing the younger generation's ability to give their older family members economic 
support. Second, the development of urbanisation could damage the relationship 
between working people and their aged parents. Indeed, although financial support from 
adult children is still a significant economic resource for the old people in these 
countries, it has been declining gradually. Thus, these countries face a choice between 
familism, to encourage intra-family financial transfer from adult children to old people, 
and de-familisation, to expand modem social provision for the older generations. 
1.5 The triangle model for older people's income protection 
In addition to the public transfer system, the labour market provides another mechanism 
for de-familisation. Moreover, the availability of intra-family and public transfer will 
presumably influence older people's participation in the labour market. Discussing 
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European social policy, a report published by Action Centre for Europe Ltd. (1998) 
offers a triangle model including three points of the state, the market, and civil society. 
They argue that all three sectors bear a share of the responsibility for ensuring social 
hannony. However, while applying to Asian countries, as far as older people's income 
protection is concerned, the family should take the place of civil society as a mechanism 
of social support. In these countries, it is the interaction between social provisions, 
larbour market participation, and family support that determines older people's income 
security. 
Labour 
market 
State 
prOVISIon 
family 
Figure 1.2 Triangle of older people's income security 
1.6 Aim of this thesis 
The main focus of this research is to analyse old age social protection systems in the 
three countries of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and to compare their orientations 
in response to an ageing society. Questions being asked in this research are: 
1. Do these countries stick to their tradition of taking family as the solution to an ageing 
society? Or do they follow their Western counterparts to introduce and expand 
de-familisation schemes? 
2. What are the factors that contribute to these governments' policy-making of 
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orientations toward familisaion or defamilisatoin? 
3. What are the factors that can explain the convergence and divergence of the 
development of familisation or de-familisation of old age income protection system 
in these countries? 
4. Does the development of familisation or de-familisation have an impact on the 
interaction between social provision, labour market participation, and family support 
in securing older people's income? 
5. How does the development of familisation or de-familisation of old age income 
protection system affect older people's living standards? 
To answer these questions, both macro and micro analyses will be employed to draw a 
thorough picture of these issues. In the macro level, the development of old age social 
protection systems in each country will be thoroughly reviewed to identify the trends of 
familisation or de-familisation. In addition, the main schemes concerning older people's 
income protection in each country will be analysed to see whether they as such should be 
regarded as familising schemes or de-familising ones. Furthermore, changes of older 
people's major income source in each country will also be analysed, to identify the 
trends of these changes. Analysis will also be undertaken to examine the connection of 
these trends and governments' orientation toward familisation or de-familisation in each 
country. Finally, a comparison will be made between three countries to draw out major 
factors that contribute to the convergence and/or divergence of the development of 
familisation or de-familisation of old age income protection system in these countries. 
At the micro level, subject to the availability of empirical data, the impact of the 
development of old age income protection system on older people's living standards will 
be analysed. 
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1.7 Definition of terminology 
1.7.1 Choosing a name 
There are a couple of names to call the group of people aged 65 and over. It \,"ould be 
inaccurate to describe them as "pensioners", because not all people in this group receive 
pensions in each country, nor in some countries are all pensioners in these age groups 
(Whiteford, 1994: 9). One of the other terms, "retired", faces exactly the same problem. 
Another possible term, the 'third age', usually do not include the 'old old' group. The 
Eurobarometer survey conducted in 12 member states of European Union in 1992, 
covered the population of the respective nationalities aged 60 and over, asked 
respondents directly: what do you prefer to be called? The results showed that there was 
no consensus across the whole 12 countries sampled. The majority vote being split 
between 'senior citizens' and 'older people'. Four out of the 12 individual countries 
showed a majority favoring 'older people' and three 'senior citizens'. By contrast, the 
term most commonly used by policy makers, the media, and social gerontologists, that is, 
'elderly', is firmly rej ected (Walker and Maltby, 1997). On the basis of their preference, 
this thesis will adopt 'older people' to indicate the targeted population of this research. 
1. 7.2 Familisation, pro-familisation, and de-familisation 
There have been various definitions of family employed by governments and 
researchers. This study broadly defines family as 'people related by blood, marriage, or 
adoption'. In this sense, the relationship between family members include grandparents, 
parents, children, spouse, son- and daughter-in-law, etc. 
In this study, the level of familisation indicates the extent to which an individual 
financially relies on other family members. On the other hand, the terms 
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pro-familisation and de-familisation are used to capture policies that intend to 
manipulate the level of familisation. De-familisation signifies policies that maximize 
individuals' income independently of familial or conjugal transfer and thus lessen 
individuals' reliance on family members. By contrast, pro-familisation represents 
policies that encourage the financial interdependence between family members. 
1.8 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two is a literature review that examines the related existing research. Chapter 
three introduces methodology of this research. Chapter four to six highlight the political, 
economic, social, and demographic developments in each of the three countries, and 
retrace the origin and development of modem social provision for older people in each 
of these countries. Chapter seven uses empirical data to analysis changes of older 
people's income and their impact on older people's living standard. Chapter eight 
compares the development of old age income protection system in these three countries 
to identity major factors that contribute to the similarities and differences of the 
development of old age income protection system in these countries. Chapter nine 
concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
The development of old age income support occurred as a gradual evolution from work, 
to the family, to the state, to the enterprise and, most recently, to an emphasis on personal 
individualized savings (Rein and Turner, 1999). Historically, older people continued to 
work until they were no longer able to support themselves in an independent household. 
When this was no longer possible, they fell back on the benevolence of family, then 
some form of co-residence was established where the working adult child moved in to 
the home of the aged parent or the reverse (Atchley, 1976). Gradually, the state played a 
larger role in protecting older people's income, first through the strict means-tested 
programmes then through the introduction modem social security pensions. At the 
meantime, many employers also developed their own systems of pensions as human 
resource managerial strategies. More recently, governments in most industrialized 
countries have been encouraging occupational and private pensions in order to reduce 
the dramatically increasing burden on pension expenditure. Although many industrial 
countries are trying to relieve the role of the government by privatizing the pension 
systems, most of the 'privatized' pension system are still regulated and/or supervised by 
the government. In other words, the role of the government as a provider is declining. 
However, the governments nowadays are bearing more responsibility as regulators and 
supervIsors. 
Although the state has gained the overwhelmingly dominant position in providing 
financial support for the older population in all the highly industrialized countries, the 
importance of labour market and family has never completely fallen away. That is to say, 
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the relationship between the state, labour market, and family in protecting income 
security for older people is not only substitutive but also supplementary. Thus, there is 
an insufficiency of traditional welfare state studies focusing only on the state. As 
Esping-Andersen (1999) criticized, the family tended to disappear within the studies of 
comparative political economy. He argued that the term 'welfare state' has become 
misleading, and studying just the welfare state leaves a huge 'welfare residual' 
uncounted for. He claims the necessity of the practice of using terms like 'welfare 
regimes', since what is being studied is the broader package of welfare production and 
distribution. In addition, he defines a welfare regime as 'the combined, interdependent 
way in which welfare state is produced and allocated between state, market, and family' 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 34-35). In terms of protecting older people's income security, 
these three sectors represent different principles of risk management. Within the family, 
the dominant essence of allocation is reciprocity of filial obligation. The labor market, in 
contrast, is governed by the principle of commodification and distribution via the cash 
nexus. The dominant principle of allocation in the state, on the other hand, takes the 
form of authoritative redistribution. 
The triad of welfare regimes proposed by Esping-Andersen is rather well-suited for 
analyzing the income maintenance of older people. A review by Rein and Turner (1999) 
confirmed that the historical income package of older people was a welfare mix based 
on market, state, and family. They argued that the income package managed by these 
three sectors was the dominant strategy in most industrial societies at the early stage of 
the welfare state. The reason for this was that the market (work after age 65), the family 
(children's earning), or the State by itself could not provide an adequate income for 
survival. As demonstrated in chapter one, although the family has been ignored in most 
of the comparative studies regarding older people's income protection, intergenerational 
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financial transfer within the family is still playing a significant role in the selected Asian 
countries involved in this comparative research. In these countries, the three sectors of 
state, labour, and family are an inter-causal triad. At the macro level, the welfare effort 
of any of the three sectors is obviously related to what happens in the other two. At the 
micro level, individual welfare depends on how the three sectors interact. 
The following literature review will focus on these three sectors. The first part will 
retrace the role of work, family, and state as a mechanism for protecting older people's 
income. The second part will examine the interaction of these sectors, as well as their 
influence on older people's living standard. Although most of the existing research 
regarding these issues are based on GECD countries, they offer good reference materials 
for analyzing the relative issues in the targeted countries in this thesis. 
2.1 Labour market and older people's income security 
In the pre-industrial era, being older was really a 'risk' since very few people could 
survive till the age of 65 and there was hardly any social support mechanism for people 
who remained alive after losing their working capacity. Actually, with only limited 
accommodation available in almshouses and with retirement pensions virtually 
non-existent before the nineteenth century, there was a genuine fear of old age among 
working people (Phillipson, 1994). 
With the improvement of the medical system and the increase in life expectancy, to most 
people, surviving until the age of late 60s nowadays is no longer a random unknown 
which is the key element of 'risk', but a future which can be expected (Culpitt, 1999). 
However, older people are more likely to incur hazards than the younger and thus are 
more vulnerable. Poverty is probably the most commonly identified 'hazard' (Brearly, 
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1982). To some extent, the poverty risk of older people is connected with modernisation 
(Beck, 1992), as the development of living and working styles in the modem societies 
makes it more difficult for people to get sufficient resources on their own in their later 
life. 
The picture of older people's working style in pre-industrialized period was rather 
diverse. Reviewing the historical development of retirement in the US, Atchley (1976) 
pointed out that for the rare persons who lived to grow old in agricultural America, those 
who lived to become old tended to come from the upper economic strata. Those working 
men who did the heaviest labor were least likely to live long. For those from a better-off 
economic background, there was no problem with the living standards of their late life as 
they could get sufficient economic resources from assets. However, for people from the 
working class who did grow old, they had to continue full-time work as long as they 
could. 
The existing historical studies verify the profile that older people keep working into old 
age. A study by Carter and Sutch (1996) provided a clear picture of older peoples' 
working pattern. They use the tenn 'agricultural tenure ladder' to represent the process 
of working peoples' life cycle in the agricultural era. That is, a working man started in 
life as a fann labour with limited capital, or with nothing but his own energy and 
enterprise, and then progressed to be a tenant fanner and finally became a fann 
owner-operator. Since they held the power of ownership, it is technically impossible for 
anyone to force the older fanners out in the early days. A survey of several less 
modernized nations by Cowgill and Holmes (1972) also supported the life long working 
assumption. They found that in all societies, older people were transferred to activities 
that are less strenuous and physically exhausting. They also found that in the societies 
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they surveyed, through control over land and the use of land, older people tended to 
retain power. 
In addition to the earnings from work, the savings from work and the income from assets 
were also important economic resources for older people before the availability of social 
security benefits and pensions. As Carter and Sutch (1996) indicated, workers began 
work early and exited late, and the long working years and relatively short life 
expectancy in later life made it possible for many men at the tum of twentieth century to 
save a substantial fraction of their income during their working years to finance a period 
of non-employment in later life. They suggested that many men invested their savings in 
assets such as land, tools, shops, and inventory; became self employed; and eventually 
ceasing productive activity and presumably living off the stream of earnings generated 
by their assets. 
However, industrialisation upset this picture. With the coming of the industrial era, the 
meaning of work and employment was recast, from artisan-type shops and small 
manufactures to modem mass production. Industrialisation also brought with it new 
forms of social organisation. The small-scale farmer and small businessman were 
gradually replaced by the salaried workers. The rise of the corporation and large-scale 
organisation for production eliminated the family with its patriarchal head as the typical 
unit of production. In addition, industrialisation reduced the power of older people by 
divorcing management from ownership and by devaluing experience. The long-run 
decline in the relative importance of self-employment, especially in agriculture and in 
owning and operating one's own business or farm meant that the vast majority of people 
had no way to claim an income except through a job. In countries like Germany and the 
United States, the share of agricultural employment declined from 50 per cent in 1870 to 
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about 33 per cent in 1910 (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 92). Land or other resources were no 
longer available, and ownership and control of the economic surplus were concentrated 
in the hands of large business concerns and financial institutions. 
Industrialisation also put older people in the labour market at a disadvantage and 
brought about the phenomenon of retirement. The growth of the factory system brought 
about a growing concern with maximizing productivity rather than a stress on labour 
intensity. In particular, the argument of the scientific management school of thought that 
efficiency in the labour process depends on the removal of those with low levels of 
marginal productivity, which was crudely related to age is very influential (Walker, 1986; 
Myles, 1989). Thus, the desire of management to shed itself of ageing workers, 
accompanied by the development of assembly-line production, hastened the 
displacement of older workers by institutionalized retirement. The Northcote-Trevelyn 
report of 1857 on the efficiency of the British civil service, the first document that 
promoted the idea of retirement, was a typical example representing this idea. The 
authors of this report argued that the efficiency of the civil service would be enhanced by 
the removal of older workers. So from its inception retirement has been seen as a way of 
improving the economic efficiency of firms and organisations rather than as a reflection 
of concern for the well-being of the work force (Victor, 1994). 
The statutory retirement defines older people as a social group and absolves them from 
the requirement to work, yet it has virtually no physical justification when longevity is 
increasing. Therefore, although the rising population of old people became steadily fitter 
and healthier, and thus more able to participate in the labour market, they were 
increasingly marginalised into economic inactivity. 
Accounts of the emergence of retirement also suggest that older people have been used 
as a reserve army of labour: older people were encouraged to remain in employment in 
times of boom but were the first to be dismissed in times of recession (Walker, 1986; 
Townsend, 1986; Guillemard, 1999; Kohli et aI, 1992). At times of high unemployment, 
retirement has come to be used as one of the most important strategies for adjusting the 
numbers and structure of the labour force, with the additional advantage that it is much 
more acceptable to the unions than some other options. Thus, in the boom of the late 
1950s, older people were encouraged to work on to achieve a 'happier old age', while in 
the high unemployment period of 1930s and 1980s, older people were encourage to 
retire early in many industrial countries. 
Empirical surveys have also shown continuing discrimination against older workers in 
recruitment and employment. Research by Trinder and his colleagues suggest that 
employers' are now using early retirement to reduce the workforce and to change the age 
profile of their organisations and provide opportunities for younger employees to be 
promoted. On the other hand, a mail survey conducted by Taylor and Walker (1993a) 
found a range of negative and inaccurate stereotypes toward older workers. Their survey, 
targeted on 500 employers of big organisations with 500 or more employees in Britain 
with a response rate of61 per cent, showed that nearly halfofthe employers (43 per cent) 
considered age to be an important consideration in the recruitment of staff. In addition, 
approximately 15 per cent of all employers specified maximum recruitment ages in the 
advertisements for the most common job in their organisation, and 60 per cent of 
employers in the sample considered people to be too old to be recruited at the age of 60. 
In fact, being discriminated against is an important factor causing the steady decline in 
share earnings of the age groups over 55-59 years old (Taylor and Walker, 1993b). 
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2.2 Family and older people's income security 
As mentioned earlier, the family was a back-up for older people when they were no 
longer able to work. As an ILO review stressed, documenting and understanding the 
existing informal systems of support based within the family and how these systems are 
themselves changing is a prerequisite for developing appropriate and effective social 
and economic policies addressing older people (lLO/EASMAT, 1997). 
In the past, children and relatives have, under ideal circumstances, supported parents 
who could not provide for themselves or wanted to retire. Support for the elderly 
traditionally took the form of an informal contract across generations. As parents cared 
for them as children, adult children should support their older parents in return (Pampel, 
1998). In some countries, this sort of familial obligation is even written in the code. For 
example, Twigg and Grand's (1998) comparative study of family obligations between 
France and Britain showed that French law encodes responsibility for the financial 
maintenance of parents by their children through the operation of 'obligation 
alimentaire'. The 'code civil' was established in 1804 in French law, which sets out the 
character of marriage and the related nature of family obligation 
The main measure for a family to support its older members is co-residence with their 
offspring. A survey in the United States of the composition of family earnings in 1890, 
1918 and 1939 shows that the relatively low earnings of aged household heads could be 
offset because the family was able to maintain its economic position with adequate 
income by requiring that children work (Gratton, 1996: 51). Until recently, it was still 
the norm that aged parents would reside with their children. Laslett and Wall (1972) 
suggested that 30-40 per cent of older Britons in the eighteenth century lived with their 
offspring. Barbagli (1982) estimated that this was the case for 60 per cent of aged 
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Italians in the nineteenth century. As late as the 1950s, between one-third and one-half of 
the older people cohabited with their children in Finland, Norway, the UK, and the US 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999:54). Even in 1980s, there were still more than 10 per cent of 
persons over 65 years old living with children in the Netherlands (12%») and US (13%) 
(World Bank, 1994: 64). 
Empirical studies show that older people who live with their children receive significant 
help from children. A cross-sectional survey conducted in 1991 interviewing 4,628 
people aged 65 and over in the UK, Canada, the UK, West Germany, and Japan found 
that a large proportion of respondents did receive help from their children and family. 
The proportion of respondents receiving help from other members of the family in 
Canada, Japan, the UK, West Germany, and the US was 78 per cent, 91 per cent, 82 per 
cent, 90 per cent, and 74 per cent respectively. However, if we only look at the help with 
money, the percentage points were much lower: 7.5 per cent often received money from 
their children and their family in Canada, 25.8 per cent in Japan, 15.7 per cent in the UK, 
9.0 per cent in West Germany, and 5.0 per cent the US (Kunemund and Rein, 1999). 
Although the family has played a significant role for older people's income protection, 
the process of modernisation has eliminated its function in supporting its older members 
in western industrial countries. Urbanisation and industrialisation have disrupted 
extended families and isolated adult children from their aged parents. Urbanisation 
attracts young people from the rural areas and results in a break-up of the extended 
family. In addition, as fertility declined and families became smaller, older parents found 
they had fewer adult children to support them. 
However, In countries with strong familial cohesion, there are still rather high 
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proportions of older people living with their children. For example, the percentage of 
older people living with children in mid-1980s was still as high as 65 per cent in Japan 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999). Although the proportion of aged parents living with married 
children in Japan is declining, the process seems to be very slow. Palmore and Maeda 
(1985) found that, despite rapid industrialisation, the honorable status of older Japanese 
people has remained stable and older people have continued to be integrated into their 
children's families. In China, the three-generation family continues to be an important 
family type today. The case of Singapore also shows that although co-residence is 
declining, the trend is only modest. An earlier survey taken in 1988 indicated that 88 per 
cent of Singapore people aged 60 and over lived with at least one of their children, and in 
1995, the figure was 85 per cent (Knodel and Debavalya, 1997). In the case of Taiwan, 
Thornton, Chang, and Sun (1984) reported that, the proportion of newly married women 
living with their parents-in-law declined from 90 per cent for the 1930-34 birth cohort to 
78 per cent for the 1955-59 birth cohort. This finding suggests that fewer elderly persons 
live with their married children, however, the proportion of older people living with their 
children is still high. The case of Thailand also shows a very modest trend in the decline 
of co-residence. Knodel and Chayovan's review indicated that, for people aged 60 and 
over and with at least one living child, the percentage of co-residence with a child in the 
same household was 80 per cent in 1986, and 74 per cent in 1995, during the decade of 
rapid economic development decade, a drop of only 6 percentage points of co-residence 
(Knodel and Chayovan, 1997). 
Co-residence is not the only way to support older family members' income security. 
Adult children do not necessarily have to reside with their aged parents to give them 
financial resources. A 1929 New York survey showed that more than half of older people 
depended on support from family and friends (Weaver, 1982: 42). Family support still is 
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the most important resource of older people's income in many Asian countries. For 
example, a recent official survey in Taiwan shows that near half (48.30/0) of the older 
people pointed to "monetary support from children" as the most important resource for 
expense (Taiwanese Government, 1997). A survey in South Korea also showed that in 
the late 1980s, 72 per cent of older people received financial support as living expenses 
from family members (Kim and Choe, 1992). 
In addition, although the percentage of older people who reside with their children has 
been declining with the development of industrialisation and urbanisation, this does not 
mean it is also true that the importance of intergenerational financial support within 
family members is declining. By contrast, empirical data from South Korea, Thailand 
and Philippines shows that the proportion of financial support from children to aged 
parents is higher instead of lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Data from the 1996 
Philippine Survey on the Near Elderly and Elderly showed that the percentage of people 
aged 60 and over who received significant money from any non-coresident child was 27 
per cent in urban areas, 10 percentage points higher than that in rural areas (1 7%) 
(Natividad and Cruz, 1998). A survey in South Korea in 1988 showed the same picture: 
for older people living in big cities, 79 per cent received financial support from family 
members, while for older people living in medium-size cities and rural areas levels were 
lower at 72 per cent and 64 per cent respectively (Kim and Choe, 1992). Data from the 
Survey of the Welfare of Elderly in Thailand conducted in 1995 revealed that, although 
there is no clear relationship between the location of the child and giving any money to a 
parent, if consideration is limited to significant amounts of money (more than 1,000 baht 
or US$ 40 at the time of the survey), children who live farthest away from their parents 
are distinctly more likely to provide such amounts than other children, including 
coresident children (Knodel and Chayovan, 1997). A national survey of older people in 
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Singapore also showed that a high proportion of respondents who received financial 
support from their non-coresident children. In 1995, for people over 60 years old and 
with at least one non-coresident child, 85 per cent received money regularly from at least 
one non-coresident child in Singapore (Chen, 1999). The high proportion of 
non-coresident and distant children giving financial support to their aged parents could 
be attributed to the situation in which a higher proportion of such children attempted to 
substitute money for other types of exchanges that they could not provide. 
The high proportion of older people residing with and/or receiving money from their 
children in Japan and Singapore suggests that it is the culture rather than purely 
economic factors that contributes to the high intergenerational support in these Asia 
countries. People in many Asian countries today still hold strong faith in Confucianism 
that highlights filial piety, which means that young and middle-aged family members are 
believed to provide assistance to their aging parents and to give priority to their parents' 
needs over their own (Lee, Netzer, and Coward, 1994). 
In addition to the faith of Confucianism, another possible reason for the high degree of 
monetary transfer in Asian countries is the underdevelopment of pension system. It was 
not until 1980s that South Korea established a pension system, and in Thailand, a 
pension system was not introduced until 1990. In Taiwan, there is a remarkable 
reluctance to replace the retirement lump sum payment with pensions even though these 
could be financed within the present rate of the payroll tax (Chow, 1987). In Singapore 
and Hong Kong, provisions for conventional insurance are still absent. 
Although these Asian countries still want to hold the traditional virtues of family 
obligation and filial responsibility, there is an increasing pressure toward these countries 
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to keep their status as industrial countries and to prove that they can gl \'e their 
populations the same protection other nations give to theirs. In many ways, they have 
taken what may be called a 'learn-as-we-go' approach to social welfare, continuously 
seeking and taking information and models from abroad, and adapting them to their 
domestic situations (Goodman and Peng, 1995). 
2.3 State and older people's income security 
2.3.1 The origin of pensions 
Although pensions nowadays have become the largest programs of social security and 
the most important resources of older people's income in all western industrial countries, 
the considerations of these countries introducing the pension system are far more than 
pure income protection. The high age of eligibility and the low benefit were both good 
evidences that the original pension programs were far from ideal means of helping the 
very poor. The qualifying age for both the first British and German pension programs 
was 70. However, by 1900, life expectancy at birth was below 50 years. To adjust for 
high rates of infant mortality, we may note that life expectancy at age 20 around the tum 
of the century hardly surpassed 60 years: 60 years in Austria, 61 years in France, 62 
years in the US, and 66 years in Sweden (United Nations Statistics Office, 1949). In 
other words, it was hardly usual for someone to survive beyond the age of70 and qualify 
for pension benefit (Esping-Andersen, 1990:89). In addition, the 1889 German scheme 
remained a class of causal labourer earning less than M300 p.a. (c. 7s. per week) who 
were excluded from state insurance because they were irregularly employed and poorly 
paid (Williams, 1970: 63). 
Instead of income protection, the 'politics' has been accepted as the main purpose of 
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old-age pensions. In early days, poverty was not only a curse, but also a danger. The old 
charity of rich towards poor was often motivated by fear of burglary and acts of violence 
which the desperate poor might perpetrate. In the Middle Ages and up to the 1 i h century 
while violent crime rose to worrying proportions in all European countries, public 
assistance was then an institution which made it possible to register and consequently 
control the poor and so prevent them from becoming a danger to society (Langendonck: 
25-26). Such motivations may explain why the 1908 British pension scheme and the 
1898 New Zealand pension scheme had clauses excluding applicants of 'bad character', 
such as having been imprisoned for a certain term. 
Many researchers argue that the prime motivation for early state legislation of pensions 
was to arrest the growth of labor movements, and to redirect workers' loyalties toward 
the existing order (Williams, 1970; Rimlinger, 1971; Myler, 1989; Vincent, 1996; 
Esping-Andersen, 1997; Pempel, 1998). When Bismarck launched an old-age social 
insurance program for workers in 1889, he was hoping that the program would 
undermine the labour movements and dispel potentially more radical socialist programs, 
and that state-sponsored pensions would make workers loyal to the Prussian monarchy. 
These reasons were also the clear rationale behind the early Danish, and Austrian 
reforms (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The perspective that pension started as the gift for 
loyalty could also explain that, in many countries, pensions spread from soldiers and 
sailors to other civil servants and became over time a routine feature of public 
administration. Therefore pensions are middle class in origin and with the rise of 
modem society, it was state officials and then middle-class bureaucratic officials who 
first became pensioners (Vincent, 1996). 
In addition to politics, the attempt to adjust the labour market was also a driving force for 
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introducing pension programs. As a number of studies have shown, retirement and the 
spread of pensions were stimulated by demands for greater efficiency and productivity 
in the workplace (Thane, 1978; Victor, 1996; Macnicol, 1998). In the early 1900s, new 
technology displaced older workers, and older workers were caught in a situation of 
shrinking job opportunities and a decrease in demand for their particular skills. Unless 
supported by the state, the unemployed older workers would become a growing reserve 
army of labour that would compete with younger workers and force down wages. Thus, 
pensions and statutory retirement were introduced as a legitimate way of excluding older 
workers from the job market and thereby decreasing the demand for employment. 
Researchers who examined the background of the initial campaign of old age pensions 
also found that pensions were seen as a means of effecting an immediate and simple cure 
for unemployment (Philipson, 1982; Victor, 1994; Macnicol, 1998). By offering pension 
benefits as an economic incentive, it seemed elderly workers could be removed from the 
labour market, and their jobs being redistributed to the young. As in the pensions debate 
of the late nineteenth century in the UK and of the 1930s in the US, the dominant 
concern was focusing on the unemployment of the young male breadwinner, rather than 
the poverty of older people (Victor, 1994; Macnicol, 1998). The older workers, 
'worn-out' after a lifetime of industrial service, could be granted an 'honourable 
retirement' through the payment of a pension at a level that would guarantee reasonable 
material comfort. Simultaneously, the young unemployed with families - who were 
perceived to be the most tragic victim of the economic recession - would be given jobs, 
a decent income, and thus self-respect in a culture where self-esteem came from the 
work experience. This argument was to dominate discussion on pensions in the early 
1900s (Victor, 1994; Macnicol, 1998). In 1919, an American Trades Union Congress 
report argued that increasing the pension would induce 'those above the age of 65 to take 
34 
a well earned rest from their work to allow the younger men, who are waiting for a job. 
to come into their place' (Trades Union Congress, 1919: 195, quoted in Phillipson, 
1982). 
2.3.2 Explaining the emergence and development of pensions 
As introduced earlier, pensions have now become the most important programs of social 
security system in most industrialized countries, regardless of the huge social, economic, 
political differences between these countries. However, there have been considerable 
debate over the explanation of the emergence and extension of pension systems. Four 
major perspectives have been well developed on explaining the development for the 
welfare state and pensions: industrialism, social democratic, state-centre, and diffusion. 
The industrialism approach to explaining the welfare state focuses on the growth of 
industrial technology and its demographic and institutional development. The basic 
argument of this approach is that the welfare state is a response to problems created by 
the development of industrialisation. From this point of view, the structural 
transformation of societies, when traditional productive and social relationship based on 
an agricultural society shifts to the modem capitalistic society based on industrial 
organisation and technology, creates pressures to expel less productive people, including 
the elderly and the disabled, from the labour market. Those citizens who do not possess 
productivity and can not earn themselves living expenses from the labour market need 
economic support, hence it creates the need for social security institutions. On the other 
hand, in terms of causal sequence, it appears that before positive change in political 
structure can bring about positive change in social security programme development, a 
nation must have experienced some economic growth (Cutright, 1965; Williamson and 
Pampel, 1993; Orloff, 1993a; Orloff and Skocpol, 1984). 
35 
According to the logic of industrialism, the ageing of the population is an important 
factor that explains the emergence and development of pensions because the aged need 
economic support more than other age groups since the family in modem societies no 
longer provides such support. In addition, the difficulty of accommodating older 
workers in mass production organisation also increases the need for pensions as 
economic development proceeds. From this point of view, the social security system is 
treated as responding automatically to substructural changes in the age structure and 
labour market. As a result, the increase in the number of older people and retirement 
increases the need for pensions and thereby raises the expenditure on pensions. This 
claim has gained much support from cross-national comparative studies. Pample and 
Williamson (1985) analyzed the pension expenditure during the period of 1960 to 1975 
in 48 countries, for the regions Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, Northern American, 
and Oceania, and found that the relative size of the older population has a dominant 
effect on social security and pension expenditure. Another study by the same research 
team examined the welfare spending in 18 advanced industrial democracies from 1950 
to 1980 also showed that the size of the older population has the strongest determinating 
effect (Pample and Williamson, 1988). Palme's (1990) study also found that, from a 
large number of factors, the best predictor of cross-national variations in the early stages 
of pension development in 18 GEeD countries was the degree if unionisation of 
non-agricultural labour force. 
However, the influence of industrialism variables on pensions is not always consistent. 
For instance, Palme's (1990) study has found that economic-industrial development is 
not the factor explaining the cross-national diversity of social security rights. His study 
of pension rights covers 18 countries and adopted data for 12 points of time from 1930 to 
36 
1985. He finds that, although they have a positive effect on pension coverage, economic 
and industrial factors have very little to do with the cross-national differences in 
adequacy of pension rights. Thus he argues that for the 'logic of industrialism' 
hypothesis, the results are inconclusive. 
The social democratic conception of the politics of social spending emphasizes the 
advancement of working-class interests by strong working-class movement, in 
particular left-party governments (Korpi, 1989). According to social democracy theory, 
social welfare programs benefit the working and lower classes. As a result, it is in 
nations where reformist labour unions are strong and social democratic or socialist 
parties dominate the government that social welfare programs are extensive. From this 
point of view, rightist-party participation in government tends to dampen welfare 
expanSIon, while leftist-party governmental participation tends to advance welfare 
expanSIon. 
There is much empirical evidence supporting the social democratic perspective. 
Analyzing welfare expenditure across 18 OECD countries during the 1960-82 period, 
Hicks and Mishra (1993) found that left rule, or left party control of governmental 
authority, strikes, and working-class protest positively affect welfare effort, while petty 
bourgeois protest dampens welfare effort. Palme's (1990) study, also focused on 18 
OECE countries, found that the working class mobilisation variables had positive and 
significant effects on the pension variables regardless of the differentiation of pension 
models within these countries. 
The significance of social democratic variables, like industrialism variables, are not 
always successfully found in all empirical studies. Moreover, the results of some 
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empirical studies even produce results that are contrary to the working class 
mobilisation hypothesis. Pampel and Williamson (1985) found that class variables and 
the strength of the leftist parties had little or no effect on pensions, and concluded that 
age politics had been more important than class politics for the development of pensions. 
Wilensky (1981) analyzed social security expenditure in 1960 and 1971 in 19 advanced 
countries, and observed that left party dominance in the government during 1919-76 or 
1946-76 did not have any effect. Kohl (1981) found that centre-based coalition 
governments tended to increase public and social expenditure more than socialist 
government among 14 Western developed countries in 1950-1975. 
The third popular perspective explaining the development of the welfare state and 
pensions is the state-centre approach. This approach argues that the development of the 
welfare state is a part of nation building that can be seen as outcomes of a process where 
states gain capacity to provide social security on a large scale. In other words, it argues 
that welfare effort is shaped by relatively autonomous state institutions and elite (Orloff 
and Skocpol, 1984). Therefore, the crucial importance of elected or appointed state 
officials for explaining welfare state growth has been one of the leading themes in the 
state-centred approach (Palme, 1990). 
The state-centre hypotheses have been supported by some empirical studies. Heclo 
(1974) found that the most important factor for explaining cross-national differences is 
the functioning of the central state bureaucracies and their administrations, while 
political and economic factors were only of secondary importance. The importance of 
state autonomy was also a finding in Orloff and Skocpol's (1984) comparative analysis 
of British and US patterns of social security systems at the tum of twentieth century. 
They concluded that the autonomous actions of officials and politicians, and the state 
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structures and their transfonnations were the main factors that explained why Britain 
launched a full range of modem workers' compensation, old age pension, health 
insurance, and unemployment insurance before World War I, while the United States 
resisted the possibility of launching modem social-spending measures. Allen's (1991) 
study also provides evidence for the state-centre approach. Using the samples of 589 
capitalists in 1936, he found that four in five major capitalists who contributed to 1936, 
the year before the New Deal was enacted, US presidential campaign contributed to the 
Republican party. These results suggested that most capitalists were opposed to the New 
Deal by 1936, thus he argued that the New Deal refonns were initiated by state managers 
over the opposition of most capitalists. 
The fourth perspective explaining the development of social security programs is the 
diffusion approach which was originally proposed by Collier and Messick (1975) who 
argue that social security adoption is taking place within an international system of 
communication and influence. They argue that some nations have directly imitated the 
legislation of other countries. For instance, the Italian insurance system for works' 
pensions established in 1898 is a synthesis of corresponding laws in France and Belgium, 
and the first program in Austria was modeled after those in Germany. The European 
experience had considerable influence on social programs adopted in the United States. 
Although it is common for a country to learn from the experience of foreign forerunners, 
the influence of international effects on domestic social security programs is very 
difficult to measure empirically. Even if some countries have similar characteristics in 
social security programs, it is difficult to define the influence of diffusion. These 
difficulties probably explain why there are very few empirical studies regarding this 
approach. 
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In addition to the above four major approaches, there are other factors that might 
influence the development of the welfare state and pensions as well. The pluralist 
perspective argues that the growth of the welfare state represents the influence of the 
power of pressure-group politics reflecting the ordered segments of society. Accordingly, 
welfare effort reflects the ability of 'have-nots' to exhort and extort policy concessions 
from 'haves' (Hichs, Swak and Ambuhl, 1989). Pample and Williamson (1985) argues 
that unlike nearly all other social welfare programs, pensions benefit a large and easily 
identifiable population with ascribed characteristics and a high rate of voting. These 
characteristics make the aged a potentially strong interest group that can influence 
public policy in ways that welfare mothers, the unemployed, children, and the poor 
cannot. Their study found that the effect of the percent of the aged on pension 
expenditure increases with political democracy, which suggests that the aged wield 
political power in increasing pension expenditures. Day's (1990) study also provides 
evidence of pluralist approach. His case study of pension reform in the United States 
found that aged interest groups played an important role. 
2.4 Comment on current research 
Although each of the major approaches has provided some evidence from empirical 
studies, none of the particular theoretical perspectives can be plausibly regarded as a 
sole or sufficient source of explanation. Neither industrialism nor social democratic, 
diffusion nor state institutions and elite can be judged decisive. Moreover, empirical 
support for these theoretical perspectives come from a large number of studies, most of 
which focus on approximately twenty of the wealthiest, developed democracies and 
limit the time period to between 1960 and 1990. Although it has been important to 
explain continuities and changes in postwar welfare state development among capitalist 
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democratic countries because these countries, unlike other countries, have largely 
similar economic and political systems, which provide boundaries for empirical 
propositions (Amenta, 1993). However, the history of rich capitalist democracies from 
1960 through the 1980s as far too restricted a pool of experience since almost all these 
countries established their pension systems before the 1940s. Thus research on postwar 
welfare state efforts cannot answer fundamental questions concerning why the systems 
were constructed the way they are and do not sufficiently explore why breakthroughs 
that might well have happened did not occur at relevant points in nations histories 
(Orloff and Skocpol, 1984). Neither can they explain critical phenomena such as the 
timing and content of innovations in the welfare state and pensions. Another weakness 
of the study of 20 nations at one point in time is that it truncates variation in 
development and age structure; industrialism variables are discredited through analysis 
of a sample in which such factors are nearly constant (Pamlpe and Williamson, 1985). 
Therefore, this sphere of research is far too narrow a focus to make strong 
generalisations about social policies. 
After discussing the insufficiency of current comparative research regarding welfare 
state development, Amenta (1993) suggested that case studies and close comparisons of 
countries will remain the main means for understanding the development of welfare 
state expansion and provide propositions and hypotheses for examination of quantitative 
data sets. Moreover, he argues that it seems likely that only comparative historical 
research can untangle issues of causality for which quantitative indicators are too highly 
correlated to interpret. He also argues that more quantitative research is needed, but 
mainly on new units of analysis, in different time periods, and sometimes focusing on 
the quality and efforts of individual programs. 
41 
In consideration of the inherent weaknesses of existing research, this research is going to 
bring the family, an important transfer mechanism outside of public transfers, into the 
analysis of pension system development. In addition, a comparison of the similarity and 
difference of the development will be drawn between the three Asia regions including 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which have not gained much attention from 
welfare state studies. Therefore, by bringing a new factor - family - into the analysis, 
and focusing on regions that have been neglected by most of the researchers, this 
research will contribute to broaden the understanding of the development of social 
security systems. 
After examining the development of the three sectors of labour market, family and state, 
the next part of this chapter will review the relationship between each two of the three 
sectors: labour market, family, and pensions. However, the relationship between labour 
market participation and family support will be left out, as there seems to be no 
empirical studies regarding this topic so far. 
2.5 Relationship between pensions and older people's labour market 
participation 
There are a couple of factors that influence older people's decision about whether to 
continue participating in labour market or to retire, and the financial circumstances are 
one of them. Pension benefits improve older people's economic conditions, and may 
thus have considerable effect on retirement. In fact, empirical studies from economists 
have confinued the importance of pensions and social security benefits as an 
explanation for the dramatic decline in older people's labour force participation. An 
early study conducted by Zabalza and his colleagues, using a 1977 British data consisted 
1,940 men aged 55-73 and 1,848 women aged 55-73, all of whom had ajob after age '+5, 
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estimated that the supply elasticity curves for men over pensionable age are much 
shallower than those for men under pensionable age. The implied elasticity of 
substitution of the former is 0.25 while that of the latter is only 0.15. They interpreted the 
result as that being eligible for a state retirement pension makes the individual less 
dependent on his main job, and therefore has a higher degree in his choice of work 
regime (Zabalza et aI, 1980). Their model also confirmed that the increase of the pension 
will have a positive effect on the retirement probability when the man reaches the 
eligible age. Samwick (1998) used the data of the Survey of Consumer to examine the 
effect of changes in pension coverage and simulated the probability of retirement. He 
estimated that as much as one fourth (270/0) of the decline in labor force participation in 
the early postwar period can be attributed to the contemporaneous of pensions. Favreault 
and his colleagues', using the data of the 1990-93 Survey of Income and Participation 
sampling individuals between the ages of 62 and 69 in the US, also found that being 
covered by a pension plan, as well as the higher Social, reduces the probability of 
working (Favreault et aI, 1999). 
Research targeting on Old Age Assistance (OAA) benefit, the first means-tested 
program for older people in the US which was received by two million individuals by 
1940, also found a negative relationship between this benefit and older people's labour 
force participation. Fiedberg (1999) used individual data from 1940 and 1950 American 
Censuses which contain 25,426 and 29,422 observations respectively, found OAA's 
impact on older people's labour force participation was strong. Their model estimated 
that if benefits had not increased during the 1940s, the participation rate of 66-73 year 
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olds would have risen to 53.1 per cent in 1950, instead of falling to 51.4 per cent, from 
the level of 1940 in 52.6 per cent, as strong economic growth was encouraging people to 
work longer. Parsons (1991) also analyzed the impact of AAA. He estimated that 500/0 of 
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the increase in retirement rates between 1930 and 1950 could be attributed to OAA. By 
including the 1930s, however, he was compelled to use aggregated state level data 
because individual records from the 1930 Census are not available. 
The participation in the labour market, by contrast, also has a significant effect on the 
probability of claiming pensions. The Canadian pension system offered a unique 
structure for examining this argument. There are two public pension plans in Canada: 
the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) covers workers in the province of Quebec, while the 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) covers workers in the other provinces. Retirement/earnings 
tests, which applied to pensioners between the age of 65 and 69, were part of both plans 
when they were initiated in 1966, but were eliminated from the CPP in 1975 and from 
the QPP in 1977. Baker and Benjamin (l999b) used the micro data from the 1972, 1974, 
1976, 1978 and 1980 Census Family files in the Survey of Consumer Finances to 
examine the labour market activity of men between the ages of 65 and 69. They found 
clear evidence that the removal of the retirement test is correlated with higher take up 
rates. The removal of the retirement test from CPP in 1975 is associated with a roughly 
15 percentage point's increase in pension receipt. 
2.6 Relationship between pensions and intro-viva transfer 
Some researchers suggest that the role of state pensions and assistance was designed to 
make it easier for the family to maintain their aged parents through shared residence 
(Williams, 1970; Rein and Turner, 1999; Kunemund and Rein, 1999). The 1601 British 
Poor Law and means-tested programs in Asian countries, such as Hong-Kong and 
Taiwan might be good examples that social security benefits serve as a pro-family 
measure. These benefits enshrine the principle that children support their families and 
that the state enters only after the obligation has been honored. 
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Figures from survey data in many countries do show that groups that receive a higher 
proportion of government transfer receive a lower proportion of receiving financial 
support from children (Taiwan Government, 1997; Singapore Government, 1995). 
Compared to men, fewer women have income from pensions, and even if they do, they 
usually receive lower levels of benefit. This disadvantaged status of women is the 
continuance of the division of the labour market. Women work less often because of 
family and domestic duties. Furthermore, women in the paid labour force typically have 
low-status jobs which offer low pay, limited pension benefits, and high turnover. During 
middle age, gender differences in labour force experiences, wages and salaries and 
pensions contributions to create a large gap in the independent resources available to 
men and women. Thus, during old age, public programmes moderate the market 
disadvantages of women. On the other hand, in countries with strong familial cohesion, 
more women than men receive financial support from their children. All the 1996 
Survey of Senior Citizens' Situation in Taiwan, the 1995 National Survey of Senior 
Citizens in Singapore, the 1996 Philippine Survey on the near Elderly and Elderly, and 
the 1988 Korea (Sourth) Gallup Survey indicate this picture. However, there is no clear 
evidence to draw conclusions about the relationship between these two sorts of transfers. 
Actually, there is hardly any empirical studies exploring the relationship between 
government benefits and intergenerational family transfer or other informal transfers. 
Lampman and Smeeding (1983) examined the relationship between government 
transfer and informal transfer - transfer between nuclear families - from the 1930s to 
1979. They observed that during this period, there had been a modest decline in 
interfamily transfer as a percentage of personal income and a strong growth of 
government transfer. They suspected that the growth in government cash and in-kind 
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transfers explains much of this decline in interfamily transfer. Their study was targeted 
on the whole population rather than older people, furthermore, their interpretation of the 
relationship between public and informal transfer was only a conjecture. More research 
is needed to explore the real situation. 
2.7 Relationship between labour market, family, and pensions 
Researchers suggest that the development of old-age income support occurred as a 
gradual evolution through which a new mechanism replaced the earlier one. However, 
there are different viewpoints on the stages of this process. One of them argues that the 
sequence goes from labour market (work), then family support, and finally state support 
(pensions). The literature cited earlier from Atchley (1976) and Rein and Turner (1999) 
represented this point view. However, Esping-Andersen (1999) proposed a different 
perspective. He defines the labour market as a sector of commodity where the survival 
of older people was contingent upon the sale of their labour power, and the state as a 
sector of de-commodity which loosens the commodity status by introducing modem 
social provision programs including pensions, and family as a sector of pre-commodity. 
He argues that individuals first need to leap from the pre-commodified sector to the 
commodified sector, then they can be de-commodified. In other words, individuals 
relying on family support cannot have a high level of pensions unless they participate in 
the labour market. In spite of the difference, these two perspectives both seem to regard 
the three sectors to be mutually exclusive. 
This chapter has reviewed changes of older people's strategies for securing their income 
in later life in the history, and interactions between the three sectors of the social security 
system, labour market, and family in providing financial resources to older people. As 
discussed above, in Western countries, the social security system has replaced the labour 
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market and the family as the major mechanism for protecting older people's income. 
However, in some Asian countries, as discussed earlier, changes of older people's 
income are still underway. In addition, the dynamics of interactions between the social 
security system, labour market participation, and family support might be more complex, 
as governments in these countries has expanded its old age income protection system 
under a situation where traditional family functions are still strong. Discussions in this 
chapter have already showed that the current situation of these sectors in providing 
income source to older people in selected Asian countries is very different from those in 
the West. Therefore, a study based on Asian countries where family cohesion is still 
strong will offer an opportunity to map a more comprehensive picture on these issues. 
The next chapter will be addressing the methodology adopted by this research. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
This research will be adopting a comparative method. This chapter is divided into two 
parts. The first part introduces the characteristics and perspectives of comparative 
research, as well as its advantages and challenges. The second part explains the rationale 
of the research approach adopted in this research. 
3.1 The development of comparative research in social policy 
The use of systematic observation across societies is as old as Herodotus (ca. 495-424 
Be.) (Warwick and Osherson, 1973: 3). In the field of social policy, cross-national 
research was carried out as early as the 1890s (Orloff, 1993a). However, it was not until . 
the decade after the Second World War that comparative research on modem social 
provision has proliferated (Orloff, 1993a; May, 1998). In a way, the expansion of 
comparative research on social policy after World War II is attributed to the massive 
growth of the welfare state in many countries in this period, especially those of the 
industrialized West. One stimulus to comparative analysis on social policy, then, has 
been that of explaining common trends and accounting for national difference. (Orloff, 
1993a; May, 1998; MacPherson and Midgley, 1987) 
On the other hand, the growing theoretical sophistication of social policy studies has 
also increased the demand for comparative research. In their attempts to formulate broad 
generalisations and to conceptualize social policy issues in abstract terms, investigators 
have recognized the limitations of basing their research on the unique experiences of 
particular countries. Most have been aware that the analysis of social policy can be 
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strengthened by examining experiences from abroad and constructing cross-cultural 
models. This realisation has stimulated more comparative social policy research and 
resulted in a somewhat broader appreciation of the welfare systems of other societies 
(MacPherson and Midgley, 1987). 
The increasing availability of cross-national data also encourages the adoption of 
comparative research in social policy. There has been an increasing amount of useful 
data from international agencies and databases, such as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Commission (EC), and the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Such organisations have reworked national 
government statistics to make them comparable (Ginsburg, 1996: 19). These 
increasingly accessible and comparable sources make comparative research more 
attractive to researchers. 
3.2 The meaning of comparative method 
The term comparative method refers to social scientific analyses involving observations 
in more than one social system, or in the same social system at more than one point in 
time (Warwick and Osherson, 1973). According to this definition, the units of this 
method are diverse. The comparison could be done between national units, as well as 
regions, cities, communities, and other sub-national units. A comparison could also be 
drawn between different time periods in the same society. 
Although it is argued that comparative study should be regarded as a different and 
separate research approach from others as its data and objective are distinct from 
analysis limited to a single society (Warwick and Osherson, 1973), many researchers 
argue that comparative study is not a field of study nor a distinct discipline (Higgins. 
49 
1981, 1986; Doling, 1997). In fact, viewed as a fundamental operation in human thought, 
comparison is essential to any effort at social scientific analysis. In itself the tenn 
'comparative' does not imply anything about the object of study. Even in the phrase of 
'comparative social policy', Higgins claims that "it is something of a misnomer" (1981: 
1). She argues that it is not social policies themselves that are comparative, but the study 
of them. In other words, a more accurate description of the activity in which we are 
engaged should be 'comparative research (or analysis) in social policy'. 
In addition, there is obviously no simple, unitary 'comparative method' as such, as the 
definition of comparative research is not linked to any specific research methodology 
(Warwick and Osherson, 1973; Higgins, 1981). Comparisons may be based on historical 
analysis, survey research, use of aggregate data, participate observation, content 
analysis, or many other options from the panoply of social science methods. 
3.3 The rationale for comparative research in social policy 
The most important reason that comparative research in social policy has gained more 
and more respect from researchers and policymakers is its potential contribution to both 
policy practice and academic acknowledge. At a practical level, comparative study 
provides a better understanding of the domestic social policy environment. As a matter 
of fact, it is increasingly assumed that reaching a full understanding of developments in 
any particular country is only possible if its experience is set in the context of those of 
other countries. It is also increasing acknowledged that developments in any single 
country cannot be explained without setting them in the context of global change 
(Cochrane, 1993). On the other hand, as different societies may have many common 
goals and common problems, it is possible to look at the political system of different 
countries as a range of experiments for solving common problems. As Titmuss argued in 
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the early 1970s, "It is only when one adopts a comparative approach and analysis that 
one can distinguish something of the nature of the real choices and priorities in social 
policy." (1975: 102-103). By examining how and why things are done differently in 
other countries, policy-makers can learn from and avoid mistakes which others have 
made elsewhere, and replicate their successes (Madison, 1980; Higgins, 1981, 1986; 
Jones, 1985; O'Higgins et aI., 1990; Doling, 1997; Ditch and Chilvers, 1995; Ovretveit, 
1998; May, 1998). 
Most, ifnot all, of the researchers doing comparative research in social policy recognise 
that the ultimate aim of this research method is to generalise and develop theories about 
social policy formation, which to an extent would not be possible by doing research 
based only on the home country's experience and material alone (Warwick and 
Osherson, 1973; Leichter, 1979; Madison, 1980; Jones, 1985; Higgins, 1986). In order 
to theorize and generalize adequately, it is essential to compare, as theories should 
ideally cover the full range of explanatory conditions under consideration. 
Cross-national comparisons are clearly necessary for this task, for there is no single 
country that covers the full range of condition for all variables central to a theory. 
In addition, by identifying the similarities and differences between the social institutions 
of two or more nations, comparative studies often reveal the causal links within each 
nation. As circumstances cannot be experimentally varied, comparisons of observations 
of the same identifiable phenomenon in different places and at different times can help 
us understand causal relationships. For example, by comparing and contrasting public 
expenditures of many countries, Pryor was able to discover "relationships which, for 
lack of perspective, can never be unearthed from study of such expenditures in a single 
country. If nations with different economic systems are used in such comparisons, 
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additional generalisations with political and ideological significance can be derived 
which are unobtainable if we limit such comparison to nations with the same economic 
system" (Pryor, 1968: 19-20). 
The second academic merit of comparative research in social policy is the avoidance of 
cultural hegemony or ethno-centrism, because "we all wear blinders of some sort" 
(Janoski and Hicks, 1994: 6). People would argue that researchers could not possibly 
survey other countries' system without cultural bias and without any misunderstanding. 
However, observing from some distance without taking anything for granted, 
comparative study often contributes wider and plural angles to view the social policy 
system in each country. Allardt's (1990) argument is a good example to illustrate this 
point. This Finnish researcher points out that, Scandinavian social policy researchers 
tend to pay more attention to what has been institutionalized in Scandinavian. In other 
words, it is more or less taken for granted that, for instance, high state expenditures, a 
high degree of unification of the welfare schemes, the universalism of coverage, and the 
making of the reduction of inequality to a main target are tokens of the good society. It 
may be so, but it is also obvious that the goals attached to the welfare state may be very 
different in different countries. As a matter of fact, many authors have acknowledged the 
dangers of the' Sweden-centrism' approach of comparative studies for misrepresenting 
other countries with different policy regimes (For example, Shalve, 1983; Palme, 1990). 
Thus, research in connection with strongly market-oriented societies such as the US, or 
societies with a corporatist welfare orientation such as the Germany, would help to offer 
an all-round understanding of welfare regimes. 
3.4 The perspectives of comparative research in social policy 
A large number of comparative studies have accumulated in social policy for the past 
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decades. Many researchers have tried to classify them into clusters or so-called 
'generations' (for example, Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kangas, 1991; Hauser, 1993; 
Bradshaw, 1994; Johnson, 1999). The existing comparative studies not only differ from 
each other in terms of the research topic and approach they have chosen. In fact, they 
reflect the difference in perspective in looking upon social policy system. By reviewing 
the development of the dimensions of comparative studies in social policy, we also can 
see the paradigm shift of the perspectives on welfare states. 
The development of comparative study in social policy can substantially be divided into 
three stages from their research focuses. At the first stage, comparative social policy 
study focuses on the welfare efforts and the explanation of welfare expansion. 
Comparative studies at this stage assumed that the level of social expenditure adequately 
reflects a state's commitment to welfare, while in most comparative analyses 
expenditures have been expressed as a proportion of GDP (for example, Curight, 1965; 
Wilensky, 1975; Hewitt, 1977; Korpi, 1989). The heavy concentration of previous 
research on social expenditure has been largely data driven, as comparative expenditure 
data has been easily available in published sources (Kangas, 1991; Korpi, 1989). Thanks 
to the fruitful cross-national data produced by international organisations, this approach 
has dominated comparative social policy study for decades since the 1960s. 
The theoretical intention of the comparative social policy study at this stage was to test 
the validity of contending theoretical models in political economy. By scoring nations 
with respect to, for instance, the level of economic growth and urbanisation, the 
demographic and employment structure, and working-class strength, they tried to find 
the key factors that stimulate the development of the welfare state. However, the 
findings are difficult to evaluate, since there is no convincing case for any particular 
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explanation. 
The expenditure oriented approach has been criticized for making too strong 
assumptions about the relationships between spending rates and the quality of benefits, 
and about the linear growth of welfare states (Therbom, 1987; Allardt, 1990; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kangas, 1991; Orloff, 1993a; Bonoli, 1997; Johnson, 1999). As 
a matter of fact, an approach which concentrates only on expenditure is misleading, 
because not all spending counts equally. For example, as Esping-Andersen (1990) points 
out that in Austria large sums are spent on a scheme for privileged servants. When 
comparing welfare efforts, expenditure on such programmes should not be considered as 
equivalent to spending on universal schemes. Moreover, some nations spend enormous 
sums on fiscal welfare in the form of tax privileges to private insurance plans that mainly 
benefit the middle class. But these tax expenditures do not show up on expenditure 
accounts. In addition, expenditure indicators cannot reflect differences between 
countries in types of programs and institutional structures, nor the ways in which the 
welfare state differentially affect and benefit various categories of citizens. 
The second stage of comparative social study focuses on social rights. In a way, this 
approach derives from Richard Titmuss's (1958) classical distinction between residual 
and institutional welfare states. Social rights, according to its founding father T. H. 
Marshal, cover a whole range of rights, from the right to a economic security through to 
the right to share in the heritage and living standards of a civilized society (Marshall, 
1950). In this approach, efforts are made to measure the welfare entitlements and the 
quality of legislated social rights (For example, Myles, 1989; Korpi, 1989; Palme, 1990). 
At this stage, research focus has moved from the level of expenditures to the content of 
welfare states, such as the eligibility requirements, financing and administrative 
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arrangements, the level of benefits and quality of servIces, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the extent to which employment and working life are encompassed in the 
state's extension of citizen rights (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
This approach successfully avoids the above-mentioned inappropriate assumptions of 
the expenditure-oriented approach. However, it incurs some critique as well. The main 
weakness of this approach is that it focuses only on public welfare efforts and neglects 
the value of private solution. To an extent, that has led to considerable misrepresentation 
and misunderstanding. Social risks may be ameliorated not only by direct public 
provision, but also through regulation of the private market or by providing incentives 
for particular sorts of market-sector activity. Public social expenditure is just one 
element of a mixed economy of welfare in which protection for the individual against 
social risks arises from a combination of public and private sector activity. In 
consequence, studies focusing only on public welfare entitlements and state legislation 
may misrepresent the underlying level of social security or insecurity faced by the 
individual. Particularly, the neglect of non-state activities would distort the images of 
welfare of non-Western, non-industrialized, non-urbanized societies (Higgins, 1986; 
Johnson, 1999). 
The third stage of comparative social policy study focuses on welfare regimes. This 
approach theoretically selects the criteria to judge types of welfare regimes. In his recent 
book, Esping-Andersen argues that the term 'welfare state' has become misleading in 
many studies conducted in the past two decades, as what was been studied was the 
broader package of welfare production and distribution. Thus, he suggests the 
emergence of the term 'welfare regimes' which can be defined as "the combination, 
interdependent way in which welfare is produced and allocated between state, market, 
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and family" (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 35). As a matter of fact, the study conducted by 
him has been the most representative and influential work of this type of study so far. By 
characterizing systems of social provision along the three dimensions of the relationship 
between the state and the market in providing welfare, the effects of the welfare state on 
social stratification, and the character of social rights, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
constructed a typology of regimes: liberal, conservative-corporatist, and 
social-democrati c. 
This approach of study has overturned the linear growth assumption employed by 
expenditure oriented study by showing that different types of welfare regimes can 
coexist. It also has a wider view on welfare provision than the social rights oriented 
approach as non-state welfare efforts are included. 
However, there are limitations to this approach. The allocation of countries to any 
particular regime type is contestable and may depend on the positioning of thresholds 
between regime types or on the criteria chosen to determine national ranking. As 
Ginsburg (1996) criticizes, Esping-Andersen's model is only applied to pensions, 
sickness and unemployment benefit and to labour market politics. It has not been 
applied to policy areas such as health care, family benefits and services, education, 
housing and so on. Lewis (1992), on the other hand, points out that the concept of 
de-commodification, by which Esping-Andersen established his typology, is limited. It 
fails to identity the meaning of the welfare state for gender and the sexual division of 
labour and overlooks the role of family as a crucial dimension engaging with state and 
society. Shaver and Bradshaw's study examining state's support to wifely labour also 
find that there is no obvious association between their measures and commonly 
identified regime types (Shaver and Bradshaw, 1995). A research comparing child 
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support in fifteen OECD countries conducted by Bradshaw and his colleagues also 
produced different groupings to Esping-Andersen. They conclude "it would have been 
inappropriate to classify the Netherlands with Norway, French with Gennany and the 
United States with the UK, at least on the basis of the value of their horizontal 
redistribution in favour of children" (Bradshaw et aI, 1993: 269). There also has been 
considerable debate about which countries should be allocated to Esping-Andersen's 
three welfare regimes, and about whether there should be four ( or more) different 
regImes (Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Kloostennan, 1995; Ferrera, 
1996). 
In addition to the difference in research focuses and approaches, comparative studies 
have varied in the research methods they've chosen. The adoption of different research 
method also reflects different objectives when they are exploring the emergence and 
development of social policy. 
3.5 The method of comparative social policy research 
Although the merit of comparative social policy studies is generally acknowledged, 
there is no agreement concerning the best way to approach the matter. Most of the 
existent comparative studies in social policy adopt one of the three approaches as their 
research method: variable-oriented, variable-oriented, or pooled analysis. 
3.5.1 Variable-oriented analysis 
As mentioned above, one of the most important aims of comparative social policy 
research is the development of theory. The variable-oriented method of comparati\'e 
study is probably the best research strategy that can help to greater cross-national 
generalisability (Leichter, 1979; Ragin, 1994; Kangas, 1994). In this theory-centered 
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approach, hypotheses are derived from theories. By examining a large number and 
variety of nations, and with the help of statistics techniques, the relevance of the theory 
can be tested, and can thus be generalized to the broadest possible sample. 
In this approach, two basic different kinds of measures have been used as the dependent 
variables: welfare efforts (inputs) and outcomes (outputs). Bradshaw has further added 
the dimension of macro and micro and thus forms a matrix of two dichotomies. He 
points out that macro studies seek to explain the origins and evaluate the impact of social 
policies on society at an aggregate level, whilst micro studies focus on particular 
policies or policy packages. Furthermore, the term inputs refer to policies and outcomes 
refer to their effects. Generally, macro studies have more concern for the construction of 
theory, whilst micro studies tend to focus on examining particular systems and to 
abstract lessons for policy making (Bradshaw, 1994: 439-442). 
Although the variable-oriented approach is generally the best research strategy to test 
hypotheses and generalize theories, it has two substantial weaknesses. Firstly, it often 
sacrifices in substance and insight into the content of the policies and the dynamics of 
the policy process. It is not at all unusual for these studies to virtually ignore the 
individual nations. Second, it has been accused of being linear and monocausal, that is, 
of assuming that the cause links between explanandum and explanans work in a similar 
fashion from case to case regardless of the variation in other attributes in a wider social 
and historical framework. 
3.5.2 Case-oriented analysis 
Case-oriented studies employ small-N and intensive strategy, aim at the knowledge of 
cases, the understanding of pattern diversity, and the use, application, and advancement 
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of theory (Ragin, 1994). In this approach, by contrast, investigators begin research not 
by positing general dimensions of social, economical, and political variation, but by 
asserting the existence of comparable entities. 
The strong point of the case studies design is that it gives a detailed description of the 
state of affairs and the processes through which actual historical developments took 
shape. It is sensitive to time, place, agency, and process. In addition, the investigator is 
able to evaluate more effectively the complexity and variability of causal conditions by 
concentrating on one or a few countries. However, these kinds of studies face severe 
restrictions on making theoretical generalisations. 
3.5.3 Pooled analysis 
In a sense, pooled analysis could be classified as variable-oriented analysis but 
combines attention to variability across both time and space. Technically, 'pooled' 
arrays of data are ones that combine cross-sectional data on J spatial units (e.g., nations) 
and T time periods (e.g., years) to produce a data set of J*T=N observations (Hicks, 
1994). This approach has been widely adopted in quantitative studies of the political 
economy of democratic welfare states, especially in studies of income maintenance 
spending, benefits, and social rights (For example, Pample and Williamson, 1988; Korpi, 
1989; Palme, 1990; Hicks and Swank, 1992). 
This method has two weaknesses which are similar to that of variable-oriented method. 
First, with so many countries in the study, the researchers cannot know the intimate 
details of each case. Second, pooled studies tend to reduce the explanation to a single 
cross-nationally homogenous set of variables and parameters (Hicks, 1994). 
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3.6 The insufficiency of existing studies 
In tenus of either theoretical testing or exploring differences and similarities of policy~ 
there are some insufficiencies in the existing comparative social policy research. First. 
comparative studies in social policy, even those that aim to produce uni\'ersal 
generalisation, are limited to a few advanced industrial countries (Spalding, 1980; 
Uusitalo, 1984; MacPherson, 1992; Amenta, 1993). As a result, there exists a major gap 
in comparative social policy between those countries that are loosely categorized by 
Western social scientists as belonging to developing countries and the Third World. In 
addition, although a number of interesting hypotheses have been fonnulated by social 
policy investigators, they have not been tested on a global scale. 
Second, almost all the existing comparative social policy research involving advanced 
industrial countries focus on time periods after 1960, the periods of welfare expansion 
rather than innovation in these countries. They focus on incremental changes in already 
existing social policies. These studies cannot answer fundamental questions concerning 
why the systems are constructed the way what they are and that accounts for gaps in the 
networks of programs and innovations. Insofar as general theories of social policy aspire 
to explain the initiation of policies as well as incremental increases in them, this type of 
research has little to offer. 
The existing comparative research on pensions precisely reflects the insufficiency of 
comparative social policy research mentioned above. Day's (1978) work is probably the 
earliest comparative social policy research on pensions. Adopting criteria such as the 
coverage, adjustment, benefit levels, eligible conditions of pensions, and employing 
data from 19 industrialized countries, he finds that the development of pension rights in 
these countries substantially showed a convergent trend of expansion rather than 
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retrenchment from the year 1967 to 1975. A recent study conducted by Johnson (1999) 
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has adopted a similar approach. To answer the question 'has there been convergence of 
public pension outcomes?', he has used five simulate individuals who earn respectively 
25, 50, 100, 200, and 400 percent of the average earnings in each country, then 
compared their pension rights in each country in each time period. He found that the five 
European countries, including France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and U.K., shared a 
convergent trend since the 1950s on the development of pension rights. 
Another mode of comparative social policy research on pensions is to develop a set of 
measure to compare and rank the pension systems in different countries. Myles's (1989) 
and Esping-Andersen's (1990) work are typical cases of this type of study. The former 
adopts eight criteria, including benefit levels, adjustment rules, coverage, eligible 
conditions etc, to weight grades of pension policy as the "quality of pensions" of 15 
capitalist democracies in the mid-1970s. The latter chooses criteria such as replacement 
rate, contribution periods, individual's share of pension financing etc, to measure the 
degree of de-commodification of pensions. This type of comparison has incurred a great 
deal of criticism as the ranking of different countries depend very much upon selection 
of criteria and countries to be included in the comparison. 
Another type of comparative social policy research seeks the determinant factors 
contributing to the development of pension expenditures or pension rights. This type of 
study usually adopts a pooled analysis approach (Palme and Williamson, 1985; Myles, 
1989; Palme, 1990; Pampel et aI, 1990; Williomson and Pampel, 1993; Huber and 
Stephens, 1993; Ragin, 1994). Just as the conclusion drawn early in chapter two, these 
studies yield contradictory results on key independent variables. For example, Hicks 
finds modest effects of centrist government on pension expenditure; Myles and Ragin 
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find that working class parties was an important determinant of pension quality: 
Williomson and Pampel, Huber and Stephens, and Pample et al. find strong effects of 
rightist government; and the other three showed no party effects. The weaknesses of 
these hypothesis-testing approach studies have been discussed in chapter two. 
Research adopting a historical case-oriented approach is in a minority in comparative 
social policy research on pensions. Myles's and Williomson and Pampel's study cited 
above do include a section of historical development of pensions in some of the 
countries involved in their comparison. However, such part in their work is just a 
country-by-country descriptive analysis, to supplement the pooled analysis of 
hypothesis-testing in their studies. Heclo's (1974) study comparing the development of 
pensions in Sweden and Britain also follows the descriptive approach. This mode of 
analysis offers rich detail and information of each country involved in their study, 
however, they are short of cross-national "comparison", and limited in their contribution 
to theory testing and structuring. 
Orloff's (1993a) work is probably the only study that compares penSIon policies 
employing a holistic, historical, and case-oriented approach, and aims at theory testing 
and building. She combines the logic methods of agreement and difference to compare 
the development of pension policies in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. 
These three countries all share substantial similarities along dimensions that are 
commonly invoked to explain cross-national differences in social welfare policy, such as 
liberal culture, ideological heritage, and political systems. In this way, she's controlled 
some variables and is able to highlight the causal contributions of state and political 
factors in producing policy outcomes. She divides the time involved in her research into 
three periods: the pre-World War I period, the 1920s, and the 1930s. In the first period, 
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Britain, which enacted pension legislation in 1908, is the positive case, while the United 
States and Canada serve as negative contrasts. In the second period, Canada is the 
positive case of enactment, while the United States again serves as a negative case. In 
the third period, the success of the United States in enacting old-age pensions is 
contrasted with the failure of extending old age assistance into a contributory scheme in 
Canada. Through this logical causal analysis model, she is able to conclude that the state 
capacity was the key factor that explains the failure or success of modem social 
provision in these three countries through the year of 1880 to 1940. 
To sum up, the majority of the existing comparative social policy studies on pensions 
focus either on the comparison of pension expenditures and qualities, or on exploring 
the determining factors that explain the development of pension systems. The most 
popular research approach is either cross-sectional variable-oriented analysis or pooled 
analysis. The case-oriented approach is relatively unlikely to be adopted. In addition, 
most studies focus only on Northern American and European industrial countries, 
among the above-mentioned studies concerning pensions, only Myles's and Williamson 
and Pampel's study include developing countries and the Third Word nations. 
3.7 Research strategy of this study 
As mentioned earlier, the topic of this study is to look at the vicissitudes of 
pro-familisation and de-familisation in the development and expansion of modem social 
provision for older people. That is to say, the main concern of this study is not the 
typology or quality of old age income protection systems, but the process of these 
systems. For this purpose, historical case-oriented comparative analysis is the 
methodology of choice. This approach allows for the most thorough observation of the 
content of old age income protection systems and the detail of the policy development 
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process in each country involved in the comparison. To approach a full understanding of 
the evolution of old-age security policy and its relationship to family cohesion, it is 
essential to assess the extensive information for each country. Such comprehensive 
understanding can be achieved only by detailed historical case-oriented study. 
As soon as the comparative approach has been chosen, the questions that all researchers 
in the cross-national field then confront are how many and which countries should be 
covered in the comparison. As Bradshaw (1994: 443-444) has identified, comparative 
researchers face a dilemma of being naIve or native. A comparison between very few 
countries may enable the research to cover more dimensions in more depth and adequate 
detail. However, such comparison is relatively limited. By contrast, bringing in a great 
number of countries would cover more variability and enlarge the range of contrast and 
increase the credibility of theory-testing. However, besides the demands on time and 
intellectual efforts, such large-scale comparison also sacrifice the thorough 
understanding of the historical and social background of each country involved in the 
comparison. Such sacrifice brings with it a great danger to comparative study. As Kilby 
and Taira point out: "there is no point in saying anything about several countries in a 
comparative fashion until one has thoroughly studied the history and political-economic 
sociology of each country" (1969: 139-40). 
In a case-oriented historical analysis, it is more realistic to choose only a small number 
of countries to compare. In the case of the case-oriented historical approach, a 'most 
similar nations' strategy has been suggested (Smelser, 1973; Orloff, 1993a; Doling, 
1997). This principle is exactly the one that Orloff (1993a) chose for the United States, 
Canada, and Britain in her comparison of pension policy development. It is believed that 
it is more fruitful to study variations in societies that are very close to one another in 
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many respects. In this way, the researcher minimizes variation among background 
variables while maximizing variation along potentially explanatory dimensions. On the 
other hand, similar countries are more likely to be comparable units. As Smelser (1976) 
points out, only when a common socio-culture context can be reasonably assumed, is the 
direct comparative analysis of specific historical development possible. 
3.8 The strategy for comparison and the selection of countries 
Among the comparative strategies discussed above, this research adopts a small-N, case 
oriented approach analysis. The comparison in this study will focus on three small Asian 
island-countries, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. It should be noted that Hong 
Kong is now in reality not an 'country' but a 'special administrative region' of China. 
However, it has a definite boundary of territory and a stable populace. In addition, as 
will be discussed later, it has been enjoying a high degree of autonomy in policy-making. 
Therefore, it is safe to treat it as an independent political realm. 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are three of the four Asian 'Little Dragons' whose 
social policy are ofter clustered into the same model. People in these three countries all 
have a strong adherence to 'familism' and share a faith in Confucianism which 
emphasises the notion of family obligation. Economically, they have adopted a similar 
strategy for development which puts economic growth the first priority since the 1960s. 
They are all open economies whose developments heavily depend on international trade 
and the world economy. Politically, they all experienced a long period of colonisation, 
and their development, especially during the first two decades after the end of the 
Second World War, were all heavily influenced by the world politics. Geographically, 
they all have a big hinterland, which constrains their domestic policies making. Most 
importantly, they all have been facing a trend of popUlation ageing and all have 
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conducted substantial refonns on their old age protection system in the 1990s. A 
comparison will be made of these three countries. However, due to the availability of 
data, the analysis of Taiwan will be more in depth than that of the other countries. 
3.9 Methods of comparison 
The methods employed on this research for comparison are the "Method of Agreement" 
and the "Method of Difference", labelled by John Stuart Mill. The method of agreement 
is to find common features for all cases with similar outcomes. As Mill himself 
illustrates, "we supposed two instances, ABC followed by abc, and AD E followed by 
a d e. From these instances it might apparently be concluded that A is an invariable 
antecedent of a, and even that it is the unconditional invariable antecedent, or cause, if 
we could be sure that there is no other antecedent common to the two cases" (Mill, 1974: 
435). 
On the other hand, the method of difference is to identify cause factors by comparing 
cases that have common features on some variables but are different on other critical 
variables (Janoski and Hicks, 1994: 15). As Mill illustrates, "For if we have two 
instances, ABC and B C, of which B C gives b c, and A being added converts it into a b 
c it is certain that in this instance at least, A was either the cause of a, or an , 
indispensable portion of its cause ... "(Mill, 1974: 436). Among these two approaches, it 
is well-documented that the method of difference is more powerful than the method of 
agreement for establishing causal associations (Mill, 1974: 436; Skocpol and Somers, 
1980: 183). Skocpol and Somers (1980) have illustrated these two designs as figure 1.3. 
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The method of agreement 
Case 1 Case 2 Case n 
A d G 
B e H 
C f I 
} overall difference 
X x X } crucial similarity 
y Y Y 
The method of difference 
Case 1 Case 2 
A A 
B B 
C C 
} overall similarity 
X not x } crucial difference 
y not y 
Figure 1.3 Two designs of macro-comparative study 
Source: Skocpol and Somers, 1980: 184, Figure 1. 
In this study, we treat the introduction ofa de-familisation scheme as a positive case, and 
the introduction of a familisation scheme or the lack of a new de-familisation scheme as 
a negative case. Thus, in the 1950s, Taiwan and Singapore are both positive cases, while 
Hong Kong is a negative case. In the 1970s, all three countries are positive cases as 
Singapore and Hong Kong introduced new schemes and Taiwan significantly expanded 
the coverage of its social insurance. In the 1980s, Taiwan initiated a new scheme and 
Hong Kong expanded its old schemes, and thus both are positive cases, while Singapore 
is a negative case as it introduced a new scheme to reinforce intra-family transfer. In the 
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1990s, both Taiwan and Hong Kong introduced new schemes and are again positiYe 
cases, while Singapore is a negative case as it enacted legislation to confirm family 
obligation. 
3.10 Challenges to this research 
There are a number of problems confronting researchers in the comparative field that 
may potentially challenge this study as well. The first issue is comparability. In other 
words, it is necessary to be sure that one is comparing like with like. As Bolderson and 
Mabbett put it: " ... oranges are compared with oranges and not apples" (1991: 4). This 
problem will not be crucial in this study, as Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong share 
many common features of social and economical characteristics. Furthermore, their 
territory, population, economies, and other significant variables are more or less 
equivalent. In addition, the key concepts involved in this study, for instance, family 
cohesion, filial piety and modem social provision, all have the same construction in 
these societies. The similarities between these three societies also help to minimize 
some critical problems facing comparative study, such as, different definitions and 
meanings of the terminology and phenomena that are overtly the same, and the difficulty 
of language. 
Another problem often mentioned is the difficulty for foreign observers to comprehend 
and interpret reality in other societies. As Bradshaw points out, "... for a foreign 
observer, they can be very alien and we often do not understand the real meaning of what 
we see" (Bradshaw, 1994: 444). Sometimes knowing one country from the inside is 
difficult enough. It becomes more difficult as the number of countries increases. 
Investigators who range over different cultures and nations in their search are at risk of 
misunderstanding events and of reaching conclusions that may fit their own conceptual 
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proclivities but not the perceptions of the members of these societies. Avoiding this risk 
is one of the important reasons why this study employs a case-oriented rather than 
variable-oriented research strategy, as the former is the one which more likely allows the 
research to get the thorough understanding of other societies. Furthermore, intelTie\Ys 
with policy makers and academic scholars in these countries will be conducted on an , 
informal basis, to ensure that this thesis interprets materials concerning these countries 
properly. 
The last problem worth noting here for besetting comparative researchers is the 
comparability and availability of data. The limitations of official statistics are well 
documented. The sources, the definition, the categories, and the formats used for official 
statistics in different countries may vary. In addition, there may be gaps in coverage, 
changes in definitions or in methods of collecting and classifying data. As this study 
covers only three societies, it will not be too difficult to carefully discriminate the way 
these regions construct their official statistics. However, the lack of empirical data is a 
crucial problem of this study. First, there is no database exist that offers empirical data 
that can be directly adopted in this study. Furthermore, Hong Kong is a region not an 
independent country, and Taiwan is excluded from many international organisations. 
This makes it difficult to find official statistics concerning these two regions in 
documents published by international organisations. 
This study will adopt a strategy to deal with the above-mentioned challenges. Firstly, the 
three societies will not be given the same in-depth analysis, while the most 
comprehensive analysis will be focusing on Taiwan. Second, a micro as well as macro 
analysis will be carried out to make the understanding of related issues as 
comprehensive as possible. The emphasis of the macro analysis will be on the historical, 
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social, economical, and political backgrounds of the three regions, while the micro 
analysis will focus on the effects of policies on individuals. 
3.11 Sources of data for this research 
As mentioned above, this research contains two parts of analyses. The first part of macro 
historical analysis will be based on both primary and secondary materials. 
Governmental documents, including policy platforms and social security White Papers 
will be used to analyse related issues. Official statistics will also be used to understand 
trends of demographic structure, changes of the old age income protection system and 
labour force participation, and situation of family support. Acts and regulations related 
to social provision for older people will also be collected to examine their principles and 
objectives. Materials published by Parliaments will also be collected to examine 
government's preference and stands of different political camps. A special emphasis will 
be put on political leaders' policy address in the Parliament in these countries to analyse 
government's orientation toward related issues. Political leaders' speeches, interviews, 
memoirs, as well as reports on magazines and newspapers concerning related issuess, 
will be reviewed to understand their true intention of implementing related policies. 
In the second part of micro analysis, empirical data sets will be used to analyse changes 
to individuals' situation and the connection between these changes and the development 
of related policies. As mentioned earlier, there is no comparable data set existent that can 
be used in this study. Therefore, this part of analysis will only be focusing on Taiwan. 
Data sets of 1989, 1993 and 1996 Survey of Health and Living Status of the Middle 
Aged and Elderly in Taiwan will be used. These data sets were collected by National 
Institute of Family Planning, Department of Health, the Executive Yuan (Taiwan), and 
the Population Studies Centre, University of Michigan (USA), in Taiwan. This is the 
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only panel data existent and suitable for analysing issues concerning older people in 
these countries. By comparing changes of the samples' situations over time, this panel 
data is of great help to understand changes of older people's economic situations \vhen 
experiencing changes of the old age income protection system. 
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Chapter Four 
Modern social provision for older people in Taiwan 
Taiwan's experience in the last century offers a great deal of material to the studies of 
political economy. Politically, it went through colonisation by the Netherlands and Japan, 
followed by the autocratic power of the Nationalists. It was not until one and a half 
decades ago that it peacefully embarked on political reform, and successfully transferred 
from an authoritarian regime to a full democratic one during a very short period oftinle. 
Economically, it has developed from a ruined society into a prosperous newly 
industrialised country. It experienced economic development in the past decades and has 
been described by some scholars as a 'miracle' (for example, Gold, 1986; Simon and 
Kau, 1992). In 2001 its overall world competitiveness was well ahead of Japan, who was 
its colonizing power half a century ago (IMD, 2001). Despite these outstanding 
achievements, however, Taiwan is struggling for its independent identity in the 
international political arena, and only about two dozen countries reject China's claim of 
'one-China' sovereignty and have a official relationship with it. 
These political and economic situations play an important role in shaping social policy 
in Taiwan. International political practice, domestic political reform, and economic 
development are the most documented factors employed by scholars when analyzing 
Taiwan's social policy development. This chapter will discuss the establishment and 
development of modem social provision for older people in the context of political and 
economic development. It should be emphasised that the development of Taiwan's old 
age income protection system is highly correlated to Taiwan's social, political and 
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economic situations at the same periods of time. This chapter will put the development 
of Taiwan's social security system in these contexts based on different stages of 
development. 
4.1 The development of Taiwan's old age income protection system 
4.1.1 Prior to 1945: The fate of being a colony? 
Taiwan is a small island in the West Pacific and is about one hundred miles east of the 
Chinese coast. Its history can be traced back to 230 AD when a Chinese military 
expedition occupied Taiwan. It was not until the late 1500s that Taiwan first had contact 
with the western world. The first western visitors were Portuguese navigators, who 
marked their maps as 'Ilha Formosa' (Beautiful Island) when they first saw the island 
(Metraux, 1991: 1). In the 16th century when the European empires were expanding to 
Asia by sea for the first time, Taiwan received much attention because of its strategic 
location. The Dutch arrived in Taiwan in 1624 and built a colonial town in southwestern 
Taiwan as their major East Asian entrepot (Winckler, 1981). In 1662, the adherents of 
the Ming dynasty, after being expelled from the mainland by the Manchu who 
established the Ch'ing dynasty, came and drove the Dutch out of Taiwan (Ho, 1978: 7-9). 
They were subdued by Manchu forces in 1683 and Taiwan became part of the Chinese 
Empire (Gold, 1986: 25). The Manchu government declared Taiwan a province of China 
in 1887. In 1895 Taiwan was handed to Japan based on the Shimonoseki Treaty, as a 
result of its victory in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japan war. Thereafter Taiwan became a 
Japanese colony for half a century, till the take-over by the Chinese government at the 
end of the Second World War. 
Despite political alternation, Taiwan had accomplished some construction and 
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modernisation. The Dutch recruited thousands of workers from the southeastern coast of 
China and stimulated economic activities. The cultural development began to sprout 
under the governance of the Ming Dynasty, as about 1,000 of the followers were literati 
and opened schools. Education and civil service systems had been established durina 
~ 
this period (Metraux, 1991: 15). Before Japan's colonisation, the most remarkable 
construction, however, was accomplished by the Chinese government. During the late 
1880s and the early 1890s, the Chinese governor introduced the first railway and 
telegraphy system to the island and established steamship and cable connections 
overseas. By then Taiwan may have been the most modem and progressive province in 
China (Metraux, 1991: 19). 
Modernisation significantly advanced during the Japanese colonisation, due to the 
colonial power's practical consideration of benefit to Japan both militarily and 
economically. Its strategic location made it a perfect place for Japan to form a southern 
bastion for defense and expansion (Lamley, 1999: 203-204). In addition, Japan intended 
to develop Taiwan's agriculture to supply foodstuffs and raw materials for their own 
national sovereignty and industrialisation (Gold, 1986: 32-35). The production of rice 
and sugar was stimulated, and during the early decades of Japanese rule, 20 per cent of 
Taiwan's rice and 90 per cent of its sugar, the two most important agricultural products, 
were exported mainly to Japan (Metraux, 1991: 23). In 1930s Japan changed its strategy 
developing Taiwan as a supplier for foodstuffs. The expansionism and militarism in 
Japan was then increasing and it wanted to develop Taiwan as an industrial dependency 
and a gateway for invading south China and southeastern Asia (Amsden, 1991: 92). 
However, before long, the Second World War broke out and interrupted this strategy. 
Despite the motivation of improving its self-interest, Japan did much to modernize 
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Taiwan's infrastructure. Irrigation system were built, cultivated land expanded and new 
agricultural skills introduced. Heavy investment was also made in efficient transport and 
communication systems, such as railroads, harbors, roads, warehousing and banking 
(Barrett and Whyte, 1981; Grane, 1991: 33; Metraux, 1991: 24). Even the Taiwanese 
officers admitted that the Japanese had left the island a well-developed agricultural and 
industrial infrastructure 1 • 
Social and welfare servIces were also significantly improved in this period. The 
Japanese vastly improved the health of the Taiwanese. Modem medical services were 
increased, the public health environment was improved, and the diet was bettered. As a 
result, many infectious diseases were controlled (Metraux, 1991: 25). The education 
system was established. The primary enrollment increased from 21 per cent for males 
and 4 per cent for females in 1921 to 81 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively, by 1943 
(Phillips, 1999: 278). The Japanese not only maintained the institutions left by the 
Chinese government but also introduced pioneering measures. These new measures 
included public housing, social settlements, public pawnshops, low interest loans and 
employment services (Lin, 1990; Ku, 1997). 
4.1.2 Postwar to 1950s: A period of crisis 
After the Japanese forces surrendered to the Allies in 1945, Taiwan reverted to Chinese 
rule based on the agreement of China, the US, and the UK3. The Taiwanese at first had 
eagerly welcomed the Nationalists as liberators. However, the early Nationalist rule 
1 For example, K.Y. Yin, one of the most important economic planners of Taiwan in the 1950s and the 
1960s wrote that, at the time of its restoration to China in 1945, Taiwan had "a well developed system of 
land ;nd ocean transportation and abundant supply of electric power", and "virtually all agricultural 
resources having economic value were being developed and utilized". (Yin, 1962: 4). 
3 The Cario Declaration of China, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of December 
1 1943 states that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as ... Formosa ... shall be 
r~stored to the Republic of China. See "Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan" 
published by Peking Foreign Language Press (editor not indicated), 1955, pp.7. 
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brought serious problems between the native Taiwanese and the mainland arrivals. The 
occupying mainlanders regarded themselves as colonised people and governed Tai\\"an 
as an occupied territory rather than as a liberated Chinese province. They resented the 
local population who had adopted the customs and culture of Japan, and treated them 
suspiciously as collaborators with China's mortal enemy (Gold, 1986: 50). All important 
positions in the administration were monopolized by the mainlanders, and undisciplined 
soldiers and officials from the mainland caused serious corruption (Phillips, 1999: 
283-287; Rigger, 1999: 15-16). 
The extremely tense situation led to serious riots that broke out in February 1947, known 
as the '228 Incident'. The KMT leaders adopted a tough measure to suppress the riots. 
As Maclear Bate, a British journalist who was born in China and traveled in Taiwan in 
1952, described, "The full story of those terrible days of February, 1947, is still 
unknown ... We do know, however, that the rioting came to an end in a cascade of 
machine-gun fire ... " (Bate, 1952: 20). It is estimated that about 10,000 people were 
killed, and 30,000 were wounded, among whom were a large number of the Taiwanese 
elite (Phillips, 1999: 295-296). After this accident, the KMT tightened its high-handed 
control on the Taiwanese society. Political activities were suppressed and opposition 
activists jailed. This policy lasted until the early 1970s, and was often regarded as a 
period of "White Terror" (Rigger, 1999: 58). 
Apart from the tragedy of the 228 Incident, Taiwan was in a desperate situation when the 
Nationalists withdrew from mainland China to Taiwan after being defeated by the 
Communists in the civil war in 1949. It suffered severely during the Second World War 
and economic performance was worse than that before the War
4
. On the other hand, 
4 In the year of 1948, the level of industrial output came up to only 59 per cent of that of 19.+ 1 (Yin, 
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Taiwan also suffered from serious domestic problems. In the first half of 1949, the 
inflation rate was as high as 3,000 per cent (Wang, 1999: 324). On the other hand, the 
lack of industrial recovery, magnified by the demobilisation of many youth \vho had 
served as labourers or soldiers for the Japanese during the War, caused mass 
unemployment (Phillips, 1999: 284). In addition, the Communists were eager to take 
Taiwan by military measures, and the U.S. had adopted a hands-off policy6 and was 
contemplating the right time to recognize the Communist regime (Wang, 1999: 321). As 
Chen Cheng, the then Governor of Taiwan, notes: 
"When I took up my duties as Governor of Taiwan early in 1949 ... our strength 
for the defense of Taiwan was extremely weak. We were in no position to offer 
effective resistance to enemy attacks from the sea. Most of our troops that had 
been evacuated from the mainland to Taiwan were a disorganized mass and were 
tired out ... pessimistic and defeatist sentiments were rampant and everybody 
feared that doomsday was near at hand. Internationally, it was taken for granted 
that the fate of the Republic of China was sealed and that the fall of Taiwan was 
simply a matter of time. " 
(Chen, 1954: 1-2) 
Under such a turbulent situation, the Governor insisted that he "had to take 
extraordinary measures in military, government and economic affairs" (Chen, 1954: 55). 
Several emergency measures were implemented by the ruling KMT party, and some of 
these measures remained unchanged until the 1980s. 
First of all, the Provisional Amendments for the Period of Mobilisation of the 
1962: 5). . d "Th Ch' 1 ' 
5 As Chou En-Iai, Premier of the People's Republic of Chma, state.: e 1~~se p~op e S 
determination to liberate their own territory of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands IS unshakable, and ... the 
civil war still continues ... fighting is unavoidable" (Chou, 1958: .2&~). _ " 
6 Th 'd t fthe USA Harry S. Truman made it clear m hIS statement on January). 19_0 that 
e presl en 0, ' . h "1 f1 . 
"the US Government will not pursue a course which w~ll lead t? m~?l\'ement t~ t e Cl~I ~on lct m 
China". See "Important Documents Concerning the QuestIOn of TaIwan ,pp.16 (edItor not mdlcated). 
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Suppression of Communist Rebellion promulgated by the ROC government in the 
mainland in 1948 was extended to Taiwan. These provisions nullified Articles 39 43 
, , 
and 57 of the constitution and allowed the president and the Executive Yuan to have 
unlimited power to authorize any policies deemed necessary to deal with threats to 
national security, natural disasters, and economic catastrophes (Chao and Myers, 1998: 
49). Moreover, an emergency decree was issued in 1950 and the 1934 martial law was 
applied to Taiwan. The authorities justified these two emergency measures on the 
ground that China's civil war remained technically unfinished, and Taiwan was to be 
treated as a combat area (Tien, 1992: 7). To enforce compliance with martial law, the 
Taiwan Garrison Command and Security Bureau were established, and police and a 
military court were used to arrest, imprison, or execute any individual they considered a 
threat to national security and public order (Chao and Myers, 1998: 52). Limitations 
were also placed on the number of newspapers and the number of pages for each paper7. 
In addition, the KMT, claiming that the nation-wide election was technically unrealistic, 
suspended the elections to the three national representative bodies, National Assembly, 
Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan. As a result, the representatives elected in 1947-48 
were able to hold on to their offices since their arrival in Taiwan for more than four 
decades. They provided rubber-stamp functions that legalized the election of the ROC 
president and facilitated the passage of governrnent bills. Through these measures, the 
KMT was unrestrained in its absolute control over Taiwanese society. 
To maintain a stable economy was also a crucial challenge for the KMT in the late 1940s 
7 In 1946, for example, the number of papers was only 27, and the total circulation was as low as 
300,000. In addition, a regulation introduced in 1950 limited the number. ofpage~ for ea~h pape.r to. one 
d h If ·eces (Chen 1947: 70-71). In a public speech, the then PreSIdent ChIang Kal-shek Justified an a a pI , . d· d h h· h 
these limitations by claiming "the urgent need for pulp and the lowered domestic pro uctlOn an t e Ig 
cost of paper" (Chiang, 1955: 33). 
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and the early 1950s. They embarked on critical monetary reform in 1949 but failed. 
Unexpectedly, the U.S. started its siege policy toward Communist China and the Soviet 
Union and valued Taiwan's strategic geographic location in the pacific area after the 
Korean War broke out in 19508. The financial and military support to the KMT was 
reverted. The Seventh Fleet of the USA was deployed to prevent any attack on Taiwan in 
1950, and the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of 
China was signed on December 2, 1954 (Chiu, 1973: 228&250). On the other hand, 
between 1951 and 1965, Taiwan received $US 1 00 million of non-military aid, which 
served as important capital for the development of Taiwan's economy, infrastructure, 
and human resources (Wang, 1999: 328). 
The KMT government embarked on a series of measures for land reform from 1949 to 
1953, which helped to establish a good foundation for subsequent economic 
development. Land reform comprised a three-pronged package, namely the programme 
to reduce farm rents, the sale of public lands, and the land-to-the-tiller programme. The 
reform was a great success. About 500,000 farm households, or approximately 60 per 
cent of the total, benefited from such a reform (Yin, 1962: 13). The proportion of land 
cultivated by tenants fell from 44 per cent in 1948 to 17 per cent in 1959, and the ratio 
owner-cultivators to total farm families increased from 36 per cent in 1949 to 60 per cent 
in 1957 (Kuo et.al. 1981: 51-52). These changes in tenancy conditions provided a great 
incentive to produce more agriculture products and increased efficiency of the 
agriculture labour force. As a result, the agricultural productivity grew by 70 per cent 
and agricultural output by 80 per cent between 1949 and 1960 (Yin, 1962: 15). In 
addition to a stabilized and enriched agriculture sector, the land reform also helped the 
8 As Truman, the president of the USA, stated, "In these circumstance [Kore~ War], the occupatio~ of 
Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the. sec~ity of the P~~Iflc area a~d to the Umte,d 
States forces performing their lawful and necessary functIOns III that area . See PreSIdent Truman 5 
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government to extract the increasing agricultural surplus which was used to support 
economic development (Amsden, 1991: 97-100). 
Meanwhile, large-scale economic reconstruction also began to move forward, due to the 
manpower and supplies evacuated from the China mainland in 1949 (Yin, 1962: 5). An 
import substitution policy was implemented in the early 1950s, a period when most of 
Taiwan's necessities, raw materials, and industrial equipment came from abroad, which 
resulted in a serious trade imbalance9. Protectionist measures such as high tariffs, import 
quotas, and multiple exchange rates were introduced to offset the island's growing trade 
deficit (Metraux, 1991: 125; Wang, 1999: 328). In addition, the first and second 
four-year Economic Development Plan was started in 1953 and 1957, respectively, to 
promote production, development, employment, and balance of payments (Li, 1988: 
39-41). Altogether, between 1949 and 1960, the number of factories increased by 8,900, 
or 90 per cent more than the original total; industrial employed expanded by 147,000, 
showing a 70 per cent increased; total industrial output increased by 300 per cent, and 
productivity increased by 130 per cent (Yin, 1962:18). 
Despite rapid growth, economic performance and living standards in Taiwan in the 
1950s was low compared to Western countries. The average wage in the mid- 1950s was 
three to eight times lower than that in the US (Yin, 1954: 22), and GNP per capita in 
1960 was as low as US$154 (CEPD, 2000: 13). According to a survey targeting families 
of wage earners and salaried employees in cities and townships conducted by Taiwan 
Provincial Bureau of Accounting and Statistics in 1954, the ratio of expenditures 
spending on food and beverages among these families was high. Expenditure on food 
Statement on the Mission of the U.S Seventh Fleet in the FonnosaArea, (Chiu, 1973: 2~8).. _ 
9 The unfavuorable balance between imports and exports was as high as US$106.2 nulhon III 19)-+. See 
Taiwan Industrial Development Commission, 1958, pp.21. 
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accounted for 57.5 per cent of consumption expenditures or 48.8 per cent of total 
expenditure (Taiwan Provincial Bureau of Accounting and Statistics, 1954: 4). On the 
other hand, census data showed that in 1955, 51 per cent of the total population lived in 
farm families and one-third of the national income came from agriculture (Taiwanese 
Ministry of Interior, 1958: 6). All these figures indicate that Taiwan in the 1950s was far 
from a wealthy society. 
Despite the infavourable economIC conditions, the foundation of Taiwan's social 
security system had been well built in this period. The ROC Constitution enacted in 
1947 contained a whole section (Chapter 13, Section 4) relating to social security. The 
most important article concerning social security is Article 155. This Article states that a 
social insurance and social relief system will be established for those who are old, weak, 
disabled, or victims of disasters. In addition, Article 157 stipulates that the state shall 
implement a national health system. Effectively, the social insurance system was given 
constitutional status. 
The first main social security scheme, the Labour Insurance Scheme, was brought into 
effect in March 1950. Workers for public enterprises and utilities were covered. The 
coverage of the insured was expanded several times and, by June 1951, all workers who 
worked for an enterprise with more than 10 employees were covered. The Military 
Servicemen's Insurance was also in place in 1950. In 1958 the Civil Servants' Insurance 
was introduced. The coverage of these three insurance schemes were similar; notably 
maternity, injury, sickness, disability, old age and death. Thus Taiwan had established 
comprehensive social insurance covering major occupational groups, providing 
protection against industrial risks. 
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Some argue that the government's motivations for implementing these social insurance 
schemes in the 1950s was to strengthen social control and to accelerate the accumulation 
of national capital. There was no coincidence that military servicemen, labour, and civil 
servants are the three groups covered by the social insurance system (Lin, 1990; Fu, 
1993a, 1994; Ku, 1997). As Taiwan was then facing a desperate war situation and 
encountered severe internal and external challenges, these people were the groups that 
the state wanted most to put under control. They served to ensure the island's security, 
helped to increase economic surplus and accelerate capital accumulation, and enabled 
the government to work effectively. Scholars who hold this view have correctly pointed 
to political factors to explain the introduction of the social insurance system in Taiwan in 
the 1950s. However, they failed to recognise that the fundamental task for the KMT 
government in the early 1950s was not only to maintain a stable society, but, more 
importantly, to prepare the island for the counterattack and the reunion of Taiwan with 
mainland China. Therefore, it was nation building rather than social control that the 
government established social insurance system for. The introduction of the social 
security system during this period was part of the measures for the preparation of the 
counterattack. It also served as a demonstration to the world and to the Taiwanese people 
that the KMT could provide a better state for its people than the Communists. This point 
will be further explored in Chapter eight. 
4.1.3 The 1960s and the 1970s: Economic take-off, political incubation 
These two decades could be described as a transition period. Economically, this is a 
period of 'take-off', from being poor to prosperity. Politically, the sovereign power 
faced severe internal and external challenges and was forced to change, from 
authoritarian to democratic. In the field of social security, the social insurance system 
was expanded, followed by the frame and principles introduced in the previous decade. 
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All these developments were overtures that prepared for the radical structural change in 
the next two decades. 
The strategy for economic development had an essential change in the 1960s. The 
domestic markets became increasingly limited and the need for foreign exchange 
earnings was urgent. On the other hand, the KMT government wanted to accelerate 
economic development to strengthen its political legitimacy and to avoid political 
opposition. These factors, coupled with the international trade situation in which the 
American and Japanese enterprises moving overseas to seek less expensive labour, 
resulted in a policy change from import substitution to export expansion (Crane, 1982; 
Wang, 1999: 331). The Statute for the Encouragement of Investment was enacted and 
the Nineteen-Point Economic Financial Reform was introduced in the early 1960s to 
adopt measures to enhance capital formation, to liberalize the trade control, and to 
encourage export expansion (Kuo et. al. 1981: 73-74; Li, 1988: 13; Wang, 1999: 331). 
Many restrictions on trade were lifted, investment incentives were offered, and several 
Export Processing Zones were built (Wang, 1999: 332-333). 
On the other hand, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth four-year plans -- started in 1961, 
1965, 1969 and 1971 respectively -- served as guides for economic expansion. In 
addition, a ten-year perspective plan was formulated in 1965 to provide directions for 
the long-term development of the economy (Li, 1988: 39-42). These plans, coupled with 
favorable conditions for an expanding world trade and international markets, helped 
Taiwan to successfully expand its economy. Between 1961 to 1972, the year before the 
oil crisis, the average annual economic growth reached 10.20/0, and the consumer prices 
increased only by an annual 3.3% (Li, 1988: 13). On the other hand, for the two decades 
between 1960-1979, per capita GNP increased from US$154 to US$1,920 (CEPD, 2000: 
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13). These indicators demonstrate that Taiwan's economy achieved great success during 
this period of time. 
The economic situation in the 1970s became severe. The 1973 oil crisis was the first 
challenge. The commodity price, which had been stabilized from the 1950s, increased 
dramatically. In 1974, the consumer price index was as high as 47.5%, and the industrial 
sector experienced a recession, for the first time since 1955 (Peng, 1991: 278-279). The 
government reacted to this crisis by investing heavily in the 'Ten Major Construction 
Projects', including seven transportation projects, one nuclear power plant, an integrated 
steel mill, and a petrochemical complex. These projects have made a tremendous 
contribution to the consequent economic development of the island (Li, 1988: 267-297). 
It is also worth noting that Taiwan's high economic growth during this period was 
accompanied by the improvement of income distribution (Fei, et. al. 1979; Kuo, et. al. 
1981). As Kwoh-ting Li and Wan-an Yeh, two Taiwanese senior economic planners, 
pointed out, several governmental development strategies had contributed to this. These 
strategies included carrying land reform programmes to equalize income distribution in 
the agriculture sector; developing labour-intensive industries to increase employment 
opportunities; promoting mass education and raising the quality and level of education; 
and maintaining a fair structure (Li and Yeh, 1982: 125). During the period between 
1964 to 1975, the income share of the richest 20 per cent of families increased 181 per 
cent, while the income share for the poorest 20 per cent of families increased 231 per 
cent (Kuo, et.al. 1981: 38). In 1976, the ratio of the top highest fifth's income to the 
lowest fifth's was 4.2, well below other developed and developing countries during the 
same period, including Japan (5.2 in 1969), UK (6.2 in 1973), South Korea (7.9 in 1976), 
and USA(9.5 in 1972) (Li, 1988: 57; CEPD, 2000: 76). The relatively equal distribution 
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of income justified the government's economic-first development strategies and eased 
the pressure to expand the social security schemes for income redistribution. 
Compared to economic prosperity, the progress of political development was much 
slower. In the 1960s the KMT remained as an absolute monopolistic power and, under 
the shadow of the '228 Incident', the political atmosphere was quiet. Even though there 
were some opposition activities, they did not make a critical challenge to the authorities 
and were soon suppressed by the KMT government. It was not until the 1970s when 
Taiwan faced challenges from international political practice that the political refonn 
critical opposition movement emerged. 
In the 1970s Taiwan's position in international politics faced essential changes. Since 
1960 the ROC's seat in the United Nations became an "important Question" and Taiwan 
had to fight for its seat each year. In 1971, with 76 anti-ROC votes and only 35 pro-ROC 
votes (Hsieh, 1985: Appendix 2), Taiwan was eventually ousted from the United 
Nations and its place was taken by Communist China. Thereafter, due to its rigid and 
unrealistic diplomatic policy, the vast majority of the countries who had a diplomatic 
relationship with Taiwan terminated their official relationships 10. When the U.S.A. 
broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, the whole island was shocked. More 
and more people became concerned with the diplomatic isolation of the country and its 
political future. Many were convinced that only by critical political reform could the 
country win the goodwill of the democratic West and the moral support of 
non-Conrnmunist countries (Lu, 1991: 40). The local Taiwanese petty bourgeoisie also 
developed gradually, due to the educational and economic development. Many of them 
hoped the state could relax its tight control on the society and financially supported the 
10 Between 1971 to 1979,46 countries ended their diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and in January 1979, 
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opposition (Lo, 1997: 223-224). All these conditions helped to generate the capacity for 
extensive campaigns for democratisation. 
In response to domestic and external pressure, the National Assembly amended the 
Temporary Provisions in 1966 to pennit supplementary elections to the ?\ational 
Assembly, the Legislature Yuan, and the Control Yuan. This measure was to increase the 
legitimacy of the KMT government after it had lost international recognition (Shelly, 
1999: 110-111). These elections offered an opportunity for opposition leaders to 
participate in politics. They started campaigning election seats in the early 1970s. These 
candidates pooled resources and fonned a campaign organisation which later became 
the core of a movement for founding an opposition party. In 1977 the opposition 
candidates scored impressive victories by winning 21 of the 77 seats in the Taiwan 
Province Assembly election (Tien, 1992: 9). At the meantime, several opposition 
magazines were also published and became influential (Shelly, 1999: 25). In late 1979, 
Meilidao (Beautiful Fonnosa), an opposition magazine which contained articles critical 
of Tai\van's political authorities, had a circulation of about 100,000 subscribers (Chao 
and Yfyers, 1998: 56-57) . 
.\1ean\vhile, due to the development of favourable economic and social conditions, 
social movements and labour disputes also increased dramatically during this period. As 
Hsin-huand Hsiao pointed, Taiwan in the late 1970s sa\\" the emergence of a "second 
generation" of the working class who, compared to the fIrst generation working class 
\\"ith conservative and rural backgrounds, were more educated and had a longer urban 
industrial life experience. This group was more oriented to activism and initiated a ne\\' 
labour movement (Hsiao, 1991: 135). As Table 4.1 shows, throughout the 1960s, the 
there were only 21 countries which still recognised the R.O.C. See Hsieh, 1985, Appendix 4. 
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yearly occurrence of labour disputes was about 36. Each individual case in\'olved 2'+.72 
workers, and as low as 0.07 per cent of the total employed population \\'as implicated in 
labour disputes. In the 1970s, the total number of labour dispute cases increased by more 
than ten times, and the proportion of disputing workers in the total employed population 
increased five times (Hsiao, 1992: 157). These figures suggest that the KMT had 
eventually lost its monopoly of control over the political arena and the societv. 
Table 4.1 Labour disputes in Taiwan 
Year Cases Workers involved Total employed population (C) B/C 
in disputes (B) (Thousands) 
1961-70 359 8,875 12,294 0.07 
1971-80 4,048 106,408 26,732 0.40 
Source: Wu, 1989:4, cited in Hsiao, 1992:158, table 7.1 
The most important internal events that influenced Taiwan's political future, however, 
were the 'Chungli Incident' and the 'Formosa Incident' in 1979. The former broke out on 
the election day when a crowd of angry voters protesting against alleged irregularities in 
vote counting touched off a serious clash. The latter broke out when opposition leaders 
extended political activism to street protests and mass rallies in an attempt to foster a 
nationwide network organisation. Forty-one key opposition activists were subsequently 
sentenced (Tien, 1992: 9). Even though they soon successfully suppressed these protest 
activities, the KMT government realised that they could no longer resist the call for 
democracy, and eventually embarked on critical political reform in the 1980s and the 
1990s. 
As mentioned earlier, the development of the social security system in this period 
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generally followed the model set up in the 1950s. That is, to expand the coverage of the 
system by introducing separated schemes and putting more people in different 
employment positions into protection, based on the principles of social insurance. The 
most significant one was the Insurance for Retired Civil Servants introduced in 1965. It 
was not until the 1980s and the 1990s when the KMT carried out its series of significant 
political reforms that the social security system substantially expanded, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
4.1.4 The 1980s and the 1990s: Great strides on democratisation 
Based on the incubation in the last two decades, Taiwan made impressive progress in 
economic development and political democratisation in this period. In a short period the 
economy was transformed from a highly regularised one to a liberalised one. Equally the 
political system transferred from a highly authoritarian to a fully democratic one. The 
social security system also underwent revolutionary transformation in this period, and 
has become a main political issue. 
The organized opposition movements became more aggressive during the 1980s. The 
most important one was the movement calling for a genuine opposition party. The 
alliance formed by the opposition candidates in the 1970s had the same characteristics as 
a quasi-party. They had enjoyed an increasing proportion of votes in a series of elections 
since the early 1980s, and the KMT government found it difficult to continue its 
non-toleration policy. Several attempts were made by the government to dissolve the 
group, but they remained consolidated. In September 1986, a group of opposition 
leaders announced the founding of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), at the time 
illegal under martial law. However, the government tacitly accepted the DPP. The new 
party became a strong opposition power and contested intensi\'ely with the K\lT in 
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every election thereafter. They won the 2000 presidential election and terminated the 
KMT's monopolistic regime. 
In addition to domestic opposition movements, changes in international politics were 
also important factors that made it difficult for the KMT government to resist political 
reform. The isolation of Taiwan's situation in international politics, especially the loss of 
political recognition by the United Nations and the US, meant the KMT State had lost 
external legitimacy. To win support from the West, the KMT go\'ernment had to 
demonstrate that it was superior to the Communist. Notwithstanding political and 
military tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait was moderating and the 
government could no longer use national security as a reason to resist political reform. 
A series of critical political reforms started in the late 1980s. In 1987 the Martial Law, 
implemented in 1947 and originally meant to be a temporary measure, was lifted. This 
was a milestone in political development, as opposition parties were legalized, and some 
restrictions on demonstration, group activities, and pUblication of newspapers were 
removed. As a result, there was a boom in a number of social movements. As Hsiao 
indicated, by the end of 1989, 18 social movements had already taken shape in Taiwan's 
resurrected civil society, including the labour movements, farmers' movement, students' 
movement, welfare group protests and women's movement, and so on (Hsiao, 1992: 
157-163). The reported frequencies of social protest the government, including labour, 
environment, minority, and industrial ones increased from 175 in 1983 to 1,172 to 1988, 
among which 43 protests involved more than 1,000 protesters (Schafferer, 2001: 7-+-75). 
The other milestone in the move to greater democratisation is constitutional reforms 
leading to full-scale elections for the National Assembly and the LegislatiYe Yuan in 
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1991-2. As discussed earlier, based on the temporary provisions, the representatiYes 
who were elected in 1947-8 in the mainland and arrived in Taiwan in 1949 could hold on 
to their position permanently. Even though there were so-call supplement elections for 
adding members to the national representative bodies in 1969, 1972, 1980 and 1989. 
only a small number of seats were opened up to be contested. The 'pennanent 
representatives' were forced to retire by the end of 1991, with a great deal of financial 
benefit. Thereafter, the KMT faced a crucial challenge from well-organized opposition 
parties in every election. Eventually, the development of social policy has become one 
of the most important issues in each election campaign. In the 1995 Legislative Yuan 
elections, for example, 85 out of total 389 candidates proposed a national pension 
insurance scheme in their election manifestoes, and 55 of them won elections (Aspalter, 
2002: 126). 
Meanwhile, income inequality increased during this period. The growing trend toward 
two-income families, coupled with the rapid growth of non-wage income as a result of 
wealth accumulation in the country, resulted in a widen gap of income distribution 
(Chan et aI, 1999:274). The ratio of income of highest fifth's income household to the 
lowest fifth's income household increased from 4.21 in 1981 to 5.51 in 1998, and the 
Gini coefficient increased from 0.287 to 0.324 during the same period of time (CEPD, 
2000: 16). In other words, the miracle of growth with equality was no longer existed. The 
government thus was under an increasing pressure to expand public policies for 
redistribution. 
On the other hand, the changes in international politics also had a significant effect on 
the development of the social security system in the early 1980s. As mentioned earlier. 
the KMT government lost its international support when the US and other \yestem 
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democratic countries withdrew their political support in favour of Communist China in 
the 1970s. The KMT government's strategy for coping with these challenges \\'as to 
improve its legitimacy by expanding the social welfare system. As Shui-de Hsu, former 
Minister of Home affairs, recalled: 
HAfter the US severed diplomatic relationship with us, the Central Committee of 
the KMT established six reform groups to respond to the crisis. AIr. Ku 
Cheng-gang, Mr. Chiu Chuang-huan and I were the leaders of the social reform 
group. We attended the Central Standing Committee on February 8, 1979, and 
submitted plans for social reform. We proposed to the Government to introduce a 
social assistance act, a older people welfare act, and a handicapped welfare 
act. " 
(The Central Daily, Overseas Version, 4/5/1999, translated from Chinese) 
The three Social Welfare Acts Hsu proposed were all enacted in 1980. Clearly, the 
expansion of the social welfare system in Taiwan during this period was a result of the 
national crisis. Soon after the Americans severed diplomatic relations with the KMT 
government, three important welfare laws, including the Older People Welfare Law, the 
Handicapped Welfare Law and the Social Assistance Law, were enacted in 1980. 
Simultaneously, the social security system was also expanded. The Insurance for 
Teaching and Administrative Staff in Private Schools and the Health Insurance for Civil 
Servants' Dependents were introduced in 1980 and 1982 respectively. In 1986 the 
insurance for farmers was introduced, covering those farmers who were the heads of 
farming households. Followed by a series of farmer movements from 1987 to 1988, this 
scheme was further extended to cover all members of farming households. 
The most important social security scheme, however, is the National Health Insurance 
introduced in 1995. Before the 1990s, the development of the social insurance system in 
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Taiwan was a typical example of the Bismarck model. Insurance schemes \\'ere 
introduced, each covered a certain group of people, mostly based on their position in the 
labour market. In the mid-1980s, the Prime Minister declared that the National Health 
Insurance was on the political agenda and would be implemented by 2000. Thereafter, 
this agenda became one of the most important issues in political debates, especially 
during the period of election campaigns. Due to the keen competition between the KMT 
and the DPP, this scheme was introduced in 1995, five years ahead of schedule. All 
citizens were insured into the same scheme, providing payment in kind for the risk of 
injury, sickness and maternity. Hence, both the Beveridge Model and the Bismarck 
model have been coexistent in the social insurance system. 
After the implementation of the National Health Insurance scheme, the most important 
item on the social security agenda was the introduction of a nation-wide pension scheme 
to provide a secure income for older people. Although the Labour Insurance, the 
Military Servicemen's Insurance and the Civil Servants' insurance cover the risk of old 
age, however, they only provide a lump-sum payment which is not regarded as a good 
measure for old age income security. In addition, there are about four million people 
aged between 15 and 64, 20 per cent of the total popUlation, who are not covered by any 
retirement protection scheme (CEPD, 1999). These limitations of the current social 
insurance system, combined with the facts that the aged population is growing bigger, 
and that the intergenerational financial transfer within families is declining, make the 
introduction of a nation-wide pension scheme necessary and urgent. 
In the election for local authorities at the end of 1993, the DPP proposed a universal, 
non-contributory and non-means-tested pension system and intensified the debates 
concerning a national pension scheme. The DPP captured 41 per cent of the total votes in 
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these elections, while the KMT got 47 per cent of the votes. It was the first time in any 
election in Taiwan that the KMT's share of the vote fell below 50 per cent and the DPP 
increased beyond 40 per cent (Dickson, 1997: 169). The old age benefit was thus 
considered as useful propaganda for winning votes 12. Thereafter, this issue has become 
one of the most controversial debates in every election campaign. The KMT responded 
by expanding means-tested schemes for older people. The Middle-Law-Income Elder 
Allowance and the Older Farmer's Allowance were introduced in 1993 and 1995, 
respectively. At the same time, the government declared that the national pension 
scheme was on the political agenda. 
The first stage of planning a national pension system was launched in March 1994. A 
committee was nominated under the auspices of the Prime Minister to review the 
adequacy of the retirement payment of the current social insurance schemes, and to 
assess the necessity for a national pension scheme. This committee completed a 
preliminary report in May 1995, suggested the necessity of introducing a national 
pension scheme and recommended a national-wide insurance scheme. Nevertheless, due 
to the implementation of the National Health Insurance in 1995, to avoid too nluch of a 
burden within too short a period of time on the populace, the national pension system 
has not been put forth immediately, but designated to the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD) to further study its details by August 1996. The 
second stage of the pension planning thus began in November 1996 and completed the 
proposal stage in June 1998. On the other hand, the Prime Minister has declared that the 
proposed scheme would be realized by 2000. Nevertheless, a serious earthquake hit this 
island in September 1999, more than 2,000 people were killed and tens of thousands of 
12 In 1998 mayoral election, for example, then President a~d ~T party c~airm~n, Lee Teng-Hui 
warned the party candidate ofKaohsing City that he would loss Ifhe dId not pronuse to mtroduce new old 
age benefits. See Aspalter, 2002: 119. 
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people became homeless. The government later declared that the schedule of the 
pension plan was suspended, as, they argued, the plans for recovery should ha,'e be a 
priority for all possible financial resources. Until now, the date for implementing the 
national pension scheme has not been declared. 
4.2 Governmental orientation towards provision for older people 
Since the Republic of China was established in 1912, the 'Three Principles of the 
People' , set out by its founding father, Dr. Sun Vat-Sen, have become the foundations of 
the country. Among these three principles, 'the Principle of Livelihood' has been taken 
as the government's guidelines for social welfare development. Since the KMT retreated 
from the mainland after the civil war in 1949 and established a centralised government 
in Taiwan the Government, has been taking these principles as the fundamental 
guidelines for nation building. 
In his discussion on 'the Principle of Livelihood', Dr. Sun Vat-Sen repeatedly 
emphasizes the problem of the poverty gap in western countries, and advocates an equal 
society. In fact, his ideal state is rather similar to the welfare state. It is argued that in the 
spectrum of welfare ideology, his philosophy is close to Pinker's (1979) classification as 
'Keynes-Beveridge collectivism', and George and Wilding's classification as 'Fabian 
socialism' (Lin, 1993). However, during the five decades of the KMT's governance, Dr. 
Sun Yat-Sen's ideal has never materialized. KMT government practice is based on 
'familism' and 'enterprise-liberalism', and social welfare is taken as a matter of familial 
obligation (Lin, 1993). 
This section will examine the Taiwanese government's attitude and strategies toward 
protecting for old age. A method of content analysis will be adopted and the Prime 
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Ministers' policy addresses to the Legislative Yuan since the 1960s will be used as 
materials for analysis. As Lin states, the Prime Ministers' policy addresses are useful 
material to understand a government's intention and effort in social welfare as it is meant 
to present a comprehensive picture of a government's plan (Lin, 1993). This is 
especially true in Taiwan since it had been a one-party state for half a century and the 
ruling party, the KMT, had absolute power to make its policies realized. 
The approach of analyzing the Prime Ministers' policy addresses to understand 
governmental policies has been adopted in Taiwanese research before. Lin (1993) 
analyzes the Premiers' policy addresses from 1974 to 1993 to explore the KMT 
government's ideology toward social welfare. His intention is to employ a theoretical 
structure to identify Taiwan's position in the spectrum of welfare typology. He 
concludes that Taiwan is purely a residual welfare state. In addition, he correctly points 
out that in the field of social welfare, what these addresses have offered is merely 
technical details rather than policy guidelines. These details may not be good material 
for theoretical analysis, but offer plenty of information about the government's rationale 
and effort in different fields of social welfare. 
It is worth noting that in the early years after the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, 
the government did not consider the Civil War as ended and still regarded Taiwan as a 
base for counter-attack. In addition, the main purposes of nation building and 
construction were to strengthen the military force and facilitate national power, in order 
to restore the KMT on the mainland. As the Prime Minister Cheng Cheng stated in his 
policy address speech in 1962: 
"Our efforts in military, economy, diplomacy, relieving the refugees of the 
Civil War, and in other fields, are all to accelerate our restoration of [he 
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mainland and the rescue of our fellow nationals. " 
(Taiwan Parliament Debates, 1961: 164, translated from Chinese) 
Under these circumstances, social welfare programmes also served political purposes. 
In 1965, the KMT government promulgated "The Present Stage Social Policy under Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen's Principle of Livelihood". This was the first governmental guideline for 
social welfare development in Taiwanese history. However, from the government's 
points of view, this signaled not the improvement of citizenship, but the enforcement of 
power for counterattack. The policy address by the Prime Minister Yan Gia-Gan this 
year clearly revealed this attitude. He stated: 
"The intention that the government has decided to promulgate the 
comprehensive and intensive social welfare programmes, under the critical 
circumstance in which international situations are crucial and the mission of 
our national reunion is yet accomplished, is to serve for the goal of the 
counterattack ... " 
(Taiwan Parliament Debates, 1965,36-1: 202, translated from Chinese) 
It was very common to see this kind of statement in the Prime Ministers' policy 
addresses in the 1960s and the early 1970s. The KMT government declared that the 
Communist government was nothing but a rebel organisation, and regarded itself as the 
sole legal government that represented the whole of China. Thus, the implementation of 
social welfare programmes, despite limited, became a strategy to demonstrate that the 
KMT government treated its people better than the Communists. In other words, the 
KMT government regarded the welfare programmes as a measure to secure its 
legitimacy. 
In the field of old age protection, these addresses reveal two important messages. First. 
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the retirement system, which contained schemes for the groups of go\'ernment 
employees, soldiers, and teachers, was established not to protect retirees' income 
security, but to improve administrative efficiency. In the early years of its settlement in 
Taiwan, one of the issues that concerned the KMT government most was administrati\"e 
reform. In order to strengthen military and political power for the counterattack - the 
government's first priority, an efficient and effective administrative system was 
essential. Therefore, during these years, although the governmental financial situation 
was not good, these addresses repeatedly emphasized the government's commitment to 
increase these groups' wages (see, for example, the policy addresses from 1964 to 1967, 
1973). In was under such situation that the retirement system for government employees 
was created to serve as an incentive to replace older workers, who were considered less 
efficient. As the Prime Minister Gia-Gan Yan stated in his policy address in 1965: 
"To improve our political strength, we will need to accelerate the 
metabolism of the personnel system of governmental organisations. To 
achieve this, we are working on improving the retirement system for 
government employees and teachers ... " 
(Taiwan Parliament Debates, 1965:35-1: 176, translated from Chinese) 
The measure of using the retirement system to renew workers and to improve 
productivity and efficiency is not an innovative strategy. As Macnicol argues, when the 
introduction of a state pension system was first raised on the British political agenda in 
the late nineteenth-century and the early twentieth-century, it was an important 
argument to support the establishment of a system where the 'worn-out' older workers -
whose industrial value were deemed to be very dubious - should be forced into 
retirement and replaced with healthier more productive younger workers (MacnicoL 
1998). The Taiwanese government did not hesitate to admit its intention in this area. 
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Second, care for older people did not appear in the policy addresses until the 1980s, and 
was typically paid lip-service, for example: "to improve children, disabled, and older 
people's welfare" (policy address by the Prime Minister Sun Yun-hsuan, 1981). When 
the government began to elaborate on this issue in the 1990s, 'conventional virtue' is 
repeatedly emphasized, referring to family obligations. As the former Prime Minister 
Hao Bo-chun stated in his policy address in 1991: 
"Learning from Western countries' experience, our welfare system should be 
based on people s industriousness and thrift, and the filial piety within the 
family. Social welfare should not become a disincentive to our conventional 
virtue of industrious, thrifty, and filial piety. " 
(Taiwan Parliament Debates, 1991, 80-78: 175, translated from Chinese) 
This kind of statement reveals a message that the government regards family obligations 
as a primary resource and the best solution to meeting people's need in later life. This 
might explain why the government was unwilling to reform the retirement benefit 
system, which contains different schemes to cover labour, government employees, 
teachers, and soldiers and offers a lump sum payment to the retirees, and to replace it 
with monthly payment system, which was considered a better system for older people's 
income protection. Even when the former Prime Minister Lian Jan pronounced in 1994 
that the government was to establish a national pension system and a pension scheme 
for farmers, he also stated: 
"In order to better older people s life, we need to improve community care, and 
to enhance the idea of 'three generations living in the same household. " 
(Taiwan Parliament Debates, 1993, 83-10: 124, translated from Chinese) 
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After 1994, national pension system planning and the importance of 'conventional 
virtue' and 'family obligation' have been repeatedly emphasized in each year's policy 
address. There are, however, contradictions. Logically, a government that wants to 
assign welfare obligation to the family would not be willing to implement a pension 
system, which, based on Western experience, is considered as a system of 
de-familisation, unless the government creates a pension system based on 
interdependence between family members. Whilst, the establishment of a national 
pension system has been regularly emphasised recently, these speeches failed to address 
how to combine 'family virtues' with the future pension system. 
To sum up, the Prime Minister's policy addresses from the 1960s reveal three important 
messages concerning the retirement system and older people's income protection. First, 
although the retirement system was introduced as early as the 1950s, in the early years 
of the KMT government's settlement in Taiwan the income protection for retirees was 
never a major concern to the government. Taking the retirement system for the groups of 
government employees, teachers, and soldiers for example, the government regarded it 
as an incentive for administrative efficiency rather than a mechanism to increase the 
degree of de-modification and de-familisation in older people's income. Second, the 
government has not ruled out family obligations as a solution to the coming aging 
society. However, the government has not clearly stated how they are going to embed 
family obligations into the old age income maintenance system. The government's 
advocacy of family obligations to support older people became more serious in the early 
1990s when there was a significant voice asking for the establishment of a nationwide 
old age income protection system in political campaigns. Family solidarity thus has 
become an excuse for the government to resist the pressure for creating a nationwide 
pension system. Third, the government has faced a contradiction since the middle of the 
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1990s when it started planning a national pension system whilst at the same time 
remaining strongly advocate towards the virtues of family obligations in looking after 
older people. Thus, the government is encouraging family cohesion whilst establishing 
a national pension system, which is normally considered to be a system for 
de-familisation. To explain this contradiction, it is important to recognise the gap 
between the government's preferences and political reality. Ideally, the government is 
still in favour of the family to protect older people. However, the increasing political 
pressure has made it impossible for the government to secure its position in power 
without promising the introduction of a nationwide pension system. The political reality 
has pushed the government from holding family values to establishing a system which 
will inevitably increase the degree of de-familisation. 
4.3 An analysis of provision for older people: Familisation or de-familisation? 
This section examines the contents of current old age income protection schemes to 
observe the intention and objective of these schemes, and to explore its implications. 
The main concern of the analysis is to understand whether the designs of these schemes 
are to increase or to decrease the degree of familisation. 
When discussing the Taiwanese old age income protection system, a division of three 
categories of benefits is commonly adopted: contributory or social insurance benefits, 
means-tested benefits, and non-contributory non-means-tested benefits (Chen, 2000). 
Taiwan has employed a Bismarck model of social insurance system since the 1950s, 
including schemes to cover labourers, government employees, teachers, and soldiers, 
offering comprehensive benefits including medical benefits and cash benefits. In 1994 
when universal National Health Insurance was implemented, all medical benefits of 
these schemes were shifted to this new scheme. However, the structure of cash benefits 
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of these schemes remained the same, including maternity benefit, injury benefit, and 
retirement benefit (each scheme's coverage varies). Together these schemes cover the 
majority of the working population and are considered the main system for protecting 
old people's income security. 
Apart from social insurance benefits, means-tested benefits are also an important part of 
the old age income protection system. These benefits were not introduced until the early 
1990s. However, with political reform and the severe party competition, the threshold of 
the means-test requirement has been lowered several times. One of these benefits, the 
Older Farmers' Allowance, has even become a non-means-tested benefit when the 
requirement of the means test was abolished in 1999. Together these schemes benefit 
43.8 per cent of people aged 65 or above in 200013. 
4.3.1 Contributory schemes 
There are three contributory social insurance schemes which offer retirement benefits 
for the insured, namely the Labor Insurance Scheme, the Government Employees and 
Teachers' Insurance Scheme, and the Military Insurance Scheme. All these schemes, as 
discussed earlier, are comprehensive social insurance schemes. However, the old age 
benefit has become the most important payment of these schemes accounting for the 
largest percentage of total expenditure. The Labor Insurance is the most important social 
security scheme in Taiwan as it covers the majority of those participating in the labor 
market, including employees and employers. On the other hand, welfare schemes 
targeting government employees and soldiers are generally considered as, to use 
Titmuss's (1958) term, 'occupational welfare' rather than 'social welfare'. The position 
of this thesis is grounded on the same position as Titmuss. The Government Employees 
13 Data provided by the Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, Tai\\'an 
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and Teachers' Insurance Scheme and the Military Insurance Scheme are therefore 
excluded here. 
Since the Labour Insurance Scheme was implemented in the 1950s, it became the most 
important scheme in the Taiwanese old age provision system. The scheme targets wage 
earners and started with a limited number of eligible people, then later extended 
coverage. At first only industrial workers employed by the public or private factories 
and mines were covered by the scheme. The number of people insured was only 128,625. 
The coverage expended to craft workers in 1951, to fishery workers in 1953, and to 
sugarcane farmers in 1956. In 1958 the Labour Insurance Act became national 
legislation and was applied to the whole Taiwan area, and the categories of workers 
covered remained almost unchanged. The coverage continued to expand to manual 
workers, drivers and mechanics employed by governmental agencies and public schools 
in 1965. However, up until this point, only blue-collar workers were covered, - the vast 
majority men. The 1970 Amendments broadened coverage in order for manual workers 
and those working in commercial firms and shops, ranches and pasturage employing ten 
or more workers to be compulsory insured. The 1979 Amendments required compulsory 
insurance for people employed in government agencies and public schools under 
contract, employees in journalistic, culture, non-profit organisations and cooperative 
enterprise, and skilled workers receiving practical training. This was the first time that 
Insurance expanded coverage to white-collar workers. The 1988 Amendments brought 
coverage to full-time employed fishermen, people working for an agency employing 
five or more staff. By the end of 2000, the number of insured reached 7.9 million, the 
equivalent of 83.4 per cent of the employed population. 
The coverage of this scheme clearly reflects a 'male breadwinner' approach. As Nelson 
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(1990) argues, by defining 'work', women and the minority groups are easily excluded 
from social security schemes. It was physical labourers who were first covered by this 
scheme and most of them were men. By the end of 1950, the year when this scheme was 
introduced, 93 per cent of those insured were men. Thus this kind of income-related 
scheme benefits men more than women due to differences in their contributions to the 
paid labour market participation. This scheme, which is the first social security scheme 
introduced to labourers, was based on the assumption of the traditional family form of a 
male breadwinner and a dependent wife. Clearly, at least at first, the approach did not 
help to increase the degree of de-familisation and de-commodification in women's 
income security for their later life. 
The scheme offers a lump sum payment rather than pension benefit for retirement, 
therefore its function of protecting older people's long-term income security is limited. 
In 1950, a retiree who had paid the contribution for more than 15 years and retired at the 
age of 60 was entitled to a lump sum payment equivalent to 15 months of their last 
month's salaries. If one continued to work and did not retire until the age of 65, he or she 
would be granted another five month's wages for retirement. In other words, for those 
who did not have any other income, even if they were granted the maximum payment for 
retirement, they could not count on it for long. The 1958 Amendment substantially 
increased the entitlement of retirement payment. For the first 15 years of contribution, 
the insured are entitled to one month's salary as retirement payment for each year's 
contribution. For subsequent years of contribution, each year's contribution would be 
granted two months wages. An insured person could therefore claim up to 45 months 
salary when they retired. However, for those who continue to work after 60 years of age 
and continue to pay the contribution, they could be entitled to up to five month's salary. 
In other words, the maximum amount that an insured might be entitled to receive at 
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retirement is equivalent to 50 months wages. These calculations of retirement payment 
still remain the same. Although it has increased significantly in absolute terms, this lump 
sum payment is still considered insufficient and inadequate, as the average life 
expectancy for older people continues to rise. In addition, there are other issues arising 
with a lump sum payment, such as inflation and financial management, which could 
place retirees' financial situation at risk. 
With the extension of its coverage, the sex composition of the Labour Insurance Scheme 
has become more equal. The proportion of women insured increased to 40 per cent by 
1980 and in the 1990s women comprised about 50 per cent of the insured popUlation. 
The equal share of proportion between the sexes, however, does not mean that women 
enjoy the same protection for retirement as their male counterparts. 
The lack of consideration for women in the formation makes the Labour Insurance 
Scheme different from the same kind of male breadwinner schemes in other countries. 
First, pension schemes in some EU countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland 
and Britain in allow women to claim or top-up pensions based on their relationship with 
the breadwinners (Leitner, 2001). In Taiwan, women insured in this scheme do not have 
this option. This means that the Taiwanese scheme, compared with systems in some ED 
countries, is based more on the principle of individual responsibility rather than the 
support between family members, thereby lowering degrees of familisation. However, 
given women's income is generally lower than their male counterparts, their pension 
entitlements are lower and thus face a higher risk of income insecurity in later life. 
Second, unlike pension schemes in some EU countries in which the period of caring for 
young children and family members is considered in benefit calculation (Leitner, 200 I), 
this is not the case in the Labour Insurance Scheme. Again, women are usually the group 
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who suffer from the neglect of these considerations. 
Compared to pension schemes in EU countries, the retirement payment of Labour 
Insurance in Taiwan is more individualized placing less emphasis on mutual support 
between family members. Furthermore, there is no entitlement for spouses of the insured 
apart from the Survivors' Allowance and the period of caring for family members is not 
taken into account when calculating retirement payments. The absence of these two 
elements, which would improve women's entitlement in the social security system, 
results in a disadvantageous situation for women's retirement income. On the other hand, 
these two dimensions are considered as the main criteria of a pension scheme for 
familising women's role as carers and economic independents (Daly, 2000). Does the 
absence of these two elements in the Labour Insurance in Taiwan mean that this scheme 
has the intention of, or results in a higher degree of de-familisation than the schemes 
based on the same male breadwinner approach in EU countries? In short, the answer is 
that it does not. 
The absence of considerations for insured women and dependents does not increase 
women's economic independence, instead, it deepens their reliance on men 
breadwinners for their later life. By offering credit for caring or spouse pensions, women 
in many EU countries enjoy a higher degree of financial independence, although some 
of these entitlements are based on their relationships with other family members. 
Women in Taiwan, whether insured or not, rely more on family support for their later life 
due to limited social security entitlement and the low female labour force participation, 
which will be discussed in a later section in this Chapter. 
Although the Labour Insurance Scheme increases family solidarity by reinforcing the 
105 
support of a male breadwinner to his wife for later life, it has no element to encourage 
intergenerational financial support on a personal level. Apart from the SUf\"ivors' 
Allowances, parents and children of an insured can neither transfer their contribution to 
the insured nor share entitlement based on the contribution made by the insured. In fact, 
the principle of intergenerational support is difficult to incorporate into a social 
insurance scheme. It is in the non-contributory benefit system where the 'virtue' of 
intergenerational obligations are emphasized. 
4.3.2 Non-contributory schemes 
The two non-contributory schemes of Middle-Low-Income Elder Allowance (MLIEA) 
and Older Farmers' Allowance (OFA) were first introduced at a time when the KMT 
government was facing severe competition from the opposition party and struggling to 
maintain their governance. The ruling party could no longer bring about its own 
platform for social policy without considering voters' preferences. As discussed earlier, 
these two schemes are products of political campaigns. Although these schemes were 
introduced when the KMT still enjoyed the overwhelming domination in the Legislation 
Yuan, the influence of political campaigning on these schemes cannot be overlooked. 
4.3.2.1 Middle-Low-Income Elder Allowance (MLIEA) 
The MLIEA scheme was first introduced in July 1993 and amended in November 1993, 
July 1994, December 1994 and October 2000. Each amendment expanded the coverage 
or the levels of benefit. Despite these expansions, the fundamental principles of this 
scheme do not change. Eligibility is based on a means test which assesses incomes and 
assets of all household members. This practice is common to all means-tested schemes 
in Taiwan as well as in many Western countries. What makes the Taiwanese system 
distinctive, however, are the definitions of a 'household', which is much broader than in 
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Western countries. 
In OECD countries, for instance, a test of income and assets is also required for all social 
assistance schemes. However, most of OECD countries take the nuclear family as the 
means test and benefit unit. Of all the OECD countries, in only three countries --Austria, 
Japan and Switzerland -- does the means test go beyond the nuclear family. Apart from 
these three countries, other adults outside the nuclear family would be considered as 
separated households even when living in the same house. Furthermore, financial 
obligations between spouses and from parents to their dependent children are clearly 
written in social assistance regulations in many OECD countries. However, it is only in 
Austria, Japan and Switzerland that these ties may expand to the relationship between 
grandparents and grandchildren, and also between other relatives who may have a duty 
of financial support under family law (Eardley et al. 1996). 
According to Article 7 of the Ordinance of MLIEA, the members of a 'household' 
include 1) the applicant and his or her spouse; 2) the applicant's children and their 
spouses who have a duty of financial support, while married daughters and their spouses 
are excluded; 3) dependent children of the family member who fall into the above group; 
4) the applicant's grandchildren who provide financial support should the applicant's 
family not have any member who falls into Clause two of the Article. Thus, lineal 
relatives are regarded as having an obligation to support their aged parents and 
grandparents, and it is only when they are not capable of doing so that their aged family 
members are entitled to the MLIEA. 
The MLIEA, being a means-tested one, is different from other social assistance schemes 
in Taiwan. The coverage of 'household' by this Ordinance is more limited than \\'hat is 
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defined in the Social Assistance Act, which sets the basic principles for all means-test 
benefits. Furthermore, the income standard of eligibility is much more generous than the 
level set in the Social Assistance Act. Consequently, although the proportion of people 
who fall under the official poverty line is as low as 0.7 per cent, the proportion of older 
people who received the MLIEA was as high as 10.8 per cent in 200014. 
The importance of means-tested benefits to a large number of older people has 
significant implications in the development of familisation and de-familisation. First, 
the MLIEA is provided only to older people who do not have a family to support them or 
whose family is not capable of supporting them. It is the family, in particular the 
extended family, that has the responsibility for their aged members' financial security. 
This is a very clear declaration towards familising older people's financial protection. 
However, this approach runs the risk of contradictions. As Thane (2000) argues an older 
person who is poor and needs income support is likely to have a poor family which is not 
able to provide financial support to them. Consequently, a scheme like the MLIEA will 
not make a significant contribution to familisation despite its intentions to do so. As the 
well-off older people excluded by this scheme do not need familial support, and the 
poorer people who need familial support have to rely on state benefits. 
Of course, this scheme has some effect on familisation. A group of older people without 
sufficient financial resources might have no other choice but to tum to their family as the 
state limits intervention to those without any capable immediate relatives to support them. 
This group of older people has no income from the labour market nor social security or 
occupational retirement benefits. Notwithstanding, the threshold of the means test set by 
this scheme for eligibility is relatively generous when compared with regulations set by 
14 Data provided by the Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executiye Yuan. Taiwan. 
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Taiwan's Social Assistance Act, and the proportion of older people receiving MLIEA is 
relatively high. Therefore, this scheme benefits older people, not only in the very 
low-income group, but also in the low-middle income group, whose family might have 
reasonable financial resources to support their aged members. Whilst the MLIEA 
scheme was intended to reinforce familial responsibility for supporting older people, it 
could have an opposite effect of de-familisation in older people's income protection. For 
the poorest beneficiaries, the reliance on the family is legitimated and strengthened, and 
the low-middle income group of older people enjoys a higher degree of de- familisation 
in financial protection. 
It is important to recognise that the benefit levels of the MLIEA are as low as NT$3,000 
(for the lowest income group) or NT$6,000 (for the middle-low income group) per 
month. These levels were equivalent to just 10.3 per cent or 20.6 per cent of employees' 
average income, or 21.4 or 42.8 per cent of the monthly minimum wage in 1994. Thus 
beneficiaries without other resources might still rely on family support. The effect of the 
MLIEA on de-familisation is therefore limited. 
4.3.2.2. Older Farmers' Allowance (OFA) 
The fundamental principles of the OFA were similar to that of the MLIEA when 
introduced in 1995: the means test with a relatively generous criterion, the recognition 
of family obligation in supporting older people, and a low level of benefit. The main 
difference between the PFA and other Taiwanese social security benefits was that this 
scheme was only for full-time farmers. This is mainly due to the fact that before the 
introduction of the OFA, all employees in different sectors except farmers were already 
covered by a social insurance scheme with an old age benefit. The first old age income 
security scheme for farmers was not brought into force until as late as 1995, which could 
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be due to fanners maintaining traditional ways of work and associated life styles. 
Fanners tended to work until they were no longer able to. Most farmers do not bequeath 
the fann to their children until they die. In addition, most of them live in rural areas 
where the extended family was common and the traditional function of the extended 
family for mutual-support was still strong. These factors eased the pressure of 
government intervention and delayed the emergence of social provision for the older 
fanner. 
To some extent, the implementation of OFA symbolises the government's recognition 
that the development of industrialisation and urbanisation brings the dissolution of the 
traditional familial function for supporting its aged members. The government's 
response to the trend of family dissolution was to adopt a means test approach to support 
older fanners who can no longer support themselves and whose family cannot afford to 
support them. Clearly, the impacts of the OFA on the familisation or de-familisation of 
older people's income protection is similar to that of the MLIEA. Together these 
schemes characterise the government's strategy to old age income protection in the early 
and mid 1990s. Their impact on family cohesion, as discussed earlier, is contradictory. 
The condition of the means test as eligibility criteria for the OFA was abolished in 1999. 
The OFA thus became a demogrant. The level of benefit remains unchanged at a flat rate 
of NT$3,000, thus, this benefit, however low, may have a positive impact on the 
de-familisation of the older fanner's income protection. On the one hand, family 
resources are no longer a criterion for eligibility and farmers may receive this benefit 
without having to prove that their family cannot support them. On the other hand, old 
fanners, who tend to live in rural areas, experience low living costs. This benefit, plus 
fragmental income from the farming, may be sufficient for older farmers to sustain a 
110 
reasonable economic position in later life without dependence on their family. 
However, as discussed earlier, the elimination of the means test practice can be 
attributed to political considerations rather than older farmers' financial needs. This 
change is not a product of the government's policy plan but a result of political pressure. 
The government lifted the assignment of family responsibility from this scheme only 
when it could no longer defend it against campaigns from political groups. The increase 
on the degree of de-familisation from this scheme is due to reductions in state autonomy. 
This point will be further discussed in Chapter Eight. 
4.4 Other social legislation concerning older people: familisation or 
de-familisation? 
Apart from the content of governmental declarations and social security schemes, other 
governmental platforms and regulations directly or indirectly concerning social policy 
or older people's well-being are also good material in order to explore the government's 
orientation towards family obligation. 
4.4.1 Governmental platforms 
Since the end of the Second World War, there are two platforms promulgated by the 
government as guidelines to social policy. The "The Present Stage Social Policy under 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principle of Livelihood" proclaimed in 1965 is the first governmental 
platform of social policy in Taiwanese history. It addressed seven policy areas as the 
core of social policy, namely, social insurance, employment, social assistance, housing, 
personal services, continued education, and community development. It mapped out a 
comprehensive picture for social policy development, as well as practical strategies. As 
pointed out earlier, this platform was set forth at a time when the KMT enjoyed the 
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absolute domination of the government and took the counterattack to the '\lainland as 
the most important national objective. The real intention for the government to 
promulgate this guideline was t t nh . '. .. 
no 0 e ance CItlzenshIp, but to manIfest that It \\'as 
more kind and benevolent than its political and military rival, the Communist 
government. 
Surprisingly, this platform does not mention anything about family obligation. In fact, 
when this guideline was set forth, the family was still the most important mechanism 
from which older people received their support. In addition, the demographic feature 
showed no sign of decline in family structure. At the time when the guidelines were 
promulgated, people aged 65 or above only accounted for 2.7 per cent of the whole 
popUlation (CEPD, 2000), and the old age dependency ratio was as low as 5.1 per cent. 
Furthermore, the total number of childbirths per 1,000 women was as high as 4,828 
(CEPD, 1999), more than double that the number of childbirths needed for population 
replacement. Moreover, living with adult children was still the most popular style of 
older people's living arrangement. According to a piece of research which reconstructed 
the data from 'Survey on Family and Production', in 1973, four-fifths (79.96%) of 
parents who had married children lived with their married children (Chi, 1990: 65). All 
these facts suggest that the reason for the government's not mentioning family 
obligation was the fact that it was so strong and showed no sign of decline so that the 
government had no reason to worry about it, rather than the intention to replace it with 
the social security system. 
The second guideline for social policy was not promulgated until as late as 1994. When 
the 'Guiding Principles for Social Welfare Policy' was set forth, the demographic, sociaL 
economic and political situations were very different from when the first guide \\'as 
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proclaimed. There was an increasing demand for social policies caused by the rapid 
demographic, social, economic and political changes. The proportion of people aged 65 
and above reached to 7.1 per cent, and the old age dependency ratio increased to 10.5 per 
cent (CEPD, 2000). In particular, the total number of childbirth per 1,000 women 
decreased to 1,755 (CEPD, 1999), well below the population replacement rate. An 
ageing society was expected to be coming soon. Simultaneously, the series 'The Old 
Status Survey' conducted by the Government showed a clear trend of decline in family 
structure. On the other hand, the opposition party was getting stronger and started 
advocating social security schemes as a strategy to attract votes. The KMT government 
faced severe challenges from the political opposition, and had to demonstrate its ability 
to respond to people's need. 
The Guidelines contains nine fundamental principles for social policy, in which the first 
four of them are general principles for all policy areas, the other five of them each 
addressed one core policy area for the future, namely, employment, social insurance, 
social service, housing, and health care. In this comprehensive blueprint for social policy, 
the role of the family is highly emphasized. One of the four guidelines for all policy 
areas is indeed all about the family. The Article four states: 
UTo construct a social welfare policy based on the principle offamily-center, to 
advocate jamily ethic' and to improve family relationship, and to accelerate 
jamily ethic' to better its members' well-being. " 
(Guiding Principles for Social Welfare Policy, translated from Chinese) 
It is clear that, from the government's point of view, it is the family that people should 
tum to when they are in need. When the family function was declining and the 
government faced the inescapable task to respond to people's need, its intention was to 
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reaffinn and to reinforce family obligation, rather than to replace it with social security 
benefits. On the other hand, this blueprint does not address any strategies or practical 
measures to improve traditional family function. Nor does it explain how to integrate the 
family obligation into each policy area. For instance, in the section of social insurance, 
the introduction of a national health insurance and a pension system are proposed, 
however, all practical measures addressed to improve these social insurance schemes 
contain no elements about family obligation. In other words, the emphasis on family is 
more a moral totem rather as opposed to a policy orientation. 
4.4.2 The legal system 
Table 4.2 shows regulations concernIng family obligation to older people in the 
Taiwanese legal system. It appears that this kind of regulation exists in various laws. 
These Laws together present three main features of family obligation. First, there is no 
doubt that the offspring have a statutory obligation to support their parents and 
grandparents, regardless of their ability for self-reliance. In addition, the obligations for 
children and grandchildren to take care of their parents and grandparents have the 
priority against any other kind of obligation and mutual support between family 
members, including the obligations for parents to take care of their children. That is to 
say, in a three-generation household, the breadwinner generation with economic 
limitations should place priority on taking care of their parents against looking after their 
children. This regulation offers clear protection to older people for later life. Second, 
only when this family obligation is, due to economic reasons), unable to function may 
older people be entitled to the protection of a social safety net. Third, there are rewards 
and penalties to this obligation. Those who fail to fulfill this obligation will according to 
the law be fined. Those families who indeed shoulder this obligation are entitled to some 
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exemption from taxation, and enjoy priority when applying for public housing. 
Table 4.2 Taiwanese Laws containing regulations about family obligations towards 
older people 
Laws 
Civil Law 
Income Tax Law 
The Social 
Assistance Law 
Articles Contents 
Article 1084 Children must show filial piety and respect for their parents. 
Article 1114 Immediate relatives as well as persons living with spouse's 
parents have the obligation of mutual support. 
Article 1116 In the case of economic limitation to which people are 
unable to support all of their immediate and coresident 
relatives, the following sequence prioritises who should 
receive their support: 
1. Immediate older relatives 
2. Immediate younger relatives 
3. Family members 
4. Siblings 
5. Head of household 
6. Spouse's parents 
7. Children in Law 
Article 17 Taxpayers and their spouse who look after their immediate 
relatives aged 60 or above are eligible to exempt a certain 
amount of earnings from taxation. 
Article 5 Earnings of immediate relatives and collateral relatives who 
statutorily have obligation for multual support must be 
added to the family earnings for means test. 
The Older People's Article 7 
Welfare Law 
Children have a duty to support their older parents. The 
Government and welfare organisations may help and 
Article 15 
Article 25 
Article 30 
The Public Housing Article 6 
Tender Ordinance 
+ 
Assistance in Article 9 
Mortgage Housing 
Ordinance 
supervise this duty. 
The three-generation family should have the priority to rent 
public housing. 
Older people who are ignored, abused, or abandoned by 
immediate offspring may apply for accommodation and 
protection. Their immediate offspring must pay for these 
expenses. 
A person who is responsible for supporting an older person 
will be fined and named if he or she fail to fulfil this duty. 
Governmental department responsible for public housing 
should take the need of aborigine, lower income veteran, 
lone parent and three-generation family, and provide up to 
one-fifth of public housing for these families. 
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Generally speaking, the legal system clearly defines family obligation to take care of its 
aged members. However, these regulations are indeed a backing in form rather than in 
practice. The Civil Law formally declares that children must show filial piety and 
respect to their parents, but provide no punishment to those who fail to do so. The Social 
Assistance Law includes all immediate relatives as a household that is supposed to share 
the obligation of mutual support. This only makes it harder for older people with adult 
children to receive benefit from the social safety net and offers no help to those older 
people whose offspring refuse to do so. In addition, the tax and housing incentives are 
not attractive thus offers little effect in encouraging this obligation. Furthermore, it is 
only when children ignore, abandon, or abuse their aged parents may they be penalised a 
fine for up to NT 150,000 Dollars (equivalent to about 3,000 pounds). Both the 
standards of the obligation and the penalty are low. All these facts suggest that what the 
legal system does is to highlight the moral standard of family cohesion, rather than to 
threat or coerce people to hold this obligation. 
The analysis so far has shown that there is a clear discordance between the government's 
preference and the policy in practice. The government has been trying to advocate 
family obligation as a solution to older people's later life, however, social policy 
provisions rarely integrate the essence of intra-family support. How do these 
contradictory orientations influence the familisation or de-familisation of older people's 
income? The key to this question is to examine the change of importance of labour 
market, family, and social security benefits to older people's income. 
4.5 Vicissitudes of familisation and de-familisation of older people's income 
This section explores the changing role of the three sectors - the labour market, the 
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family, and the social security system in protecting older people's income security. In 
discussing this issue, historical data are essential. Unfortunately, there is no systematic 
serial statistics or survey existing covering this subject. There are fragmented data 
related to each of these sectors, collected by different organisations using different 
methods of sampling and surveying. Although these data are not empirically comparable. 
they offer a great deal of information about the role of these sectors in supporting old 
people's later life. 
4.5.1 Changes of older people's labour force participation 
There is no doubt that the government wants to encourage older people to join and stay 
in the labour market. The 'Employment Law', enacted in 1983, states in Article XXIV 
that the government must set plans to help older people with ability and willingness to 
participate in the labour market, and must evaluate these plans regularly to make certain 
that they succeed. This Law was enacted in a time when the ruling party enjoyed the 
overwhelming majority in the Legislative Yuan, and thus doubtlessly illustrates the 
government's intention. Following this Law, the 'Improving Older People's Labour 
Force Participation Scheme' was introduced. This scheme clarifies the responsibility of 
the governmental department, including central and local government, Labour, 
Economics and related Departments, to improve older people's participation in the 
labour market. Some practical measures are adopted to increase the incentive for both 
employers and older people to improve employment. These include subsidising 
employers for recruiting older people, awarding companies for redesigning jobs to suit 
older people and utilizing retired manpower, conducting symposium, and issuing 
handbooks to deliver information. In addition, the older unemployed, defined as an 
unemployed person aged forty-five or over, may attend vocational training courses 
freely with subsidy for board and living expenses. All these efforts, despite being more 
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symbolical than practical, confirm the orientation of government's policies toward older 
people's employment. 
On the other hand, various surveys show that older workers' willingness to staying in 
employment remains at a high level. The governmental statistics show that in 1988, 34.4 
per cent of the employees aged between 55 and 59, and 37.1 per cent of the employees 
aged 60 or above planed to stay in employment after they reached the compulsory 
retirement age of 65 (Department of Labour Affairs, 1990). In 1991, the figures 
increased to 33.4 per cent and 42.8 per cent respectively (Department of Labour Affairs, 
1990). In 1996, 24.5 and 25.9 per cent of the age groups of 55-59 and 60-64 planed to 
stay in employment till they reached the compulsory retirement age, regardless of the 
situation of the company, the working condition, retirement benefit, and their health 
(Department of Labour Affairs, 1996). A governmental survey conducted in 1999 shows 
that, only 2.8 per cent of the employed aged between 55 and 59 planed to retire before 
the age of 60, and 34.1 per cent of them plan to retire at the age of 65 or above. None of 
the 499 interviewees fell into the age group between 60 and 64 had planed to retired 
before they reached the age of 60. 75.2 per cent of people in this group did not want to 
retire before they were 65 (Taiwanese Department of Labour Affairs, 2000: 28-29). 
Given the strong willingness to work until their later years, it is not surprising that the 
labour force participation rate for older people is significantly higher than that of the 
Western countries. In the 20-year-period between 1977 and 1996, the labour force 
participation rate for the age group between 55 and 64 years old, despite fluctuations, 
stabled within the range between 48 and 52 per cent, followed by a steadily falling trend 
down to 43.9 per cent in the year 2000. The difference between the labour force 
participation rate in the age group of 55-64 and the average rate of all age groups 
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fluctuated between 6 and 11 percentage point in the same 20-year-period, then increased 
steadily and researched the peak at 13.7 percentage point in 2000. On the other hand, the 
labour force participation rate for people aged 65 and over has stabilised within the 
range of 8 to 11 per cent for the last 20 years. Although there is a slight trend of decline 
from 1995, the change has not been significant. 
The labour force participation rate is highly different for older men and older women. As 
Table 6-2 illustrates, the labour force participation rate for men aged between 55 and 64 
years has even been significantly higher than that of the national average for all age 
groups over the past quarter of the century. Among the male groups, the labour force 
participation rates for the age group of 55-64 has been close to that of the national 
average, and the difference between these rates has never gone beyond seven per cent. 
As for the age group of 65 years and over, the male labour force participation rate 
stabled at a high range between 13 and 17 per cent. 
The picture for women has changed more dramatically. The labour force participation 
rate for older women, as shown in table 4-3, is much lower that their male counterparts. 
However, there has been a significant increase in older women's labour force 
participation rate. The labour force participation rate for females aged between 55 and 
64 almost doubled from 14.8 per cent in 1977 to 27.6 per cent in 1995, while the rate for 
female aged 65 and above increased more than threefold during the same period, from 
1.05 per cent to 4.32 per cent. 
It is reasonable to assume that earnings from the labour market help older people to 
de-familise their income. Therefore, changes in the degree of de-familisation in income 
should be more significant for women than for men, as men's labour force participation 
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rates have been stable and women's have been increasing. To examine this point, it is 
necessary to review the trend of intra-family financial support to older people. 
Table 4-3 Labour force participation rates In Taiwan 
(%) 
All age groups 55-64 years old 65 years old or above 
Year Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
1977 56.75 77.19 36.02 45.85 70.48 14.77 4.84 9.48 1.05 
1978 58.28 77.65 38.47 51.68 77.30 17.23 8.63 15.43 2.18 
1979 57.80 77.09 38.23 51.29 75.51 18.39 8.51 15.53 1.74 
1980 57.87 76.36 39.20 50.58 72.71 20.07 8.10 14.66 1.63 
1981 56.90 76.12 37.57 49.95 73.41 17.42 8.03 14.43 l.66 
1982 56.75 75.67 37.71 49.06 7l.95 16.95 7.93 14.08 l.73 
1984 58.87 75.28 42.42 50.76 71.42 2l.57 9.19 15.07 2.99 
1985 59.01 75.01 42.97 49.35 69.52 20.87 9.52 14.85 3.84 
1986 59.43 74.61 44.19 49.69 68.20 23.85 9.57 15.36 3.31 
1987 60.14 74.41 45.79 51.21 69.73 25.78 9.51 14.95 3.56 
1988 59.11 73.67 44.52 50.23 68.73 25.35 9.25 14.41 3.50 
1989 59.87 74.70 45.00 50.98 70.74 25.02 10.66 16.49 4.10 
1990 58.67 73.29 44.03 48.93 68.28 24.60 8.98 13.79 3.50 
1991 59.13 73.57 44.66 50.20 70.15 26.19 9.88 14.89 4.09 
1992 59.10 73.83 44.32 49.29 7l.07 24.20 9.13 13.57 3.95 
1993 58.59 72.42 44.68 49.70 70.32 26.64 9.52 13.99 4.20 
1994 58.63 72.11 45.06 48.00 68.67 25.63 8.99 13.23 
3.09 
1995 58.51 71.56 45.44 49.09 69.83 27.55 9.77 14.28 
4.32 
1996 58.28 70.29 46.28 48.33 69.62 26.91 8.80 
12.90 3.84 
1997 58.11 70.43 45.86 47.62 69.70 25.82 8.66 
12.68 3.85 
1998 57.84 70.22 45.57 46.05 67.62 25.07 
8.35 12.08 3.97 
1999 57.80 69.37 46.32 45.67 65.70 26.26 
8.06 11.64 3.95 
2000 57.51 69.27 45.82 43.85 66.25 22.26 
8.04 1l.97 3.60 
Sources: Report on the Manpower Utilisation Survey, various years, Taipei: CEPD 
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4.5.2 The trend of intra-family financial support to older people 
The data often cited to argue that the family function is declining is the proportion of 
older people living with children, which, based on the series of governmental old age 
surveys, declined from 70.24% in 1986 to 61.16%) in 1996 (Taiwan Government, 1997). 
However, Hu's research which reconstructs the data has successfully demonstrated that 
the proportion of young and mid-age people living with aged parents has not had any 
significant change between 1986 and 1989 (Hu, 1995). In other words, the decline in the 
proportion of old people living with children is mainly due to demographic factors, and 
offers no evidence of the decline in traditional beliefs in family functions. Lo used the 
ten-year data of 'Household Income and Expenditure Survey' between 1976 and 1985 
also found that although the proportion of older people living with married children 
decreased in this period, the proportion of older people living with unmarried children 
increased in the same period (Lo, 1987). On the other hand, an older person who does 
not live with children does not necessarily mean that he or she receives no financial 
support from his or her children. As discussed in Chapter Two, the cases in Singapore, 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand show that a significant proportion of older 
people receive financial support from their non-coresident children. 
The trend of change in older people's financial resources offers a clearer picture about 
the change of intra-family financial support. Table 4.4 shows a clear trend that the 
importance of children's financial support to older people has been decreasing 
throughout the past decade and half. The percentage of older people relying on their 
children for living decreased from 65.8 per cent in 1986 to 47.1 per cent in 2000, a drop 
of28.4 per cent in 14 years. It is worth noting that the 2000 Survey made a change to the 
use of telephone interviews, which might underestimate the proportion of older people 
living alone, and overestimate the proportion of older people living with relatiyes. This 
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suspicion is proved to be true by comparing data collect by this survey to census data. 
The 2000 Old Status Survey finds that 67.8 per cent of people aged 65 or above lived 
with their children, and 9.2 per cent of them lived alone. On the other hand, the 2000 
census finds that the proportions of older people fall into these groups are 58.1 and 16.0 
per cent respectively. In other words, had the 2000 Old Status Survey exactly mirrored 
the demographic profile, the picture of de-familisation in 2000 would have been more 
significant. 
Table 4.4 Main sources of living expenses of people over 65 years old in Taiwan (0/0) 
Item Total Childrenl Saving & Pensions Own Spouse's Social Others 
Jnvestmen~ eammgs eammgs OJ assistance & 
Year pens10ns Allowances 
1986 100.00 65.81 29.77 1.24 3.18 
1987 100.00 64.00 31.68 1.70 2,45 
1988 100.00 61.82 34.88 1.07 2.25 
1989 100.00 58.37 15.29 11.87 8.23 2.72 1.23 2.29 
1991 100.00 52.37 15.87 16.07 8.10 2.68 1.57 3.33 
1993 100.00 52.30 17.25 14.76 6.60 4.25 1.61 3.24 
1996 100.00 48.28 13.15 17.55 7.30 4.34 6.37 3.00 
20003 100.00 47.13 9.26 15.39 13.723 -- 12.86 1.64 
Note: 1. Including children-in-Iaw 
2. Including oneself and hislher spouse's saving and investments 
3. Including oneself and hislher spouse's earnings 
Sources: Survey of Older people's Living Status in Taiwan, Taipei: Department of Interior Affair, 1997, 
2000 
Taiwanese authors who argue that the traditional family function for supporting their 
aged family member is fading away often cite these data to prove their argument. In fact, 
being relative figures, these data do not show whether the proportion of older people 
receiving financial support from children has changed. Nor do they show whether the 
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absolute level of financial resources older people receive through intra-family support 
has changed. The decrease of the relative importance of children as older people's 
financial resource might result from the real decline in intra-family transfer, or the 
increase in other financial resources. 
Although these data do not provide any direct evidence about the change of the absolute 
level in intra-family transfer, they do show that older people's reliance on their family 
has been decreasing. The question that remains here is what are the driving forces of this 
decline? Is it the labour market or the social security benefits that help to increase the 
degree of de-familisation in older people's economic resource? As Table 4.2 shows, the 
labour force participation rates for the age group of 55-64 and 65 and above in this 
period are decreasing rather then increasing. Therefore, earning from the labour market 
cannot be the direct cause of de-familisation. This point is reconfirmed by Table 4-3 
which shows that, while the proportion of older people who mainly count on 
intra-family dropped for 26.7 per cent between 1986 and 1996, the proportion of older 
people relying on own earnings as the main financial source did not increase in the same 
period. 
Other possible forces for de-familisation are personal financial management and social 
security benefits. It makes sense that older people with the increasing awareness of the 
fading away of family function adopt a personal financial management strategy, such as 
savings and investments, to secure their later life. However, Table 4-2 clearly shows that 
the proportion of older people mainly relying on saving and investments has been 
decreasing rather than increasing since 1993. In other words, personal financial 
management cannot be the force of de-familisation either. This leaves the social security 
benefits as the only possible reason. 
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4.5.3 The trend of old age social security benefits 
As introduced earlier, before 1994, the Labour Insurance scheme is the main social 
security scheme that provides cash payments to older people. This scheme was 
introduced in 1950 and, as shown in Table 4-5, 30 years on, in 1980 it had matured as the 
average units of retirement payment leveled at the plateau. The average retirement 
payment per claim in 1980 was equivalent to 23.5 months of wage, a level as high as in 
the 1990s. In fact, the highest level of the average retirement payment per claim is only 
25.5 months of wages, equivalent to about 20 years of contribution. This is due to the 
interruption of employment of the insured, in particular female employees. 
Table 4.5 Average units of Old Age Benefit, Labour Insurance scheme, Taiwan 
Year Average units of Year Average units of 
benefit per claim benefit per claim 
1961-1969 10.81 1988 21.23 
1970-1979 19.31 1989 19.08 
1980-1989 20.45 1990 2l.54 
1990-1995 22.40 1991 25.52 
1996-2000 21.26 1992 23.48 
1980 23.52 1993 23.86 
1981 22.48 1994 24.51 
1982 20.83 1995 16.93 
1983 2l.18 1996 17.82 
1984 19.18 1997 19.79 
1985 17.10 1998 21.56 
1986 22.64 1999 23.00 
1987 19.47 2000 24.11 
Sources: Labour Insurance Statistics, various years, Taipei: Bureau for Labour Insurance 
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Therefore, if this benefit had a direct effect on the degree of de-familisation of older 
people's income for later life, logically, the impact should have started in 1950 when this 
scheme was first introduced, and increased afterwards as the insured were cumulating 
their contribution record for retirement payment. Furthermore, with the maturity of this 
scheme, its impact on de-familisation should have leveled at the peak since 1980. 
However, there were not many discussions concerning the change of the traditional 
family function before 1980. When the Old Age Welfare Law was introduced in 1980, it 
contained only as little as 21 Articles, and did not mention anything about the family 
obligation and older people's financial needs. Furthermore, the census did not contain 
questions regarding older people's situation till 1990. On the other hand, governmental 
surveys concerning older people's economic situation were not conducted until 1986, 
they found that almost two thirds (65.8%) of older people still counted on their children 
as the main financial resource. 
These pieces of evidence suggest that intra-family support was still strong while the 
Labour Insurance scheme had matured. Does this suggest that this scheme has no effect 
on the de-familisation of older people's income? 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 provide another angle to examine this issue. Figure 4-1 clear shows 
that although the Labour Insurance was implemented in 1950, it was not until the 1970s 
that the number of insured started increasing significantly. This was due to the fact that 
the Labour Insurance only included a small number of workers when it was first brought 
into practice, then gradually extend its coverage. The 1970 Amendment, which 
expanded its coverage to white-collar workers for the first time, is no doubt a milestone 
and accelerated the increase in the number of insured. Therefore, although this scheme 
was supposed to mature in the 1970s, the newly-covered insured were then just starting 
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to build their contributions for retirement payment, and would need at least another one 
or two decades to receive decent retirement payment. 
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Figure 4.1 Number of persons insured by the Labour Insurance Scheme 
Figure 4.2 echoes this point. It shows that it was not until the 1980s that the number of 
people receiving a retirement payment had increased significantly. Before 1980, 
although the average units of retirement payment (19.3 months wages in the 1970s) 
were almost as high as that in the 1990s (21.8 months wages) (see Table 4.5), the number 
of people that actually received this payment was low. The number of people who 
claimed retirement payment increased dramatically in 1994 when the National Health 
Insurance was implemented, and then fell back to the normal level. This picture remains 
the same if the number of insured and the number of people claiming retirement 
payment in the other two social insurance schemes, Government Employees' Insurance 
and Teaching Staffs Insurance, are included. 
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Figure 4.2 Number of people receiving pensions. 
Note: Including people receiving retirement payments from the Labour Insurance 
Scheme, the Government Employee's Insurance Scheme and the Private School 
Staff's Insurance Scheme, and people receiving Veteran's Settlement Allowance, 
Older Farmer's Allowance and Middle-low Income Elder Allowance. 
This offers the likely explanation that although the social insurance system was 
established in the 1950s and is supposed to be matured in the 1970s, it did not have 
significant effect on de-familisation during this period. The fact that an increased 
number of people claimed retirement payment since the 1980s coincides with the timing 
when both the government and the academia starting paying attention to the decline of 
the traditional family function. However, these aggregate data offer only a general 
picture. Empirical data is needed to examine the real impact of social insurance benefit 
on the degree of de-familisation and the extent of this influence. This will be done on 
chapter seven. 
The Middle-Low-Income Elder Allowance and Older Farmers' Allowance were 
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successively introduced 1994 and 1995, which together have significantly increased the 
number of older people receiving state benefits. By the end of 1995, 38.6 per cent of 
people aged 65 or over received one of these new benefits (CEPD, 1997). This figure 
increased further to 43.8 per cent by the end of2000. Consequently, as Table 6-3 shows, 
the proportion of older people relying on social assistance and allowances increased 
dramatically in the 1996 and 2000 survey. 
As the levels of these two benefits are low and the beneficiaries of one of these benefits 
are disentitled to the other one, older people cannot comfortably rely solely on these 
benefits. This point might explain the fact that from 1993 to 2000, the increase in 
proportions of older people mainly relying on social assistance and allowances is 
significantly higher than the decrease in proportions of older people relying on children 
in the same period. On the other hand, it is too soon to conclude that these benefits has 
had any effect on de-familising older people's income as the process of de-familisation 
started earlier than the introduction of these benefits. In fact, Table 4-4 does not suggest 
that the importance of children to older people's income declined more sharply after 
these benefits were introduced. 
4.5.4 Vicissitudes of older people's income from Social Security, intra-family 
support and labour market 
The analysis in previous sections has offered a general picture about the trend of the 
importance of labour market, family, and state benefit to older people's income. First of 
all the familiar function as older people's financial reliance was still strong in the 
, 
mid-1980s, when the aggregate data concerning this field were first produced. 
Furthermore, older people's labour participation rate leveled between 1980 to the 
mid-1990s and was followed by a trend of decrease rather than increase, thus it could not 
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be the main cause of de-familisation for the past two decades. In addition, with the 
maturity of the Labour Insurance by 1980 and the lack of new schemes supporting older 
people's living expenses before the mid-1990s, the social security system is not to be 
attributed to the de-familisation for this period either. However, as shown in Table 4-6, 
the percentages decline in family support were approximately the same as percentage 
increase in the social security system. However, the real relation between family 
cohesion and state benefit needs further exploration. All these points suggest that these 
aggregate data are not sufficient to work out the relation between the three sectors of 
labour market, the family and state benefits as older people's financial resources, and 
empirical survey data is needed to examine this issue. This will be done in Chapter 
Eight. 
Table 4.6 Old people's main reliance for later life in Taiwan (%) 
Item Total Children Own or spouse's Social security Others 
earning & resources total pensIons Social assistance 
Year & allowances 
1989 100.00 58.37 2624 13.10 11.87 123 2.29 
1991 100.00 52.37 26.66 17.64 16.07 1.57 3.33 
1993 100.00 52.30 28.09 16.37 14.76 1.61 3.24 
1996 100.00 48.28 24.79 23.93 17.55 6.37 3.00 
2000 100.00 47.13 22.98 28.25 15.39 12.86 l.64 
Source: sorted from Table 4.4 
4.6 Conclusion 
Taiwan's old age income security system was established during a period of national 
crisis and based on the Bismarck model. It is a result of a national plan rather than plural 
or corporatist politics. It originally served to strengthen the state rather than to impro\'e 
older people's living standards. As this system grew and became mature, its role in older 
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people's income provision became more significant. To a large extent, it does help to 
de-familise older peoples' incomes, although it contains an element of family support. 
This is against the government's preference, which is to encourage family obligations of 
support older people. The effect of de-familisation of this system, therefore, is not a 
result of the government's deliberate plan, but of unexpected development. 
On the other hand, the development of the old age social security system alone can not 
explain the de-familisation of older people's income in Taiwan. The process of 
large-scale de-familisation did not occur until a decade after the social insurance scheme 
had matured, and speeded up before the social assistance system expanded. To explore 
the relationship between the social security system, the labour market, and the family in 
older people's income protection, a further analysis based on empirical data is necessary. 
Chapter Seven will be dealing with this issue. 
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Chapter Five 
Modern social provisions for older people in Hong Kong 
The social, economic and political development of Hong Kong in the twentieth century 
presents a very unique case. Not only does its economic achievement provide a 
successful model, but its political and social transitions also offer a good example to 
examine many political and sociological theories. Hong Kong was colonised by Britain 
for one and a half centuries, however, by the end of the colonisation, its GDP per capita 
was greater than its colonial master. Although it is one of the wealthiest and most 
prosperous areas in the world, it was as late as 1995 when its citizens could select all the 
members of the Legislative Council through a direct election system for the first time. 
The densely populated society is mono-racial, namely Chinese. However, according to 
the by-census report published in 1996, 40 per cent of the population were not born in 
Hong Kong. These social, economic and political aspects are important elements which 
have constructed modem Hong Kong, and have influenced the development of the 
modem social security system in Hong Kong. 
This chapter analyses Hong Kong's old age social provision system. The first part 
highlights social, economic and political changes influencing the development of old 
age social provisions since the end of the Second World War. The second part discusses 
government's policy orientation toward provisions for older people. The third part 
provides a context analysis on Hong Kong's old age income protection schemes. The 
fourth part reviews changes of older people's financial sources and discusses the trend of 
familisation and de-familisation of older people's income. The fifth part concludes this 
chapter. 
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5.1 The development of Hong Kong's old age income security system 
Since the end of World War Two, the development of the economy has been set as the 
most important objective for the government. Under this clear guideline, all other public 
policies are more or less subordinated to economic policies, or at least should be planned 
with economic considerations. Hence, it comes as no surprise that the social security 
system in Hong Kong is significantly under-developed. However, it would be far too 
over-simplified if we attributed the lagging development of the social security system 
only to economic development strategies. 
From the 1840s to the late 1990s, the British colonial government successfully turned 
Hong Kong from a remote poor fishing village into a modem prosperous city. However, 
until Hong Kong was taken over by its mother country, the PROC, in 1997, the colonial 
government did not establish a comprehensive social security system. In the area of 
modem social provision for older people, the schemes were introduced much later, 
compared to other advanced capitalistic countries. The reason for this is multi-faceted 
and varies from period to period. 
5.1.1 Prior to 1945: A developing free port 
The area we now call Hong Kong consists of three main parts. First, the island of Hong 
Kong came into the British Empire's dominions as a result of the Treaty of Nanking in 
1842. Second, Kowloon was added in 1860 through the Convention of Peking. Third, 
the New Territories were added in 1898 on a lease of 99 years which expired on 30th 
June 1997. Geographically, it has many advantages to accelerate development. The 
Victoria Gulf, located between the Island of Hong Kong and the Peninsula of Kowloon, 
is one of the finest natural deepwater ports in the world. In addition, Hong Kong is 
132 
located in a crucial position for world shipping. It is right in the middle between Tokyo 
and India, and between Peking and Indonesia, and located on the golden shipping line 
from Eastern Asia to Australia and New Zealand. 
However, the situation of China in the nineteenth century was so severe that one could 
not imagine the government would have developed this remote area had Hong Kong not 
been ceded to the UK. The island of Hong Kong was so poor when the British En1pire 
first took it over that Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary of the UK at that time, even 
doubted the value of occupying it. In a letter to Captain Charles Elliot, who raised the 
first British flag in Hong Kong in 1841, he wrote: 'You have obtained the cession of 
Hong Kong, a barren island with hardly a house upon it. Now it seems obvious that 
Hong Kong will not be a mart of trade any more than Macao is so' (quoated in Harris, 
1988: 1). Actually, some thousands of people inhabited the territory, most of them were 
farmers, fishermen and their families, many of whom lived permanently on boats along 
the sheltered coast. The inhabitants were from China and most of them were male. They 
went there alone to make a living and left their family on the mainland, and only a small 
proportion of them brought their families here after they settled (Lim and Liou, 1998: 
11). After the takeover, the British Government soon employed a free port strategy in 
Hong Kong, allowing goods to transfer freely without imposing customs duties. There 
was no other choice considering the natural limitations. Hong Kong was a small place 
without any natural resources, all the food and commodities were dependent upon 
imports. Had there not been a free port policy, there would not have been any good 
transport to this remote place (Yung, 1992). 
The free port policy, coupled with the excellent geographic location, soon enabled Hong 
Kong to become an important site of trade not only between China and the U.K. but also 
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between China and the rest of the world. In 1880, 21 per cent of goods exported from 
China and 37 per cent of goods imported to China were transferred through Hong Kong 
(Yu and Liu, 1994). In addition to being a port of transit, Hong Kong was also a transfer 
port for Chinese coolies. Between 1851-1872, there were in total 320,349 Chinese 
coolies going through Hong Kong to America, Oceania, and other parts of the world (Yu 
and Liu, 1994). 
Table 5.1 Hong Kong population, 1841-1941 
Year Population 
1841 7,650 
1851 32,983 
1861 119,321 
1871 124,198 
1881 160,402 
1891 217,936 
1901 300,600 
1911 456,739 
1921 625,166 
1931 878,947 
1941 1,640,000 
1945 600,000 
Note: 1841 to 1851 only includes the island of Hong Kong, from 1861 onwards includes Kowloon, from 
1901 onwards includes New Territory. 
Source: Cheng (G-Y), 1997: 123, Table 1. 
During the first century of British occupation, the population of Hong Kong increased 
dramatically and eventually became a huge pressure in tenns of providing sufficient 
welfare and services. In 1841, the year before Britain's takeover, the population of the 
island was less than eight thousand, by 1851, just ten years under British governance, it 
had increased more than three-fold to about thirty-three thousand. In 1860, Kowloon 
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became part of the colony and the population kept on growing. From 1861 to 1891. the 
population increased by 83 per cent. In the beginning of the twentieth century, with the 
addition of the New Territory, the population exceeded 300 thousand and continued 
growing at a much higher rate than in the nineteenth century. As we can see from Table 
5.1, the population of the Hong Kong area doubled in the first twenty years of the 
twentieth century, and then almost tripled in the next twenty years. Natural growth could 
not explain this and immigration is the major reason for these increases. Most of the 
immigration came from southern China because of politics and war. In the 1930s when 
China was involved in military conflict with Japan, a huge wave of residents moved 
from southern China to Hong Kong and made the population of Hong Kong double in 
ten years. By contrast, the born-in-Hong Kong group was the minority. According to the 
census data, in the year 1921 and 1931, the proportion of the population born in Hong 
Kong was 27.7 per cent and 32.5 per cnet respectively (Cheng, 1997: 123). Between 
December 1941 and August 1945, when Hong Kong was occupied by Japan, large scale 
deportations of Hong Kong's inhabitants were carried out to solve the food shortage 
problem and the popUlation decreased for the first time since 1841. At the end of the 
Second World War, the population was estimated to be only 600,000, less than that of 
1921. 
Being a free port and a transfer port had become Hong Kong's key feature from 1842 to 
1941. The transfer trading was the most important economic activity. By contrast, there 
were not many industrial activities before the Second World War, apart from 
family-based manual industries and cottage industries. In 1932, The British Empire 
signed the Ottawa Agreement which offered Hong Kong, as a British Colony at that time, 
the entitlement of its industrial products to Imperial Preference. This tax preference. 
coupled with the development of a financial market; the demands created by the 
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increasing population; the industrious immigration and the enterprising businessmen, 
helped Hong Kong's industry to develop. In the year before the Japanese occupation 
(1940), a total of 800 were factories registered in Hong Kong and hired 30,000 workers. 
During the Japanese occupation, Hong Kong's industry experienced a decline. By the 
end of Japanese occupation, there were only 366 factories left (Wong, 1997: 37"+). 
During this period, the colonial government in Hong Kong was like those in other 
British Colonies. In general, they believed that a very limited administration would meet 
the needs of the people. On the other hand, it was British policy to make each colony as 
self-sufficient as possible (Tang, 1998). However, in the nineteenth century, Hong Kong 
had no resources to embark on social reform. As a result, public expenditure was 
confined to the bare essentials. It was no surprise that there was not any form of 
systematic welfare provision by the government at this stage. Just like all other 
industrialized countries in their early developing stage, the responsibilities of looking 
after the underprivileged and vulnerable groups in Hong Kong were undertaken by 
voluntary organisations. 
5.1.2 Postwar to the 1950s: Coping with refugee problems 
When the Second War just ended, Hong Kong was a chaotic society!. It experienced 
huge demographic, social, political and economic change during the first one and a half 
decades after the Second World War. A great crowd of people kept on fleeing to Hong 
Kong from China. They created huge social tension and eventually caused political 
turmoil. On the other hand, the cheap labour, capital and the merchant equipment 
withdrawn from China after the Civil War contributed to the significant economic 
1 As Horold Ingrams, a British Journalist who travel to Hong Kong in ~950., wrote, "Hong Kong's 
economic life was dead ... public utilities were scarcely working: food, shippmg, mdustIJ: and trad:, were 
. t The place swarmed with rats malaria was rife... and lawlessness was WIdespread . See non-eXIS .,. , 
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growth in Hong Kong. It was during this period that Hong Kong's economy began to 
take off. 
The harsh conditions in the 1950s were mainly brought by a sudden increase of 
population. Many people who left during the period of Japanese occupation moved back 
to Hong Kong after the end of the Second World War. Moreover, a huge number of 
emigrants from China flowed into Hong Kong after war. The population tripled in three 
years from 600,000 in 1945 to 1,800,000 in 1947 (Lim and Liou, 1998: 11). It was the 
political instability in China that caused this huge wave of refuges. In 1947 and 1948 
during which period the Nationalists were defeated by the Communists in China, 
another wave of immigration occurred to Hong Kong. In 1950, Hong Kong introduced a 
quota system and successfully stabilized the migration flow. However, in 1958 when the 
Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune caused massive starvation in China, the 
illegal immigrants flooded in again. By 1959, a third of the population of Hong Kong 
were refugees (Hilton, 1962: 71). At the same time political instability in China made 
people living in Hong Kong feel insecure. As a consequence, a great deal of the 
population in Hong Kong migrated to other countries (Lim and Liou, 1998: 15). Hong 
Kong in this period was a lifeboat for refugees and a temporary shelter for population 
transience. 
The massive number of refugees brought cheap labour to Hong Kong. In addition, after 
the Civil War in China, there were wealthy merchants running the textile industry in 
China moving to Hong Kong with the skill, experience, capital, and equipment to restart 
their business after the Civil War. These are two important pulling factors which 
accelerated the development of the Hong Kong economy (England and Rear. 1975: 25: 
Ingrams, 1952: 243. 
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Scott, 1989: 69-70). The geographical politics also served as a pushing factor behind 
Hong Kong's industrial development. The Korean War that broke out in 1950 caused an 
embargo to be imposed on China. At the same time the democratic world then led b\' the 
U.S. started employing encirclement policy toward communistic countries. These 
situations meant that Hong Kong could no longer rely on its transit trade to survive. 
Hong Kong was forced to develop its industry to maintain economic growth (Yung, 
1999). 
The shift from transit trade to industrial manufacturing was successful. The number of 
registered factories increased from 961 in 1947 to 4,784 in 1960, and, between 1947 and 
1960, the number of people hired in manufacturing industries increased more than the 
population growth with the only exception of 1951-52 (Wong, 1997: 378-379). In the 
1950s, Hong Kong experienced an average 5 per cent of growth in trade. From 1947 to 
1960, the G.D.P. increased almost three-fold from HK$1,535 to HK$5,895 (Yung, 1992: 
460-462). 
Although the economy started growing, the situations in employment were still severe. 
The huge number of working age people, most of them were male, fled from China and 
provided a surplus of labour supply and caused massive unemployment. According to an 
official estimation, the unemployment rate in 1950 was as high as 25 per cent (England 
and Rear, 1975: 29). In addition, employers had no incentive to increase wages or to 
improve the working conditions of their workers. Many people were forced to work for 
inadequate wages under very bad working conditions. According to a sample survey of 
industrial workers' earning and expenditures in 1955, the Hong Kong worker \vas 
earning only one-third as much as his British counterpart (Saczepanik, 1958: 70-71). 
Furthermore, due to the insufficiency of adequate housing, many people had to live in 
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appaling conditions. As the Governors of Hong Kong stated in their Policy Address, in 
1951, there were estimated about 330,000 squatters (Hong Kong Hansard, 1951/2: 39). 
and in 1955, there were "some 350,000 persons - not squatters -- who were inadequately 
and squalidly housed." (Hong Kong Hansard, 1955/6: 43) This created a lot of serious 
problems in the densely populated Hong Kong, including both health and fire hazards, 
problems of water supply, and a menace to law and order (Hong Kong Hansard, 195011: 
39-4; 1954/5: 21). 
These problems caused by refugees put a tremendous strain upon governmental 
resources. The Government at one time hoped that these people would return to China 
and regarded the problem as a temporary one which would solve itself. But instead, they 
had come to stay, and the Government was compelled to take action (Hong Kong 
Hansard, 1954/5: 21). The Government thus faced severe challenges in its capacities in 
providing housing and urgent social services. As Governor Hilton pointed out in an 
address in 1959: "For the past ten years the heavy burden of caring for these refugees has 
been borne almost entirely by the Hong Kong Government. Directly and indirectly ... 
one-third of Government's annual expenditure is being spent annually by the Hong 
Kong Government on the refugees" (Hilton, 1962: 69). This financial burden caused by 
the refugees limited the government's means in both the pace and extent to which it 
could develop social services. 
The development of the social security system in Hong Kong was originally in response 
to political changes and social instability rather than the needs of the underprivileged. In 
the 1950s, there were still hardly any kind of systematic social provisions provided by 
the government. The reason for this, apart from the limitation of state capacity 
mentioned above, came from many directions. After the Second World \Yar, China 
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claimed its sovereignty over Hong Kong, and the British Government looked into the 
possibility of returning all or parts of Hong Kong to China. Moreover, the British 
colonial covernment saw the enlarged population as mobile and transient (Tang, 1998: 
51). Therefore, there was no point in providing social welfare for them. As La\\' has 
pointed out, in the 1950s, the transience of the Chinese population was frequently used 
by the government as an excuse to abstain from playing a more active role in service 
provision (Law, 1982: 46). Furthermore, thanks to economic growth, the Government 
was able to possess internal legitimacy without providing social security benefits. On 
the other hand, the British colonial government insisted in its self-sufficiency policy, as 
it "certainly doesn't want to be a burden on Great Britain" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1948/9: 
58). It employed a conservative fiscal policy and adopted an economy-first policy. It 
also stressed its laissez-faire capitalism and least-government orientation (Saczepanik, 
1958: 7). Regarding provisions for education, health and housing as its responsibility, 
the government's strategy was to encourage voluntary organisations to provide services. 
Under these circumstances, it comes no surprise that the government did not introduce 
any modem social security scheme at this stage. Although there were insufficient 
housing supplies and a huge number of people unemployed, the government enjoyed a 
financial surplus in the 1950s (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Governmental finance of Hong Kong, 1955-1960 
Financial Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus 
(1 st April to 31 st March) ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) 
1955-6 454.7 402.5 52.2 
1956-7 509.7 469.5 40.2 
1957-8 584.2 532.7 51.5 
1958-9 629.3 589.9 39..+ 
1959-60 664.6 709.9 --+5.3 
Source: Hong Kong Government, 1960: 57 
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Another reason for the limited development in social service and social security in this 
period comes from a lack of democratic development. After the end of the Second \\'orld 
War, former European colonies started a process of decolonisation to pursue 
independence and to develop democracy. However, the colonial polity of Hong Kong 
remained largely unchanged. There were proposals advocating political refonns in 1945 
and 1952, but these were abandoned due to opposition by the Governor and the 
conservative business elites who dominated the Executive Council and the Legislati\'e 
Council (Lo, 1997: 34-35). The business elites feared that the development of a 
democratic polity might cause political turbulence and thus jeopardize the economy, In 
addition, China would not tolerate any attempt to develop democracy in Hong Kong and 
saw any political reform in Hong Kong as an omen of moving toward independence 
(Scott, 1989: 69-70; Lo, 1997: 15). In addition, there was a fear that, after its victory in 
the Civil War, the Communists might carryon fighting for the sovereignty of Hong 
Kong (Lo, 1997: 36-37). Under such circumstance, any political reform toward 
democracy was unlikely to happen. On the other hand, the difficulty in control over 
ingress of population also discouraged the government to introduce a democratic system, 
as, claimed by Governor Hilton, "universal suffrage is usually exercised in a territory by 
people who consider themselves citizens of that territory, and where there is careful 
control over the ingress and egress of population" (Hilton, 1962: 13). Above all, the 
majority of the populace were not interested in political reform due to their apathy 
toward politics2 . These factors together allowed the Government to enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy and remain free from pressures to introduce comprehensive social service 
or social security system. 
2 d' H Kong's constitutional advance and democratic reform, a minute by a British official Regar mg ong 0 0 0 
d h "Ot Id be dlocficult especially in view of the effect of the prevaIlmg apathy on the workmg of state t at I wou 1J , _ 
10t O I 0 t'tutiOons" See British Government Document CO 537/16) 1, 18 Jan 19-+7, Quoted Hong Kong po I Ica ms I 0 
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Despite these disadvantageous conditions, there were some developments in social 
welfare provisions in this period. The Social Service Office was established as a 
sub-department of the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs in 1947, and the Social Welfare 
Department was set up in 1958. In addition, in response to the need of a massin~ 
population working under low wages, many of whom could not even have adequate 
food, the first public assistance scheme in the fonn of providing free meals was 
introduced in 1948. The recipients were nearly all women and children (Hong Kong 
Hansard, 1948/9: 49). During the 1950s the Government provided about 2,000 cooked 
food and dry rations every day. It was far too deficient considering that the whole 
population in Hong Kong was about two million (Chow, 1984). This scheme was too 
limited to be seen as the origin of the social security system. It did not provide any cash 
payment nor related social service. 
5.1.3 The 1960s to the 1970s: Building a homeland 
This was a period of transition. Illegal immigrants kept on flooding into Hong Kong, 
which caused social and political tensions; its economy enjoyed a very rapid growth; 
and it was in this period that the government started integrating refugees into the Hong 
Kong society and building Hong Kong as a homeland for the Chinese residents. 
The demographic trend became relatively stable as both the inflow and outflow of 
migration became more balanced during this period, and natural increase replaced 
migration as the major factor in population growth. According to the census, the 
contribution of natural increase to the total population increased from 63 per cent 
between 1951 and 1961 to 87 per cent between 1961 and 1971 (Hong Kong Cencus and 
from R. Hyam ed. Part II, 1992: 385. 
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Statistics Department, 1982: 119). The proportion of the population born in Hong Kong 
also sharply increased. According to the 1961 census, 47.7 per cent of the Hong Kong 
population was born in Hong Kong, while the 1966 by-census showed that 53.8 per cent 
of the people living in Hong Kong were born there. It was the first time in Hong Kong's 
history that more than half of the population was native-born. In addition, unlike before 
the 1950s when many Chinese came here for economic reasons and eventually returned 
back to China, more and more people had decided to stay in Hong Kong (Law, 1982: 
11-13). Although there was still a lack of a sense of belonging for people in this place, 
Hong Kong had shifted from a temporary shelter for transient people to a permanent 
home for its residents. This change had an important effect on the government's 
investment in social programmes after the late 1960s. As Governor Sir David Trench 
stated in his Policy Address in 1970: 
tiThe fundamental change which then occurred was that the population, rapidly 
swelling in numbers, also became much more static, and the numbers of those 
who could be considered long-term residents vastly increased. Hong Kong 
started to change in character, and ... social policy had to recognize this change 
by undertaking the provision of social services for vastly increased numbers ... " 
(Hong Kong Hansard, 197011: 8-9) 
There were also significant changes in the age structure of the population during this 
period. When the first census was carried out in Hong Kong in 1961, the population was 
very young. The population under the age of 15 accounted for 40.8 per cent of the total 
population, while the population over the age of 65 constituted only 2.8 per cent of the 
total population. However, the latter almost doubled in only 15 years, to 5.5 per cent in 
1976 (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996: 22). Although the 
. f ld people in Hong Kong was still low compared to its European or proportIon 0 0 er 
North American counterparts, a symptom of a rapid increase in aging population had 
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appeared. Therefore, it is no surprise that issues on provision for older people \\'ere first 
raised in this period. 
Table 5.3: Age structure of the population, Hong Kong 
Age group 1961 1971 1976 
Under 15 40.8 35.8 30.1 
15-64 56.4 59.7 64.4 
65 and over 2.8 4.5 5.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: 1996 By-census Main Report, p22, Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department. 
Meanwhile, the economy continued to develop. According to the GDP data published by 
the Government since 1966, the average economic growth rate between 1966-1979 was 
8.3 per cent. During the same period, GDP per capita based on current price increased 
from HK$ 3,779 to 21,816, a 477 per cent increase in 13 years. Ifbased on 1980 prices, 
the increase in GDP per capita during this period was still as high as 109 per cent (Wong, 
1997: 392). The flourishing economy contributed a stable and adequate source of 
income to the government which accumulated a huge sum of financial reserve. Many 
people started criticizing the government for being over-conservative in spending 
money on social dimensions, such as social policy (Chan, 1996). On the other hand, the 
rapid economic growth brought significant increase in taxation and public revenue. In 
the ten years from 1961 to 1970, public revenue grew by an average of 11 per cent 
annually (Hong Kong Hansard, 197112: 4). This increase in government revenue lifted 
the Government's capacity to spend on social investments - a task which had been 
postponed for one and a half decades since the end of Second World War - without 
having to increase taxation and thus was able to avoid opposition from the business 
elites (Scott, 1989: 127-8). 
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Despite rapid economic growth, the problems of insufficient job opportunity and lack of 
decent and adequate housing were not solved. These problems deepened social tensions 
and eventually caused riots. In 1966, a riot came about and lasted for a few nights, 
during which one person was killed and property damage was high. The report on the 
riots drafted by the government came to the conclusion that they were sparked off by 
economic causes and the lack of a sense ofbelonging. This report also called for refonns 
in social policies such as housing and education and for improvements in social 
environment and working conditions (England and Rear, 1975: 5; Chan, 1996: 86). In 
1967, a more serious riot broke out in May and the political unrest lasted until December 
during which period many people organized a series of protests against the colonial 
government. The militant Red Guards in China and many local dissidents wanted the 
immediate return of Hong Kong to China (Tang, 1998: 65). This was the first time after 
the Second World War that there was a disturbance which directly challenged the 
legitimacy of the government and lasted for such a long period of time (Chan, 1996: 86). 
These political tensions were important backgrounds against which the government 
started implementing social welfare programmes in the late 1960s (Law, 1982: 44-45; 
Scott, 1989: 152). 
The demographic, economIC and political situations discussed above led to the 
government's intention to build Hong Kong into a more integrated society for all its 
residents, including the refugees. From the 1960s, "integration" and "community 
building" became important issues that frequently appeared in political leaders' 
addresses. As Governor Sir Robert Black stated in his Policy Address in 1961: 
"It is important that those who wish to knOlt' about Hong Kong ... should see 
bl ne o>jrefugee integration not just one of refugee relief. .. Ire our pro em as a :J' ' -
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have offered shelter and we have offered it in the form of integration ... Our 
hope is to make this integration successful, not just for Hong Kong as a 
community, but for every soul who lives here, that he or she ma), enjo)' 
freedom from want. " 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1961/2: 32) 
Social services had become a means for social integration. In addition, according to the 
Governors' Address, they were also good tools to "make Hong Kong a better place to 
live in" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1965/6: 313), to "build a society ... in which there is 
mutual care and responsibility" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1976/7: 25), and for "the building 
of our community and its channels of communications with its government" (Hong 
Kong Hansard, 1976/7: 26). In other words, social welfare became a means for state 
building. However, to some extent, the government was still reluctant to expand its role 
in this field. There are some reasons for this. First, the provision of social services was 
contradictory to the government's doctrine of laissez-faire (Law, 1982: 45-6). The 
Financial Secretary for the 1960s, John Cowperwaite, and his successor for the years 
from 1972 to 1982, Phillip Haddon-Cave, were both free market advocates and insisted 
in non-intervention policy (Lau, 1977: 269). Second, the government and the business 
elites feared that increasing social welfare might lead to increased taxation (Hong Kong 
Hansard, 1965/6:311) and jeopardize Hong Kong's competitiveness in international 
trade (Hong Kong Hansard, 1964/5: 38-39). Third, the government believed that 
extended help would weaken the Chinese tradition of family responsibility for its 
members (Hong Kong Hansard, 1965/6: 309). 
Despite the disadvantageous conditions, there were big improvements in social services 
and the social security system during this period. In 1965 the government published its 
first White Paper regarding social welfare, titled "Ain1s and Policy for Social Welfare in 
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Hong Kong". However, we can hardly see any policy guidance or planning for the future 
in this report. It was merely a report to justify the lack of government action to carry out 
social policy. It stressed that, considering the vital importance for the government to 
develop Hong Kong's economy, and the fact that the traditional function of the family 
was still strong, "it is not realistic ... to plan for the establishment of fully comprehensive 
social security and social welfare services (Hong Kong Government, 1965: 7). 
In 1966, the British government sent Professor Williams, a Professor at the University of 
London, to go to Hong Kong to give advice about social policy. Her advice was that the 
extended family system was no longer capable of carrying out its traditional functions of 
looking after older people and there was a need for a social insurance system (Williams, 
1966). In 1967, an inter-departmental working party was set up to examine the feasible 
development of Hong Kong's social security system. A report was published by the 
working party in 1967 calling for the introduction of a comprehensive social insurance 
system. It appealed that "social insurance for old age and survivorship benefit and for 
employment injury benefit should be introduced as soon as possible after sickness 
benefit and medical care insurance have been successfully established" (Hong Kong 
Government, 1967: 221). However, the government rejected the proposal. Instead, a 
tax -funded, means-tested scheme was introduced in 1971. 
The public assistance scheme which implemented in 1971 was the first scheme that 
offered cash payments to those in need. This scheme was means-tested, and the 
able-bodied, defined as aged from 15 to 55, were excluded. Therefore, to some 
b 't hared some elements with the antecedent Poor Law, and was set out in o servers, 1 s 
h to ml'nimize cost (Heppel and Webb, 1973; Jones, 1990a). suc a way as 
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In 1973, the second White Paper regarding the development of social \\"elfare \\"as 
published, titled "Social Welfare in Hong Kong: The Way Ahead". In this Paper, the 
government clearly stated its reason for not implementing social insurance: 
" while there may be no overriding technical reason why social insurance 
should not be considered as suitable for Hong Kong, there are a number of 
practical objections which, in the Government 50 view, argue against the 
introduction of social insurance in Hong Kong. Foremost amongst these is the 
fact that a social insurance is usually built round the payment of compulsol'}' 
contributions. The Government does not believe that such a system \\'ould be 
generally acceptable to the people of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the 
alternative of making employers alone responsible for funding the scheme would 
place a heavy financial burden on them and so affect their competitiveness in 
overseas markets. In any event, even if these obstacles were overcome, it would 
not be possible to build up the necessary administrative machinery without a 
fairly lengthy preparatory period. Social insurance, therefore, is not judged to 
be the right way in which social security in Hong Kong should develop at this 
state. " 
(Hong Kong Government, 1973: 19) 
Therefore, the government rejected proposals for the social insurance system and 
implemented this tax-funded, non-contributory scheme instead. To the government, it 
"can be introduced much more quickly ... without building up a new administrative 
structure" and is "less complicated and less expensive than that for a social insurance" 
(Hong Kong Government, 1973: 19). 
It was in the same year that the demogrants named Disability and Infirmity Allowances 
. I nted according to the White Paper to offer aid to those who were in need 
were Imp erne , ' 
d t II'gl'ble for social assistance. These included Special Needs Allowances an were no e 
which offered benefits to older infirm people, defined as those over 75 years old, and 
I d· bl d and Normal Old Age Allowance \vhich provided payment to those severe y Isa e , 
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aged 65 and over. The fonner was non-means-tested while the latter was means-tested. 
These were the first social security schemes especially targeted at older people in Hong 
Kong. In 1978, the eligible age for Special Needs Allowances was adjusted from 75 to 
70 years old. 
The introduction of these allowances was in line with the government's orientation that 
the social security system only targeted the most deprived groups. As the public 
assistance scheme "had to help those who were by definition the worst off financially", 
these allowances were to provide help "on the next most vulnerable groups in the 
community who were least able to support themselves" (Hong Kong Government, 1973: 
20). The 1977 Green Paper on social security, "Help for Those Least Able to Help 
Themselves", confinned again this strategy by both its title and its content. In 1979, the 
third White Paper regarding social welfare, titled "Social Welfare into the 80s" was 
published. However, there were barely any in-depth discussions about the social needs 
and welfare plans in the 80s. In the same year, public assistance was extended to the 
able-bodied. 
Since the mid 1970s, there were numerous debates over the necessity of introducing a 
social insurance or a provident fund to meet the need of retirement. Opposite positions 
were held by two clear camps among which social workers and labour unions were in 
favor and businessmen and industrialists were strongly against it (Tang, 1998). In 1974, 
the Secretary of Social Welfare pointed out in an oral session in the Legislative Council 
that the government was not going to implement a mandatory provident fund as people 
in Hong Kong would not be willing to pay the contribution (Hong Kong Hansard, 
1974/5: 125). In 1977, a semi-compulsory social insurance plan was rejected by the 
The reasons that the government was not willing to in1plement social government. 
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security schemes were mainly two-fold, the opposition of employers and the uncertainty 
over Hong Kong's future, the reasons that the government could not admit and manifest 
(Chow, 1988). The right time for the emergence of a comprehensive old age income 
security system was yet to come. 
5.1.4 The 1980s to the 1990s: The coming of plural politics 
Hong Kong in this period experienced huge change in its polity as the British 
colonisation came to an end. During the preparation for the takeover, the British 
administration, the Chinese government, and the people of Hong Kong contested the 
future of Hong Kong. The emergence of a direct-election system reduced the 
government's dominance in the polity and the government at this state had to contest 
with other political forces against policy issues. Meanwhile, the signs of the coming of 
an ageing society became more obvious. The issue on whether or not to introduce a 
contributory old age benefit scheme became a subject for political battle in this period. 
The demographic changes in Hong Kong became more severe when it entered the 1980s. 
The proportion of people aged 65 and over doubled again in 25 years from 5.5 per cent 
in 1976 to 11.1 per cent in 2001 (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996: 
22 & 2002). The proportion of older people was higher than any countries in Asia apart 
from Japan. On the other hand, the proportion of people below 15 years old had been 
following a declining trend with a sharper rate, from 24.8 per cent to 16.5 per cent in the 
same period (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996: 22 & 2002). An 
ageing society had emerged in Hong Kong. At the same time, the family structures were 
also experiencing significant changes. The proportion of nuclear families was increasing 
whilst the proportion of extended families was decreasing. In 1996, the former counted 
for 63.6 per cent of the total households while the latter counted for 11.1 per cent (Hong 
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Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996: 41). Another important demographic 
trend in Hong Kong in this period is that the population had become more 
'Hongkongnized'. The proportion of people born in Hong Kong continued to increase. 
The 1996 by-census data shows that 60.3 per cent of the population was born in Hong 
Kong and 79.5 per cent of the population have been living in Hong Kong for more than 
10 years (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996: 29). Although there is 
still a significant proportion of people born in China or holding a Chinese passport, 90.4 
per cent of the entire population held a Britain Overseas Passport, meaning that they had 
the right of residence only in Hong Kong; or held a Chinaese Passport but take Hong 
Kong as their permanent abode (Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996: 
24-25). This demographic picture signifies that, to people living in this area, Hong Kong 
was no longer merely a harbour of refugees, but a resident homeland. An empirical 
survey carried out in 1985 also showed that a large proportion of respondents (59.5%) 
identified themselves as "Hongkongese" rather than "Chinese" when they were asked to 
choose between these two (Lau and Luan, 1988: 2). As a consequence, people's 
expectatione of the Hong Kong government increased. These demographic shifts are 
important forces that drove governmental political and social reforms in this period. 
Meanwhile, Hong Kong's economy followed the trends of the growth in the 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s, then experienced huge fluctuations subsequently, suffering 
from the financial upheavals that swept Asia in 1997. The contagious impact of the 
Asian financial crisis brought Hong Kong its worst economic downturn for half a 
century. In 1998, consumer spending fell by 6.6 per cent in real terms, the spending on 
investment dropped by 5.8 per cent, and the total export of goods dropped by 4.3 per 
cent (Hong Kong government, 1998). The result was a fall in GDP of 5.1 per cent. 
Fortunately, Hong Kong soon recovered from the economic turbulence before the end of 
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the twentieth century and enjoyed 10.5 per cent of growth in GDP in 2000 (Hong Kong 
Commerce & Industry Bureau, 2001). The financial crisis did not alter Hong Kong's 
policy towards the economy and public finance. By the contrast, it reinforced the 
government's beliefs and commitments to its fundamental principles. In the 2000 budget 
speech, the Minister of the Treasury reaffirmed three economic and fiscal believes, 
including: the economy must be market-led; the government must stick to its rule of 
'maximum support and minimum intervention' (Hong Kong government, 2000). 
The government's orientation toward economic, financial and fiscal policies remained 
mainly the same as before 1997. The factor that had the most impact on the development 
of the social security system in this period was the huge change in the political situation. 
The negotiation between Britain and China, started in the early 1980s regarding Hong 
Kong's future, raised people's concern on political issues (Tsang, 1995: 277). Beijing's 
promises that Hong Kong would continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and that 
Hong Kong's capitalist system and lifestyle will remain unchanged for 50 years after the 
establishment of the Special Administration Region (SAR) did not sound convincing to 
the Hongkongese. The Hong Kong people's lack of confidence in the face of 
communists and fear about their future, coupled with Britain's desire to withdraw from 
Hong Kong in glory and their hope of protecting Hong Kong's autonomy vis-a.-vis 
China after 1997, resulted in furious political reforms in the 1980s and the 1990s (Lo, 
1997: 68-69). These reforms changed Hong Kong's situation in every aspect. 
Concerning social policies, the establishment of political parties and reforms of the 
election system have proved to have huge impacts on the policy-making process and the 
direction of policy development. 
In 1990, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong 
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SAR) was promulgated by the People's Congress of the People's Republic of China as 
Hong Kong's institution to protect people's rights and interests. Concerning social 
welfare, it states that 'Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in 
accordance with the law. The welfare benefits and retirement security of the labour force 
shall be protected by law' (Basic Law, 1990, Article 36), and that 'On the basis of the 
previous social welfare system, the Government of the Hong Kong SAR shall, on its 
own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of its system in the light 
of economic conditions and social needs' (Basic Law, 1990, Article 145). Clearly, the 
Basic Law confirms the position of social welfare and concedes that certain 
improvements are necessary, but they can only be made under the precondition of 
economic development. In other words, the SAR is expecting to see itself sticking 
continuously to its economy-first policies, that have been adopted since the end of World 
War Two for the foreseeable future. However, with the political reforms since the 1980s, 
especially the regular direct election of the members of the Legislative Council, the 
issues related to social welfare have become political matters. Neither the SAR 
authorities nor any political group alone can dominate social welfare development. 
It was not until 1990 that political parties were allowed to be organized, and there were 
not direct elections for members of the Legislative Council before 1991. The Legislative 
Council was established in 1844 and, before 1985, its members were all appointed by 
the Governor. In 1985, the first ever elections to the Council were held, and 24 out of 57 
members were elected by functional constituencies and other official institutes (Hong 
Kong Legislative Council, 2001). In 1991, Hong Kong voters were permitted to elect 
some of its members under full adult suffrage. This was the first time in Hong Kong's 
history that people could vote directly for the members of the Legislative Council, even 
though it was just a small proportion of the Council. It was not until 1995 that it became 
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a fully elected legislature. 
Since the first direct election to the Legislative Council in 1991, the British 
administration had lost its domination in the legislature and started facing challenges in 
policy making from different political forces. The introduction of a direct election 
system also contributed to the emergence of party politics. To compete in the first partial 
popular Legislative Council election, the first party in Hong Kong, United Democrats of 
Hong Kong, was organized in 1990 and the era of political competition began (Tsang, 
1995: 277). The government could no longer monopolize politics and had lost its 
autonomy in policy-making process. 
The election since 1991 also contributed to huge changes in Hong Kong people's 
attitudes toward social welfare. Among the candidates campaigning for elected seats in 
the Legislative Council in 1991, nearly all of them pledged that they would support the 
introduction of a scheme to provide income protection in old age (Chow, 1998). These 
political campaigns not only put the government under pressure, but also made some 
people begin to believe that the government should be held responsible for their welfare. 
Studies conducted since the early 1990s on people's attitudes toward responsibility for 
welfare have clearly indicated a shift from perceiving it as family obligation to seeing it 
as a shared responsibility between the government and the family (Tam and Yeung, 
1994). These are such important pulling forces that the government finally proposed 
introducing contributory social security schemes, the schemes that the government had 
denied had been necessary or practical since the 1970s, to protect older people's income 
security. 
In fact, the issue for establishing a scheme to protect older people's income security had 
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become a popular subject for political debate since the late 1980s. The matter was not 
only whether an old-age income security scheme was to be established, but also, for 
those who advocated it, what kind of programme was to be chosen. These issues raised a 
big debate on May 13, 1987 in the Legislature Council3. However, the idea of 
introducing a contributory old age income security scheme was once again rejected by 
the government. In November 1991, the government changed its passive position to 
active strategies by setting up an inter-department Working Group on Retirement 
Protection (WGRP) (Hong Kong government, 1992: 2). In October 1992, a consultant 
paper titled "A Community-Wide Retirement Protection System" was published 
proposing a mandatory retirement scheme for all employees in full-time employment 
under the age of 65 unless specially exempted. It proposed that either pension or lump 
sum schemes, or a combination of both, should be permitted under the retirement 
protection system (Hong Kong Government, 1992). However, this proposal did not gain 
majority support within the community because, among other reasons, it did not help 
those outside the workforce (Hong Kong Hansard, 1995: 2493). 
The government was fully aware of the fact that "there is a powerful sentiment within 
this (Legislative) Council and among the community at large in support of more 
comprehensive arrangements to cover the entire workforce" and was trying to find a 
way "to respond to this sentiment." (Hong Hong Hansard, 1992:23). In December 1993, 
the second consultation document, entitled "An Old Age Pension Scheme for Hong 
Kong" was released. When the consultation period ended, a total 6,665 written 
submissions were received showing that public opinion on this programme was "at best 
divided" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1995: 2493). The government and social workers were 
in the support camp, while economists were in the opposing camp. Both of them used 
3 See Hong Kong Hansard, 1986/7: 1531-1611. 
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mass media to advocate their preference4 (Lei, 1998: 8). 
In 1994, another consultation paper titled "Taking the Worry out of Growing Old" was 
published. In this paper, the government comprehensively compared the two approaches 
of a central provident fund and a pay-as-you-go old age pension scheme. The former, 
like that in Singapore, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is a fully-funded 
scheme with contributions made by employees and their employer. This approach was 
relatively preferred by business society as it was considered to be less harmful to the 
economic development. This scheme would also free the government from financial 
responsibilities apart from administrative costs. However, this kind of scheme only 
covered those who participated in the labour market and it would take decades for 
labourers to build up a sufficient fund for retirement. The pay-as-you-go scheme, on the 
other hand, could provide immediate benefits to the vast majority of the populace, 
including low-income employees, housewives and retirees. However, it would cause a 
heavy burden to the government in the long-run (Hong Kong Government, 1994). The 
consultation paper made a clear decision between these two options. It stated, "[h]aving 
examined the other retirement protection options i.e. a central provident fund (CPF) and 
a mandatory privately-run retirement protection scheme (RPS), Government has 
concluded that only an OPS (Old Age Pension Scheme) would be capable of meeting the 
community sentiment within a reasonably short time" (Hong Kong Government, 1994: 
1). 
On the other hand, from 1993 to 1995, there were no less than six motions proposed by 
members and passed by the Legislative Council urging the government to implement an 
4 For instance, seventy-eight scholars, mainly economists, singed a letter opposing the proposed 
pay-as-you-go old age pension scheme in favour of a central provident fund system and published it in 
mass media on September 1, 1994 (Lei, 1998: 9). 
156 
old age income security scheme. In March 1995, the government, claiming that there 
was no clear public consensus on this issue and that there seemed to be widespread 
opinion in favor of a private mandatory central provident fund program, announced the 
abandoning of the proposed pay-as-you-go Old Age Pension Scheme system. The 
Secretary for Education and Manpower proposed a motion in the Legislative Council 
urging that the government implement a private mandatory retirement income 
protection system. As a result of intensive canvassing, the motion was approved by the 
Council by a vote of 28 against 21 (Hong Kong Hansard, 1995: 2013-2068). In April, 
the Mandatory Provident Fund Office was established. The Legislative Council 
approved of the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance in 1995 and the 
subsidiary legislation in 1998. The debates in favor of different programs had finally 
tailed off and a new system for protecting retirement income security had been brought 
into practice. 
5.2 Governmental orientation toward provisions for older people 
As in the last chapter, this section is to examine the Hong Kong government's attitude 
toward provisions for older people by analyzing Governors' policy addresses and state 
secretaries' statements in the legislature. Although the universal suffrage to the 
Legislative Council did not come to realisation until 1985, Governors of Hong Kong 
have been giving policy addresses each year in the legislature since its establishment 
like other democratic countries. Before 1997, the Governor of Hong Kong was 
appointed by Britain. He was the head of the Executive Council, the administration body 
of Hong Kong, and the chairman of the Legislative Council, the legislature body. Before 
1985, he appointed all members of these two councils. In other words, he was able to 
implement all policies under his preference. Even after the people in Hong Kong were 
given universal suffrage in 1985 to elect members of the Legislature, the Governor still 
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enjoyed supreme governance as he was not elected by people in Hong Kong but 
appointed by the British authority. Therefore, his policy addresses are the best materials 
to understand the government's orientation and preference in each policy area. 
In the field of social policy, Governors' policy addresses after the Second World War 
clearly showed the government's reluctance to see its expansion. The main reasons for 
this are economic considerations. As discussed above, political leaders strongly believed 
that Hong Kong's prosperity depends on trade. It has long adopted an economic-first 
orientation for development. A low tax system and a minimum intervention of the 
government toward the force of the market are regarded as essential conditions for 
international competitiveness. Therefore, it is no surprise that the government is against 
the ideas of increasing tax and building a welfare state. In 1962, Governor Sir Robert 
Black stated in his policy address: 
"In a full welfare state, where welfare services go hand in hand with steeply 
progressive personal taxation, the administrative convenience of providing 
free or nominally priced services to rich and poor alike is not seriously 
prejudiced by considerations of equity. We do not have a steeply progressive 
taxation system and I often wonder whether the substantial subsidies we give, 
for example, in education, to all, irrespective of ability to pay, are really 
justified ... It is true that we have some leeway, too, on taxation before it is 
heavy enough to do serious damage to the economy. But... as our public 
services grow the margin between revenue and expenditure narrows, not 
only do we have to be concerned about the danger of the one overtaking the 
other but there is also the fact that we will no longer have an adequate 
surplus to help finance capital expenditure. " 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1962: 57-58) 
Clearly, the government saw the expansion of social welfare as a threat to governmental 
finance and economic growth. The government insisted on its policy of financial 
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prudence and low tax system. In 1984, the Financial Secretary pointed out in his Budget 
Speech that the revenue just accounted for 11.3 per cent of GDP, much lower compared 
to 50.3 per cent in Sweden; 40.0 per cent in Britain, 31.2 per cent in USA, and 26.9 per 
cent in Japan (Hong Kong Hansard, 1983/4: 591). However, instead of proposing a 
financial plan to increase taxation, he emphasized again the government's insistence of a 
minimum government. He stated: 
" ... the majority in Hong Kong have by now learned, I believe, the lessons that 
income must be earned before it is spent; that incentives must be offered,· that 
taxation should moderate... and above all that growth of public sector 
expenditure must be related to growth in G.D.? " 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1983/84: 591) 
The government was reluctant to expand public expenditure, even at a time of financial 
surplus. Its intention was to keep the social services system at a minimum scale, in line 
with its least-intervention ideology. In Hong Kong, the functions of the social welfare 
system were not to improve equality, income distribution, or social solidarity, but just to 
provide a safety net for the deprived people. This philosophy never changed under the 
British governance. As recently as 1996, Governor Chris Patten admitted in his Policy 
Address that "Hong Kong recently spends on welfare about the same as it spends on 
perfume and cosmetics each year." (Hong Kong Hansard, 1996: 25) He also stated that 
"Quite deliberately, our welfare system does not exist to iron out inequality. It 
does not exist to redistribute income. Our welfare programmes have a different 
purpose. They exist because this community believes that we have a duty to 
provide a safety net to protect the vulnerable and the disadvantaged members of 
society, the unfortunate minority who, through no fault of their own, are left 
behind by growing prosperity enjoyed by the rest of Hong Kong. " 
(Hong Kong Hansard, 1996: 24) 
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In line with the least-intervention orientation toward economy, the government regards 
the responsibility to look after people in need as a family matter and thus has no 
intention to interfere. The fact that the people of Hong Kong are ethnically Chinese who 
have a tradition of strong family cohesion is often used by the government as an excuse 
for not expending the social welfare system. This cohesion relieves the government's 
burden in providing service and aid to people in need, and the government certainly 
does not wish to replace or jeopardize it. As the Colonial Secretary stated in the 
Legislature in 1965: 
"Government's first reason (for not proceeding more comprehensive social 
welfare services) is that extended help would weaken the Chinese tradition of 
family responsibility for its members who find themselves in need, and that it 
would be bad if they came to rely on Government and shed their own 
responsibilities. " 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1965: 309) 
Therefore, the government's strategy is to minimize the number of people who are 
eligible for benefits. When the first cash benefits for older people were introduced in the 
early 1970s, two conditions of age and means-test were adopted to limit the number of 
beneficiaries. First, the universal allowance for older people was called "Infirmity 
Allowances", and the eligible age for this benefit was as high as 75 years old. The 
second benefit for older people, Normal Old Age Allowance is for people aged 65 and 
above. However, it is a means-tested scheme. Therefore, only those families that proved 
to have insufficient means to support their aged members can be eligible for this benefit. 
The belief in family obligation by the government has never changed. After the hand 
over in 1997, the Secretary for Health and Welfare emphasized again in the Legislatiye 
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Council that it is the family's responsibility "to take care of and support their elderly 
members", and the government's responsibility is only to offer assistance "for those 
elderly people who have no one to lean on" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1997:183). In 
addition, the purpose of providing cash benefits for older people is not to promote their 
independence from their family or to replace the family's obligation to look after them. 
Rather, it is to reinforce family cohesion. As the Secretary of Health and Welfare 
pointed out, "[t]his allowance (old age allowance) is intended to encourage families to 
continue to look after their elderly members" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1987/88: 1583). 
On the other hand, the existence of family cohesion was one of the main reasons that the 
government used to reject introducing a contributory old age income maintenance 
scheme when it became a hot political issue in the 1980s and the early 1990s. In a long 
debate on whether to introduce such a scheme or not in May 1987, both the Secretary for 
Health and Welfare and the Secretary for Education and Manpower took the opposition 
stand. The main reason they gave was family cohesion. The Secretary for Health and 
Welfare stated: 
"According to the by-census, in 1986 over 80 per cent of elderly lived with 
their family ... the statistics I have quoted do not indicate that there is a general 
breakdown of the extended family system ... " 
(Hong Kong Hansard, 1987/88: 1584) 
While the Secretary for Education and Manpower stated: 
"People tend to remain fit and active to a more advanced age and are working 
longer. The proportion of old people drawing public assistance has remained 
small and there is no evidence at present that families are either less able or less 
willing to support their elderly members. " 
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(Hong Kong Hansard, 1987/88: 1586) 
These statements clearly reveal a residual approach towards social security. In the 
responsibility of supporting older people, the government comes after the family and the 
labour market. It has no intention of introducing social security schemes to increase the 
degree of de-familisation or de-commodification for older people. Although there are 
cash benefits for older people, the purpose is to reinforce the familisation of older 
people's support rather than defamilize it. When the government could no longer resist 
political pressure and finally implemented a contributory old age income protection 
scheme, it chose to adopt a private-managed provident fund scheme. Older people's 
financial resources after retirement still, to a large extent, rely on their own contribution 
during their working career. In other words, it has only a limited effect of 
de-commodification. The next section will discuss these aspects further by examining 
each of the existent schemes. 
In summary, in consideration of international competitiveness and economic growth, 
Hong Kong's government has no intention to expand the scale of its social investment. It 
has never changed its preference for taking family as the best solution to the coming 
aging era. Its believe and emphasis on family obligation to look after its older members 
after their retirement appeared in Governors' and state Secretaries' statements repeatedly 
through the 1950s to the 1990s. However, due to its long-standing philosophy of 
least-intervention, the government did not take any action, such as enacting a 
Maintenance of Parents Act, as happened in Singapore in 1995, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter, to enforce this obligation. Instead, it took the tradition of such family 
functions as an excuse for not introducing or expanding the old age income protection 
system. This strategy was successful through the 1950s to the mid 1980s during which 
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period the government was actually the sole political power and no other party could 
challenge it in the policy making process. After the later 1980s when the introduction of 
a contributory old age benefit attracted public concern and parliamentary debates, the 
government still tried to rej ect the urge for introducing such schemes by emphasizing 
the existence of strong family cohesion. However, with the progress in political reform, 
the government had lost the autonomy in policy making and finally had to implement a 
de-familisation scheme, the MPF, for older people's income protection. 
5.3 An analysis on the old age income security system: familisation or 
de-familsation? 
Hong Kong's old age income protection system comprises three main schemes: the 
Mandatory Provident Fund scheme, the Old Age Allowance scheme, and the 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance. The first were are introduced to provide 
income for people after retirement or upon reaching a certain age, while the last one is 
for those who lack financial resources, among them older people is the majority. 
5.3.1 The Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) scheme 
The CSSA scheme was introduced in 1993 to replace the original Public Assistance 
scheme, introduced in 1971. It also extended its coverage and significantly increased the 
standard rates for benefits (Hong Kong Government, 1996: 2). However, the 
fundamental elements of this scheme, including the means-test process and ungenerous 
benefits covering only basic needs, remained the same. When it was first introduced, it 
even excluded the able bodied, defined as people aged between 15 and 55 years old. 
These elements made it difficult to be eligible. It was often regarded as a "Poor Law" by 
critics (e. g. Jones, 1990a). 
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Since its predecessor, the Public Assistance scheme, was introduced, old age became the 
main reason for people to claim this benefit. This feature has not changed since its 
implementation in 1993(see Table 5.4. Old age accounted for about two-thirds of all 
cases till the early 1990s. It was not until the mid 1990s when Hong Kong suffered from 
a economic recession that the unemployed cases increased and the old age cases 
declined. However, it still accounted for more than half of the total cases. Therefore, this 
scheme was important in supporting older people and their family. Before the 1990s, the 
government frequently argued that many older people were already supported by this 
scheme when it defended its position for not introducing a contributory old age income 
protection scheme. 
Table 5.4Number ofCSSA (Public Assistant scheme) cases by type 
1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1998/99 
Old Age 29,262 40,214 44,806 84,243 124,304 
Total 45,813 63,713 66,675 136,201 232,819 
% 63.9 63.1 67.2 6l.9 53.4 
Sources: Hong Kong Social and Economic Trends 
The feature of this scheme that has the most important effect on a family is its nature of 
means-test, which is based on household rather than individual income. In the 
means-test process, a household is defined as people living with family members under 
the same roof and enjoying the benefit of shared household facilities. Based on the belief 
that the income-earners have a responsibility of supporting other family members who 
have no financial means, the resources and the needs of the whole family are taken into 
account when assessing a family's eligibility for the CSSA scheme. In other words, it 
required an admission of family failure in order to qualify (Jones, 1990a). 
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In the case of older people, the process of means-test is operated in the following ways: 
H ••• where an elderly applicant is living physically apart from his adult children 
and claims that he is not supported by them, the Social Welfare Department 
processes the claim in the normal way, and the usual conditions attached to 
public assistance applies. Where an elderly applicant lives under the same roof 
as his adult child or children and there are contradictory claims from the parties 
concerned, eligibility for public assistance would have to be determined on the 
basis of the departmental investigator s observations of the daily pattern of life 
of the applicant, supplemented by any evidence of the source of support. In the 
absence of any concrete evidence to the contrary, sharing of cooking utensils 
and meals with independent adult children would usually be taken as prima 
facie evidence of support by the latter, and the family would have to be assessed 
as a unit for public assistance purposes. " 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1979/80: 278) 
This process may cause some problems and results in a rejection of an older applicant. 
Practically, when older people who have children apply for the CSSA benefits, a written 
declaration signed by their children saying that they are not supporting them might be 
required. However, in a society where filial piety is still a common value, some children 
are not willing to do so as this will make them lose face. As a consequence, 
administrative staff have to make the decision by subjective judgements which in some 
cases lead to a rejection of the applicants (Mo, 1993: 89). 
The principle of assessing the whole family'S resources may also result in a separation 
between older people and their children for the sake of being eligible. It seems 
understandable if older people who want to apply for the CSSA benefits ask their 
children to move out of the same roof in order for them to be eligible for the benefits. 
Just like in the United States in the 1960s a mother would choose to live with her 
children, apart from her children's father, in order to be eligible for AFDC (Aid to 
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Families with Dependent Children) benefits, as its regulations prohibited benefits if 
there is 'a man in the house' (Murray, 1984: 156-162). However, this is very unlikely to 
happen. Hong Kong is a one of the most densely populated cities with one of the highest 
housing costs in the world. Members of a household that might potentially be eligible for 
the means-tested public assistance scheme can hardly afford to set up another home. For 
the same reason, due to the ungenerous benefit rates, the CSSA benefits can hardly 
enable the beneficiaries to live independently without pooling their resources with their 
family. In other words, the CSSA benefits can not have any significant effect on the 
degree of de-familisation. 
5.3.2 Old Age Allowance (OAA) 
The OAA was first introduced in 1973 and was called Infirmity Allowance. It was a 
flat-rate, non-contributory, non-means-tested universal benefit for people aged 75 and 
over. In 1978, the eligible age was lowered to 70 years old and it changed into the 
present name. In 1987, the government proposed to lower the eligible age to 65 and 
employ a means-test process. This proposal encountered severe opposition so that only 
people aged between 65 and 69 needed to go through a means test. As a consequence, 
the OAA was practically divided into two benefits. First, the Normal Old Age 
Allowance (NOAA) is a means-tested benefit for people aged between 65 and 69. 
Second, the Higher Old Age Allowance (HOAA) is a universal demogrant payable for 
people aged 70 or above. 
Its original name, the Infirmity Allowance, tells its own tale that initially it targeted only 
the most deprived people. After lowering eligible ages, the number of beneficiaries of 
OAA has increased dramatically. By the end of 1998, 63 per cent of people aged 65 or 
above received these benefits. However, due to its low benefit rates, it can hardly 
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improve older people's financial situation. In the year 2002, the monthly benefit level 
for the NOAA is as low as $625 (equivalent to about £60), and for the HOAA is 5705. 
These rates are equivalent to only one-quarter of the standard rate of the public 
assistance scheme, the CSSA benefits, payable to an able-bodied person aged above 65 
years old. The fact that the rates are so low has made these benefits be regarded as "fruit 
grants", meaning this benefit serves as pocket money for older people to buy fruits5. 
Theoretically, a demogrant like the HOAA could be an ideal scheme for de-familisation. 
It is payable to all citizens above a certain age without requiring any conditions such as 
means test and records of contribution or labour force participation. However, the low 
benefit rates of the HOAA lead to a result that these benefits hardly have any significant 
effect on the de-familisation of older people's financial support. As discussed in the 
previous section, the purpose of the government's implementation of these benefits is 
not to replace but to reinforce family cohesion. It is impossible for older people to live 
solely by these benefits without relying on other financial support. With the absence of 
other old age benefits, the family is the only resource that older people can count on if 
they have financial difficulties after retirement. In addition, , these benefits, despite 
being very limited, would to some extent relieve children's financial burden for 
supporting their parents. Therefore, they would promote children's willingness to look 
after their parents and thus increase the degree of familisation rather than de-familisation 
of older people's financial support. 
Its low benefit rates were also the reason that, despite the existence of an Old Age 
Allowance, there had been a long campaign for a contributory old age income protection 
scheme by scholars and politicians, especially since the late 1980s. After aln10st a 
5 This point was made by Professor N.W.S. Chow of Department of Social Work and Social 
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decade's debate, a provident fund was finally established to protect older people's 
income after retirement. 
5.3.3 Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) 
This is the first and sole contributory old age income protection scheme in Hong Kong. 
The Ordinance was first enacted in 1995 and amended in March 1998. It was then 
supplemented by subsidiary legislation enacted in April 1998 and May 1999 
respectively, and came into operation in 2000. Based on the regulations, all employers 
except those who have set up an occupational retirement scheme for their employees are 
required to arrange all their relevant employees to join a registered MPF scheme. Under 
this scheme, an employee and his/her employer both contribute 5% of hislher relevant 
wages to a private-managed, fully funded provident fund. The employees may withdraw 
the lump sum benefit in the MPF scheme once they attain retirement age, normally 65 
years of age. The self-employed under the age of 65 are also required to join a registered 
MPF scheme and contribute 5 per cent of their relevant income for the protection of their 
retirement. By March 2001, 82 per cent of employers, 92 per cent of employees, and 90 
per cent of self-employed had joined a MPF scheme (Hong Kong Mandatory Provident 
Fund Authority, 2001: 89). 
Although now regarded as the first pillar of the old age income protection system by the 
government, this scheme is merely a compulsory individual saving plan rather than a 
social security scheme. The amount of money a retired person can have depends mainly 
on the amount of money he or she had contributed during his or her participation in the 
labour market. It has no effect on interpersonal income distribution. In addition, it does 
not offer any help to those who for one reason or another have not participated in the 
Administration, University of Hong Kong, at an interview with the author on October 28, 2000. 
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labour market, among whom many are the most deprived. People who have a fragmental 
record in labour market participation, most of whom are likely to women, will also find 
themselves in a disadvantageous financial position after retirement. In other words, just 
as the social insurance system in Taiwan, this scheme creates an unequal world after 
retirement that mirrors the class stratification in the labour market. That is, people who 
enjoy an advantageous position in the labour market will also have a better payment 
after retirement, and vice versa. 
Despite the lack of social functions, the MPF is no doubt a de-familisation scheme. Both 
the contributions and the payments are based on individuals' status and have nothing to 
do with their family. There is no mechanism for mutual support between family 
members in this scheme. In addition, people who accumulate a reasonable fund during 
their working age might have sufficient financial resources to maintain a decent life after 
retirement without having to rely on family support. However, the effect and the degree 
of de-familisation of this scheme is not through the input of the government's resources, 
but the participation in the labour market, the sector of commodification. The 
government only plays a role of regulator and does not provide any financial resources 
for people who attend this scheme. The levels of protection that employees can enjoy 
after retirement depends on the continuity of their participation in the labour market and 
the levels of their wage. In other words, the higher participation in the commodification 
sector, the higher degree of de-familisation one can enjoy after retirement. This situation 
certainly does not support Esping-Andersen's view that one has to be de-familised 
before he or she can be de-commodified (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
5.4 The vicissitudes of familisation and de-familisation 
Discussions in the above sections have clearly shown that Hong Kong is a laggard in 
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terms of the development of an old age income protection system. Its public financial 
provisions for older people have never played any significant part in supporting older 
people's life after retirement. Therefore, it is no surprise that the degree of 
de-familisation of older people's income is low. 
5.4.1 The public sector 
The first old age benefit, the OAA, was introduced as early as 1973, and the cases 
receiving this benefit have increased dramatically ever since. For the 20 years from 1976 
to 1996, the number of people aged 65 and above increased 159 per cent from 262,800 to 
629,555. During the same period of time, the cases receiving OAA increased 676 per 
cent from 56,399 to 437,827. Although it has benefited the vast majority of older people 
in Hong Kong, the OAA is not considered to be a major scheme to protect older people's 
income after their retirement. Nor does it have any significant effect on the 
de-familisation of older people's income. The main reason this, as discussed in the 
previous section, is its low rates of benefits. 
The scheme that is now considered the most important one for old age income protection, 
the MPF, only came into operation in 2000. It will need two decades or longer for 
attendants to accumulate an adequate amount of money for retirement. Therefore, its 
effect on the degree of de-familisation will not appear immediately. The question, that to 
what extent does this scheme affect the degree offamilisation or de-familisation of older 
people's income, cannot possibly be answered until it has matured in two or three 
decades time. 
5.4.2 The family sector 
A quarter of century after the implementation of the OAA, the ties between older people 
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and their family are still strong. As we can see from Table 5.5, in 1996, more than 20 
years after the OAA came into operation, the vast majority of older people, 71.1 per cent 
of people aged 60 or over, still lived with at least one non-elderly persons. Despite there 
being no empirical statistics data available to approve of, it is reasonable to assume that. 
in most of these cases, the persons whom old people lived with were their 
children/grandchildren or children/grandchildren-in-Iaw. For the ten years from 1986 to 
1996, despite the rapid change in demography and economy, the proportion of people 
aged 60 or over living with one non-elderly person decreased by only 3.8 per cent, from 
74.4 per cent to 71.3 per cent. The family is still the most important resort for older 
people to count on for their later life. 
Table 5.5 People aged 60 or over living with at least one non-elderly person 
Year Number of people aged 60 or Number of people aged (l )/(2)* 1 00% 
above who lives with at least 60 or above (2) 
one non-elderly persons (1) 
1986 459,891 618,156 74.4% 
1991 509,867 716,901 71.1% 
1996 634,537 889,850 71.3% 
Source: Derived from Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1996:2-3 & 44; Table 2.2 & 3.7. 
The other criterion that indicates the degree of familisation of older people's income is 
the proportion of older people who rely on family support as their main financial 
resource after their retirement. Although there are no official statistics regarding this 
field available, some academic sample surveys might help us to piece together a picture 
of older people's financial resources. 
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Table 5.6 Surveys on Older People's Income 
Chinese University of Hong Kong Baptist Chi (1998) 3 I 
I 
Hong Kong (1984) 1 University (1993) 2 
Time of survey 1984 1992 1995/96 
Target group People aged 60 or People aged 65 or above People aged 
above 60 or above 
Sample size 235 service recipients 2,196 samples 334 samples 
& 1441 community 
samples 
Major Children! 55% 60.6% 67.5% 
source Grandchildren 
of Earning 16% 11.4% 6.1% 
Income Retirement 16% 3.2% 6.10/0 
payment 
------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
Social security 11.40/0 
Savings 5% -- 8.90/0 
Others 8% 14.3% 11.7% 
Sources: 1: Cited fromMo, 1986, pp.36, Table 2. 
2: Liu, W. et aI, 1993, Table 7, cited from Mo, 1999: 104, Table S.ll. 
3:Chi, 1998, pp.174, Table 3-2. 
Table 5.6 shows three surveys that contain data regarding older people's income 
resources. Although this data is not strictly comparable due to differences in population 
and sampling, they clearly show a message that the family is still the most important 
resource for older people to count on in their later life. The majority of older people take 
financial support from the children and/or grandchildren as their major source of income. 
In addition, this data confirms the fact that public provision does not playa significant 
part in supporting older people's income. The proportions of older people taking social 
security benefits as their main income source are very low in these results. 
It is worth noting that the proportions of older people taking retirement payments or 
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pensions as their major income source are also very low. These figures are certainly 
inconsistent with the fact that the government claims 30 per cent of the work force have 
been covered by some kind of retirement plans provided by their employers before the 
implementation of the MPF (Hong Kong Hansard, 1992:23). The most possible reason 
for this gap is that, given the fact that occupational pension plans are neither universal 
nor transferable, very few people actually stay in the same firm for long enough and 
until their retirement to get a sufficient payment for retirement. Therefore, the 
proportion of older people who have a sufficient occupational pension to count on are 
much lower than the proportion of people who were once covered by an occupational 
pension plan during their working age. 
The under development of public provisions, coupled with the lack of occupational 
pensions, makes the family the last resort for older people. Althought those who are still 
fit for work, they might stay in the labour market for as long as possible as a strategy in 
response to the lack of external resources. 
5.4.3 The labour market 
Table 5.7 shows the labour participation rates for both male and female in the age groups 
of 60-64 years old and 65 years old and over. It reveals several important messages. First, 
there are dramatic declines in both male and female labour force participation rates in 
the past quarter of a century in these age groups. For males, the labour force 
participation rates for the age group of 60-64 years old has declined from 67.2 per cent in 
1976 to 44.8 in per cent in 1999, a drop of more than 22 percentage points in 23 years. 
For the age group of 65 years and over, this rate declined from 32.0 per cent to 11.0 per 
cent in the same period. The rate is now just about one-third of the level of two decades 
ago. These trends of decline are in line with those in the West. 
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Table 5.7 Labour force participation rates in Hong Kong 
Year 60-64 years old 65+ years old 
male female male Female 
1976 67.2 28.8 32.0 11.3 
1977 66.1 27.7 32.5 11.0 
1978 65.8 30.4 33.8 12.1 
1979 64.4 27.2 32.5 11.3 
1980 64.1 26.8 32.1 11.9 
1981 67.0 31.4 35.2 13.7 
1982 62.1 27.8 33.0 12.7 
1983 60.2 25.7 30.6 11.5 
1984 61.0 24.7 29.8 12.0 
1985 57.6 24.8 26.7 11.1 
1986 56.5 21.7 25.0 10.0 
1987 57.6 21.6 23.8 9.9 
1988 55.7 21.1 23.9 8.6 
1989 56.6 19.4 22.4 7.6 
1990 54.7 18.4 21.4 5.9 
1991 54.7 17.2 20.8 6.4 
1992 54.6 16.3 18.3 4.4 
1993 51.9 13.5 16.8 3.8 
1994 50.7 12.4 15.4 3.2 
1995 50.7 12.5 15.2 3.0 
1996 50.1 11.3 13.5 2.7 
1997 48.5 10.5 12.0 2.0 
1998 47.1 11.2 11.2 1.9 
1999 44.8 11.1 11.0 2.0 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest Statistics, various years, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government 
However, the trends of female labour force participation rates in these age groups in 
Hong Kong in the past two decades are distinct from other advanced capitalistic 
countries. Unlike Western European and North American countries which experienced a 
rebound in older females' labour force participation as part of an overall increasing trend 
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in female labour force participation in recent years, older females' labour participation 
rates in Hong Kong have followed a trend of steady decline in the past two decades. In 
1976, about three out of ten women aged between 60-64 participated in the labour 
market. However, in 1999, only about one out often are still participating in the labour 
market in this group. For the group of females aged 65 and over, the labour force 
participation rates declined from 11.3 in 1976 to only 2.0 in 1999, much lower than those 
in advanced Western capitalist countries. 
The declining trends in older people's labour force participation are surprising. As 
mentioned earlier on, given the lack of public and occupational retirement payments, 
one would expect to see older people in Hong Kong stay in the labour market for as long 
as possible for the sake of maintaining a decent life. However, the actual figures of older 
people's labour force participation behaviour just reject this expectation. The seeming 
contradiction in relations between public and occupational old age income protection 
and older people's labour force participation is not difficult to explain. The answer to 
this lies in the sector of family. 
As mentioned above, the traditional function for the family to look after its older 
members is still very strong in Hong Kong. The proportion of older people living with 
children/ grandchildren has not changed too much in the past decades and still remains at 
a very high level. With the continuous economic prosperity in the past decades, 
children/grandchildren's financial capacity to support their parents/grandparents has 
been increasing. As a consequence, older people no longer need to stay in the labour 
market just for financial reasons as they had to decades ago. A survey of 641 samples 
selected among those aged 55 or over in Hong Kong in 1981 found that, among those 
who stayed in the labour market, 69.2 per of them were because of financial reasons. 
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Another survey targeted people in the same age group conducted in 1984 in Wen-Chai 
area found that 59.4 per cent of those who participated in the labour market did so for 
financial reasons (Mo, 1986: 36). Moreover, in 1986, for those who still participated in 
the labour market, two-thirds (66.4 per cent) of them worked for more than 44 hours per 
week; 37.5 per cent worked for more than 55 hours per week (Mo, 1993: 131). These 
figures clearly show that, up until the early 1980s, staying in the labour market was still 
a necessity, not a preference, for older people due to economic considerations. As the 
economy of Hong Kong became more prosperous and the families no longer needed 
their older members' income for financial maintenance, older people have taken the 
option to retire from the labour market and rely on their family. The figures in Table 5.3 
also provide evidence for this point. It shows that, despite not being strictly comparable, 
the proportion of older people taking family support as their major financial resource in 
the 1990s are significantly higher compared with the figures of the early 1980s. In other 
words, the key to the decline in older people's labour force participation in Hong Kong 
in the past two decades is not the change of public provisions for old age, but the 
increase in the capacity of the family to support its older members. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Compared to other advanced capitalistic countries, Hong Kong is no doubt a laggard in 
the development of a social security system. When it finally introduced the first cash 
benefit system in the 1970s, it was a mean-tested scheme targeted for the poorest and 
excluded the able-bodied - a copy of the seventeenth century British Poor Law. In the 
field of provisions for older people, the first scheme was implemented in 1973 and also 
targeted only the most deprived groups. Although issues about introducing a 
contributory old age benefit system were raised as early as in the late 1960s, it was not 
until the late 1990s when the MPF system was brought into operation. However, the 
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government still managed to limit its role to a minimum scale. This is a private-managed 
compulsory savings scheme per se, and the government is exempted from contributing 
to the fund and offers no guarantee in levels of benefit for the participants. Clearly, 
despite being considered as a proper modem social provision for older people, the MPF 
scheme does not break the government's long-standing path of a least-intervention 
strategy. 
During the whole process in establishing an old age income protection system, the 
government's insistence on the family obligation was a key element. The government 
never actually changed its preference for traditional family function to look after older 
people. Before the 1970s, the existence of this function of the family was used to justify 
the government's stand for not introducing an old age benefit. While in the 1970s, 
benefits for older people were introduced to strengthen family cohesion. When 
campaigns and serious debates on introducing a contributory old age benefit system 
emerged from the mid 1980s, the government, again, tried to reject the advocates by 
emphasizing family obligations. 
On the other hand, the degree of commodification of older people's income protection 
has declined since the 1970s, as older people's labour market participation rate has 
decreased steadily since then. It is the increasing ability of the family sector, rather than 
governmental de-commodification schemes, that has promoted the de-commodification 
of older people's income protection. Simultaneously, older people's income protection 
has become more familised. In other words, with the government's input in social 
provisions for retirement kept at almost the same level, which is a level of minimum, 
older people's income protection in the past three decades has been shifting from 
commodification sector toward familisation sector. With the introduce of the first proper 
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benefit for older people's income protection, the MPF, both the de-commodification and 
the de-familisation of older people's income is likely to increase at a slow rate in the first 
decade, then at a faster rate in the long run. 
Overall, the development of the old age income protection system in Hong Kong since 
the end of the Second World War does not fit the models described by some mainstream 
theoretical approaches, including the logic of industrialisation approach, the diffusion 
approach, and the social democratic approach, as addressed in Chapter Two. Instead, it 
has a strong link with the characters of the state. In the 1950s, unanticipated 
international situations made Hong Kong a transit camp for refugees with an indefinite 
future for its sovereignty. Under these circumstances, the government had no 
willingness or capacity to develop any old age income protection schemes. Between the 
1960s and 1970s, old age benefits were introduced along with many social policies and 
services for the purpose of making Hong Kong a homeland for its residents. However, it 
was not until the 1990s when the government lost its autonomy and faced challenges 
from other political forces that the first old age income protection scheme was 
introduced. In this regard, the case of Hong Kong in its development of the old age 
income protection system is rather in line with what Skocpol (1986) has categorized as 
the 'state centre' model. 
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Chapter Six 
Modern social provision for older people in Singapore 
In early nineteenth century when western colonist arrived here, what they found was a 
tiny peninsula inhabited by about only 150 fishermen (Tremewan, 1994). Today there 
are more than 3.2 million citizens and permanent residents living in this city state, 
producing the highest population density in the world, which including foreigners was 
5,900 persons per square km in 2001. The political and social development of Singapore 
is an extraordinary model of stability and harmony. Since the country's independence in 
1965, the ruling party, the People's Action Party (PAP), has won every general election, 
and there has been no significant political resistance. In addition, since 1977, there has 
been no labour strike and the number of working days lost has remained at zero. 
Although it is a multiracial society that consists of Chinese, Malay, Indian and others, 
there has been no significant ethnic conflict in the later half of the twentieth century. 
In the field of social security, Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF), as will be 
discussed later, not only benefits people in getting their houses, receiving health services 
and retirement payment, but it also works together with economic policies and has been 
a main contributor to economic success. While many industrial countries are suffering 
from a shortage of funds to finance social security, the problem that the Singapore 
government is facing now is how to efficiently manage the huge amount of CPF 
. 1 
savIngs. 
The initiation and changes of Singapore's old age protection system has a close relation 
1 This point was made by the Singapore Chief Statistician, Dr. Paul Cheung at an interview with the 
author on November 4,2000. 
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with different stages of its economic and political development. This chapter begins 
with the analysis of the development of Singapore's old age protection system, then 
discusses the state's orientation toward the family's role in an aging society, and finally 
examines the vicissitudes of familisation and de-familisation of Singaporean older 
people's income sources. 
6.1 The development of Singapore's old age income protection system 
There is no doubt that the CPF scheme has been a big success and has played a 
significant role in Singapore's social policy and economy. There are some essential 
social and economic conditions that make this programme work. To analyse this 
programme, it is essential to trace it back to the colonial history and to put it into the 
context of the political, economic and social development of this country. 
6.1.1 Prior to 1945: A free trade port 
The modem history of Singapore dated back to 1819 when Sir Stamford Raffles 
established a trading station under an agreement between the East India Company (EIC), 
the Sultan of Johor and the Malay ruler of the island (Singapore Government, 2000). In 
1826 the EIC united Singapore with Malacca and Penang to form the Straits Settlements 
and ruled them from India. In 1830 the Straits Settlement came under the Presidency of 
Bengal in India, and in 1851 Singapore was transferred to the direct control of the 
governor-general of India. It was not until 1867 that the control of Singapore was 
transferred to the Colonial Office. Britain eventually took control of Singapore due to its 
intention to build a trade entrepot against Dutch monopolistic practices, and to provide a 
base for imperial military and naval purposes (Cheng, 1991). 
Raffles established Singapore as a free port. The free trade policy, coupled with its 
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natural geographical advantages, and its deep-water harbour, quickly drew the highly 
developed regional trade of Southeast Asia in the early years of settlement (Chia, 1995). 
The development of the Straits Settlements, combined with the general expansion of 
trade arising from the liberalisation of Dutch trade policy, the founding of Hong Kong, 
the opening of Chinese treaty ports, and the opening of Siam to the British, helped 
Singapore to gain enormous economic achievement in the first half of the nineteenth 
century (Tremewan, 1994). In addition, the opening of the Suez railway in 1858 and 
then the canal in 1869 confirmed the Strait of Malacca's status as the major sea route 
from the West to East Asia (Tremewan, 1994). In the late nineteenth century Singapore's 
exports increased in response to the demand in the West for tin and tropical products 
from Malaya and Dutch India. As these trades expanded, the port became an economic 
centre which mediated imports from Malaya and Dutch India and made them become its 
exports to the West. During the period from 1870 to the end of the nineteenth century, 
Singapore's imports from Malaya and the Dutch India and exports to the West both rose 
more than fivefold (Huff, 1995). 
The free port policy, accompanied by the free immigration policy, attracted an enormous 
number of immigrants from other parts of the region. By 1821, only three years after the 
free port was established, the population had risen from just over a hundred to 
approximately 5,000, and by the years 1840 and 1860, it had reached 35,389 and 81,734 
respectively (Tremewan, 1994). In 1871 when the first census took place, the population 
had reached 97,100 and the rapid growth trend continued (You, et. aI, 1971). It was not 
until 1930 when the Immigration Restriction Ordinance came into force to restrict the 
inflow of unskilled male labourers, due to rising unemployment, that the free 
immigration policy changed (You, et aI, 1971; Tremewan, 1994). In 1931 when the last 
census before the Second World War took place, the population had risen to 557,700. 
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The development of social welfare in Singapore in the nineteenth century was like 
western countries in their very original stage. It mainly depended on the provision of 
religious and voluntary groups. Missionaries and other religious leaders played a major 
role in establishing welfare services. Since 1920s, the government gave increasing 
attention to the inhabitants' well-beings. A Women and Girl Protection Ordinance was 
passed soon after the First World War, and a Children's Ordinance in 1927. In 1932 a 
Worker's Compensation Ordinance to regulate and enforce proper conditions of health 
and labour was passed. A charity, known as the Silver Jubilee Fund, was created for the 
relief of distress in Singapore. Assistance was given in the form of old age allowances, 
funeral grants, educational grants, meal subsidies, and special allowances (Cheng, 
1991). 
6.1.2 From 1945 to 1965: Unrest before independence 
After the Japanese force surrendered to the Allied Forces in 1945, Singapore 
experienced a brief period of military control under British Military Administration. In 
April 1946, Singapore was detached from the rest of the Straits Settlements and made a 
separate crown colony of the United Kingdom to emphasize its importance as the 
leading British naval base east of Suez (Cheng, 1991). However, the British Authorities 
had lost their legitimacy and the support from Singaporeans as they failed to protect 
them from the ravage of Japanese forces. The nationalists became more active and 
powerful, and anti-colonialism forces developed further (Tremewan, 1994). 
Despite the separation of Singapore from the rest of Malaya, practically all Singaporean 
political parties during the period 1946-1963 regarded the island as being inseparable 
from its Malayan hinterland, and sought political unification with the Federation of 
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Malaya. In addition, the majority of Malayans also rejected the armed struggle of the 
Malayan communists against British rule and preferred the constitutional movement 
(Cheng, 1991). However, the constitutional advance in Singapore was slow. The first 
ever election based on universal suffrage in Singapore was held in 1948, to elect six 
members of the Legislative Council. However, a large number of the people in 
Singapore were immigrants who were not officially citizens of Singapore and thus could 
not vote (Hill and Lian, 1995: 26). On the other hand, these six elected members were 
only a minority of the total 25 members in the Legislative Council and could not actually 
make any significant differences in Singapore's politics. Moreover, many people were 
not interested in these elections simply because they did not speak English, which was 
the language that these elections proceeded with (Lee, 2000: 163-167). Therefore, there 
was no surprise that the turnouts were low. In 1948, only about ten per cent of the 
potential electorate registered. In 1953 election, the figure was still as low as twenty-five 
per cent (Yeo, 1973: 252-260). 
In 1957 the Constitutional Conference held in London agreed in principle that Singapore 
should become a state and receive full internal self-government. In 1959, the general 
election on the first full-elected Legislative Assembly was held and the system of 
compulsory voting was first introduced. The People's Action Party (PAP) won 43 seats 
out of 51 and formed the government, and became the dominate power in Singapore's 
politics ever after. The Singapore Constitution Order in Council came into operation and 
Singapore eventually achieved internal self-government. In 1961 the Malayan Prime 
Minister proposed the formation of Malaysia to include the Federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. A referendum was held in Singapore in 
1962 and 71 per cent of the electorate voted in favour of the merger with Malaysia 
(Turnbull, 1996: 272-273). In 1963 Singapore joined Malaya with virtual freedom from 
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colonial rule. However, due to the antipathy between Chinese and Malay populations, 
Singapore eventually separated from the Malaysian Federation and became an 
independent republic in August 1965 (Murray and Perera, 1996: 13-14; Huff, 1995). 
In addition to unstable political situations, Singapore in the 1950s and the 1960s also 
suffered heavily from industrial and social unrest. The communists, who were regarded 
as great heroes during the Second World War in Singapore due to their efforts in 
resisting the Japanese army in Malaya, gained enormous support among the masses 
(Turnbull, 1996: 223). Under the influence of the Malayan Communist Party and the 
Chinese communist revolution in China, left-wing powers were active in the late 1940s 
and the 1950s. Singapore's anti-colonial movement, organized largely by 
Chinese-educated leaders from the Chinese middle schools, and the labour movement, 
organised by communist-oriented and left-wing leaders, caused enormous political 
unrest and industrial dispute during this period (Yeo, 1973; Huff, 1995). The society was 
wracked by strikes, lockouts, and racial conflicts and riots. In the year 1955, for example, 
the working days loss through industrial dispute reached to almost a million (946,354) 
(Colony of Singapore, 1955). During the period 1960 to 1963, the average working days 
loss in strikes per month was as high as 23,251 (Lim and Ow, 1971). To counter the 
influence of the communists, the Emergency Regulations Ordinance was enacted in 
1948 (Colony of Singapore, 1954:194). In addition, the Immigration Bill was enacted in 
1950 to prevent Chinese who had gone to China for political indoctrination from 
returning to Singapore (Yeo, 1973: 278). 
On the other hand, the PAP, which came to power in 1959 as the moderate wing of a 
coalition based on gross-roots support of the labour movement, used the repressive 
legislative measures to deal with the mass political opposition. The law was used to 
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illegalise existing organisations. Left-wing unions were deregistered and their leaders, 
as well as sympathetic politicians and journalists, and other community leaders, were 
arrested and placed under political detention without trial in 1963. As a result, the PAP 
successfully gained the monopolistic control of the parliament and the politics in 
Singapore (Tremewan, 1994). 
The turbulent political developments, coupled with the rapid population and 
labour-force growth, made Singapore suffer from economic difficulties. The rapid 
natural population growth joined with the immigrants returning to the country after 
China's 1949 civil war and the end of World War Two resulted in a substantial amount of 
unemployment in 1950s (Lim and Ow, 1971; Krause, 1995; Huff, 1995). The other 
economic difficulty was the low voluntary personal saving and so a lack of capital 
formation needed for development. Moreover, the Confrontation policy of Indonesia 
between 1963 and 1965 as a response to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia also 
advanced the economic difficulties. 
Despite these challenges, Singapore, in the last phase before its independence, 
experienced a rapid economic growth and expansion. Apart from the year 1964 when it 
suffered from the Indonesia Confrontation, the average real GDP growth rate from 1960 
to 1965 was as high as 8.2 per cent (Cheng, 1991). This remarkable performance in this 
period was due to both internal and external factors. Singapore, as an open economy, 
benefited from the boom conditions prevailing in the major industrial democracies and 
leading to expansion in world trade and growth in overseas investments (Cheng, 1991). 
The Economic Development Board was established in 1961 under the suggestion and 
assistance of a team of United Nations experts to improve the economy and to attract 
foreign investments (Singapore Government, 1961: 97). On the other hand, the 
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expansion of the construction and manufacturing industries was also an important factor 
that stimulated the economic growth. From 1961 to 1965, whilst embarking on the 
housing programme and the construction of infrastructural facilities, the average annual 
growth rate of the construction industry was as high as 26.7 per cent. The manufacturing 
and quarrying sector also enjoyed a high annual growth rate of 17.3 per cent in the same 
period (Lim and Ow, 1971). 
Singapore in the late 1940s and the early 1950s also suffered deeply from the after 
effects of war. The Department of Social Welfare, which came into existence in 1946, 
carried out a survey of living conditions and found an appalling state of misery and 
overcrowding (Turnbull, 1996: 234). It conducted a survey again in 1952-53 and found 
that living conditions had not improved since the end of the war and poverty was a 
severe problem. About one-quarter of the survey population and more than one-third of 
the survey population aged 60 or over were living in poverty (Low and Aw, 1997: 17). 
As a consequence, social provisions from voluntary organisations, which were the main 
source of welfare before the war, were no longer sufficient in meeting the urgent need of 
the masses and the government. 
The development of social welfare in this period was largely in response to the need of a 
large number of destitute people suffering from the war (Colony of Singapore, 1947: 
81-82). As half the popUlation was under the age of 21 and many did not have proper 
education and decent jobs after the war, the provision of education, employment and 
housing were most important (Colony of Singapore, 1953: 8). In addition, the annual 
reports of the Social Welfare Department in the 1950s and the 1960s also clearly put an 
emphasis on the protection and welfare of youth and women. On the other hand, Public 
Assistance had been payable since 1947 to three categories of people, including the 
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unemployable, namely the aged, physical impaired, and widows, the temporarily 
unemployed, and dependents of war victims (Colony of Singapore, 1948:84). The Silver 
Jubilee Fund, which was established in 1936 to relieve distress in the Colony of 
Singapore, was also payable to older people and convalescents who were in need 
(Colony of Singapore, 1954: 12-13). 
Despite the government's reluctance, there were also important progresses in the 
development of an old age income protection system during this period. When its 
colonial power, Britain, established a comprehensive social security system after the end 
of the war, the Government of the Colony of Singapore had no intention to follow it due 
to, as the government claimed, the differences of social conditions between these two 
countries. The Five-year Plan, published by the Department of Social Welfare in 1949, 
states that 
"In England ... a complete framework of social security is near achievement. 
This stage has, however, only been reached after 100 years of steady advanced 
in the field of social progress. The present structure in England had been built 
on a homogeneity population with a high rate of literacy. 
A very high degree of co-operation exists between the more enlightened 
members of the various communities of the Colony, but the lack of 
homogeneity and education amongst the masses of the people will inevitably 
militate against any rapid introduction of a comprehensive state-controlled 
system of social security. " 
(Colony of Singapore, 1949: 2-3) 
In 1951, a commission was appointed by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
Franklin C. Gimson, to "inquire into the desirability and practicability of ensuring 
payment of retirement benefits to wage-earners" (Colony of Singapore, 1951: 1). After a 
thorough comparison with a provident fund scheme, it recommended a flat rate benefit 
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pension scheme financed by flat rate contributions from employers and employees with 
the government's financial responsibility being limited to meeting the cost of 
administration of the scheme (Colony of Singapore, 1951). However, after serious 
debates, the Provident Fund was chosen over the pension scheme due to its self-funding 
principle. The decision was also swayed by two important reasons. The first one was the 
intention of the British to avoid the potential financial burden for setting up state funds 
to support pension funds in case they were at deficit. The second one was consistency, as 
the Federation of Malaya, a country which was geographically proximal and shared the 
free flow of labour with Singapore, had adopted a provident fund scheme in 1951 (Low 
and Aw, 1997: 15). The CPF Ordinance was legislated in 1953 and came into force on 
July 1, 1955. Employers and employees were each required to contribute five per cent of 
wages, the balance of which was available to retirees at age 55; the government did not 
make financial contributions other than as an employer. Employers who had provided 
benefits more favourable than the Central Provident Fund were allowed to continue and 
to be exempted from the CPF (Colony of Singapore, 1955: 27). By the end of the year, 
the Fund had registered 12,300 employers and 190,000 employees (Colony of Singapore, 
1956: 42). 
The establishment of the CPF did not end discussions on social security issues. Several 
papers regarding this issue were published and all of them claimed that the Provident 
Fund was inadequate for old age income protection. The report by G. J. Brocklehurst, 
which was based on the study of the problems of social security system in Singapore on 
behalf of the ILO and published in 1957, pointed out that "the provident fund ... is not 
adequate for any substantial part of the working popUlation" (Colony of Singapore, 1957: 
33). Therefore, it explicitly recommended that "the general approach adopted be that of 
contributory social insurance" (Colony of Singapore, 1957: 70), to provide sickness, 
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maternity, old age, invalidity and survivors' benefits. In the same year, a committee 
studying Singapore's minimum standards of living and social security published its 
report, known as the Caine Report. It stressed that problems of poverty among older 
people in Singapore were already severe and it would take decades until employees 
could accumulate sufficient funds for retirement under the CPF system. Therefore, it 
recommended that the government cease the operations of the Central Provident Fund, 
and introduce a social insurance pension scheme (Colony of Singapore, 1957). In 1958, 
a Committee of Officials, was appointed by the Minister for Labour and Welfare to 
examine the Caine and Brocklehurst Reports. It published a report in 1959 and also 
recommended that the government start a social insurance scheme to provide benefits 
including old age benefits (Singapore Government, 1959). In 1959, a report by the ILO 
also suggested to the Singapore government that they cease the CPF scheme and start a 
social insurance scheme providing sickness, maternity, old age and survivors' benefits 
(ILO, 1959). However, the Singapore government rejected all these suggestions and 
stuck to its provident fund approach. 
There is no doubt that, considering the unfavourable political and economic context, the 
establishment of the CPF was a great achievement during this period. However, the 
colonial government's commitment to older people's income protection is subject to 
doubt. Although a couple of committee reports and empirical surveys addressed the 
inadequacy of the provident fund system in protecting older people's income, and 
recommended a social insurance pension benefit, the government stuck to its decision. 
The colonial government's preference for the provident fund scheme, as in some other 
Britain's former colonies, is generally perceived as a result of the colonial power's 
reluctance to subsidise financial resources to these countries (Low and Aw, 1997). On 
the other hand, the establishment of such an old age income protection system at a time 
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when the democratic system was yet to develop and the demographic structure was 
young, also suggested that Singapore's case in social security is beyond the explanation 
of the convergent theory discussed in Chapter Two. This issue will be further discussed 
in the next chapter. 
6.1.3 From 1965 to 1980: From survival to affluence 
The separation from the Federation of Malaya in 1965 brought Singapore big challenges 
to its economy and politics. Economically, it meant that Singapore lost its hinterland, a 
big domestic market, and Singapore's advantageous economic position as a centre of 
transit trade and business services in the Malay Peninsula faced uncertainty. Politically, 
even though the Chinese society excitedly welcomed the end of the governance by 
Malayan racism (Lee, 2000), Singaporean political leaders worried about the state's 
future. Lee Kuan Yew, the then Prime Minister of Singapore, recalled his feeling about 
the independence in his memoir, "now we are independent. We said that an independent 
Singapore could hardly survive. . .. Among the archipelagos consisting of more than 
30,000 islands inhabiting more than 100 million of Malayan and Indian Muslim, our 
Chinese population is trifling. Singapore is a Chinese island in Malayan surroundings. 
How can we survive in such a hostile surrounding?" (Lee, 2000). 
Soon after the blow of the separation, the country was shocked again by Britain's 
announcement in 1968 of large-scale military withdrawal east of Suez. The British 
armed forces employed directly and indirectly 38,000 local workers, or 20 per cent of 
the work-force (Krause, 1995); Britain's spending accounted for 20 per cent of 
Singapore's GNP and played a vital part in Singapore's economy (Turnbull, 1996: 294). 
It is obvious that the withdrawal of the British Military threatened to plunge Singapore 
into a recession. In addition, it raised the issue of national security as Singapore was 
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surrounded by hostile neighbours (Chua, 1995: 48). 
Under these unfavourable situations, the foremost mission for the government was 
national survival, and the only way to achieve it was to develop its economy, and thus 
increase the capability of the state (Chua, 1995: 49). The PAP government accomplished 
remarkable economic success in this period. In absolute terms, the GDP rose by 4.4 
times from $ 6,627 million in 1965 to $28,833 million in 1980 (Peebles and Wilson, 
1996). By 1975, Singapore claimed to be the third largest port in the world after 
Rotterdam and New York, although it was later overtaken by Hong Kong (Turnbull, 
1996: 295-6). There were manifold factors that contributed to these remarkable 
economic achievements, including the favourable international developments, the 
valuable political and economic heritages, and the adequate policy efforts. 
Internationally, again, thanks to its geographic location, Singapore benefited from the 
increasing liberalisation and growth of world trade in the late 1960s. It had developed a 
major refining industry in the 1960s, and a petroleum industry in the 1970s. By the early 
1970s, it had also become a regional financial centre with an influx of foreign banks 
(Wawn, 1982; Tremewan, 1994; Chia, 1995; Huff, 1995a; Murry and Perera, 1996). On 
the other hand, good political and economic heritages and assets were also important 
factors to its economic success in this period. These heritages included a strong and 
stable government, an efficient administration, hard-working and good quality human 
resources, a solid free trade tradition, and substantial infrastructures built before the 
early 1960s (Tremewan, 1994; Chia, 1995; Huff, 1995a, 1995b). 
In addition to the elements mentioned above, the government's strategies were also 
important factors that contributed to its economic achievement. After Singapore's 
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independence, the most important strategy, to make domestic economic conditions 
favourable for investment, especially by foreign capitals, was developed and has been 
consistently applied since. The government's effort to attract foreign investment 
included expanding and upgrading necessary infrastructure services and facilities, 
developing banking and other financial institutions, and offering tax concessions (Chua, 
1995: 60). This strategy was successful and foreign capital became a vital part of 
Singapore's economy. Foreign-affiliated companies, defined as companies whose 
foreign equity exceeded 50 per cent, accounted for 57 per cent of total manufactured 
export in the 1970s. If joint ventures are included, the proportion rises to 84 per cent. 
Between 1966 and 1976 foreign-affiliated companies increased their proportions of 
employment in manufacturing from 25 per cent to 54 per cent, value of output from 42 
per cent to 73 per cent, and value-addendness from 44 per cent to 64 per cent (Cheng, 
1991). By 1979 wholly foreign owned firms alone accounted for 63 per cent of total 
industrial employment (Deyo, 1995). 
In addition to upgrading infrastructure and offering tax incentives, the government's 
effort on controlling wages was also an important factor to Singapore's success in 
attracting foreign investment (Lim and Ow, 1971; Yeh, 1971; Wawn, 1982; Cheng, 1991; 
Huff, 1995b; Rodan, 1995; Chua, 1995). The Employment Act and the Industrial 
Relation Act of 1968 "de-politicised the labour movement, established de facto 
government control over unions and transferred bargaining power from workers to 
employers" (Huff, 1995: 324). As a consequence, labour costs in Singapore were 
significantly lower than other industrialised countries. By 1969, although productivity 
levels were as high as in the other newly industrialized countries (NICs) and higher than 
the United States, hourly compensation in Singapore was less than one-eleventh of the 
US level, and below those in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Huff, 1995b). When 
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the National Wage Council was established in 1972, the collective wage bargaining role 
of unions was further reduced (Chua, 1995: 61). The government had a powerful 
influence on wage determination, and had been able to steady the wage level and 
construct a competitive economy to attract foreign investment. 
In addition to its economic success, Singapore's political situation had been stable after 
its independence. The PAP had successfully suppressed the critical left-wing political 
oppositions both in the political arena and in the labour movement (Cheng, 1991), and 
enjoyed overwhelming support in the elections. In the 1968 election for the Assembly, 
which was the first election after Singapore's independence, the PAP received 84.4 per 
cent of the vote and won all the 58 seats, among which 51 seats were uncontested. In 
addition, even though the proportion of votes in favour of their candidates fluctuated, the 
PAP maintained its absolute domination over the Assembly in the 1970s by capturing 
about 70 per cent of the vote and winning all the seats of the Assembly in the 1972 and 
1976 elections (Quah, 1991). In other words, since Singapore's independence in 1965 to 
the 1970s, the PAP won every single seat for the parliament and, undoubtedly, enjoyed 
an absolute dominance in Singapore's politics. 
In addition to political and economic development, Singapore's demographic policy in 
this period was also heavily influenced by the separation from the Federation of 
Malaysia. The loss of its hinterland highlighted the viability of the tiny island devoid of 
natural resources. The rapid population growth rate thus had to be reduced. The 
Singapore Family Planning and Population Board Act was passed by the Parliament 
without any debate in 1965, and came into force in 1966 (Saw, 1999). In 1972 the 
government promoted a two-child family policy, backed by an array of incentives and 
deterrents. Abortion laws were liberalised, priorities in government housing formerly 
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given to large families were withdrawn, and hospital fees for third and subsequent 
confinements were raised and the provision of paid maternity leave to working women 
was abandoned (Turnbull, 1996). This policy, coupled with widespread economic and 
social changes, resulted in a dramatic drop in the fertility rate. The total fertility rate 
decreased sharply from 5.76 in 1960 to 3.07 in 1970, and by 1975, it fell below 
replacement level (Cheng and Vasoo, 1992: 79). 
The reduction in the fertility rate inevitably resulted in an increase in the percentage of 
older people. The proportion of people aged 65 or above more than doubled in 23 years 
from 2.2 per cent in 1957 to 4.7 per cent in 1980 (Singapore Ministry of Health, 
1984: 10). Although the proportion of older people was still low, issues related to 
provisions for older people had attracted concerns within both academic society and the 
government. As Cheng and Vasoo (1992: 78) pointed out, during the 1970s, at least 
seven studies were conducted on this issue. On the other hand, worries about declining 
family functions in supporting older people started being raised in this period (Chen, 
1977: 23-24). Additionally, the government also started using housing policies to offer 
incentive to encourage intergenerational family support (Hill and Lian, 1995: 123). 
Simultaneously, the CPF, a system originally designed for old age income protection, 
also played an important role in the economic development process, as it helped to 
accumulate the capital and contributed to stabilised employment. Since its establishment, 
the CPF contribution rate had gradually increased, from 5% in 1955 to 10% in 1971 for 
both employee and employer. By 1980, the contribution rate was 20.5% for employee 
and 18% for employer. These savings provided a huge amount of cheap capital for the 
government to fund infrastructural development, and to invest in income-earning 
enterprise and thus consolidate the power of local capital (Tremewan, 1994; Huff, 
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1995b). 
On the other hand, the content of the CPF had gone beyond old age income protection to 
allow workers to use the saving for the purchase of public housing since 1968, and from 
the late 1970s, the saving could be used to finance selected financial and estate 
investments before retirement. During the period of 1968-1977, the proportion of the 
withdrawal for housing schemes consisted of65.6 per cent of the total withdrawal, while 
withdrawals at age 55 counted for 25% (Carling and Oestreicher, 1995). The high 
proportion of the CPF savings used by participants for the purchase of houses raised the 
issue that there might not be a sufficient sum of money left at their retirement. Therefore, 
a demarcation was considered necessary to ensure that social provision for old age 
remained secure. It is under this situation that, in 1977, CPF contributions were divided 
into the Ordinary Account and the Special Account. The Special Account reserved 4 per 
cent of the total CPF contribution especially for retirement, disability, or special 
contingencies (Carling and Oestreicher, 1995; Low and Aw, 1997). This measure was to 
ensure that the Singaporeans have a decent fund to rely on after their retirement. 
6.1.4 The 1980s and 1990s: Preparing for the future 
The overall situation of political stability and economic progress in Singapore did not 
fundamentally change when the 1980s started. However, there were crucial issues that 
challenged the country. The most serious political challenge to the PAP state was that the 
ruling party started losing its monopoly of parliament. The PAP obtained 75.5 per cent of 
the vote in the 1980 general election, and, again, won all the seats of the Assembly. 
Seven opposition political parties fielded 43 candidates against the PAP in 38 
constituencies and did not win any seats. However, this was the last time that the PAP 
retained its monopoly of parliamentary seats. A candidate of the Worker's Party beat 
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PAP's candidate in the 1981 by-election and ended its monopoly of parliament that had 
begun in 1966 (Quah, 1991). The 1984 general election brought a worse result to the 
PAP. They won 75 of the 77 contested seats, capturing 62.9 per cent of the votes, a 12.6 
percentage-drop in its popular vote (Quah, 1991). It was the first time in a general 
election since 1963 that the opposition parties won two seats of the parliament. This 
result was perceived as a signal that the voters wanted a more open polity (Vasil, 1988: 
175-176; Chong, 1991: 35). The PAP was alerted by this warning and responded to it by 
promising more consultation and participation in the public policy-making process 
(Quah, 1991). In the 1988 election the PAP improved its performance by winning 80 of 
the 81 seats, and slightly increased its votes to 61.8 per cent (Quah, 1991). However, 
under the compulsory voting system, in addition to 2.2 per cent spoilt votes, 36 per cent 
of the voters voted against the PAP (Singapore Government 1990: 13), which clearly 
sent a warning of dissatisfaction of the voters toward the PAP government. In the 1991 
election, the PAP got a worse result winning 77 out of 81 seats, and the percentage of 
votes dropped again to 60.97 per cent. However, it recovered in the 1997 election by 
winning 81 out of83 seats, with 64.98 per cent of the votes. 
The extraordinary performance of the PAP in the general elections in the 1980s and the 
1990s shows that the ruling party's achievement in bringing about continuing stability 
and prosperity had won the Singaporean's approval. In addition, the high support of the 
populace to the PAP government did not change as the second-generation took over the 
helm of the government. Therefore, the government has been able to continue policies of 
its preference without being confronted by opposition forces. This autonomy of the 
government makes the Singapore government different from the governments in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong which have lost their dominance in politics since the 1980s. This feature, 
and its influence on the making of old age income protection policies, will be further 
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discussed in the next chapter. 
On the other hand, there were important constitutional changes in Singapore during this 
period. The first one was to strengthen the function of the parliament to check the 
government's policies. Before the 1984 election, a scheme was inaugurated to guarantee 
that there are at least three seats in the parliament held by opposition parties. If 
candidates from opposition camps win less than three seats, than those from these camps 
capturing the highest votes may fill the positions (Vasil, 1988: 185). The second 
institutional reform was the introduction of an directly-elected President who was given 
the right to veto key public services appointments, and the annual budgets of the 
Government, statutory boards and key Government companies, and the use of reserves 
accumulated during the terms of previous governments (Singapore Parliament Debates, 
1990: 460). The constitutional reforms were introduced within the period that the 
first-generation leaders were handing over political power to their successor's and were 
thinking over how to strengthen the check on the government's power to secure 
Singapore's long-term prosperity (Vasil, 1988: 184), and thus have important political 
implications. 
As for economic development, despite facing recessions in the mid-1980s and the late 
1990s, Singapore by and large continued the trend of rapid growth in the last two 
decades. The recession in the mid-1980s was mainly due to the 'Second Industrial 
Revolution' that started in 1979. The background of this programme was that Singapore 
was facing increasing competition from other new Asian industrialised countries, and 
the government planned to move out of low-wage, labour-intensive manufacturing to 
capital-intensive and higher value-added industries (Wong, 1989; Tremewan, 1995). In 
addition to providing incentives for high-technology industrial capital, the most visible 
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component of this programme was the significant increase in wages. The National Wage 
Council recommended a wage increase of some 20 per cent in 1979/80, 19 per cent in 
1980/81 and 14-20 per cent in 1981/82 (Chia, 1995; Tremewan, 1995). Unfortunately, 
these strategies didn't attract foreign capital to invest in Singapore's technological base 
as the government had hoped for. By contrast, foreign investors were driven away by 
high business and labour cost, and it resulted in a recession between 1985-88 
(Tremewan, 1995; Yuen and Lim, 2000). 
The government responded to the recession by adopting a less rigid wage system and 
reducing employer's CPF contribution rate from 20 per cent to 10 per cent (Wong, 1989; 
Yuen and Lim, 2000). By the end of the 1980s the economy recovered and the real 
average growth rate between 1989 and 1997 was as high as 8.9 per cent (Singapore 
Government, 1999a). Then, the country was hit by the Asian economic crisis which 
broke out in 1997, with the economic growth rate falling to 0.4 per cent in 1998, and the 
unemployment rate rose from 1.8 per cent in 1997 to 3.2 per cent and 3.5 per cent in 
1998 and 1999 respectively (Singapore Government, 1999b). The economic recession 
resulting from the Asian economic crisis, reinforced and refined the strategy of 
'managed flexibility' adopted by the government after the last recession in 1985 (Yuen 
and Lim, 2000). With the tax and wage adjustments, and the cooperation of the National 
Trade Union Congress, Singapore had managed to get through the economic crisis by 
1999. The economic growth rate increased to 5.4 per cent by the end of 1999 (Yuen and 
Lim, 2000). 
The aging population had also become a significant issue since the 1980s. The 
proportion of the population aged 65 or above increased from 4.7 per cent in 1980 to 7.3 
per cent in 1999 (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000:24). It is projected to 
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Increase to 18.9 per cent in 2030 (Singapore Ministry of Community Development, 
1999: 31). In response to the trend of aging, a series of actions were taken by the 
government. A Committee on the Problems of the Aged was set up in 1982, and a 
national survey of older people's needs and problems was conducted by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs (Singapore Government, 1985: 227). In 1989, the National Advisory 
Council on the Family and the Aged was formed "to advise the government in issues 
related to these groups" (Singapore Government, 1993: 191-192). The Senior Citizens' 
Day and the Senior Citizens' Week were designed to promote people's concerns about 
older people's welfare (Singapore Government, 1993: 92; 1997: 205). The 
Inter-ministerial Committee on the Aging Population was established in 1998, chaired 
by the Minister for National Development, consisted of Minister of Health, Minister for 
Community Development, Chief Statistician, Department of Statistics, and twenty other 
members from different Departments and key social groups. Its mission is "to prepare 
Singapore for the Challenge brought about by a rapid aging society" (Singapore 
Government, 2000: 203-204). These actions clearly show that the Singapore 
government takes issues concerning aging seriously and has been preparing for it. 
In response to popUlation ageing, serious schemes have also been introduced since the 
late 1980s. The two-child policy was officially abolished, replaced by an array of 
encouragement for three-child or even four-child families (Cheng and Vasoo, 1992: 80; 
Hill and Lian, 1995: 153; Lee, 1988: 295). In addition, the retirement age was raised. 
There was no mandatory retirement age in Singapore before 1993 although companies 
usually retired their employees at the age of 55 (Singapore Manpower Research and 
Statistics Department, 1999: 13). The retirement age was made mandatory and set at 60 
in 1993. It was further raised to 62 in 1999. 
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Concerning the support to older people, the most distinctive scheme was the 
government's intention to return to the three-generation tradition, and to reinforce 
family cohesion (Turnbull, 1996). The Maintenance of Parents Act was introduced in 
1994. Actually, advocates for the enactment of this Act had started in the early 1980s. 
Reports by the Committee on the Problems of the Aged, published in 1984, and by the 
Advisory Council on the Aged, published in 1989, both recommended for the 
introduction of this legislation. The government had also been prepared to adopt legal 
measures to ensure that children undertake the responsibility to support their parents 
(Cheng and Vasoo, 1992: 98). The Bill was intensely debated in the parliament for three 
days for its second reading and eventually got the support of 50 out of 63 members who 
voted for this move (Singapore Parliament Debates, 1994: 149-363). This Act allows 
Singaporean parents to apply to the Tribunal for Maintenance for Parents (TMP) to seek 
redress for support from their children who fail to take up their responsibilities. Through 
this enactment, the government wants to deter 'negligent children' who abandon their 
parents as the state believes that children have moral responsibilities and obligations 
towards maintaining their parents (Rappa, 1999). 
Simultaneously, the CPF has seen significant changes during this period. In addition to 
adjusting in line with the economic fluctuation, the CPF contribution rates by different 
age groups have differed since 1988. Employees who are above 55 years of age pay a 
lower contribution rate to the CPF, so do their employers. The aim of this reform is to 
encourage the employment of older people. In 2000, the contribution rates for 
employees in different age groups are 20 per cent for those who are below 55 years old, 
12.5 per cent for 55-60 years old, 7.5 per cent for 60-65 years old, 5 per cent for above 
65 years old, and for their employers, the contribution rates are 16 per cent, 6 per cent, 
3.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively (Singapore CPF Board, 2001). 
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The content of the CPF has also been expanded further in the last decades. The 
Medisave Account was introduced in 1984, a fixed proportion of CPF contribution is set 
aside to be available to meet hospitalisation and medical expenses. In 1987 the 
Retirement Account, known as the Minimum Sum Scheme, was introduced to fund a 
pension, with the intention of ensuring that all retirees had sufficient income for basic 
subsistence. Thereafter, the members of CPF have to leave a minimum amount of 
savings in their Medisave Account and transfer a specified amount into a newly created 
Retirement Account when they withdraw their balance upon reaching the age of 55. The 
required amount for the Retirement Account may also be used to purchase an approved 
annuity or pension from a commercial bank (Carling and Oestreicher, 1995). The 
Topping-up Scheme was introduced later in the same year so that members of CPF 
below 55 years of age may transfer their Ordinary Account saving to their parents' 
Retirement Account, which enjoys a higher interest rate, to supplement their payment 
for old age (Singapore Government, 2000a). 
6.2 Governmental orientation toward provisions for older people 
The development of Singapore's old age income protection scheme is a unique story, not 
only because it was established as early as in the 1950s, when the state was still under 
the threat of the Communists and the uncertainty of political unrest, but also because the 
scheme has gone far beyond the function of protecting older people's income to securing 
housing and medical expenses. Since the 1990s, as discussed above, the government has 
tried to use this scheme to encourage intergenerational family support. Thus, the scheme, 
perceived from the Western point of view as a de-familisation programme, has been 
assigned the task of reinforcing family cohesion. However, to comprehend the 
government's strategy in responding to the challenges of the coming aging society, we 
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need to thoroughly review the intention and the design of this programme and other 
related schemes. 
Before Singapore gained the position of self-government in 1959, the British colonial 
government undoubtedly had absolute political control. The PAP government thereafter 
has enjoyed an overwhelming dominance in the parliament and politics. The first 
generation leaders, led by former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, encountered few 
challenges in adopting policies of their preference. After the second-generation leaders 
took over in the 1980s, the party has still had a monopoly in politics. Therefore, there is 
no doubt that these political leaders' policy addresses reflect the government's policy 
preference. This section is to review these policy addresses and governmental 
documents to identity the government's orientation in responding to the aging society. 
6.2.1 Developing the economy at the price of egalitarian distribution 
As discussed earlier, the British colonial government was reluctant to see expansion in 
social security in its colony due to its fear of financial burden. In the first stage after 
Singapore's independence, the country was struggling for survival and adopted an 
economy first strategy. It is not surprising that the government had no intention to 
expand the social security system during this period, due to the fear of its potential 
impact on national finance and economic competitiveness. The government first 
revealed this view in the Five-year Plan for social welfare. In this report, the government 
emphasized the importance of fiscal balance and economics when planning social 
welfare programmes. It states: 
"The fiscal question is again far from simple: the Colony occupies a very special 
economic position and governmental activity in Social Welfare as in other 
matters must take full account of the dependence of revenue upon reasonably 
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untrammeled trading facilities. Any activity tending to upset the extremely 
sensitive adjustment of local economy would defeat its own objects. " 
(Singapore Department of Social Welfare, 1949: 3) 
When the PAP government came into power, it valued the tradition of this prudent 
financial strategy. In his Policy Speech in 1968, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew actually 
praised European colonial administrations for their insistence on a surplus budget 
compared with many countries who, after gaining independence, have failed 
economically and collapsed socially due to the lack of self-discipline in their leaders and 
their people to budget and live within their means (Singapore Parliament Debates, 1968: 
40). The government's prudent attitude toward the budget, coupled with the fact that the 
country's economy was yet to develop, not surprisingly marginalised issues related to 
social security. As Lee Kuan Yew recalled in his memoir: 
"It was not until the 1960s when I took over the government that I realised the 
burden of governmental finance. The tiny country of Singapore was much poorer 
than the U.K. The challenge I was facing was how to enlarge taxation and to 
create wealth. Therefore, there was practically no room to discuss issues 
concerning income distribution. " 
(Lee, 2000: 136, translated from Chinese) 
On the other hand, the government was deeply convinced that the idea of a welfare state 
was detrimental to Singapore as it would jeopardize traditional virtues, such as 
hard-working, an ethic that the government considered vital to its economic 
development. In his 1972 Policy Address, the Prime Minister states: 
"Singapore must eschew one of the characteristics of the welfare state syndrome, 
where everyone expects others, not himself, to work harder to carry the subsidies 
for services everyone wants. For us, a yet to be developed and fully 
industrialised society, this selfish rejection of the work ethic is fatal ... No one 
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should get away with enjoying services subsidised through the hard work of 
others, without making his own contribution, to the best of his ability and 
capacity. " 
(Singapore Parliament Debates, 1972: 9) 
This kind of anti-welfare ideology has been carried through and never changed. Since 
the early 1990s when signals for an aging society became clear, the government still 
insisted on this approach of limited state welfare. In addition, criticism of the welfare 
state from the anti-welfare camp was cited by political leaders to support the 
government's stance. For instance, in his policy address in 1990, the Minister of 
Community Development cited the views in Charles Murray's book, Losing Ground, to 
explain the government's stance for not expanding welfare provisions. In 1992, the 
Prime Minister cited Frederick Hayek's view to reject the idea of the welfare state. He 
insisted that the way to improve the living standard of the less able was 'leveling up' 
rather than 'closing the income gap' (Singapore Parliament Debates, 1992: 355). He 
states: 
"The egalitarian approach is detrimental to economlc progress... The 
population, once fed in the milk of welfare, cannot be weaned away. 
Consumption patterns then become distorted by subsidies and resources are 
misused. The result, eventually, is economic decline, indebtedness and a falling 
standard of living relative to others ... For a country to progress, let the market 
reward a person according to his worth, i.e., his ability, performance and 
contribution. There will always be an income gap between the able and less able. 
And if the Government intervenes to make them equal, the result will be tyranny 
and bankruptcy. We must help the less able to increase his income, but we should 
never stop the able from increasing his income even higher. The gap can never 
be closed under a market economy. What we can do is to level up a person s 
standard of living, as opposed to artificially handing him more money to spend 
as he likes. We can do this by upgrading his competence and by spreading the 
fruits of economic progress. " 
(Singapore Parliament Debates, 1992: 355-358) 
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These quotations reveal a clear message that the government feared the potential 
negative effect of the welfare state and has no intention to expand welfare provisions. 
They also show that the government strongly believes in the mechanism of the market, 
not the state, in improving people's living standard. Therefore, it is not surprising that it 
emphasizes the responsibility of the family, rather than the government, to support 
people in need. 
6.2.2 State hiding behind the family 
There is no doubt that Singapore is one of the countries that emphasizes the values of 
Confucian philosophy most. The importance of these values to the development of 
Singapore's economy has often been addressed by political leaders. Surely, the 
government is happy to propagate family virtues emphasized by Confucian's teaching. 
One of the reasons for this is practical: to reduce governmental burden in welfare 
proVIsIons, a strategy of financial prudence inherited from the British colonial 
government. 
Soon after Singapore's independence, the Prime Minister pointed out in his Policy 
Speech in 1968 that "the promotion of strong family ties and the encouragement of each 
family to look after its own members is the best way of keeping the country's 
expenditure on welfare services within reasonable limits" (Singapore Parliament 
Debates, 1968: 221). The second-generation leaders totally share this view with their 
political predecessors. Lee Kuan Yew's successor, Goh Chok Tong, echoed with his 
view in a public speech in 1996: 
HThe Government does not want to take over the role of the family. We have seen 
the disastrous results of welfare programmes in the West. There, the 
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governments provided unemployment benefits, disability benefits, free medical 
benefits, unmarried single-mother benefits, and so on, out of taxes. They have 
taken over much of the role of the family as provider. People then look to the 
governments to provide for them, instead of looking to the family. This erodes the 
family structure and results in debt-ridden governments. " 
(Singapore Ministry of Infonnation, 1996: 3) 
Although political leaders have publicly emphasized financial benefit for the 
government not to replace the family as the main welfare provider, there is no doubt that 
the advocate of family responsibility is simply due to their belief and preference in this 
traditional virtue. Actually, their belief in family cohesion are so strong that they have 
produced enonnous speeches and addresses emphasizing this virtue. For instance, in the 
Ministry of Infonnation collections on Ministers' public speeches for the two years from 
1981 to 1982, there are no less than seven speeches given by members of the Cabinet 
emphasizing the family's obligation to look after its older members. These include 
'Family units must be preserved' (1981), 'Family should look after their old' (1981), 'It 
is our duty to look after our parents' (1981), 'We should retain our oriental traditions' 
(1981), 'Three-generation family is an asset to the nation' (1982), 'Why the 
three-generation family must be encouraged' (1982), 'Filial piety helps keep the family 
together' (1982). These titles alone are enough to demonstrate the government's favour 
on the family as a main support for older people. 
The state, however, will step in when the family is incapable of bearing this obligation. 
As the Second Deputy Prime Minister, S. Rajaratnam, states in his speech in 1981 
entitled 'It is our duty to look after our parents': 
H ••• the sons and daughters owe a debt of responsibility to their parents when the 
latter are no longer able to look after themselves and need the care and affection 
they bestowed on their children. To pass this responsibility on to the state or 
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charitable organisations when the children are in a position to discharge this 
responsibility is morally indefensible and, in my view, should be made legally 
enforceable. 
The state and charitable organisations should only step in where the children 
are clearly not in a position to discharge this responsibility. With more and more 
Singaporeans earning better and with government compelling Singaporeans to 
save more of their earnings the care of the aged, the sick and the disabled could 
become more and more the responsibility of the children. Of course with 
increased savings the old and the otherwise disadvantaged may have the 
wherewithal to look after themselves but where they cannot their first recourse 
should be to family responsibility. " 
(Singapore Ministry of Communication and Infonnation, 1981: 38) 
Apart from political leaders' addresses, governmental documents concerning issues on 
aging also heavily emphasize family obligation to look after older people. The Report of 
the Committee of the Problems of the Aged, published in 1984 by the Ministry of Health, 
the Report of the Advisory Council on the Aged, published by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in 1989, and the Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Aging 
Population, published in 1999 by the Ministry of Community Development, all 
highlight the importance of family obligation in an aging society. In 1994, the 
government further stressed family virtues by identifying five values as Singaporeans' 
commonly shared family values. These values are love, care and concern; mutual 
respect; filial responsibility; commitment; and communication. In the section of filial 
responsibility, it describes that: 
"Filial responsibility means honouring and supporting one s parents and 
grandparents, and providing for them in their old age. Filial responsibility is 
more a duty or an obligation, it is a naturalfruit of the close bonds amongfamily 
b " mem ers. 
(Singapore Ministry of Community Development, 1994) 
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This statement once again highlights the importance for children to look after the older 
members of their family. In addition, it cleverly justifies the government's strategy to 
assign this task to the family: it is human nature so people should be happy to do it, and 
thus is it not inadequate for the government to hold back its role in developing 
provisions for older people. 
6.3 An analysis on provisions for older people: Familisation or de-familisation? 
Singapore's old age income protection system was established as early as in the 1950s. 
The CPF scheme, which was introduced in 1955, became the sole income protection 
scheme for older people thereafter. Although it has expanded its functions and has gone 
beyond the protection of old age, its fundamental principles have not changed since. In 
the 1980s when issues related to aging became major concerns and attracted serious 
discussions in the government and the academic society, important reforms were made 
to strengthen its function in protecting people's later life. These reforms, as discussed 
above, included the introduction of the Minimum Sum Scheme and the Topping-up 
Scheme. These changes, especially the latter, have an important impact on familising 
older people's income protection. 
On the other hand, when the government was preparing for the challenges of the 
emergence of the aging society, the Maintenance of Parents Act was inaugurated in 1995. 
The implementation of this Act echoes political leaders ' emphasis on family obligation, 
as discussed above, and clearly reaffirmed that children have the responsibility to look 
after their parents in their later life. These developments together have made Singapore's 
old age provision system very different from that in other countries. 
6.3.1 The CPF scheme 
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As discussed above, the CPF is a fully funded, defined contribution scheme. It was 
originally designed only for the protection of older people's income after their 
retirement. Under this scheme, employees, as well as their employers, contribute a 
proportion of their wages to a fund which they are not allowed to withdraw until they 
reach the age of 55. As such, this is a scheme of compulsory saving and basically the 
protection of one's income after retirement is not based on the redistribution of income 
between different groups of people, but between the different life cycle of an individual. 
In this regard, this scheme, like the MPF scheme in Hong Kong, is different from social 
insurance schemes adopted in other countries. 
However, it is undoubtedly a de-familisation scheme. Employees put aside a proportion 
of their wages during their working years as a reserve fund, so that they have a financial 
resource to count on and thus can have an independent life without having to rely on 
their family or other income sources after retirement. Ideally, if this scheme has any 
impact on increasing familial financial transfer, it will be from older people to their 
children and grandchildren. As older people withdraw their fund at their retirement as a 
lump sum rather than a monthly or weekly payment, they might use this fund to help 
their children or grandchildren, for example, for the expense or investment of their 
education, housing or business. However, there is a danger that, if the fund is not 
sufficient or if it is not managed wisely, older people might soon use it up and have to 
rely on other sources, most likely the family, especially under the consistent trend that 
life expectancy after retirement is extending. 
There is also an important feature of this scheme that it, just like income related social 
insurance benefit schemes implemented in other countries, is based on the assumption of 
full employment, the male-bread winner, and lifelong engagement. Those who for one 
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reason or another are not in the labour market, or have a fragmental history of 
employment, or are in low-paid jobs, cannot accumulate sufficient funds for their 
retirement. Undoubtedly, these groups of people are the less better off ones in the society, 
including women and the disabled. In this regard, although the CPF is generally 
perceived as a de-commodification scheme as it provides financial resource for older 
people when they no longer participate in the labour market, it to some extent reinforces 
the logic of commodification. Under this system, those who had better conditions for 
employment and were engaged in a favourable position in the labour market get better 
protections for retirement. In other words, the degree of income protection one can get 
for retirement depends on the continuity of his or her engagement in the labour market. 
For those who are engaged in unpaid work, including household works, there is not any 
protection for later life. Thus, it approves Esping-Andersen's theory that one should get 
de-familised and become commodified before they can get de-commodified 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999). Under the CPF system, it was only the individual themselves 
that one can rely on for his or her retirement. 
The introduction of the Topping-up scheme in 1987, however, changes this nature of the 
scheme. Under this new scheme, not only the individual, but his or her family as well, 
can help to accumulate the fund for his or her retirement. This new scheme, started on 1 
April 1987, enables individuals to transfer their CPF savings to top-up their Retirement 
Accounts. Siblings can also use their CPF savings to top-up their parents' Retirement 
Account. As discussed above, the government actually encourages this intergenerational 
transfer by offering the incentive of a higher interest rate. This scheme has proven to be 
very popular with CPF members. On 31 December 1987, only eight months after it was 
brought into practice, 12,400 accounts amounting to about 100 million Singaporean 
Dollars were topped-Up for parents (Singapore CPF Board, 1988:7). This scheme was 
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extended to grandparents in December 2000 (CPF Board, 2001:19). It is clear that the 
government has tried to assign the task of familisation to this de-familisation scheme. 
6.3.2 The Maintenance of Parents Act 
Apart from the reforms of the CPF scheme, the enactment of the Maintenance of Parents 
Act in 1995 is also an important step for the government's preparation of the emerging 
aging society. The gist of this Act is simple: to affirm that children have the 
responsibility to look after their parents. It states that: 
"Any person domiciled and resident in Singapore who is of or above 60 years of 
age and who is unable to maintain himself adequately may apply to the Tribunal 
for an order that one or more ofhis children pay him a monthly allowance or any 
other periodical payment or a lump sum for his maintenance. " 
(Maintenance of Parents Act, Article 3-1) 
And that: 
"An approved person or organisation in whose care a parent resides may apply 
to the Tribunal for an order that one or more of his children pay the approved 
person or organisation a monthly allowance or any other periodical payment or 
a lump sum for the purpose of defraying the costs and expenses of maintenance 
the parent. " 
(Maintenance of Parents Act, Article 3-2) 
This Act actually contains only 21 articles, most of which concern legal procedures for 
dealing with applicants' cases. It is unusual for the country, which has a strong tradition 
of Confucianism and believes that providing maintenance for parents is a natural duty of 
children, to enact a law so that parents may go to court to sue their children to support 
them. In addition, when the enactment of this Act was debated in the parliament, most of 
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the adult children were still supporting their parents, as will be discussed in the next 
section. It is probably due to these reasons that supporters of this Act emphasised that 
the aim of this Act is not to promote filial piety or to interfere in the vast majority of 
families who still hold this virtue, but only to "provide a safety net if filial piety fails" 
(Singapore Parliament Debates, 1994: 150), and to use it "as a last resort and a necessary 
evil for the errant of the recalcitrant few" (Singapore Parliament Debates, 1994: 166). 
By the end of 1998, two and half years after the Tribunal was established, it received a 
total of 424 applications for maintenance (Singapore Parliament Debates, 1999: 22). 
This low figure might reflect the fact that the vast majority of adult children do support 
their parents, just as they did before the Act was introduced. In addition, in the Chinese 
context, people are too careful of preserving the dignity or face of the family to go to 
court to sue their children for their maintenance. A survey conducted by the government 
before the enactment of this Act showed that 87 per cent of those aged 50 years and 
above said that they would not take their children to court even if their children did not 
support them financially (Singapore Parliament Debates, 1994: 171). These facts 
together suggest that the enactment of this Act would have a more significant effect on 
appeal fonn rather than on practice. 
6.4 The vicissitudes of familisation and de-familisation of older people's income 
sources 
Singapore's old age income protection system was introduced as early as the 1950s with 
the characteristics of de-familisation. Since the 1980s, the government has adopted 
major refonns to encourage family cohesion. These developments, coupled with its 
tradition of strong family ties, make Singapore an ideal case to examine the impact on 
familisation or de-familisation of the social security system. 
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6.4.1 The public sector 
As discussed above, the CPF is the sole scheme in Singapore for the protection of older 
people's income. The number of accounts increased from just 180,000 in 1955 to 
2,828,072 in 1999 (CPF Board, 1960: 2; 2000: 74). However, there are still a large 
number of account holders who do not contribute to the fund. In 1999, more than half of 
the account holders made no contribution to the fund, which leaves the number of active 
accounts (with contributions paid in) at 1,244,470 (CPF Board, 2000: 74). The 
consistent trend of an increasing number of accounts does not necessarily mean that 
more people benefit from this scheme. There have been a significant number of people 
excluded from the CPF. Groups of workers including the self-employed, casual and 
family labourers, and those in part-time and irregular employment are not covered by 
this scheme (Cheng and Vasoo, 1992:84; Lee, 1998: 301). In actuality, the number of 
CPF contributors has in relative terms. The number of contributors as a proportion of the 
total labour force declined from 69.4 per cent in 1989 to 62.0 per cent in 1999. In 1989, 
the contributors accounted for 70.9 per cent of the total employed population, and in 
1999, this figure declined to 64.9 per cent. These figures suggest that there has been a 
significant proportion of people participating in the labour market not covered by this 
scheme. 
At the same time, there has been a steady trend of increase in the numbers of people 
withdrawing from this fund upon reaching the age of 55, enjoying its protection for 
retirement. However, as discussed above, since the introduction of the Approved 
Housing Scheme in 1968, a large proportion of members' savings have been withdrawn 
for the purchasing of housing. In 2000, among all savings withdrawn by members, 
83.1 % was withdrawn for housing installments, while only 12.3 per cent was withdrawn 
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due to reaching the age of 55. The situation that large amounts of saving have been spent 
on housing before retirement may result in an inadequacy of protection for members' 
later life. 
Data from the National Survey of Senior Citizens in Singapore conducted in 1995 
confirmed this suspicion that the fund is not sufficient for retirement. Table 6.1 shows 
that the majority of people aged 55 or above actually did not have CPF savings. This 
figure increased with age, from 50.4 pre cent among those aged 55 to 64 to 67 per cent 
and 82 per cent among those of 65 to 74 years and 75 years and above respectively. In 
addition, among those who had CPF savings, the majority of them found it inadequate. 
Table 6.1 Sufficiency of CPF Saving 
Age Groups 
CPF Saving Total (55 & above) 55-64 65-74 75 & above 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Without CPF 60.8 50.4 67.0 82.0 
With CPF 39.2 49.6 33.0 18.0 
Whether CPF Adequate 
(for those with CPF) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Adequate 43.6 50.6 30.5 26.5 
In adequate 55.8 48.9 68.6 72.8 
Not Sure 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 
Source: Singapore Ministry of Health, 1996, Table 5.10, pp.29. 
It comes no surprise that for people in the higher age groups, especially for those aged 75 
or above, many did not have sufficient CPF savings, as this scheme was not introduced 
till years after they had participated in the labour market, and that the contribution rates 
for the fund were low in the early years of its operation. They might not have had the 
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chance to accumulate sufficient funds before they retired and might have run out of the 
fund during the early years after their retirement. However, even for people in the age 
group of 55-64, who were just retired and were allowed to withdraw their CPF savings 
for retirement, half of those who had the fund found it inadequate. Given the fact that the 
total contribution rates of the CPF fund for members under the age of 55 have never 
fallen to under 30 per cent since 1974. The inadequacy mentioned by the respondents 
might result from the fact that large proportions of people withdraw their CPF savings 
for housing installments before their retirement, rather than in the insufficiency of the 
CPF scheme per se. 
The inadequacy of the CPF savings for retirement has put huge pressure on older people 
themselves and their family. Fortunately, Singaporean families at large have been able to 
fulfil the task of supporting their older members. 
6.4.2 The family sector 
Although the CPF savings are not sufficient for retirement, older Singaporean people do 
not worry too much about retirement, as most of them still receive support from the 
family. As Table 6.2 shows, very few older people had financial plans for retirement. 
The basis for their lack of planning is not the social security scheme, but the family. 
Overall, 77.2 per cent of people aged 55 or above stated that they did not have a plan 
because their children would provide for their later life. 
215 
Table 6.2: Plans for financial security 
Financial plans Age Groups 
Total (55 & above) 55-64 65-74 75 & above 
With plans 12.7 16.6 10.0 5.6 
Without plans 87.3 83.4 90.0 94.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Main reasons for not 
making plans 
(Those without £lans) 
Children can provide 77.2 70.6 83.1 85.2 
Insufficient income 11.1 12.9 9.5 8.8 
Already have CPF savings 5.9 9.9 2.6 0.7 
Others 5.8 6.6 4.8 5.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Singapore Ministry of Health, 1996: 28, Table 5.9. 
The fact that very few people make financial plans for retirement might worry 
policy-makers as income protection for older people has become the thorniest problem 
of the social security system in almost all Western advanced capitalistic countries. 
However, empirical data shows that older Singaporean people's expectation for the 
family and not planning for their retirement is not impractical. As Table 6.3 shows the 
proportion of older people living with their family has, countering what modernisation 
and urbanisation theories have suggested, increased rather than decreased in the last two 
decades. Eight-six per cent of people aged 55 or above lived with their children in 1995, 
a significant increase compared with 81.4 per cent in 1983. The increase might result 
from the fact that Singaporean families' financial situations are more affluent than two 
decades ago, and thus they are more capable and more willing to have their older parents 
live with them. 
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Table 6.3: Living arrangement of older people, Singapore, 1983 and 1995 
1983 1995 
Aged 55 Aged 65 Aged 75 Aged 55 Aged 65 Aged 75 
Living Arrangement & above & above & above & above & above & above 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Living Alone 5.4 7.0 8.1 3.1 3.4 4.4 
With Spouse only 4.9 5.9 5.2 5.2 6.3 4.5 
With Children 81.4 79.0 78.1 86.2 84.4 84.0 
Other Living Arrangement 8.3 8.1 8.6 5.6 5.9 7.0 
Source: 1.Singapore Ministry of Affairs, 1983: 12, Table 1.8. 
2.Singapore Ministry of Health, 1996: 15, Table 4.1 & Table 4.2, pp.16. 
On the other hand, empirical data shows no evidence that intergenerational financial 
transfer has declined in the past two decades. As Table 6.4 shows, in 1995, 
three-quarters of old people aged 55 or above received cash transfers from their children. 
For people in higher age groups, the proportions are even higher. Among people aged 65 
or above, 83.5 per cent received financial support from their children. Given the fact that 
not every older person has children alive and of working age, the figures suggest that 
actually very few people after their sixties with able children alive do not get financial 
support from them. The availability of family support relieves older people's reliance on 
the CPF saving, and justifies older people's lack of financial plans for retirement. In this 
regard, it is safe to say that older Singaporean people are happy to take family support as 
the main resource for later life. The strong family support also reduces the necessity for 
older people to stay in the labour market in their later life. 
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Table 6.4: Respondents Receiving Income From Relatives 
Year Source Age Group 
Total 55 & above Sub-total 65 & above Sub-total 75 & above 
1983 Relatives 86.4 
1995 Children 
Spouse 
75.9 
8.4 
83.5 
3.0 
Sources: l.Singapore Ministry of Affairs, 1983: 25, Table 3.2. 
2.Singapore Ministry of Health, 1996: 19, Table 5.2. 
6.4.3 The labour market 
83.1 
1.6 
There is no doubt that the government's strategy toward older people's labour 
participation is to encourage them to stay working for as long as possible. It has adopted 
a series of measures to achieve this goal. In 1993, the Retirement Age Act was 
introduced which raised the retirement age norm from 55 to 60. This led to a increase of 
the labour force participation rate of people aged 55 to 60 from 47 per cent in June 1993 
to 52.6 per cent in June 1996 (Singapore Ministry of Labour, 1997: 1). The retirement 
age was further raised again in 1999 from 60 to 62. In addition, measures for moderating 
the cost of retaining older workers were also implemented. Since 1988, a system of 
differential contribution rates was adopted for the CPF scheme so that employers pay 
lower rates of contribution for their employees aged 55 or above than the rate they have 
to pay for the employees under the age of 55. The gap of the employers' share of CPF 
contribution rates between their employees above and under the age of 55 had steadily 
widened from 1-4 per cent in 1988 to 12.5-15 per cent in 1998. Furthermore, a reduction 
of up to 10 per cent in wages is recommended by the government if the employers think 
this is adequate. As stated in Article 5 of the Retirement Age Act Amendment of 1998, 
" ... an employer may, from time to time and in accordance with this section, reduce the 
wages of any of his older employees on or at any time after the employees attaints 60 
years of age". It has also been recommended that the current senior-based wage system 
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be replaced so that the wage structure reflects the actual value of the job and productivity 
growth rather than the seniority of the employees (Singaporean Ministry of Labour, 
1997: 27). 
Table 6.5 shows that a large proportion of people, especially males, stay in work after 
they reach the normal retirement age. About half of males aged between 60 and 64 still 
participate in the labour market. The labour force participation rate for this group only 
declined 4 percentage points in three decades from 1970 to 1999. Overall, for males 
aged between 50 and 64, the labour force participation rates in the 1990s were still as 
high as those in the 1970s. On the other hand, labour force participation rates for females 
in these age groups have largely followed a steady increasing trend in the past three 
decades. 
However, the high proportion of older people participating in the labour market does not 
imply that most of the people heavily rely on the commodification sector for their later 
life. As shown in Table 6.6, for people aged between 55 and 64 still working after 
retirement, 49.7 per cent of them did not do so for financial reasons. For those aged 65 or 
above, only about one-third of them were working due to financial reasons. In other 
words, although, as discussed above, the CPF savings are regarded by most of the older 
Singaporeans as insufficient for retirement, the majority of them do not have to rely on 
their participating in the labour market for their later life. Despite the fact that the CPF 
provides a lump sum for retirement rather than a pension, so that older people might use 
it up in their early years after retirement, this table clearly shows that the proportion of 
people working after retirement due to financial needs actually declines with age. These 
pictures together suggest that the majority of older people in Singapore have something 
other than the CPF saving and earnings from the commodification sector to count on for 
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their later life. From discussions in earlier sections, it is not difficult to conclude that this 
source is the older person's family. 
Table 6.5 Labour force 2artici2ation rates for older .Qe021e in Singa20re 
Year 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1970 88.1 17.5 73.9 16.2 55.6 13.4 31.9 6.5 
1974 90.1 19.1 69.4 17.3 54.3 12.6 31.9 6.9 
1975 87.8 18.3 73.6 14.2 54.2 14.0 31.7 6.4 
1976 87.9 17.3 70.3 12.1 58.0 11.1 32.9 7.8 
1977 89.7 19.1 70.9 15.6 57.7 12.9 31.0 6.4 
1978 89.8 20.6 73.2 13.8 55.0 12.1 28.7 7.5 
1979 92.0 19.2 75.7 16.2 55.6 12.5 30.2 7.5 
1980 90.4 22.0 73.2 15.8 55.8 12.3 29.8 7.2 
1981 89.9 22.1 71.3 15.8 54.5 12.8 27.6 6.3 
1982 90.4 23.1 75.4 18.6 53.9 10.0 29.0 6.7 
1983 89.4 25.4 73.7 18.2 54.1 12.4 29.4 5.9 
1984 91.5 25.0 74.4 18.8 54.1 14.2 27.3 6.7 
1985 88.5 25.9 69.5 18.4 52.3 11.9 25.9 5.9 
1986 90.5 28.0 68.7 17.4 47.3 10.3 23.3 5.9 
1987 89.6 28.1 63.8 17.1 45.7 12.2 22.3 5.5 
1988 88.9 28.8 65.1 17.4 47.3 11.9 21.2 4.7 
1989 89.2 30.7 66.6 19.4 48.2 11.0 20.7 5.0 
1990 89.6 33.6 72.8 18.8 47.0 10.8 21.1 4.6 
1991 92.5 34.1 71.0 21.2 46.9 12.3 19.8 4.1 
1992 89.4 36.6 71.3 22.7 49.2 12.6 22.5 4.5 
1993 90.0 36.8 71.9 23.9 50.9 10.9 21.9 4.0 
* 8.1* 1994 91.1 38.1 74.5 26.1 48.9 12.8 34.4 
* 6.8* 1995 90.6 37.1 73.5 25.1 46.3 11.6 29.8 
1996 91.4 43.7 77.8 28.5 48.6 14.9 21.7 5.2 
1997 92.7 44.7 76.2 27.1 49.9 15.5 20.9 5.1 
1998 91.7 46.0 76.6 30.0 48.9 13.9 18.7 4.3 
1999 92.2 46.4 76.1 32.0 51.7 19.1 21.4 4.9 
• For the age group of 65-69 
Source: Singapore Ministry of Labour, Annual Report 
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Table 6.6 Main Reasons for Working After Retirement, 1995 
Total Male Female 
55-64 65+ 55-64 65 + 55-64 65+ 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Need Money for Own & 43.2 22.9 39.1 23.9 56.1 18.7 
Family Expense 
Need Money for Future 7.1 12.0 9.4 10.4 18.7 
Financial Security 
To lead an Active Live 26.0 36.1 29.7 35.8 14.6 37.5 
Feel Bored 21.9 21.7 19.5 25.4 29.3 6.3 
Others 1.8 7.2 2.3 4.5 18.7 
Source: Singaporean Ministry of Health, 1996: 37, Table 6.8. 
6.4.4 The vicissitudes of older people's income from social security, intra-family 
support and the labour market 
Discussions in the above sections have shown that older people in Singapore do not get 
adequate income protection form the CPF, nor do they have to rely on participation in 
the labour market for later life. Their main reason for not having to rely on these sectors 
is that they have a family to count on. Table 6.7 reaffirms this inference. It shows that the 
family is the most important financial source for older people, and this importance 
increases with age. 
Table 6.7 Most Important Source of Finance Support, Singapore, 1995 
Age Group 
Income sources Total 55 & above 55-59 60-64 65-74 75 & above 
Children 64.0 41.1 57.4 79.0 85.7 
SalarieslBusiness income 25.7 45.9 32.6 13.5 3.9 
Spouse 3.7 7.9 3.3 1.7 0.9 
Others 6.6 5.1 6.7 5.8 9.5 
Source: Singapore Ministry of Health, 1996: 21, Table 5.3. 
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In 1995, for people aged between 55 and 59, who were still considered as suitable for 
employment and were supposed to be participating in the labour market, 41.1 per cent of 
them had already taken the family as their main source of finance for living. For people 
aged 65 or above, more than four-fifths of them are counting on their family for later life. 
On the other hand, there was still a significant proportion of people receiving financial 
resources from the commodiffication sector, including salaries and business incomes. 
However, not surprisingly, the proportion of this group of people declines sharply with 
age. Most surprisingly, income from the social security system, which is commonly the 
most important source for older people's financial support in the West, did not even exist 
in this table as an alternative for older people's financial source. 
Table 6.7 also shows that the relation between financial support from the family sector 
and from the commodification sector was almost a perfect complement. There were less 
than one-tenth who stated that their main financial source came from either of these 
sectors. As the proportion of people relying on incomes from the commodification 
sectors declines with age, the proportion of people counting on family increases with 
age almost at the same percentage points. 
Table 6.8 Respondents with/without cash contributions from relatives, 1983 
Cash Males Females Total 
contribution With Without Total With Without Total With Without Total 
from relatives income Income Income Income Income mcome 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
With 67.4 92.4 75.2 80.4 96.2 92.0 71.3 95.2 84.0 
Without 32.6 7.6 24.8 19.6 3.8 8.0 28.7 4.8 16.0 
Source: Singaporean Ministry of Affairs, 1983:25, Table 3.2. 
222 
Table 6.8 reaffinns the complementary relationship between financial resources from 
the family sector and the commodification sector once again. It shows that, although the 
vast majority of people aged 55 or above received money from relatives, there was a 
significant difference in proportions of people receiving money from relatives between 
those who had their own income and those who had not. On the other hand, a higher 
proportion of females with income still received cash contributions from relatives (80.4 
per cent) than their male counterparts did (67.4 per cent). This gap confirms that older 
women's wages from the labour market are significantly lower than those of their male 
counterpart. Overall, only 4.8 per cent of people aged 55 or above without their own 
income did not received cash contributions from relatives. 
6.S Conclusion 
Singapore's modem old age social security system, the CPF, was established as early as 
the 1950s, synchronized with many advanced capitalistic countries in the West. 
Although at the first stage there were critical challenges toward the CPF and serious 
campaigns for an alternative to this approach, it survived and has become a major 
system not only for old age protection but also for other parts of Singaporeans' life, such 
as housing and economic development. This compulsory saving system, which has 
accumulated to an amount equivalent to 61.4 per cent of the GDP in 1999, now provides 
financial resources for old age, medical services, and housing for the Singaporeans, and 
serves as a cheap capital for the government for infrastructure and investment. It is not 
an exaggeration to say that, had it not been for the CPF system it would not have been 
possible for Singapore to be enjoying the current high degree of economic prosperity 
and social cohesion. 
Ironically, the CPF's role in protecting old age is not addressed and emphasized so often 
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as its role in providing housing and in economic development, both by the government 
and the academia. In the field of old age protection, what the government has been 
addressing most is the importance of family obligation. There is no doubt that, based on 
the analysis in earlier sections, the government regards the family as the best and 
necessary solution to population aging. Since the 1980s when symptoms of population 
aging have become clearer, the government has reaffirmed family obligation to support 
older people by introducing a new law, and has encouraged family transfer in the CPF 
saving by offering financial incentives. 
It is the autonomy of the state that has made it possible for Singapore, unlike other 
democratic capitalistic countries which all generally have expanded their old age 
income protection system in the past four decades, to take the traditional approach of 
family obligation in response to population aging. Although Singapore has been a 
democratic country with universal suffrage since the late 1950s, there has not been any 
significant opposition force or interest group that might challenge or influence the PAP 
government's orientation of public policy. Therefore the government has been able to 
stick to its preference of policy orientations. The government's insistence on not 
expanding the social security system, and taking the family as the major mechanism to 
deal with social risks and to meet people's need, has not faced any serious challenge. On 
the other hand, the fact that family cohesion has been very strong in Singaporean society 
also helps to build the consensus of a familisation approach in response to aging, which 
has made the Singaporean case distinctive from all other democratic capitalistic 
countries. 
With the deliberate plan by the government, the ties between older people's financial 
need and their family are getting tighter. The majority of older people still count on their 
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family rather than the social security system for their later life. With the monopoly 
power in policy making, the PAP government has successfully established a system 
which emphasizes the role of the family, rather than the government, in providing old 
age income security. In this regard, Singapore has proved that a social security system is 
not necessarily a de-familisation one, but could also be a familisation one. 
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Chapter Seven 
Old age income protection in Taiwan: vicissitudes of familisation and 
de-familisation 
As discussed in Chapters Four to Six, although modem social provision system for older 
people have been introduced for decades in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
family is still the main mechanism for old age income protection in these countries. Do 
these systems in these countries not have significant effects on the de-familisation of 
older people's income, as witnessed in Western countries? In a situation where old age 
income protection system was not sufficient, how did older people cope to secure their 
later life? And what are the impacts of incomes from social provisions, labour market 
earnings and family support on older people's living standards? This chapter seeks to 
answer these questions by using empirical data. As mentioned in Chapter Three, as there 
is no existing data which is comparable about Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore on 
these issues, this chapter will focus only on the situation of Taiwan. 
The data used in this chapter is data of "Survey of Health and Living Status of the 
Middle Aged and Elderly in Taiwan" collected by National Institute of Family Planning, 
Department of Health, the Executive Yuan (Taiwan), and Population Studies Centre, 
University of Michigan (USA). This is panel data interviewing a same group of people 
at different points of time. The population of the first survey were those who aged 60 or 
over. Samples were selected based on multi-stage random sampling. At the first stage of 
sampling, all 331 non-aboriginal cities, towns and counties in Taiwan were divided into 
27 levels based on administrative divisions, education levels and total fertility rates. 
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Fifty-six of the 331 towns were then randomly selected as sampling areas. At the second 
stage, several neighborhood zones were randomly selected in each sampling area as 
sampling blocks. The last stage randomly selected two cases in each neighborhood zone 
as samples of the survey. 
The panel data used in this chapter are from the first (1989), second (1993) and third 
waves (1996) of the survey. In the first wave, a total sample of 4,412 cases were 
randomly selected, among those who were aged 60 or over, of whom 4,049 cases were 
successfully interviewed, achieving a successful interview rate of 91. 8 per cent. In 1993, 
894 cases were lost due to attrition (death or lost contact of the survey), which reduced 
the number of cases to 3155. By 1996, another 798 cases were lost due to attrition, and 
the number of total cases was 2,669. 
This chapter first explores respondents' income source in 1989, when the survey was 
first conducted, followed by analysis on changes of their income source from 1989 to 
1993 and from 1993 to 1996, and finally examines impacts of these changes on 
respondent's living standards. The first part of this chapter will use percentage 
distributions and cross-tables to illustrate respondents' major income sources during 
different periods of time. In the second part of this chapter, several models of income 
source will be categorised, and logistic regression models will be used to examine the 
impact of respondents' characteristics on their likelihood of falling into each of these 
models. As the probability of respondents , falling into each of these models is between 0 
and 1, logistic regression, which is design to describe a probability (Kleinbeaum, 1994), 
is the most suitable tool to be employed in this part. The third part will also use logistic 
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regressions to examine the impact of these income models on respondents' living 
standards. 
7.1 Older people's major income source in Taiwan, 1989 
Table 7.1 shows percentage distribution of respondents' income sources in 1989, when 
the first survey was conducted. It shows that the family, especially sons and 
daughters-in-law, was the major source for older people's income. Forty-five per cent of 
the respondents received income from their sons and/or daughters-in-law living in the 
same household, and 34.9 per cent of them received income from sons and/or 
daughters-in-law not living in the same household. Daughters and sons-in-law, on the 
other hand, regardless of whether they were living in the same household with the 
respondent or not, were relatively less important in supporting older people's income. 
Only a minority of the respondents had income from the labour market and the financial 
markets (the stock and estate markets). Only about one-third (36.4 per cent) of the 
respondents still earned income from the labour market, and less than one-tenth of them 
gained any income from the financial market. In addition, more than eighty per cent of 
the respondents did not have any pensions, retirement payments or old age benefits. This 
figure clearly indicates that Taiwan's old age income protection system needed radical 
reform and expansion. 
On the other hand, it was common that a respondent's income came from a mix of 
different sectors rather than from only one sector. As it can be seen from Table 7.2 that 
large proportions of respondents received income from more than one sector. Among 
those who received income from their family, about one-fourth (24.1 per cent) of them 
also had earnings from the labour market, and one-tenth (10.0 per cent) of them also 
received old age or retirement benefits. Among those who had earnings from the labour 
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market, nearly half of them (46.5 per cent) also received financial support from the 
family, and 14.8 per cent of them also at the same time enjoyed old age or retirement 
benefits. Among those who enjoyed social provisions, more than one-third (35.3 per 
cent) of them also received income from the family, and more than one-fourth (27.0 per 
cent) of them also had income from the labour market. 
Table 7.1 Percentage of respondents receiving income from various sources, 1989 
Income source 
From work 
From son, daughter-in-law living in the same 
household 
From son, daughter-in-law not living in the same 
household 
From daughter, son-in-law living in the same 
household 
From daughter, son-in-law not living in the same 
household 
From pension, retirement payment or old age 
benefits 
From rent or savings 
From stock, estate exchange 
Others 
N = 4,018 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Percentage 
36.4% 
(1,471) 
44.9% 
(1,811) 
34.9% 
(1,409) 
7.8% 
(313) 
10.6% 
(427) 
19.9% 
(804) 
7.0% 
(284) 
1.0% 
(42) 
3.9% 
(156) 
Table 7.2 Matrix of respondent's income sources, 1989 
Received income from 
amily 
Labour market 
Social provisions 
Family 
(46.5%) 
283 
(35.3%) 
Number of total valid observations: 4,018 
Source: Author's calculation. 
Also received income from 
Labour market Social provisions 
680 
(24.1%) 
(27.0%) 
283 
(10.0) 
216 
(14.8%) 
This picture provides important implications. First, it indicates that the relation of family 
support, labour market earnings, and social provision was not a replacement, but a 
supplement. Receiving income from one of these sectors did not prevent them from 
gaining financial resource from other sectors. It is also important to note that, compared 
to respondents who received income from the labour market and social provisions, 
respondents who received income from the family and at the same time received income 
from other sectors are substantially smaller. This is certainly not to say that those who 
received income from the family had the smallest need to get financial resources from 
the other sectors. Rather, it suggests that those who relied on family support were the 
most disadvantaged group who were less likely to be able to get any income from other 
sectors. Second, although the amount of money respondents received from each sector is 
not available, it is reasonable to argue that a large proportion of them received income 
from a second income source implies that income from only one source was not 
sufficient. The fact that high proportions of respondents who enjoyed old age or 
1 This includes all kinds of pensions and retirement payments provided by the government and 
employers. In Taiwan, retirement payments have been made compulsory by the government since 1984, 
thus are categorised as social provisions too. Personal pension schemes are practically not existed in 
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retirement benefits also received income from the family and the labour market at the 
same time might result from the insufficiency of the old age income protection system, 
which has been discussed in Chapter Four. 
Table 7.3 provides another picture of respondents' major income sources. It compares 
the importance of different sectors in terms of being the major income source of the 
respondents. It shows that more than half of the respondents (52.0 per cent) mainly 
relied on their family. Only about one-third (32.8 per cent) of them counted on markets 
(mainly but not exclusively the labour market), and only 14.3 per cent of the respondents 
said that social provisions were their most important income source. It is clear that these 
pictures are very different from those in most of the western capitalistic advanced 
countries where social security benefits have replaced family support and labour market 
earnings as older people's major income source since long time ago. These figures have 
also once again confirmed that, as discussed in Chapter Four, although Taiwan's social 
insurance system was introduced as early as 1950 and covered the majority of 
employees and providing old age benefits for the insured, its impact on the 
de-familisation in older people's income was very limited. 
7.3 Respondent's most important income source, 1989 (%) 
Income source Family Markets * Social Others Total 
prOVIsIons 
Percentage 52.03 32.79 14.25 0.93 100.0 
Source: Author's calculation . 
.. : Mainly the labour market, also including the estate market and the fmancial market, as can be seen in 
Table 7.1. 
Taiwan. 
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It comes no surprise that there are significant differences between different groups of 
respondents in terms of their social and economic characteristics in their most important 
income source. As Table 7.4 shows, the percentage distributions of respondents' major 
income source for respondents' in different groups of gender, age groups, education 
levels, marital status, working status, number of living children, family size, and total 
monthly money income are significantly different. Male were more likely than female to 
rely on the labour market and social provisions, while female were more likely to count 
on the family. As high as 70.8 per cent of female still depended on their family, 
compared to 38.0 per cent of their male counterparts. Forty per cent of men had earnings 
from the markets as their main income source, while only 22.8 per cent of women fell 
into this category. Only one in twenty female (5.5 per cent) relied mostly on social 
provisions, while one in five (20.8 per cent) of male did so. The difference of the 
respondent's major income source between male and female is not difficult to 
understand. Compared to female, male are more advantaged in the labour market in 
terms of occupying a better position and gaining higher wages. Male's advantaged 
position in the labour market, coupled with the fact that Taiwan's old age social security 
system is strongly linked to people's participation in the labour market, made them the 
beneficiary group enjoying retirement payments. Being disadvantaged in the labour 
market, and thus in the old age income protection system, most female were less likely 
to have income from the labour market and social provision, and were more likely to 
have to rely on their family. 
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7.4 Cross-table of respondent's most important income source 1989 (%) , 
Income source 
Independent variables Family Markets Social Others Total 
.. prOVISIOn 
Male 
Sex*** 
38.03 40.24 20.76 0.97 100.00 
Female 70.83 22.79 5.50 0.89 100.00 
60-64 36.53 47.67 14.84 0.96 100.00 
65-69 49.96 31.43 17.65 0.97 100.00 
Age group*** 70-74 65.11 22.41 11.63 0.85 100.00 
75-79 74.40 14.59 10.05 0.96 100.00 
80+ 79.57 10.21 9.36 0.85 100.00 
illiterate 71.98 22.17 4.99 0.86 100.00 
Education Can read or primary 47.42 37.33 14.36 0,89 100.00 
level*** Jr high or jr vocational 24.69 44.69 29.38 1.25 100.00 
Sr high or above 14.65 47.21 36.98 1.16 100.00 
Married 46.53 39.38 13.27 0.59 100.00 
Marital Separated or divorced 21.31 31.15 43.44 4.10 100.00 
status * * * Widowed 73.91 17.54 7.75 0.80 100.00 
Never married 4.00 34.67 56.00 5.33 100.00 
0 2.67 40.00 50.67 6.67 100.00 
Number of 
1-3 39.67 37.44 22.02 0.97 100.00 
living 
4-6 57.26 32.73 9.38 0.64 100.00 
children*** 
7 or more 68.52 26.30 4.83 0.36 100.00 
1-2 33.59 39.32 25.73 1.36 100.00 
3-4 41.50 40.39 17.36 0.74 100.00 
Family size*** 5-6 60.00 28.56 10.35 1.09 100.00 
7-8 67.17 25.79 6.30 0.75 100.00 
9 or more 73.86 23.64 2.27 0.23 100.00 
Currently working 18.33 75.53 5.52 0.62 100.00 
Work status*** 
Currently not working 65.43 15.82 17.69 1.06 100.00 
Less than NT$ 5,000 78.39 16.38 3.97 1.26 100.00 
Total monthly 
NT$ 5,000-9,999 51.26 31.21 16.87 0.66 100.00 
money 
NT$ 10,000-19,999 40.29 39.52 19.43 0.77 100.00 
income*** 24.22 58.98 16.31 0.49 100.00 2,0000 or more 
x2 test: ***: p<.OOl 
It is also the shortcomings of Taiwan's social insurance system that have resulted in the 
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significant difference in respondents' main income source in different age groups. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, Taiwan's social security old age benefits are lump-sum 
payments rather than pensions. The average level of payments is low and thus is not 
sufficient for maintaining a retirement life for too long. Therefore, the 'old old' 
eventually have to rely on their family, even if they received old age benefits at their 
retirement. Therefore, it comes no surprise that, as shown in Table 7.4, with the increase 
of age, lower proportions of respondents relied on social provisions and higher 
proportions of them relied on family support. The insufficiency of the old age income 
protection also explains the fact that there were significant proportions of respondents, 
even in the highest age groups, who had to be involved in market activities to manage 
their finance. 
It is also not surpnsing that, compared to respondents with weaker education 
backgrounds, a higher proportion of respondents in higher education groups relied on 
markets and social provisions for later life, as education backgrounds are strongly linked 
to labour market positions and the level of wages. Again, the advantaged positions in the 
labour market make people with higher education levels the favourable groups to enjoy 
social provisions. By contrast, respondents with relatively limited education levels, 
being disadvantaged in the labour market and thus the social provision system, are more 
likely to rely on their families. 
Respondents' marital status was also associated with their major Income source. 
Compared to those who had a spouse, a higher proportion of widowed respondents 
relied on family support as their major income source. Forty-six per cent of married 
respondents depended on their family, while 74.9 per cent of widowed respondents did 
so. This difference may result from the fact that, compared to those who were married, 
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respondents who were widowed were more likely to be female and tended to fall into 
older age groups. Those who were separated or divorced or never married had different 
types of percentage distribution in their major income source compared with the two 
groups mentioned above. However, the total number of cases that fell into these two 
categories were limited, and they only accounted for 3.4 per cent and 4.2 per cent 
respectively of the total valid cases. 
The proportion of respondents relying on family increased with the increase of the 
number of living children. Less than forty per cent of those who had fewer than three 
children relied on their family, compared to 68.5 per cent of those who had more than 
seven children. On the other hand, with the increase of number of children, the 
proportions of respondents depending on the labour markets and social provisions 
increased. This might result from the fact that there is usually a negative correlation 
between individuals' social and economic status and the number of their children. 
Respondents who did not have any living children had a very different picture in terms 
of the percentage distribution of their major income source, but they totaled only 
accounted for 1.9 per cent of the valid sample. 
The proportion of respondents relying on family also increased with the increase of 
number of people living in the same household. For respondents who lived alone or 
lived with only one person, only one-third (33.6 per cent) of them relied on their families; 
while more than two-thirds of respondents who lived in a household with more than 
eight persons did so. By contrast, a larger proportion of respondents who lived in a small 
household had income form markets and enjoyed social provisions. The negative 
association between individuals' economic situation and the size of their household can 
explain this difference. Wealthier families are financially more able to divide themselves 
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into several households, while less wealthier families often need to reduce their 
expenditure by sticking with each other under the same roof. Therefore, people who live 
in a small household are more likely to be those who have a better position in the labour 
market, and thus, under Taiwan's employment-related social insurance system, are more 
likely to enjoy social provisions. 
Working status also had a strong connection with the respondents' major income sources. 
For those who were currently working, more than three-quarters (75.5 per cent) of them 
depended on their earnings as their main income source. For those who were currently 
not working, about two-third (65.4 per cent) of them had to rely on their family, and only 
1 7.7 per cent of them depended on social provisions. These figures once again confirm 
the insufficiency of the old age income protection system to compensate labourers' 
earnings from commodify sectors after their retirement, and, it is the family, not the 
social protection system, that support older people when they no longer participate in the 
labour market. 
There was also an association between respondent's income and their major income 
source. Compared to people with higher income, a higher proportion of respondents in 
lower income groups relied on their family. In the lowest income group where 
respondent's total monthly income were less than NT$5,000 (equivalent to about £100), 
about four in five (78.4 per cent) of them relied on their family, while only less than one 
in twenty-five (4.0 per cent) of them depended on social provisions. These figures again 
confirm the fact that the most disadvantaged groups are more likely to be excluded from 
the social insurance old age benefits system. The fact that only a very small proportion 
of respondents in the lowest income group relied on social provisions also indicates that 
the scope of the social assistance system is rather limited. 
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Overall speaking, the picture of Taiwanese older people's major income source is very 
different from those in Western countries. As Whiteford's study finds out, in mid-1980s, 
compared to those in higher income groups, higher proportions of older people who 
were in lower quintile income groups received social security benefits and relied social 
transfers as their major source of income (Whiteford, 1994). As a consequence, social 
security systems have become a good mechanism for income redistribution. The social 
insurance system in Taiwan, however, has a reverse effect on income redistribution for 
older people. The employment-related principle for payments has made it a system 
extending income inequality in the labour market until after retirement. 
7.2 Changes of older people's major income source, 1989-1993 
This section is to analyse changes of respondents' major income source from 1989 to 
1993 to see the dynamics of their financial resource. Table 7.5 shows changes of 
respondents' major income source during this period. It reveals that the proportion of 
respondents relied on family support increased rather than decreased from 1989 (51.9%) 
to 1993 (55.1 %). In other words, overall, respondent's income sources during this period 
were moving slightly toward familisation rather than de-familisation. There are three 
possible explanations. First, compared to those who depended on other income sources, 
respondents who relied on the family in 1989 might have a higher rate of successful 
interview in 1993. However, the logistic model has rejected this assumption. As shown 
in Table 7.6, from 1989 to 1993, compared to respondents relying on family support, 
respondents who depended on market earnings had a higher successful interview rate, 
and respondents who depended on social provisions had a lower successful interview 
rate. The issue of successful interview rate is not the interest of this research, but Table 
7.6 has clearly shown that respondents relying on family support were not the group who 
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had the highest successful interview rate. 
Table 7.5 Changes of respondent's major income source, 1989-93 
Major income source, 1993 
Major income Family Market Government 
source, 1989 (55.1 %) (29.80/0) (15.1 %) 
Family (51.9%) 1,225 265 47 
79.7% 17.2% 3.1% 
Market (35.2%) 355 535 152 
34.1% 51.3% 14.6% 
Government (13.00/0) 53 83 248 
13.8% 21.6% 64.6% 
N=2963 
X2 test: ***: p<.001 
Source: Author's calculation from the 1989 and 1993 raw data. 
Total 
1,537 
100.0 
1,042 
100.0 
384 
100.0 
Second, the move towards familisation might be a result of socio-economic change 
during this period. However, there were no major changes in governmental policies 
toward the labour market and the old age income protection system during this period. 
Therefore, this explanation cannot sustain. The third possible reason was the effect of 
ageing. As discussed above, people in higher age groups are more likely to rely on their 
family than their younger counterparts. In 1993, all respondents were four years older 
than when they were in 1989, thus, if all other factors remained equal, the proportion of 
respondents relying on family support would naturally increased. 
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Table 7.6 Logistic regression model predicting respondent's successful interview rate, 
1989-93 
Major income source in 1989 
Major income was from the family 
Maj or income was from markets 
Major income was from social provisions 
Intercept 
Log-Likelihood 
Model x2 test 
N=3,922; Standard errors in brackets. 
***:p<.OOl; **:p<.Ol; *:p<.05. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
Being successfully interviewed in 1993 
(omitted) 
0.376 
(.090) 
-.214*** 
(.108) 
1.202* 
(.523) 
4074.186 
<.0001 
Table 7.5 also reveals that respondents' major income source was rather stable during 
the period from 1989 to 1993. About three-quarters of the respondents' major income 
source remained the same in 1993 as in 1989, and totally only 25.4 per cent of the 
respondents changed their major income source between these two points of time. 
Especially, respondents who relied on family support had the highest proportion - 79.7 
per cent - remained the same in 1993, and only 17.2 per cent of them changed their major 
income source to market earnings and only 3.1 per cent of them changed it into social 
provisions. These figures again indicate that the effect of the social provision system in 
de-familising older people's income was very limited. They also suggest that, with the 
insufficiency of the old age income protection system, family is to many people the only 
resort for later life. 
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It also can be seen from Table 7.5 that almost half of respondents (48.7 per cent) relying 
on market earnings in 1989 changed their major income source in 1993. Among this 
group of respondents, 34.1 per cent of them changed it into family, while only 14.6 per 
cent of them changed into social provisions. These figures suggest that the effect of 
de-commodification of the old age income protection system was very limited. For the 
majority of older people, it was the family, not the old age income protection system, 
which they could count on when they no longer participated in the labour market. 
For those who relied on social provisions in 1989, about two-third of them remained the 
same in 1993. Among this group, 13.8 per cent of them changed it into family support, 
and 21.6 per cent of them changed it into market earnings. This is a dramatic picture that 
such high proportions of respondents shifted their major income source from the social 
provision into other sectors in such a short period of time. It again confirms the 
insufficiency of the old age income protection system. It suggests that even if people 
were fortunate enough to receive retirement payments or old age benefits, many of them 
could just count on these benefits for a short period of time and had to manage to find 
other financial resources. 
7.3 Types of respondent's major income sources, 1989-1993 
By comparing respondents' major income sources between 1989 and 1993, changes of 
their major income can be categorised into seven models, as illustrated in Table 7.7, 
namely Family, Market, Government, Familisation, Commodification, De-familisation 
and De-commodification. As can be seen in the same Table, the model of Family is the 
biggest group and the model of Market comes second. By contrast, only small 
proportions of respondents fell into the models of De-familisation and 
De-commodification. This section is to analyse the connection between respondents' 
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socio-demographic backgrounds and the models of their major income source. 
Table 7.7 Types of respondent's major income source, 1989-93 
Major income source, 1993 
Major income source, 1989 Family Market Social provisions 
Family 1225 265 47 
41.3% 8.9% 1.6% 
Family Commodification De-familisation 
Market 355 535 152 
12.0% 18.1% 5.1% 
Familisation Market De-commodification 
Government 53 83 248 
1.8% 2.8% 8.4% 
Familisation Commodification Government 
N= 2,963 
Table 7.8 shows the results of logistic models companng respondent's 
socio-demographic backgrounds and the probability of their falling into different 
models of major income sources. It can be seen from this Table that several 
characteristics and social economic factors had a significant impact on respondents' 
probability of falling into different models. Compared to females, males were more 
likely to fall into the model of De-commodification and less likely to fall into the models 
of Family and Familisation. This picture again confirms a male's relatively advantaged 
position in getting old age benefits from the social security system. Being disadvantaged 
in the labour market and thus the old age income protection system, females were more 
likely to take the family as their last resort. 
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Table 7.8 Logistic regression predicting respondent's model of major income sources, 
1989-93 
Models of income source 
lndependentvariables Family Market Govem-m Familisa- Commodi De-famili- De-commo-
ent tion -fication sation dification 
Gender 
Female (Omitted) 
Male -.343** .439 .525 -.493*** -.076 .232 2.115*** 
{.109) (.333} {.275} {.144} {.122} {.366) {.2422 
Age (year) .037*** -.014 -.081 ** -.011 .001 -.002 -.076*** 
{.009) (028) (.026) (.013) (.010) (.031) (.017) 
Education (year) -.101 *** .116*** .094*** -.034* -.002 .020 .122*** 
{.0142 {.0312 {.0222 {.0162 {.0132 {.039) {.0202 
Monthly income 
Less than 5,000 (Omitted) 
5,000-9,999 -.701 *** 1.200* .976 .263 .206 .028 2.695*** 
(.132) (.535) (.668) (.177) (.153) (.554) (.481 ) 
10,000-19,999 -.0920*** 1.303* 1.773** .247 .207 .938* 2.765*** 
(.128) (.518) (.611) (.170) (.147) (.451) (.476) 
20000 and above -1.471 *** 1.307* 2.553*** -.141 .700*** .087 2.227*** 
{0.174} {.5682 {.6182 {.220) {.1742 {.6141 {.5051 
Marital status 
89 married, (Omitted) 
93 married 
89 married, 93 .894 -1.363 -.005 .106 -.227 -1.263 .710* 
not married (.186) (1.028) (.496) (.226) (.211) (1.030) (.349) 
89 not married, .199 .304 -.312 -.522*** -.370** -.248 1.099*** 
93 not married {.114} {.319) {.3042 {. 1592 {. 1292 {.3952 {.2022 
Work status 
89 working, 93 (Omitted) 
working 
89 working, 93 .686** -.099 2.064*** 1.304*** -2.114*** 11.912 1.336* 
not working (.234) (.548) (.324) (.186) (.161) (151.1) (.575) 
89 not working, .772** 2.319*** -.691 -.501 -.784*** 11.237 1.942** 
93 working (.282) (.515) (1.054) (.334) (.209) (151.1) (.698) 
89 not working, 2.208*** .5867 .787* -.474* -2.586*** 12.423 3.639*** 
93 not working (.203) (.442) (.343) (.193) (.148) (151.1) {.522) 
Change of family size -.022 .076 .027 .036 -.022 -.018 .028 
{~erson} {.018} {.0512 {.0402 (.0222 {.018) {.062) {.0392 
Intercept -3.379*** -5.502** -1.252 -.705 .785 -16.553 -5.292*** 
(.635) (1.904) (1.792) (.846) (.696) (151.1) (1.230) 
Log-Likelihood 3515.042 607.764 1072.786 2126.557 3058.481 429.770 1424.558 
Model x.2 Test <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 .0030 <.0001 
Note: N=2,597. Standard errors in brackets. 
*: p<.05; **: p<.OI; ***: p<.OOI 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Respondents' age also had an impact on the likelihood of their falling into some of these 
models. With the increase of age, the probability of respondents' falling into the model 
of Family also increased significantly, and probability of falling into the models of 
Government and De-commodification decreased significantly. In other words, 
compared to the 'young old', the 'old old' are less likely to enjoy social security old age 
benefits. This picture again suggests that Taiwan's lump-sum social insurance retirement 
payments were not a good mechanism for older people's long term income security. 
Respondents' education level also affected their probability of falling into some of these 
models. The higher education level they had, the more likely they would fall into the 
models of Family and Familisation, and the less likely they would fall into the models of 
Government and De-commodification. Again, this picture suggests that older people 
were divided into two different worlds where those with low education level were more 
likely to rely on the family, while those with high education level were more likely to 
enjoy social security benefits. 
Respondents' income also had significant impact on their falling into some of these 
models. Generally speaking, respondents who were in higher income groups were more 
likely to fall into the models of Market, Government, and De-commodification, and 
were less likely to fall into the model of Family. It is also worth noting that, compared to 
respondents whose monthly income was less then NT$ 5,000, respondents whose 
income was more than 20,000 were more likely to fall into the model of 
Commodification. In other words, older people who re-enter the labour market (i.e. the 
commodification sector) are likely to be the economically advantaged group rather than 
disadvantaged group. On the other hand, compared to the lowest income group (less 
than NT$5,000), only those who were in the middle income group (NT$10,000 to 
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NT$19,OOO) had a higher probability of falling into the model of De-familisation. 
Compared with respondents who were in the lowest income group, those who were in 
mid-low income group (NT$5,OOO to NT$9,999) and in the highest income group 
(NT$20,OOO or above) did not have a significantly higher probability of being 
de-familised in their major income. This suggests that respondents in middle-low 
income group were like those who were in the lowest income groups who had little 
chance to depart from the reliance on the family. As those who were in the highest 
income group, they would tum to markets (which would fall themselves into the model 
of Commodification) rather than the state (which would fall themselves into the model 
of De-fa mil is at ion) as an alternative for family support. 
Compared to those who had a spouse in 1993, respondents who were not married in 
1993 were more likely to fall into the model of De-commodification. In addition, those 
who were not married both in 1989 and in 1993 were less likely to fall into the models of 
Familistion and Commodification. On the other hand, compared to those who were 
working both in 1989 and 1993, respondents who had different work status either in 
1989 or in 1993 were more likely to fall into the models of Familisation and 
De-commodification, and were less likely to fall into the model of De-commodification. 
7.4 Changes of older people's income source, 1993-1996 
Unlike the period between 1989 to 1993 in which the government did not have any 
significant reform in the old age income protection system, the period between 1993 to 
1996 saw significant expansion of the means-tested old age benefit system. As discussed 
in Chapter Four, the MLIEAand the OFAwere introduced in 1993 and 1995 respectively. 
In addition, since 1993, several local governments also started to provide a universal old 
age allowance to its citizens. This expansion of the social security system might have 
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significant effects on models of older people's major income source. 
Table 7.9 presents changes of respondents , major income source between 1993 and 1996. 
It can be seen from this Table that the percentage distributions of different models are 
very different from those in Table 7.7, which presents changes of respondents' major 
income source from 1989 to 1993. It shows that, although the respondents were three 
years older, the percentage of respondents relying on the family declined dramatically, 
from 54.0 per cent in 1993 to 40.3 per cent in 1996. The proportion of older people 
relying on social provisions, on the other hand, increased sharply from 14.9 per cent to 
38.5 per cent during the same period of time. For respondents whose major income was 
family in 1993, 57.1 per cent of them remained the same in 1996. On the other hand, 
30.4 per cent of respondents relying on family support in 1993 changed it into social 
provisions in 1996. For respondents relying on market earnings in 1993, 33.8 per cent of 
them changed it into social provisions in 1996. For respondents relying on social 
provisions in 1993, more than two-third (77.7 per cent) of them remained the same in 
1996, and only 10.7 per cent of them changed it into family and only 11.6 of them 
changed it into market. 
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Table 7.9 Changes of respondent's major income source, 1993-961 
Major income source, 1996 
Maj or income Family Market Government Total 
source, 1993 (40.30/0) (21.2%) (38.5%) 100.0% 
Family 697 152 371 1220 
(54.0%) 57.l% 12.5% 30.4% 100.00/0 
Family Commodification De-familisation 
Market 179 288 238 705 
(31.2%) 25.40/0 40.9% 33.8% 100.0% 
Familisation Market De-commodification 
Government 36 39 261 336 
(14.90/0) 10.7% 11.6% 77.7% 100.0% 
Familisation Commodification Government 
x2 test: p<.001 
Source: Author's calculation. 
1: Since respondents who survive in 1993 but not in 1996 are excluded from this table, the frequency and 
percentage distributions of 1993 in this table are not the same as those in Table 7.5. 
This picture clearly suggests that the expansion of the old age income protection system 
since 1993 had a significant impact on respondents' major income source in the period 
of 1993-96. Overall, compared with the period of 1989-93, from 1993 to 1996 the 
proportion of respondents relying on family support declined sharply, the proportion of 
them relying on social provisions increased dramatically, and large proportions of them 
departed from the reliance on family support or market earning to become relying on 
social provisions. These changes together provide strong evidence that the expansion of 
the old age income protection system had substantially increased the de-familisation and 
de-commodification of older people's income. It also suggests that, to many respondents, 
social provisions served as a substitution to family support and market earnings. Once 
old age benefits were made available, significant proportions of those who relied on 
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family support or market earnings would change their major income source into these 
benefits within a very short period of time. 
Table 7.10 shows the results of logistic models of respondents' models of major income 
and their characteristics and social economic background between 1993 and 1996. It 
clearly demonstrates again that respondents' characteristics and their social economic 
background had significant impact on the probability of their falling into different 
models. It also shows that, compared with the period of 1989-93, the impact of 
independent variables on respondents' probability of falling into the same models 
changed. In other words, the expansion of old age income security system since 1993 
not only changed the percentage distribution of respondents' major income sources, but 
also altered the path of their major income sources. To avoid repetition, this chapter is 
not going to discuss the relationship between respondents' income model and each of 
their socio-demographic backgrounds again, as many of them were explained in section 
7.5. In stead, this chapter is going on to compare the similarities and differences of 
significance of respondent's backgrounds and their likelihood of falling into various 
models of major income between 1989-93 and 1993-96. 
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Table 7.10 Logistic regression models predicting types of respondent's major income 
sources, 1993-96 
Models of income source 
Independent variables Family Market Govern Famili- Commodi De-famili- De-commo-
-ment sation -fication sation dification 
Gender 
Female (omitted) 
Male -.450*** -.141 1.737*** -.144 -.453* -.029 .643*** 
{. l102 {.1782 (.2162 {.167) (.182) {. 1372 {.1762 
Age (year) .008 -.017 -.060*** .014 .014 .027* -.050** 
{.010) {.0172 {.017) (.015) (.016) {.0112 {.0162 
Education (year) -.064*** .016 .091 *** -.010 .s018 -.065*** .044* 
{.0142 {.0182 {.0172 {.0192 (.020) {.0192 {.0182 
Monthly income 
Less than 5,000 (omitted) 
5,000-9,999 .600*** .289 1.254*** .126 -.225 -.932*** -.045 
(.128) (.233) (.370) (.211) (.215) (.158) (.205) 
10,000-19,999 .135 .641 ** 2.499*** .494* -.444* -1.142*** -.456* 
(.133) (.213) (.333) (.196) (.221) (.168) (.211) 
20000 and above -.497** .937*** 2.636*** .159 -.077 -1.862*** -.010 
{.174) {.2242 {.3442 {.2392 {.2292 {.2582 {.2162 
Marital status 
93 married, 96 (omitted) 
married 
93 married, 96 .422* -.326 .176 -.166 .076 -.284 -.323 
not married (.190) (.318) (.336) (.299) (.295) (.249) (.349) 
93 not married, .341 ** -.556** .603** -.395* -.396* -.290* .222 
96 not married (.112) (.198) (.189) (.179) (.195) (.139) (. 171 2 
Work status 
93 working, 96 (omitted) 
working 
93 working, 96 1.773*** -2.775*** 2.877*** .538 -1.043*** 1.178*** .155 
not working (.250) (.171) (.430) (.279) (.020) (.291) (.230) 
93 not working, .952** -2.155*** .645 1.280*** -1.317*** .638 1.742*** 
96 working (.307) (.253) (.576) (.318) (.364) (.370) (.258) 
93 not working, -.333 -.355** .991 *** -4.526 .423*** .117 -4.660 
96 not working {.3492 {. 1342 {.2052 {2012 {.1282 {.2262 {186.92 
Intercept -2.666*** .853 -4.541 *** -3.700*** -2.021 
-3.468*** .213 
(.677) (1.130) (1.201) (1.013) (1.056) (.791) (1.077) 
Log -Likelihood 2810.070 1736.069 1616.092 1423.421 1335.642 2030.083 
1533.307 
Model X2 Test <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
<.0001 
Note: N=2275. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.05; **p<.Ol; ***<.001 
Source: Calculated from the 1993 and 1996 raw data. 
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7.5 A Comparison of impacts of respondent's backgrounds on income models 
Table 7.11 compares the similarities and differences of significance of respondents' 
backgrounds on their likelihood of falling into different income models during the two 
periods of 1989-93 and 1993-96. It shows that during these two periods, the impact of 
some respondents' characteristics and social economic backgrounds on the significance 
of the probability of respondents' falling into some models of income source had not 
changed. Males were, compared to females, more likely to fall into the model of 
De-commodification, and less likely to fall into the model of Family. The probability of 
falling into the models of Government and De-commodification were both declining 
with the increase of age, and were increasing with respondents' education level. 
Respondents with higher education were also less likely to fall into the model of Family. 
Compared to respondents whose monthly income was less then NT$5,OOO, those who 
with monthly income above NT$10,OOO were more likely to fall into the models of 
Market and Government. And compared to the same benchmark group, those who with 
monthly income above NT$20,OOO were less likely to fall into the model of Family. 
Compared to respondents who were married throughout the periods, those who were not 
married throughout the periods were less likely to fall into the models of Familisation 
and Commodification. Respondents who changed work status from working to not 
working compared to those who were working throughout the periods were more likely 
to fall into the models of Family and Government, and less likely to fall into the model 
of Commodification. 
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Table 7.11 Significance ofrespondent's backgrounds predicting models ofrespondent's 
major income source, 1989-93 & 1993-96 
Models of income source 
Independent variables Family Market Govern Famili- Commodi De-famili-s De-commo-
-ment sation -fication ation dification 
Gender 
Female (omitted) 
Male -A -A A 
-B B -B B 
Age A -A -A 
-B B -B 
Education -A A A -A A 
-B B -B B 
Monthly income 
Less than 5,000 (omitted) 
5,000-9,999 -A A A 
B B -B 
10,000-19,999 -A A A A A 
B B B -B -B -B 
20000 and above -A A A A A 
-B B B -B 
Marital status 
89 (93) married, (omitted) 
93 {96} married 
89 (93) married, A 
93 (96} not married B 
89 (93) not married, -A -A A 
93 (96) not married B -B B -B -B -B 
Work status 
89 (93) working, (omitted) 
93 {96} working 
89 (93) working, A A A -A A 
93 (96) not working B -B B -B B 
89 (93) not working, A A -A A 
93 (96) working B -B B -B B 
89 (93) not working, A A -A -A A 
93 {96) not working -B B B 
Note: 1. The significance level chosen here is p<.05 
2. 'A' means significant in 1989-93; 'B' means significant in 1993-96 
3. '+' means the probability is positive, and '-' means the likelihood is negative. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Those who changed work status from not working to working compared to those who 
were working throughout the periods were more likely to fall into the model of Family 
and De-commodification and less likely to fall into the model of Commodification. 
Respondents who were not working throughout the periods were compared to those who 
were working throughout the periods more likely to fall into the model of Government. 
What is more interesting is that the impact of some of respondents' backgrounds on the 
probability of their falling into some models changed from 1989-93 to 1993-96. The 
most dramatic change occurred within the model of De-familisation. During the period 
between 1993-96, respondents who were older, or with lower education level or lower 
income, were more likely to fall into the model De-familisation. This significance did 
not exist in 1989-93 and only appeared in 1993-96. In other words, unlike in 1989-93 
when the most socio-economically advantaged groups are more likely to enjoy social 
provisions, in 1993-96, the socio-economically disadvantaged respondents were more 
likely to change their major income source from family into social provisions. This 
difference suggests that, in 1989-93, the old age income protection system offered 
social insurance benefits to the socio-economically advantaged groups, while in 
1993-96, means-tested benefits which targeted the relatively worse-off groups took over 
and became the main part of the system. 
7.6 Models of older people's major income, 1989-1996 
Table 7.12 sums up models of respondents' major income from 1989 to 1996. It shows 
clearly that the percentage distributions of different models during these two periods are 
very different. From the first period (1989-93) to the second period (1993-96), the 
percentage of respondents fell into the models of Market and Commodification declined 
significantly, from 19.9 per cent to 12.7 per cent and from 12.9 per cent to 8.4 per cent 
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respectively. This is not surprising, as respondents became older in the second period 
were thus less likely to participate in the labour market then they were in the first period. 
The percentage of respondents who relied on Government increased slightly from 9.2 
per cent in the first period to 11.5 per cent in the second period. 
Table 7.12 Models of respondent's major income source, 1989-93 & 1993-96 
1989-93 1993-96 1989-961 
Family 45.5% 30.8% 23.9%2 
Market 19.9% 12.7% 9.7% 
Government 9.2% 11.5% 7.0% 
Familisation 15.2% 9.5% 11.6%3 
Commodification 12.9% 8.4% 7.7% 
De-familisation 1.7% 16.4% 12.7% 
De-commodification 5.6% 10.5% 9.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 82.5% 
Note: l.Throughout 1989 to 1996, 17.3 per cent of valid observations changed their major income source 
twice with different directions, thus can not be categorised into the above models. 
2. The model of Family in this column means that respondent's major income was family in 1989 
and did not change through 1996. The same principle applies to the models of Market and 
Government. 
3. Including respondents whose major mcome through 1989-1993-1996 were (market or 
government)-family-family, market-market-family, or government-government-family. The 
same principle applies to the models of Commodification, De-familisation, and 
De-commodification. 
Source: Author's calculation. 
The biggest changes, though, were related to the family sector. Respondents who fell 
into the models of Family and Familisation declined sharply from 45.5 per cent to 
30.8 per cent and from 15.2 per cent to 9.5 per cent respectively from the first period to 
the second period. These changes suggest that there were external factors that had 
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influenced the trend of respondents' major income source during these two periods, 
otherwise these percentage should have increased as there were getting older. 
On the other hand, unlike the first period in which only 1.7 per cent of the respondents 
fell into the model of De-fa mil is at ion, 16.4 per cent of respondents fell into this model in 
the second period. Respondents who fell into the model of De-commodification also 
increased from 5.6 per cent in the first period to 10.5 per cent in the second period. These 
pictures again confirm that the MLIEA and the OF A introduced during the second period 
had significantly increased the de-familisation and de-commodification of respondents' 
income. The relatively high percentage changes in the models of Family and 
De-familisation also suggest that respondents who relied on family in the first period are 
the group who benefited most by the introduction of these new schemes. In other words, 
the introduction of the old age benefits does significantly increase the degree of 
de-familisation of older people's income. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, as 
these benefits were means-tested and their levels of benefits are low, their impact on 
de-familising older people's income mainly occurred in the socio-economically 
disadvantaged groups. It is also due to the same reasons that the impact of benefits on 
de-commodifing older people's income was not as significant as their effect on 
de-familisation. 
It can also be seen from Table 7.11 that the proportion of respondents who relying on 
social provisions throughout the whole period from 1989 to 1996 was as low as 7.0 per 
cent. This figure suggests that there were serious limitations to Taiwan's old age income 
protection system in terms of its coverage and benefit levels. The shortcomings of this 
system have also left the family as the key sector to securing respondents' later life. 
Throughout the whole period from 1989 to 1996,23.9 per cent of the respondents never 
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changed their reliance on family support, and totally 11.6 per cent of the respondents 
changed from other income sources to family support. During the whole period, the 
proportions of respondents whose income were de-familised or de-commodified by 
social provisions were as low as 12.7 per cent and 9.9 per cent respectively. This picture 
again indicates the limitations of Taiwan's old age income protection to older people's 
financial independence. 
7.7 Impacts of income models on older people's living standards 
Having identified changes and models of respondent's major income source, the 
question being asked then is: do these changes and models have significant impact on 
respondents' financial situation? Table 7.12 shows the results of logistic models 
examining the impact of changes of respondent's major income source on their 
economic situation. It should be noted that, in 1993, 53.3 per cent of the respondents said 
their economic situation was the same as when the last interview was conducted, 34.3 
per cent said it was better, and 12.5 per cent said it was worse. In 1996, these figures 
were 68.7 per cent, 10.8 per cent, and 20.5 per cent respectively. Therefore, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that generally respondents' financial situation was worsening from 
1989-93 to 1993-96. This is not surprising as it was getting more difficult for 
respondents to get sufficient financial resources as they were getting older. 
Statistics results, which are not to be shown here, show that the correlation between 
changes of respondents , major income source and their socio-demographic backgrounds, 
such as their sex, age, education level, marriage status and working status are modest. In 
addition, stepwise regression models also show that the explanatory power of these 
factors to the changes of respondents' economic situation is very low. Therefore, it is 
safe to put only one group of independent variables, namely change of respondents' 
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major income source, in the logistic models and there does not exist the problem of 
muticollinearity. 
It can be seen from Table 7.13 that, generally, changes of respondents' major income 
source did not have too much impact on their financial situation. Compared to those 
whose major income source remained being family, respondents whose major income 
source changed from family to market or to social provisions did not significantly get 
better or get worse in their financial situation. This result has two indications. First, it 
suggests that income resources provided by the family were rather stable. Compared to 
respondents who managed to depart from the reliance on their family and got income 
from other sectors, those who remained relying on the family did not face a higher risk 
of getting worse-off. Second, financial resource from the family served as a supplement 
or a replacement to market income and social provisions. Once respondents managed to 
get income from other sectors, the role of the family in providing respondents income 
drew back, and their financial situation remained unchanged. 
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Table 7.13 Logistic regression models predicting respondent's financial situation 
Independent variables 1989-93 1993-96 
(Change of respondent's major Better than Worse than Better than Worse than 3 
income source) 4 years ago 4 years ago 3 years ago years ago 
Family at both points of time (omitted) 
From family to market -.018 .0159 .190 -.249 
(.157) (.229) (.271) (.258) 
From family to government .177 -.465 .213 .087 
(.329) (.606) (.200) (.174) 
Intercept -.972*** -2.174*** -2.022*** -1.536*** 
(.067) (.098) (.124) (.104) 
Number of observations 1422 1422 1112 1112 
Log-Likelihood 1672.345 931.732 844.389 1040.234 
Model X 2 Test .8565 .709 .523 .457 
Market at both points of time (omitted) 
From market to family .122 .302* -.036 .637*** 
(.161) (.183) (.360) (.239) 
From market to government -.036 .497** -.071 .542** 
(.221) (.230) (.321) (.217) 
Intercept -1.174*** -1.707*** -2.355*** -1.563*** 
(.103) (.122) (.214) (.159) 
Number of observations 1009 1009 666 666 
Log-Likelihood 1117.847 943.841 384.410 710.951 
Model X 2 Test .692 .062 .976 .0094 
Government at both points of time (omitted) 
From government to family -.081 .466 -1.214 .718* 
(.346) (.401) (1.038) (.419) 
From government to market -.089 -.079 -.274 .551 
(.289) (.399) (.637) (.393) 
Intercept -.864*** -1.852*** -2.154*** -1.412*** 
(.143) (.190) (.207) (.159) 
Number of observations 365 365 317 317 
Lo g-Likelihood 439.714 297.383 196.484 330.628 
Model X2 Test .939 .475 .360 .129 
Note: I.Standard errors in brackets. 
2. *: p<.l; **: p<.05; ***: p<.OI (Due to the fact that the number of observations in some of these 
models are low, so the significant levels chosen here are less strict). 
Source: Author's calculation. 
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On the other hand, compared to those who relied on market earnings throughout this 
period, respondents who changed their major income source from market to the family, 
categorised as the model ofFamilisation, or to social provisions, categorised as the 
model of De-Commodification, had a higher probability of getting worse in their 
financial situation. In other words, once respondents retired from the labour market, the 
financial resources they could get from the family or from social provisions could not 
fully compensate their income from the labour market. This picture also explains why 
the labour market participation rates among older age groups in Taiwan have remained 
relatively high compared to capitalistic advanced countries in North American and 
Europe, as discussed in Chapter Four. Not being able to enjoy the same standard of 
living after retirement, many older people in Taiwan have chosen to stay in the labour 
market instead of retiring early. 
Among those whose major Income source was from social prOVISIons In 1993, 
respondents who became dependent on the family in 1996, categorised as the model of 
Familisation, got significantly worse in their financial situation compared to those who 
remained relying on the same resort in 1996. This result, again, confirms the point that 
the family is the last resort for old age income protection. Once older people run out of 
their retirement payment and have to rely on the family, they fall into a worse financial 
situation. 
To sum up, respondents who retired from the labour market were more likely to become 
worse-off in their financial situation; and respondents experienced familisation of their 
major income source were also more likely to find themselves in a worse financial 
situation. Apart from these two groups of people, respondents experienced other types of 
change in their major income source did not feel having a significant difference in their 
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financial situation. Due to the fact that everyone must retire sooner or later, and that 
family is still the most important income source for later life, older people in Taiwan at 
large have to be prepared for a downgrading financial situation in their later life. 
Especially, it seems ironic that respondents who fell into the model of De-familisation 
did not significantly improve their financial situation, and that respondents who fell into 
the model of De-commodification felt their financial situation was getting worse. 
7.8 Conclusion 
Although Taiwan introduced an old age income protection system as early as the 1950s, 
its effects on the de-familisation and the de-commodification of older people's income 
were, until the late 1980s, very limited. Empirical data presented in this chapter have 
confirmed the points that the family was still the most important income source for older 
people, and only a small proportion of people enjoyed social protections in their later life. 
In addition, it has proven that the current lump-sum social insurance old age benefit 
system were not an adequate measure to protect older people's long term income 
security. On the other hand, the expansion of the old age income protection system since 
1993 has had a significant impact on the de-familisation and, to a lesser extent, the 
de-commodification of older people's income, although the impact was more common 
among the socio-demographically disadvantageous groups. Therefore, after the 
expansion of the means-tested old age benefits since the early 1990s, Taiwan's old age 
income protection system has become a dual-tier system. The half-a-century-old 
contributory schemes have been serving to de-commodify wealthier older people's 
income after their retirement, although only for a short period of time, while the 
non-contributory benefits help the socio-demographically most disadvantaged groups to 
de-familise their income. 
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There were substitutions and supplements between older people's different income 
source. It is common that older people's income came from a mix of different sectors 
rather than coming from just one sector. Receiving income from either the family, the 
labour market, or social provisions did not stop them from getting income from the other 
two sectors. Nevertheless, after the non-contributory old age benefit system was 
expanded since 1993, many people did change their major income from other sectors 
into social provisions. This picture suggests that, to a large extent, older people's 
reliance on family support was not a result of their rational choice, but a consequence of 
their lack of old age benefits. The big increase in the de-familisation of older people's 
income within such a short period of time also suggests that the traditional role of the 
family to support their aged members has not faded away, but was just being substituted 
by old age benefits. The family was still significant in its role of being the last resort of 
older people's income protection. 
Having increased the degree of the de-familisation and the de-commodification of older 
people's income, the expansion of the non-contributory benefit system, however, did not 
significantly improve older people's financial situation. With the fact that older people 
in Taiwan at large are getting worse in their financial situation, further reform on the old 
age income protection system is needed. What would be most helpful to alter the 
shortcomings of the current system and to improve older people's living standards are 
the changes of the current lump-sum benefits into monthly (or weekly) payment, and the 
increase of the benefit levels of current non-contributory schemes. 
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Chapter Eight 
A comparison of familisation and de-familisation in old age income 
protection systems in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
The analysis in previous chapters has shown that the three Chinese societies of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, although sharing many common features, have experienced 
different paths of social provision in response to older people's financial needs. In 
Taiwan, a social insurance system was established as early as 1950, covering blue-collar 
labourers and offering comprehensive cash and medical benefits, including a lump-sum 
old age benefit. The last half-century saw its expansion of coverage and levels of benefit, 
as well as the implementation of new social insurance schemes targeting other 
occupation groups, such as government employees and private school teachers. On the 
other hand, when the symptoms of an ageing society became clear in the 1980s, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, two important tax-funded, means-tested benefits, the MLIEA 
and the OF A were introduced for older people. Although the Taiwanese government has 
been emphasising and advocating the virtues of filial piety and family obligation, the 
development of a social provision in the second half of the twentieth century was clearly 
toward the direction of de-familisation. 
In Hong Kong, the first social security provision for older people did not come into force 
until the early 1970s. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Special Needs Allowance and 
the Normal Old Age Allowance, both introduced in 1973, are tax-funded and targeted at 
the most needy, and are doubtlessly de-familisation schemes. The recent implementation 
of the Mandatory Provident Fund in 1998, a scheme which is similar to the CPF in 
Singapore apart from its private-managed feature, is certainly also a de-familisation 
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scheme. The development of the old age income maintenance system in Hong Kong in 
the second half of the twentieth century has clearly followed the same direction of 
de-familisation. 
Singapore implemented its first and only old age income security scheme, the CPF, in 
the early 1950s, as early as Taiwan did. The CPF, like social insurance benefits in 
Taiwan, is based on individuals' contributions rather than their citizenship. The CPF 
scheme has gone through several important expansions and has undertaken more 
functions in addition to providing a source of income in later life. The basic principles of 
this scheme are by no means any different from other fully-funded, defined-contribution 
old age benefits operated in European countries, and should therefore also be considered 
as a scheme of de-familisation. However, as the coming of an ageing society attracts the 
government's attention, policies aimed at reinforcing family ties are adopted to support 
people in later life. These policies, as discussed in Chapter Six, include the introduction 
of a top-up scheme for the CPF, which offers a higher interest rate to encourage 
individuals to transfer their savings in the CPF to their parents' Retirement Account to 
supplement their payment for old age; and the enactment of the Maintenance of Parents 
Act in 1995, which states that children have a lawful obligation to support their parents. 
These two schemes share the same goal: to encourage family cohesion for looking after 
their older members. Clearly, to increase the degree of familisation is the government's 
strategy in response to an ageing society. 
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Table 8.1 Developments of old age schemes in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
Year Taiwan Singapore 
1950s • 1950 Labor Insurance; • 1953 CPF 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
Soldiers Insurance 
• 1958 Government 
Employees Insurance 
• 1958 Labor Insurance 
extended coverage 
• 1969 Labor Insurance 
extended coverage 
• 1979 Labor Insurance 
extended coverage 
• 1980 Older People's 
Welfare Act 
• 1980 Private School 
Staff and Educators 
Insurance 
• 1993 Low-income 
Elder Allowance 
• 1995 Older Farmer's 
Allowance 
enactment 
• 1955 CPF brought 
into force 
• 1977 the Special 
Account 
• 1987 Retirement 
Account 
• 1989 Top-up 
scheme 
• 1995 Maintenance 
of Parents Act 
Hong Kong 
• 1973 Special Needs 
Allowance 
• 1973 Nonnal Old Age 
Allowance 
• 1978 Special Needs 
Allowance expanded 
coverage 
• 1993 the Comprehensive 
Social Security 
Assistance scheme 
• 1995 Mandatory 
Provident Fund Scheme 
Ordinance 
• 1998 Mandatory 
Provident Fund came 
into force 
Comparing the schemes and Acts introduced in these three societies, as listed in table 
8.1, we see that Taiwan and Singapore established a system of de-familisation for older 
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people's financial support two decades early than Hong Kong. Nevertheless, while 
Taiwan and Hong Kong's systems have consistently followed the direction of 
de-familisation until the end of the twentieth century, Singapore has clearly shifted its 
direction from de-familisation toward familisation since the late 1980s. What are the 
factors that explain, compared with Taiwan and Singapore, the delayed development of 
Hong Kong in older people's income protection? What are the reasons that resulted in 
the divergence of trends toward familisation or de-familisation in these three societies 
since the late 1980s? Before trying to answer these two questions, this chapter first 
reviews maj or social welfare theories and examines their appropriateness in the 
development of old age income maintenance systems in these three countries. 
8.1 A theoretical review on the development of old age provision systems in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore 
As discussed in Chapter Two, modem theories that try to explain the emergence and 
development of the welfare states include the industrialism approach, the social 
democratic approach, the diffusion approach, and the state-centred approach. The 
industrialism approach, as discussed in Chapter Two, claims that the emergence and 
expansion of the social security system is a product of industrialisation. This approach, 
however, simply does not fit the cases of these three Chinese societies. When Taiwan 
established its social insurance system in 1950, its per capita GNP was less than US$ 
200 (US$ 196 in 1952) (Taiwan Government, 2000:46), and more than half(56 per cent 
in 1952) of the people participating in the labour force were involved in primary industry, 
and only one-sixth (16.9 per cent in 1952) of them were engaged in secondary industry 
(Taiwan Government, 2000: 30). The proportion of people aged 65 or over then was also 
very low (5.6 per cent in 1952) (Taiwan Government, 2000: 23). In other words, the 
modem social provision system in Taiwan was introduced when the society was 
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pre-industrial, the economy was under-developed, and the population was very young. 
Likewise, Singapore's CPF programme was introduced well before its industrialisation 
process started in the 1960s. When the CPF scheme was enacted in 1953, its population 
was still young, with half of the population under the age of 21 (Colonial Singapore 
Government, 1953: 8) and the proportion of people aged 60 or over was below four per 
cent (3.8 per cent in 1957) (Saw, 1999: 55). The industrialism approach also can not 
explain the fact that, in Hong Kong, despite the fact that campaigns advocating a social 
insurance system have been active since the late 1970s, it was not until as late as the 
1990s, when its GDP per capita overtook its colonial master, Britain, that the Mandatory 
Provident Fund was implemented. 
The social democratic conception, as discussed in Chapter Two, emphasises the 
importance of working-class mobilisation and left-wing government on the 
development of the social security system, can not explain the initiation of old age 
provision schemes in these three cases either. In Taiwan, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
the leftists were liquidated as a consequence of the suppression following the "228 
Incident" in 1947, and played no role in the formation of the social insurance system in 
the 1950s. Likewise, when the first social security programmes were introduced in 
Singapore in the 1950s and in Hong Kong in the 1970s', they were still at the stage of 
authoritarian regimes under the governance of British colonial governments. Neither in 
Taiwan, which was dominated by an authoritarian government of the KMT, nor in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, which were still under colonial rule, had any significant 
left-wing power in the political arena. Their social security systems were constructed 
without any political campaign from the left-wing power. In addition, when these three 
countries started undertaking the second wave of expansion in old age provision 
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schemes since the 1980s, non of these countries have ever had a significant left-wing 
political party. The development of old age income maintenance systems in these 
countries have come about without any left-wing influence, and thus do not fit the social 
democratic approach, which is evidenced in many European countries. 
The diffusion approach, as discussed in Chapter Two, places emphasis on international 
policy learning, seems reasonable at explaining these cases. Taiwan's social insurance 
schemes introduced in the 1950s are clearly based on the Bismarck model. However, the 
policy learning approach is of no help in explaining the timing of the establishment of 
the Taiwanese social insurance system. In Singapore, the implementation of the CPF 
scheme under the British colonial government coincides with the introduction of the 
provident fund schemes in other former British colonies. As Williamson and Pampel 
(1993) argued the former British colonial administration tended to introduce provident 
fund schemes to its colonies. However, there is always a danger that, by looking at the 
geographical and political relationship and the year in which social security schemes 
were introduced, this approach overlooks the policy making process. For instance, 
Singapore's provident fund system is often deemed as being influenced by Malaysia, 
Singapore's hinterland, who implemented a central provident fund in Malaysia in 1951, 
two years before the Singaporean system was introduced (for example, Charlton and 
Mckinnon, 2001: 135). However, people who hold this argument overlook the fact that 
the idea of introducing a provident fund in Singapore was first addressed in Singapore in 
1949, well before the same kind of scheme was introduced in Malaysia. As the original 
proposer stated in his move: 
H Of late there has been an erroneous belief in some quarters that I had introduced 
this Bill for the purpose of following in the footsteps of the Federation 
Government [of Malaya). This is entirely untrue. It was in the year 1949 that the 
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idea of a Central Provident Fund was first suggested by the Progressive Party ... 
In the first place, there was no precedent which could be found in the English 
Statute Books". 
(Singapore Parliament Debates, 1952: 195) 
This statement clearly rejects the argument that the introduction of the Central Fund in 
Singapore is a case of diffusion. The diffusion approach also can not explain the fact that 
a British colonial government did not introduce a central provident fund in Hong Kong 
in the 1950s or the 1960s, like it did to many of its former colonies. 
The unsuitability of these approaches has left the state-centred approach alone as the 
possible theoretical explanation. This study argues that the state is the main factor in 
both the development of old age social provision systems in these three countries and the 
divergence of their direction toward familisation and de-familisation since the 1980s. As 
addressed in Chapter Three, this chapter will employ the Method of Agreement and the 
Method of Different to compare the development of old age social provisions in these 
three countries. The analysis will first focus on similar features in these three countries 
to see if they are significant to explain the convergence and the divergence of this system 
in the three countries. 
8.2 Similar features in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
Table 8.2 summarises the similar and crucial different features in Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore throughout the second half of the twentieth century. As discussed in 
previous chapters, these three countries have shared a number of common ideological, 
political, and economic features. Ideologically, all these countries are mainly Chinese 
societies and thus have been influenced by Confucianism which is rooted in Chinese 
tradition. Confucianism is a comprehensive teaching that offers guidelines in almost 
266 
every aspect of the three societies. Politically, it emphasises harmony rather than conflict, 
paternalism rather than democracy. In other words, it provides an unfavorable condition 
for the development of a democratic system, which is generally considered as a 
precondition to the emergence of welfare states. Economically, it encourages individuals 
to be thrifty, industrious and hardworking, and has served as one of the main factors that 
contribute to the successful economical performance in these countries. Socially, it 
values family obligation and filial piety, the virtues that these governments are glad to be 
associated with. 
The governments' preference for family cohesion in response to people's needs and their 
emphasis on family obligation and filial piety in these three countries are well 
documented. As illustrated in previous chapters, until as recently as the 1990s, the 
emphasis on family obligations were still a common theme in official policy addresses 
in these countries, especially when referring to social welfare policies. In addition, 
practical incentives, such as tax incentives and priority housing, which have been 
commonly adopted in these countries to encourage family cohesion, also provide clear 
evidence of the government's preference for family obligation. The worries that a 
modem social security system would undermine traditional family virtues make these 
governments resistant to follow their western counterparts and establish a generous 
welfare system. 
267 
Table 8.2 Comparison between Taiwan (TWN), Hong Kong (HK), and Singapore (SI G) 
1950S 1970S 1980S 1990S 
TWN HK SIG TWN HK SIG TWN HK SIG TWN HK SIG 
SIMILARITIES 
Confucianism ideology yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Government emphasize on filial piety yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Strong family cohesion yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Low proportion of older people yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Economic-first development strategies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
High older people labour force yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
participation rate 
Export-oriented industrialisation yeslNO NO NO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
High economic growth yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
DIFFERENCES 
Imperative for national-building yes NO yes yes yes NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Free from legitimacy crisis NO yes yes NO yes yes NO yes yes yes yes yes 
Government autonomy yes yes yes yes yes yes NO NO yes NO NO yes 
= 
Introducing de-familisation schemes* yes -- yes -- yes -- yes -- NO yes yes NO 
-
*: 'yes' means introducing de-fanlilisation schemes; 'NO' means introducing familisation schemes. 
It might seem understandable that these governments prefer and advocate family virtues, 
as there has been strong family cohesion in these countries. As illustrated in previous 
chapters, although the percentages have been steadily declining, it is still common for an 
older person to live with his or her adult children and to receive financial support from 
them. A governmental survey in Taiwan conducted in 1996 showed that the more than 
one half (51.2 per cent) of people aged 65 or over live with their children (Taiwan 
Government, 1997: 18). Government statistics in Singapore also show that in 1997 the 
proportion of people aged 60 or above living with children is as high as 78 per cent 
(Singapore Government, 1999: 31). In Hong Kong, demographic figures show that, in 
1996, 67.8 per cent of households containing older persons consisted of three or more 
persons (Hong Kong Government, 1997: 43). The strong family cohesion makes it 
tenable that the governments assign heavy responsibilities to the family to look after its 
older members, although many see it as an excuse for governments' under-commitment 
or lack of effort in social welfare. 
The governments' resistance on providing universal generous old age benefits has also 
been justified by the relatively low proportions of older people in demographic features 
in these countries. The proportion of people aged 65 and over in Taiwan has increased 
from 2.50 per cent in 1952 to 3.49 per cent in 1970, and 8.44 per cent in 1999 (Taiwan 
Government, 2000: 24-25). In Hong Kong, this proportion has increased from 2.81 per 
cent in 1961 to 5.51 in 1976, and to 10.13 in 1996 (Hong Kong Government, 1997: 21). 
In Singapore, this proportion has increased from 2.30 per cent in 1955 (Colonial 
Singapore Government, 1958: 30-31) to 5.97 per cent in 1989 and 7.31 per cent in 1999 
(Singapore Government, 2000: 24). These percentages are much lower than those of 
European countries. However, since the 1980s, all these governments have noticed that 
their speed of ageing is much faster than those in Western countries, and issues 
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concerning ageIng societies have become an important political agenda and have 
attracted serious and intensive debates. 
Old people's participation in the labour market is another aspect that has made these 
countries distinct from Western countries and has eased the pressure on the governments 
for increasing policy input in old age provision. Unlike European and North American 
countries where the old age labour participation rate, especially for males, has declined 
with the affluence of living standards and the improvement of public and private 
pensions, the proportion of older people remaining economically active in these 
countries has been kept steady. In Taiwan, the labour force participation rate for the age 
group of 55-64 year-old males and females is still as high as 66.3 per cent and 22.3 per 
cent respectively in 2000 (see table 6.2). In Hong Kong in 1998, 77.5 per cent of males 
fall into this age group between 55-59 and 47.0 per cent between 60-64 are still 
participating in the labour force, while the percentage for females in these two age 
groups are 28.4 per cent and 11.1 per cent respectively (Hong Kong Government, 1999: 
24). In Singapore in 1998, the labour force participation rates for people aged between 
55-59 and 60-64 years old are 76.6 per cent and 48.9 per cent for males, and 30.3 per 
cent and 13.9 per cent for females respectively (Singapore Government, 2000: 42). 
These figures of older people's labour force participation rate reveal some important 
messages. First, the huge difference between the male and female labour force 
participation rates in older age groups signals the firmly traditional gender division in 
wage and non-wage work, and implies the gender inequality within old age benefits if 
they are based on the individuals' record of employment or contribution. Second, the 
availability of family support and the maturity of old age social security schemes, 
especially in Taiwan and Singapore whose systems were introduced as early as the 
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1950s, seem to have little impact on the older people's labour market participation 
behavour. However, further analyses based on micro empirical data are needed before 
the conclusion can be drawn. 
In addition to social and demographic features, the economic aspects certainly need to 
be emphasised when identifying similarities in these countries. It is well-documented 
that all these three countries, all lack natural resources and suffered heavily during the 
Second World War, adopted an economic-first development strategy soon after the War 
was ended as the only way for survival and development. In fact, the economic-first 
thinking has become an ideology for nation building in these countries, and explains the 
subordination of social welfare to economic policies (Goodman and Peng, 1996: 
210-211). On the other hand, government departments in charge of economic and 
financial affairs often have strong a influence in the social security policy-making 
process, and economists and business groups enjoy disproportionate representation in 
both the executive and legislative sectors, especially in Taiwan and Hong Kong. These 
institutional features result in a strong veto power to any initiation or expansions of 
social welfare schemes. 
The economic development strategy that these countries have adopted for the past four 
decades is export-oriented industrialisation. As discussed in previous chapters, the lack 
of a domestic market, coupled with the development of international politics, left these 
countries little choice in the 1950s but to employ an outward-looking strategy. 
Fortunately, the development of this strategy coincides with an international economic 
boom. After the end of the Second World War, the demand for labour-intensive products 
in the prosperous developed countries was expanding, and, before the oil crisis in the 
mid-1970s, world trade was growing fast (Tan, 1993: 271-276), core capitalistic 
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countries' trade barriers to the third world were rare and the interest rate was low (Koo, 
1987: 169). Under these favourable international economic conditions, these countries' 
policies to attract foreign investors and accelerate economic development are proven to 
be effective. This export-oriented industrialisation strategy has brought these countries 
economic affluence 
As discussed in earlier chapters, economic growth in these countries in the past five 
decades is remarkable. In addition, the economic affiuence has come with a relatively 
egalitarian income distribution (Tan, 1993: 294-6; Barrett and Chin, 1987: 28-31; Deyo, 
1987: 242-3). These factors has contributed to a high degree of legitimacy for these 
governments (Haggard and Cheng, 1987: 102), and, before the 1980s, helped to alleviate 
the pressure on improving social welfare. This trend has thus contradicted the logic of 
industrialisation in welfare development, which argues that the emergence of the 
Welfare State is to a certain extent a result of economic development. 
The export-oriented industrialisation in these countries has also had significant 
implications in industrial relations and labour mobilisation. These outward-looking 
policies often come with labour legislation to discipline workers, as the governments 
have to construct a peaceful industrial relationship and a stable political environment to 
attract foreign investors and maintain their competitiveness for export. This is more 
evident in Singapore where labour disputes undermined industrial peace when the 
export-oriented industrialisation was initiated (Deyo, 1987: 183-5). These countries' 
industrialisation in the early decades after the end of the Second World War concentrated 
on the expansion of light export industries, such as electronics and clothing, which 
featured as low wages, low job security and low skills. As a consequence, labour 
turnover was high and workers' commitment to the jobs was low, thus hindering the 
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establishment of independent trade unions and the effectiveness of labour mobilisation 
(Deyo, 1987: 194). As J ang has also found out that workers in the textiles industry are 
significantly less likely than their counterparts in metal and chemical industries to take a 
leading role in orgarusIng labour unions, and that the employment conditions of 
export-oriented industries undermine the development of stable proletarian 
communities, which are important bases for the development of independent unions and 
organisational development (Jang, 1983, cited in Deyo, 1987: 194). 
The features listed above show that there are substantial similarities in these three 
countries, including aspects in ideology, society, demography, and economic 
development. Not surprisingly, these common features are all unfavourable for the 
initiation of a generous social security system, and certainly can not explain the 
emergence and the presence of the old age provision systems in these countries. The 
method of agreement, that is, by comparing the similar features in these countries, alone 
can not answer the question of why these countries have differed from each other in 
terms of the timing of the emergence of de-familisation schemes and the direction of 
familisation or de-familisation. To answer this question, the method of difference, that is, 
comparing the crucial different features in these countries, is essential. 
As shown in Table 8.2, there are plenty of crucial differences between these countries. 
However, it is not difficult to find out that these features are all directly or indirectly 
related to one actor: the state. As discussed in Chapter Two, the variable of the state has 
been recognised as one of the key factors contributing to the emergence and 
development of the welfare state since the 1980s. Before comparing the differences 
between these three countries, this chapter will first discuss some important concepts 
related to the state. 
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8.3 The concept of the state 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the variable of the state has been recognised as one of the 
key factors contributing to the emergence and development of the welfare state since the 
1980s. Scholars have argued the need for "Bringing the state back in" (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985) and for "taking the state seriously" (Nordlinger, 
1987). The state-centred argument has since the 1980s become one of the mainstream 
approaches that offer explanations to the development of the welfare states. 
8.3.1 The definition of the state 
As Pierson stated, we now live on a planet which is almost universally divided into state 
jurisdictions (Pierson, 1996: 13). However, the difficulty of getting a consensus on the 
meaning of the state has been well-emphasised by scholars in sociology and political 
science (e.g. Abrams, 1988: 59; Mitchell, 1991: 77; Pierson, 1996: 5). Hitus, for 
example, pointed out that, after a cursory examination, he found no fewer than one 
hundred forty-five different definitions about the state, and, not surprisingly, the 
majority of them were not in general agreement (Hitus, 1931: 45). In addition, the 
concept of state varies in different places. As Nettl pointed out, the concept of state in 
Italy and France is very different from that in England and in the United States (Nettl, 
1968: 577-578). The most popularly cited one, though, is Weber's approach which 
defined the state as "a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1970: 77-8). This definition might 
have captured the core phenomenon of state, but has also left out other important 
dimensions. As Pierson argued, even the most violent states of modem time, such as 
Stalin's Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany, did not impose their rule by physical force 
alone (Pierson, 1996: 9). Rosenthal also argued that, in a modem state, only a minor part 
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of the administrative agencies and bureaucratic structures is engaged in the enforcement 
of law and order (Rosenthal, 1983: 281). 
In fact, apart from the enforcement of law and order, modem states have expanded its 
activities in other fields of the society. Hindle pointed out in his study of the British state 
and society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that, with profound social changes, 
there was an increasing need for the state not only to preclude violent self-interest, but 
also to secure the terms on which civil society might best be preserved. As a result, three 
policies were developed during this period, including the symbolic punishment of 
behavior, the promotion of social welfare, and the regulation of morality (Hindle, 1999: 
34-35). The state continued to expand, and, since the end of the Second World War, 
states have intervened extensively in social and economic activities, especially in North 
and Western Europe where the notion of social democratic have well developed (Pierson, 
1996: 81). As Castles pointed out, scholars from different schools will agree that it is 
now a distinctive feature of the state that it assumes a vast range of responsibilities, such 
as the maintenance of minimum income, public health, and education (Castles, 1982: 
22) 
Regarding the definition of state, it should be noted that this phenomenon is different 
from that of government, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish these two. As 
Stepan points out, the state "is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and 
coercive systems" and "must be considered as more than the "government" (Stepan, 
1978: xii). Kimrnerling has also made a useful contribution in this regard. He argued that, 
apart from the traditional Weberian concept of a being a monopolistic legitimate force, 
there is another essential dimension that make each state cognitively and culturally 
different from the other, i.e. its collective identity (Kimmerling, 1993). He pointed out 
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that this identity tends to persist In the event of changes of government, of 
administration, and even of the state regime. In addition, he used the tenn "state's logic" 
to mean "the basic codes, traditions, rules-of-the-game and practices which are 
unaffected by changes of government, administration, or even entire regimes" 
(Kimmerling, 1993: 398). To the state-centred approach, the core focus is this "state's 
logic" and constitutional arrangements rather than political parties in power. 
8.3.2 The state as an actor 
The state-centred approach emerged in the 1980s. It treats state as an independent actor 
and an independent variable in fonning public policies (Skocpol, 1985; Nordlinger, 
1981, 1987; Pierson, 1996: 64-93). According to this approach, the state "acts in pursuit 
of its own interest" (Pierson, 1996: 70), and "is seen to be frequently autonomous in 
turning its own policy preferences into authoritative actions ... " (Nordlinger, 1987: 355). 
These statements, in fact, contain two important concepts: state preference and state 
autonomy. 
According to the state-centred approach, the state does have its preference and its own 
interests. In addition to preserving itself, the state seeks to secure its territory and 
population, and to consolidate a politically and economically advantageous position in 
the highly competitive world system. It also has a vital interest in maintaining political 
and social order (Schmitter, 1985: 42; Nordlinger, 1987: 367). These interests 
sometimes contradict those of dominant social groups, and sometimes even not in line 
with the interests of officials who occupy the state apparatus. The question to be asked 
then is whether the state can carry through its preference when it is not backed by 
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dominant groups in the society. This question is to do with the concepts of state 
autonomy and state capacity. 
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8.3.2.1 State autonomy and state capacity 
As McLennan and his colleagues argued, the opinion on state autonomy is one of the 
most important ways of differentiating different theories of the state from one another 
(McLennan et aI., 1984: 23). To the Marxist, the state is controlled by the bourgeois 
class and serves only the interest of this dominant class. When addressing the origin of 
the state, Engels stated: 
"Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but 
because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classed, it 
is, as a rule, the state of the most power, economically dominant class, which, 
through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, 
and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed 
class. " 
(Engles, 1968: 578) 
In other words, the state acts in the interest of society's dominant class. It is only 
"relatively autonomous" and its independence is constrained by the society's class 
structure. This "relatively autonomy" allows the state to act contrary to the demands of a 
short-sighted capitalist class when it is necessary to safeguard capitalist relations of 
production and maintain political stability (Schwarzmantel, 1994; Piereson, 1996). 
The pluralist theories, on the other hand, suppose the state to be largely autonomous. 
The state reflects the diverse interest of the society rather than only one particular social 
interest. It acts neutrally as an umpire to conflicting social interests. According to this 
approach, policy outcomes are not shaped by one dominant class, but by the severe 
competition of diverse interest groups (McLenan et aI, 1984; Schwarzmantel, 1994; 
Pierson, 1996). As Pierson pointed out, " ... the making of public policy... is the 
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end-product of a process of negotiation and accommodation in which citizens organized 
in groups to represent their interests exert pressure to realize their ambitions" (1996: 72). 
One the other hand, there are scholars who address state autonomy in terms of its 
'degree' rather then arguing the authenticity of its existence. Nordlinger, for example, 
argued that, no democratic countries are totally autonomous, as all policy proposals need 
to go through political processes before they become realized, and they could be 
changed or modified in any of these stages. He classified state autonomy into three 
different categories. According to his typology, a high level degree of state autonomy is 
presented in situations in which the preferences of the state and society differ, but the 
state nevertheless enacts a policy consistence with its preferences (Nordlinger, 1981). 
Cox, on the other hand, illustrated the differences of state autonomy in different types of 
countries. He pointed out that the state autonomy is high in a monist country, low in a 
pluralist country, and varies in corporatist countries (Cox, 1993: 56). 
Despite differences from each other in terms of their views on state autonomy, both the 
Marxist approach and the pluralist approach are society-centred. To the state-centred 
approach, the state is certainly autonomous and is not simply reflective of the demands 
or interests of social groups, classes, or society. It is an independent actor of decision 
making, and "a subjective realm of plans, progress, or ideas" (Timothy, 1991: 82). As 
Skocpol argued, in the basic needs of dealing with international matters and maintaining 
control and order, leading state officials would pursue strategies "even in the face of 
indifference or resistance from politically weighty social force" (1985: 9). In many 
countries, it is the state that sharps the orientations of public policies, including social 
security policies. 
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State capacity is a concept related to the notion of state autonomy. Some researchers 
treat these two terms as similar concepts. They claimed that a state with high capacity is 
one that enjoys high autonomy and thus is able to translate their preferences into public 
policy despite divergent social interests; while states with low capacity fail to do so 
(Nordlinger, 1987). To a large extent, Migdal's term of 'state capability' links these two 
aspects together. He pointed out that there are four kinds of state capabilities, including 
the capacities to penetrate society, regular social relationships, extract resources, and 
appropriate or use resources in determined ways. And according to the difference in 
their capability to complete these tasks, there are generally two type of states: strong 
states and weak states. (Migdal, 1988: 4-5; Hill, 1984: 92-95). In this regard, a state of 
capability must at the same time be one that has a large degree of autonomy. However, 
these two concepts are no doubt very different ones, and have different implications in 
the development of social security. 
State capacities, according to Skocpol, are underpinned by not only sheer sovereign 
integrity and the stable administrative-military control of a given territory, but also by 
loyal and skilled officials and sufficient financial resources (Skocpol, 1985: 16). In other 
words, in terms of domestic policies, state capacity refers to its ability to extract and 
mobile capital and human resources from society. In this regard, state capacities in the 
West no doubt have expanded sharply in the last century. For OEeD countries as a 
whole, for example, state spending as a proportion of total national income has increased 
from about ten per cent in the 1870s to about twenty per cent in the 1960s, and to almost 
fifty per cent in 1995 (World Bank, 1997: 2). This expansion of state capability, 
especially in recent decades, is a cause as well as a result of the development of the 
welfare states. It is argued that a welfare state must be a strong one as such a state 
involves a wide range of state intervention on economic activities and distribution and 
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redistribution (Nordlinger, 1981: 21). 
8.3.2.2 The state taking action 
It is popularly argued that it is external and domestic crisis that creates pressure for 
significant degrees of state action (Skocpol, 1980; Skowronek, 1982; Krasner, 1984). It 
is well recognised, for example, that the introduction of the New Deal in the United 
States was a respond to the economic crisis of the Great Depression (Skocpol, 1980). 
Skowronek, on the other hand, addressed how the crisis of the Civil War, the class 
conflict between capital and labour, and the complexity of social relationship in the 
United States during 1877 to 1920 stimulate the state's effort to expand its 
administrative system (Skowronek, 1982). 
Another question to be ask, then, is: what is it that actually 'acts' in the name of or on 
behave of the state? The clear answer to this question is: it is state officers who 
formulate and pursue state's goals (Heclo, 1974; Nordlinger, 1981: 7 & 1987: 372; 
Skowronek, 1982; Skocpol, 1985: 9; Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 131; Mitchell, 1991: 
86). As Nordlinger (1981: 10) argued, the definition of state should include not only the 
government and the bureaucratic agencies, but also public officials who are involved in 
the making of public policy. When referring to state actions, Weber also focused on 
'individuals'. He stated that "for sociological purposes there is no such thing as a 
collective personality which 'acts.' When reference is made in a sociological context to a 
'state' ... what it meant is ... only a certain kind of development of actual or possible 
social actions of individual persons" (Weber, 1947: 102). Skowronek also pointed out 
that environmental stimuli do not produce state actions automatically, and it is state 
officials who respond to these pressures and take actions (1982: 12). Under the pressure 
of changing environment, with the support of state's capital resources, state officials are 
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able to stimulate various state actions. This chapter, however, will only focus on two 
kind of state's activities which are related to the development of social security system 
in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore: state building and state legitimacy. 
8.3.2.3 The imperative for state building 
State building, like other state actions, is stimulated by environmental pressure, and 
often by extreme environmental crisis. Skowronek (1982: 10) pointed out, crisis such as 
an outbreak of war, or the acceleration of industrialisation, requires the state to 
undertake national administration development to expand its capacity to deal with a 
more complex world. The process of state building emerges with extreme environmental 
stimuli, followed by state officers' response, and ends up with new forms of government 
(Skowronek, 1982). This point of view, apparently, focused on the expansion of 
administrative apparatus. Bogdanor, on other hand, takes a broader view on the concept 
of state building. He argues that state building is the sum of politics designed "to 
integrate the country and tie the inhabitants together in a national fellowship" (Bogdanor, 
1987: 379). It includes the dual development of public authority and control and the 
extension of civil rights. He pointed out that, in modem political studies, state building 
has been conceptualised in progressive stages of political development, including not 
only national and cultural identification, and the participation of wider sections of the 
population, but also redistribution and welfare policies as mechanisms of national 
integration (Bogdanor, 1987: 379). The concept of state building is helpful in explaining 
the development of the social security system in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in 
early decades after the Second World War. These countries were all politically and 
economically damaged during the War and were all under extreme pressure to undertake 
the process of state building. The introduction of the social security system in these 
countries thus became a part of this state-building process. This point will be further 
281 
addressed in a later section. 
8.3.2.4 The legitimacy of the state 
The notion of legitimacy, as Migdal (2001: 111) pointed out, is the core concept 
concerning the state, regardless of different definitions of the state. Although the state 
surely can maintain its control of the territory and social order by the dispensation of 
physical coercion, which is emphasised by Weber's definition of the state, a modern 
state usually expects that their rules be obeyed based on their subjects' voluntary 
compliance. In other words, the concept of legitimacy now is more about belief or 
opinion than claim or violence. As Schaar put it, "If a people hold the belief that existing 
institutions are 'appropriate' or 'morally proper', then those institutions are legitimate" 
(Schaar, 1981: 20). 
Regarding the concept of legitimacy, Weber's typology is of the most importance. He 
pointed out that there are three types of source for the state's legitimacy. The first 
justification is the authority of "the 'eternal yesterday,' i.e. of the mores sanctified 
through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform" 
(Weber, 1970: 78). He called this approach as 'traditional' domination. The second 
justification is 'charismatic' domination, which means "the authority of the 
extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion 
and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual 
leadership" (Weber, 1970: 79). The third one is domination "by virtue of the belief in the 
validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules. 
He named this approach as the legitimacy of 'legality' (Weber, 1970: 79). For a modern 
state, the justification of 'legal' is no doubt the main source of legitimacy. In practice, 
this approach is normally through competitive and open elections. If the power is gained 
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through a process of open elections, those subject to the power-holders will obey 
without the threat of coercion (Schwarzmantel, 1994: 15-16). 
In fact, gaining power from open elections only offers procedural legitimacy. It is the 
improvement of the people's well-being that offers the power-holders essential 
legitimacy. In this regard, social expenditure is a good way to secure the state's 
legitimacy. As O'Connor (1973) and Gough (1979) argued, state expenditures on social 
consumption, such as those on social insurance schemes, and social expense such as 
income subsidies for the poor, are necessary expenditures that help a capitalist state to 
fulfill one of its functions: legitimisation. Tracy also argues that the introduction of a 
government administered national provident fund in third world countries can be 
explained as an effort to legitimize central government (Tracy, 1991: 101). This 
argument, to some extent, can also explain the emergence and the early development of 
de-familisation schemes in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. This point will be 
addressed in a later section. 
Having addressed the key concepts about the state, this chapter goes on to use these 
concepts to analyse the development of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in the 
second half of the twentieth century. These concepts help to identity crucial differences 
in these countries, and thus offer strong explanations to the convergence and divergence 
of their strategies in response to the emerging of an ageing society. 
8.4 Crucial differences between Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
8.4.1 Imperative for state building in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore all experienced important political changes after the 
283 
Second World War. However, these countries faced different situations and challenges in 
nation building. Goodman and Peng (1996) have correctly emphasised the link between 
state building and the development of welfare regimes in East Asia countries. However, 
by "state building", they refer only to the economic-first development strategy adopted 
by these countries and ignore other aspects which are also important to explain the 
models of the social security systems. In addition, identifying 'state building" as a factor 
that has contributed to the similarity of these welfare regimes, they also fail to explore 
the connection between the development of state building and the divergence of the 
social security systems in these countries. 
In Taiwan, the retreat of the KMT government in 1949 brought with them one million 
people, including the military, government officers, and refugees, from Mainland China. 
They brought a huge political and societal change to the small island. Especially, Taiwan 
then had just departed from Japanese colonisation, and gone through the "228 Accident" 
of 1947 that had created a hostile atmosphere between the native Taiwanese and the 
mainlanders. Although sharing the same ethnic and cultural background as Chinese, 
there were a wide range of differences between these two groups of people, including 
political attitudes and societal customs. The KMT government, while claiming to be the 
sole legal government for the whole China, was now seeking to build Taiwan as a 'fort 
for counterattack'. Its first task was to promote the loyalty of the native Taiwanese, to 
integrate them into the new regime, and to channel them into the national goal of 
recovering the mainland. 
The most important objective of the government at that time, as Chiang Kai-shek, 
former President, emphasised, was "to put our national interests above everything else", 
while the common aim was "to fight communism" (Chiang, 1951: 75). Chen Cheng, 
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fonner Premier, also addressed that the government was to "do everything in its power 
to defend the base ... and to prepare in due course for the counterattack against the 
mainland" (Chen, 1954: 2). Under such circumstances, the social security system was 
introduced, as a tool to generate national strength for the counterattack. Therefore, there 
is no coincidence that soldiers, labourers, and government employees are the three 
groups first covered by the social insurance system, as they were the most important 
groups for defending Taiwan and developing this island as a base for counterattack. 
There is no doubt that military force was the more crucial measure for counterattack. As 
Houng Jin-Chou, former Deputy Secretary for Defence, pointed out that the basic 
objective was to "resist the Communists and the Soviet Russia" and to "defend Taiwan 
and to prepare for the counterattack" (Houng, 1954: 8). To achieve this national task, the 
government in the 1950s spent more that seven-tenths of its expenditure on defense l . 
Under such circumstances, many measures were also adopted to strengthen military 
force, including the introduction of the Soldiers' Insurance. As Houng admitted, 
"expanding the Soldiers' Insurance" was one of the many measures to "improve our 
military force" to achieve the national objective (Houng, 1954: 9). In a public speech, 
Chiang Kai-shek also emphasised that improving soldiers' living standard should be on 
the priority for the government as they "protecting our national security',2. 
As for labourers, as Chiang Kai -shek emphasised, their "contribution to the war effort is 
just as important as that of the soldiers at the front. .. " (Chiang, 1950: 30). They "made 
great contributions for the purpose of safeguarding Taiwan and making preparations for 
a counter-offensive against the mainland" (Chiang, 1951: 84). Chiang appealed to 
1 In 1950, for example, 90.0 per cent of the central government's expenditure was spent on defense. 
Until 1960, the figure was still as high as 74.7 per cent. See Taiwan Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, 2000: 138-141. 
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labourers to dedicate themselves to the national cause by improving productivity, as 
"only through the increase of production can we strengthen ourselves in our struggle 
against aggression" (Chiang, 1951: 85). Under such circumstances, labourers must" ... 
further increase production, and respond to my [Chiang's] call for working contests and 
increased production", and in return, "it is the responsibility of the Government to 
promote better labor welfare, enlarge the scope of labor insurance ... " (Chiang, 1951: 
85). Wong De-fu, former Secretary for Interior Affairs who was in charge of labour 
affairs, also admitted that the introduction of the Labour Insurance was one of the main 
measures "to stable social order and to improve productivity" (Wong, 1954: 5). 
Apart from soldiers and industrial workers, government employees are also an important 
group for the preparation of counterattack, as they are the keys to an efficient 
bureaucracy which was vita to the national goal. As Van Jia-gan, former Premier pointed 
out, "The accomplishment of the object of counterattack and recovering the nation lies 
on the hardworking and mettle of the staff of the Government.,,3 Therefore, Premiers in 
the 1950s and the 1960s often emphasised in their policy address the importance of 
improving the living standard of government employee, as it directly linked to the 
efficiency of the bureaucracy4. An obvious evidence of the government's attention to 
government employee's living standard was that, despite facing difficulties in achieving 
balance of finance, the government in the 1950s spent significant amount of its 
expenditure to subsidise them5. The government also sought to strengthen the retirement 
system for government employees. The goal, as former President Chen Cheng pointed 
2 Quoted from a Speech delivered by Chiang Kei-shek on November 12,1962, see Chiang, 1998: 1356. 
3 See Premier Yan Jia-gan's policy address to the Legislative Yuan, 1964.. . . 
4 See, for example, Premier Yan Jia-gan's policy address to the 33 and 34 Sechon of the Leglslahve 
Yuan in 1964. 
5 In 1950, for example, the government spent NT$11.5 million to provide in kind benefit to governr.nent 
employees, and NT$12.5 million on government employee's annual bonus. See TaIwan 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, 1956: 140. 
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out in his policy address in the Legislative Yuan, is to "improve metabolism and 
administrative vitality" (Taiwan Parliament Debates, 1954: 176). Under such 
circumstance, the Government Employee's Insurance was introduced to offer a 
comprehensive protection, including retirement payments, to government employees. 
The introduction of the social insurance system in the 1950s also served as a political 
appeal, to both the Taiwanese people and people in mainland China. It demonstrated that, 
compared to the Communist government who imposed brutal policies toward its people 
in the mainland, the KMT government continued the traditional Chinese political 
philosophy of benevolent, which was emphasised by Confucianism and Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen's doctrine of Three Principles of the People. By doing so, the KMT government 
attempted to create a clear comparison with the Communist regime and hoped that 
people in the world "will be able to distinguish between a government which is for the 
welfare of the people and a regime bent on persecuting them,,6. They tried to show that 
that they were superior to their Communist counterpart and that the government was 
able to build a state which was going to be a better one than the Communists could offer. 
As the Prime Minister Gia-Gan Yan stated in his policy address in the Legislative Yuan 
in 1965: 
"The task of counterattack needs both military and political actions ... We need 
to use political measures to improve social welfare so that our people, 
especially those who have encountered difficulties, receive direct support from 
the government and the society. We are going to use practical action to 
demonstrate to our fellow nationals who are in the mainland and are in deep 
distress the right way to build a benevolent government, and how cruel the 
Communist government is. If we demonstrate the truth in front of our fellow 
mainlanders, they will deeply hate the Communist regime and look forward to 
our return. " 
6 Quoted from "ROC President Chiang Kai-sek's Interview", May 23,1970, see Chiu ed. 1973: 339. 
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(Taiwan Legislative Yuan Debates, Vo1.36-1: 203, translated from Chinese) 
As Chiang Kei-sek pointed out in a public speech, the challenge for the KMT 
government was not only to recover the mainland, but also to demonstrate its ability for 
nation building. He stated that "[iJf we could not further accomplish the task of nation 
building or carry through the objective of the Three Principles of the People after we 
recover the mainland, even if we succeed in the first place we would eventually fail" 
(Cited in Chiang, 1998: 1337). Therefore, to win the battle against the Communists, the 
KMT government not only needed to strengthen its military force, but also needed to 
demonstrate its ability to build a benevolent nation. It was under such circumstances that 
KMT government in the 1950s and the 1960s emphasised that they wanted to build 
Taiwan a "model province" example to other provinces on the mainland in the future. As 
Chiang Kai-sek stated, "[0 Jnly by rebuilding Taiwan as a model province in according 
with the Three People's Principles can we attain final victory against aggression and 
ultimate success in national reconstruction" (Chiang, 1950: 68). In his address at the 
opening of the second session of the First National Assembly in 1954, he emphasised 
again that 
H ••• In the case of the laboring class we have raised their wages and enforced the 
system of labor insurance. We have been gradually carrying out the stipulations 
in the two chapters on National Economy and Social Security in the Constitution 
to the end that Taiwan may become a community based on the Principle of the 
People s Livelihood and serve as a model for economic and social 
reconstruction after the recovery of the mainland" 
(Chiang, 1954: 10). 
On the other hand, the introduction of the social insurance system also helped the KMT 
government to bring hope and a bright future to the people, which was also vital to the 
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war against the Communists. As Chen Cheng pointed out, the reason why the KMT 
government lost the mainland "was due to the loss of hope and confidence in the 
government on the part of the people", therefore, to recover the mainland, "we should 
revive the people's hopes and confidence" (Chen, 1954: 19). To bring a sense of hope to 
the people was crucial, as people at large felt hopeless about their future and did not 
want to stay in Taiwan7. Apparently, the KMT government, who sought to integrate the 
country into its national goal of re-conquest, must do something immediately to offer 
hope to their people and to win support form them. Under such situations, the social 
security system is a perfect tool to serve this object. As Chiang Kai-sek pointed out in his 
Double Tenth (the National Day) Message in 1950 that, following the introduction of 
social legislation and other policies, "Taiwan has given bright hopes to our countrymen 
on the mainland. These hopes will serve as a severe blow to the Russian aggressor" 
(Chiang, 1950: 61). In other words, just like the Beveridge Report offered a picture of a 
better nation for the British to look forward to and to fight for during the Second War, the 
KMT government introduced the social security system to demonstrate its determination 
and ability to build a nation that was better than the Communist's. 
Singapore in the 1950s also faced the imperative for state building. It is argued that 
Britain's liberal colonial doctrine had concentrated on political issues and so that social 
welfare had been neglected8. Having experienced the shock of defeat and loss in the Far 
East during the Second World War, Britain eventually realised the necessary to reform 
its imperial rule and to undertake political re-construction in its colonies. Under such 
circumstances, Britain needed to enter a new phase of constructive imperialism - to 
7 For example, some letters written by Taiwanese people to George H. Kerr, an American Formosa 
Specialist who resided in Taiwan between 1937-1940, in 1950 clearly showed that they felt no hope and 
did not want to stay in Taiwan. See Kerr, 1965: 388-421. .. . 
8 The analysis in this paragraph is based on Joanna Lewis, 2000, EmpIre State-BUIldmg: War & 
Welfare in Kenya, 1925-52, Oxford: James Currey. 
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improve social provisions and living standards in its colonies so that colonial people 
may take their place as free peoples in the commonwealth of free nations. Therefore, the 
state building process was undertaken in many of Britain's colonies. The main goals of 
the British Government were to create a modem state structure in its colonies and , , 
thanks to the influence of the Left in British politics, to bring to their people a more 
egalitarian social welfare. 
In 1951, the Colonial Office in London clearly declared that "colonial territories have 
not yet developed to the state when a scheme of social insurance, as understood in the 
United Kingdom, is feasible" (British Colonial Office, 1951: 8). Had it not been for the 
necessity of state building for the colony, the CPF scheme would not have been enacted 
in 1953 in Singapore, only two years after this statement was made by the Colonial 
Office. Especially, as discussed in Chapter Six, Singapore during this period faced the 
threat of the Communists just as Taiwan did. Therefore, to some extent, the introduction 
of its CPF system in the mid 1950s served as a symbol that the government was to build 
a state for the Singaporean better than the Communist could offer. As the Governor 
stated in his policy address in 1952: 
H [The CP FJ is one of considerable importance, as it provides an element of 
security which is necessary where workers are engaged in commercial and 
industrial activity. This is the most import step towards the establishment of a 
Welfare State which is what the British way of life desires to offer as opposed to 
the promises of the Communists which they can never hope to fulfil. 
I have on many occasions referred to the menace of Communism, and I hope that 
the manner in which Singapore us conducting its affairs will provide the best 
answer that can be made to this menace ... Deeds and not words, in my opinion, 
are the best appeal that can be made ... This measure for providing an element of 
security to the workers of this Colony, to my mind, will be the best form of 
propaganda that anyone can hope to provide. " 
(Singapore Parliament Debates, 1952: 100) 
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Although very few would believe that Britain was really intending to create a Welfare 
State in Singapore, the introduction of a social security system was no doubt a good 
demonstration to assure the Singaporeans that the Colonial government was working on 
building a better nation than a Communist regime. On the other hand, as many other 
former British colonies were experiencing a process of de-colonisation after the Second 
World War, Singapore in the 1950s departed from being a colony and became a 
self-governing state. However, the fact that the majority of the population being Chinese 
but the politics and economy dominated by Malaya brought this city-state serious 
political unrest related to ethnic mobilisation. This is an important background that 
Singapore implemented a central provident fund in the 1950s. 
As Bogdanor points out, the task of nation building is particularly crucial in states with 
different ethnic groups (1987: 379). This is very much the case in Singapore, which is a 
multiracial society and whose population mainly made up of Chinese, Malays and 
Indians. Especially, in the 1950s, the major ethnic communities had strong affectual ties 
with their motherland: the Chinese identified strongly with China and the Malays with 
Malaya and the Indians with India (Hill and Lian, 1995: 19). This situation made the 
provident fund approach attractive. As Williamson and Pampel argue, this approach is 
particularly well suited to a nation that is faced with deep ethnic cleavages and whose 
population identifies more strongly with regional and local ethnic groupings than with 
the nation as a whole (Williamson and Pampel, 1991: 35-36). This programme helped to 
reinforce the connection between people in different ethnic groups with a national 
government, thus serving as a mechanism to promote national integration. As Lewis 
pointed out, the implementation of social security schemes in Britain's colonies severed 
to create "a much more intimate relationship between state and subject". In addition, she 
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argued, if people were made aware of social security issues and their provision, then 
they might be more inclined to pay national tax (Lewis, 2000: 87-121). By doing so, the 
social security system not only strengthened the connection between the state and its 
people, but also improved the financial capacity of the new-born state. Tracy (1991: 101) 
also argued that the introduction of a government administered national provident fund 
in third world countries can be explained as an effort to strengthen the status of the 
central government. 
On the other hand, the CPF, which is a mandatory saving scheme drawing a significant 
proportion of employees' wages to a fund which members can not withdraw from until 
they reach the age of 55, also bind the Singaporeans' well-being closer to their state. 
This fund, whose long-term value heavily depends on the nation's interest rate and 
inflation rate, has created a situation in which the Singaporean's financial protection 
actually relies on the nation's prosperity. Therefore, it increases the sense of belonging 
and identification among the Singaporeans, which were crucial for Singapore in the 
1950s when the nation was under the threat of communists and experienced serious 
unrest caused by political and ethnic conflicts. As Thio Chen Bee, then a member of the 
Parliament, stated in the debates of the Central Provident Fund Bill: 
"It is quite obvious that when people have nothing to lose or little to lose by 
violent change in the existing social order, it is quite easy to tempt them to favour 
and support plans for a quick and violent upheaval. On the other hand, if the 
stability and security of the Colony are linked up with their own savings, they 
will be very reluctant to give their ear to any suggestions that the system should 
be violently overthrown. 
So a provident fund scheme such as this for the general public will help to 
produce a greater degree of stability and a greater sense of responsibility among 
our workers. " 
(Singapore Parliament Debates, 1952: 197) 
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In other words, the savings that people put into the CPF on a compulsory basis become 
not only a financial asset but also a political stake. To secure their savings, the 
Singaporeans now need to work together beyond their ethnic difference to maintain 
national stability and pursue economic development. 
When the CPF regulation was changed in 1968 to allow member to use the savings to 
purchase public housing, the government's intention to use this institution to promote 
nationals' loyalty and national integration became more obvious. When explaining the 
rationale of increasing the rate of the CPF saving to allow members to purchase public 
housing, the former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated: 
"After Singapore became independent in 1965, I worried about the situation 
that almost all Singaporean lived in urban areas. I noticed that generally people 
living in urban areas tend to vote against the government. So I decided to help 
the Singaporean to have their own house, otherwise the political situation would 
not be stable. My other attention was to let parents, whose sons must fulfil the 
responsibility of national service, understand that they own a stake in Singapore 
which is worth their sons' defending. " 
(Memoir of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. II: 109, translated from Chinese) 
In fact, the CPF not merely helps the Singaporeans to purchase houses, but also helps to 
improve Singapore's public infrastructure, which was of great importance for the nation 
in the 1950s and the 1960s. Jayakumar, one of Singapore's first-generation leaders, 
explained this point in his public speech entitled "The CPF is a significant factor in 
nation-building": 
"The CPF, therefore, invests savings in Singapore government bonds ... The 
money is used to finance investments in public the infrastructure such as roads, 
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airports, industrial estates, telecommunications facilities, water reservoirs, 
power stations, schools and other education institutions. Some of the money is 
loaned to new and desirable commercial and industrial enterprises that create 
jobs and enhance our economic development ... Because of the CPF institution, 
Singapore has one of the highest savings rates in the world. We, therefore, do not 
need to borrow from international banks or other foreign countries... We are 
thus spared the debt burdens faced by many developing countries today. We are 
also free from the strings attached to foreign aid programmes that would have 
restricted the ways we conduct our political and trade relations with the rest of 
the world. " 
(Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information, 1984: 69) 
As discussed in Chapter Six, good public infrastructure is an important factor that has 
made Singapore an attractive place for foreign investment which is vital to Singapore's 
economic growth. In this regard, the CPF system has served as a financial source that 
directly and indirectly contributes to the nation's prosperity. In tum, economic growth 
helps to increase the value of the Singaporean's CPF savings and wages, and promotes 
people's loyalty toward their country. 
In Hong Kong, the fact of being an immigrant society and facing political uncertainty 
created situations that were unfavourable to the introduction of a social security scheme. 
After the Second World War, Hong Kong became a 'life boat' for refugees who escaped 
political unrest from China. The population increased sharply from 1.6 million in 1946 
to 2.4 million in 1950 (Jones, 1990a: 18). The 1961 census shows that more than one 
half of the populations (52.3 per cent) were not born in Hong Kong. These non-native 
people came for political or economic reasons and had little sense of belongingness to 
the country of Hong Kong. Normally, a government facing this situation would try to 
introduce policies that are conducive to state building. On the contrary, this immigration 
feature, coupled with the uncertainty of its political future in the 1950s, hindered its 
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efforts toward state building. 
Chinese refugees, among whom many were illegal immigrants, arrived in the late 1940s 
and the 1950s, saw Hong Kong only as a place for temporary shelter. In addition, many 
of the early phase immigrants came alone for economic reasons and left their family in 
the mainland. They also had little interest in making Hong Kong their permanent home9. 
On the other hand, the colonial government, facing the possibility that the Communist 
regime that just won the civil war against the KMT government might proceed to fight 
for the sovereignty of Hong Kong lO, had no intention of exercising state building in the 
1950s
11
• This is why the British colonial government introduced workmen's 
compensation laws in most of its colonies in the late 1940s and the early 1950s but did 
not do so in Hong Kong. The British government's passive attitude toward Hong Kong's 
domestic affairs also explains why the British government, while helped to introduce a 
central provident fund in many of its former colonies including Singapore, failed to 
implement any old age income maintenance schemes in Hong Kong during this period. 
These differences in terms of the imperative for nation building discussed above resulted 
in the fact that Taiwan and Singapore in the 1950s developed a social provision system 
for old age, while Hong Kong at this stage still relied on family cohesion to support the 
9 As Bai-li Lin, a successful businessman and billionaire in Taiwan who grew up in Hong Kong after 
the Second World War, stated, "in Hong Kong your identity was an inhabitant, not a citizen, as Hong Kong 
was not a nation". See Business Weekly, No.784, December 5,2001 issued (internet version). 
10 Minutes of British Colonial Office clearly showed that, in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the 
British government was preparing for the military attack from the Communist China, and considered the 
possibility of handing over Hong Kong back to China or placing it under an international regime. It was 
perfectly aware that Hong Kong must be returned to China sooner or later. See British official documents 
CO 537/3702; CAB 128/15, CM 33(49)2; DO 121123; CAB 128/15, CM 38(49)3; CAB 128116, CM 
54(49)2; CO 537/4805, no 86B; CO 537/6046, nos 11 & 28; CAB 13411555 CPC (57)27; D035/8095, no 
1, M213/59. These documents are in the collections of British official documents ed. by Ronald Hyam, 
1992, Part II and ed. by Ronald Hyam, 2000, Part I. 
II Due to uncertainty of Hong Kong's future, the British government's adopted a passive attitude 
toward Hong Kong's domestic affairs. As the Secretary for Colonial Office state? at, a internal m~eting of 
the Office hold on July, 4, 1950, "[t]he real reason [for not implemented constItutIonal reform III Hong 
Kong] appeared to be that we did not want to do anything in Hong Kong". See British Official Document 
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needy and failed to introduced any de-familisation schemes for older people. The 
situation in these three countries in the 1960s was similar to those of the 1950s. In the 
1960s, Taiwan was still committed to the national goal of re-uniting with the mainland; 
while Singapore had gained its political status as an independent state. Both countries 
went on exercising policies for nation building, and social security schemes introduced 
in the 1950s were expanded to act as a tool to promote national integration. In Taiwan, 
the Labour Insurance Act was lifted from provincial level to national level. In Singapore 
the development of the public housing policy and granting official status to four 
languages -Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and English, were important policies to promote 
national integration. Hong Kong, on the other hand, had not changed its feature of an 
immigrant society, and the colonial government still had not been prepared to integrate 
the huge amount of refugees into the main society and was not willing to introduce any 
modem social provision for older people. 
The situation in these countries in the 1970s changed dramatically. In Taiwan, with 
eviction from the United Nations and the breaking off of diplomatic relations from all of 
the major countries, the KMT Government's claim to be the sole legal government 
representing the whole of China was no longer persuasive. Both the KMT regime and 
the Taiwanese people were now facing a crisis of political identity. The government thus 
had to pay more attention to domestic affairs rather than devoting all the resources to the 
goal of counterattack and re-union with the mainland, which had proved to be unrealistic. 
It is under these situations that the KMT government, to a very limited extent, carefully 
started exercising the change from a totally 'China-oriented' nation building to a 
'Taiwan-oriented' nation building. Some limited political reform was initiated, which 
will be discussed in the latter part of this section, to increase the political participation of 
CO 537/6046, no 11 & 28, in Hyam ed, 1992:402-405. 
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local Taiwanese people. On the other hand, the government expanded the social 
insurance system and enacted new social welfare legislation to extend citizenship in the 
1970s and 1980s, as strategies to progress nation building. 
Meanwhile in Singapore, which had gone through de-colonisation in the 1950s and the 
separation from Malaysia in the 1960s, had gained a totally independent status. Its 
national identity was now clear, and the people, although they still had strong affectual 
ties with their motherland, had no choice but to accept the fact that they are citizens of 
Singapore. The government, which has been committed itself to develop a multi-ethnic 
society, continued to stick by its multiligualism and public housing policies for national 
integration (Chew and Lee, 1991: 158). On the other hand, the loss of its hinterland of 
Malaya and the military and economic support from Britain means that Singapore 
urgently needed to develop its economy as the only way to survive (Chua, 1995:4). As to 
the social security system, apart from the expansion of the CPF coverage, no new old 
age provision schemes were introduced at this stage. 
The picture of Hong Kong society in the 1970s was also different from its earlier 
features. The 'Cultural Revolution' in China and the economic flourishing in Hong 
Kong made more and more people whose identity were with China started taking Hong 
Kong as their permanent home (Scott, 1989: 132). The extensive student movements in 
the 1970s that were asking for the granting of Chinese as the official language clearly 
signaled the inhabitants' increasing concerns about their identity. On the other hand, the 
lack of social legislation and employment protection had resulted in a situation where 
many people had to live in poor housing and worked under deprived conditions, which 
led to riots and violence in the late 1960s and the 1970s. This means that the government 
had to start exercising policies for nation building. Under such pressure, the government 
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introduced the Public Assistance Scheme in 1971 and the Special Needs Allowance in 
1973, which targets the disabled and older people. These schemes, although limited both 
in coverage and benefit levels, were important symbols to demonstrate that the colonial 
government had started taking its responsibility seriously to build a better Hong Kong 
for its inhabitants. 
Since the 1980s, Hong Kong and Singapore have solved the problems of national 
identity. Singapore rarely has had any problems in national identity since its 
independence in 1965. In Hong Kong, a poll conducted in 1982 shows that an 
overwhelming majority do not wish to see Hong Kong being taken over by China (Scott, 
1989: 168), a clear signal that the inhabitants have developed a strong local identity. As 
to Taiwan, although there are a certain proportion of people still holding a strong 
affection toward China, a 'Taiwan-oriented' identity has clearly replaced 
'China-oriented' identity for both the government and the majority of the population. 
Although national identity is still an unsolved problem, the government has not been 
able to continue to use social security measures as a mechanism to promote national 
integration since the 1980s, as, with a series of political reforms and severe party 
competition, the government has lost its autonomy and its dominance in policy making. 
Hong Kong faced the same problem when it went through the process of departing from 
being a British colony to become a special region of China. The issue of state autonomy 
and its connection with the development of familisation and de-familisation in these 
countries will be discussed in later sections. 
8.4.2 Legitimacy and old age provision in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
The imperative for state building in these three countries has been highly related to the 
necessity for the governments to secure their legitimacy. In Taiwan, the two periods 
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during which the KMT Government faced the most severe challenges of crisis in 
legitimacy were the 1950s and the 1970s. The 1950s saw the KMT Government's defeat 
in the civil war in the mainland and retreat to Taiwan. It was in this period that the 
Taiwanese insurance system was established. One of the most important reasons that the 
government implemented a comprehensive social security system in such a harsh time, 
as discussed in Chapter Four, was to demonstrate that the KMT government cared for its 
people's well-being more than the Communists. Since the early 1970s, Taiwan was 
gradually evicted from all major international organisations and broke off diplomatic 
relations with core countries in the world. Having lost the support of the international 
community and external legitimacy, the KMT government needed to promote its 
internal legitimacy to secure the regime. This was the main reason why the three most 
important pieces of social welfare legislation, including the Older People Welfare Act, 
were introduced in 1980 (Fu, 1994; Hsu, 1999). After the 1980s, the promotion of 
legitimacy is no longer a driving force for these expansions as the government has 
secured its legitimacy through democratisation. The connection between the state and 
democratisation and its impact on the development of familisation or de-familisation in 
the social security system will be discussed in later sections. 
In Hong Kong, the colonial government's rule before 1997 was originally based on the 
Sino-British agreement rather than the acceptance of native people. In other words, its 
legitimacy came from external rather than internal. As discussed above, most of the 
Chinese before the 1960s saw Hong Kong as temporary shelter and did not challenge the 
legitimacy of the colonial government. However, this situation changed when a series of 
protests against the colonial government and resulted in some serious the riots in the late 
1960s. This was the first time since the end of the Second World War that the colonial 
government faced a legitimacy crisis (Chan, 1996: 86). The government's response to 
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these challenges was to accelerate social reforms, including the introduction of the first 
de-familisation social security schemes in the early 1970s. 
In Singapore, the government's legitimacy has never faced any significant challenges 
since the nation's independence in 1965. The ruling party, the PAP, has won every 
general election overwhelmingly since the late 1960s and has been free of the legitimacy 
crisis. Consequently, there have been no new significant de-familisation social security 
schemes introduced after the 1960s. All major progress in the social security system has 
been the expansion and reforms within the CPF, which was first introduced in 1955. 
However, the state's function of pursuing legitimacy can only explain a part of the 
development of the social security systems in these countries. In addition, these 
countries' experiences do not really fit O'Connor and Gough's arguments. It is crucial to 
note that their theory is based on 'the capitalistic state', and Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore were, at least until the 1970s, regarded as Third World countries or 
'developing countries'. Therefore, the nature and functions of the states in these 
countries were different from those of the Western countries, which have developed an 
advanced capitalistic society and a mature democratic system. To develop from an 
'under-developed' country to a 'developing' or a 'developed' country, there are many 
fields other than social policies in which the state may place its efforts to promote its 
legitimacy. 
To O'Connor and Gough, the state's need for legitimacy is contradictory to its other 
function of accumulation. As O'Connor states: 
"The capitalistic state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually 
contradictory functions - accumulation and legistimisation. This means that the 
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state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital 
accumulation is possible. However, the state also must try to maintain or create 
the conditions for social harmony. " 
(O'Connor, 1973: 6) 
However, in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, it seems that the state's need for capital 
accumulation supports rather than contradicts state legitimisation. The economy-first 
strategy adopted by these countries in the early decades after the Second World War 
brought about rapid economic growth. In addition, the economic prosperity in these 
countries in this period came with a relative equal income distribution (Barrett and Chin, 
1987: 31; Tan, 1993: 294-296). These developments result in firm support from the 
people for the governments. In other words, economic policies that were initiated for the 
purpose of accumulation have also helped the state to achieve legitimisation. As the 
economies in these countries started flourishing in the 1980s, the states have been using 
democratisation, not social policies, as a strategy to promote their legitimacy. 
8.4.3 State capabilities and old age provision in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
The two aspects of state building and legitimacy discussed in previous sections are 
important tasks or functions that the state must fulfill. However, the state's effort in 
achieving these goals is constrained by two factors, i.e. state capacity and state 
autonomy. 
In fact, the importance of the state capacity and state autonomy, for the development of 
the country has been well emphasized, especially in the case of Asian countries. Many 
studies concerning the experience of Asian countries' development have emphasized the 
role of the state (for example, Evans, 1995; Brodsgaard and Young, 2000). However, 
most of this sort of study focused on their experience of economic development rather 
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than on the development of the social security system. In many Asian countries, state 
capacity and state autonomy, indeed, also have a strong connection with their action and 
inaction in social security. 
8.4.3.1 State capacity and old age provision in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
The capacities or strength of the state is vital to explain the difference in social security 
development in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, especially in the early period after 
the end of the Second World War. In Taiwan, the KMT government's retreat from the 
mainland in 1949 brought and allocated a huge bureaucracy designed to administer the 
whole of China and an enormous amount of skilled administrators into Taiwan. In the 
small island of Taiwan, whose population was only about six million at that time, a 
regime with four levels of government was established, i.e. the central government, the 
provincial government, the municipal and country governments, and town governments. 
At the central level, there were five branches, including the Executive Yuan, the 
Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, and 
numerous organisations and bureaucrats. In 1958, for example, apart from 600,000 
standing armed force, there were 194,000 persons working in government services, 
accounted for 6.2 per cent of total employment (Taiwan Industrial Development 
Commission, 1958: 27-28). In addition, government enterprises in 1949 accounted for 
72.4 per cent of total industrial productions (Yin, 1962: 16), and in 1952 they employed 
35.7 per cent of total industrial workers (Li, 1959: 34). This super state apparatus 
enabled the KMT government to enjoy a high degree of capacity in Taiwan to execute its 
power. 
State revenue also increased dramatically from the 1950s. The total state revenue 
increased from NT$3.6 billion in 1952 to NT$6.7 billion in 1955, and to NT$12.1 billion 
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in 1960. In other words, it increased about 240% in eight years. In 1999, it reached as 
high as NT$2,218.6 billion (Taiwan Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
2000: 167). In addition, in the 1950s and the 1960s US aid helped Taiwan to go through 
its difficulties in the state treasury and thus balanced public finance. The huge state 
apparatus and healthy state finance made Taiwan a strong state in the early decades after 
the Civil War, and enabled it to implement complicated policies, including the Labour 
Insurance, Soldier's Insurance, and Government Employee's Insurance, which were all 
introduced in the 1950s. 
In Singapore, the state had also enjoyed a high degree of capacity since the early years 
after the end of the Second World War. The total government revenue increased from 
$76.6 million in 1947 to $230.9 million in 1956, an increase of more than twofold in ten 
years (Colonial Singapore Government, 1947-1957). During the same period, total 
government expenditure increased from $62.7 million to $222.5 million, an increase of 
more than two-and-a-half-fold (Colonial Singapore Government, 1947-1957). At the 
same time, the government also paid much attention to promoting both the quality and 
quantity of personnel in the civil service. The Public Service Commission and the 
Permanent Examination Board were established for the recruitment of civil service staff. 
Candidates needed to go through an intensive competition, including examination and 
interview, prior to appointment. The Higher Scheme of Service was also introduced for 
the interim appointment to these services for suitable candidates. In 1950, out of 316 
applications received, only 11 appointments were made, a clear indication of the severe 
competition and careful selection (Colonial Singapore Government, 1950: 189). In 
addition, to further promote the quality of government personnel, the opportunity for 
study courses both at the University of Malay and overseas were expanded, and 
scholarships were awarded (Colonial Singapore Government, 1950: 189). In 1955, the 
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government and official authorities together employed 48,000 people (Colonial 
Singapore Government, 1955: 252), which was equivalent to about 4 per cent of the 
population of 1.2 million (Colonial Singapore Government, 1955: 11). Since 
Singapore's independence in 1965, the PAP government continued paying much 
attention to recruiting new talents to the government. With the incentive of very high 
income and benefits, the authorities have been able to carefully select and recruit 
ministers and civil servants by their ability (Vasil, 1988: 134-156; Sachenroder, 1998: 
22). The high quality of civil servants, coupled with the substantial increase in public 
finance, offered Singapore a high degree of capacity. This was an important condition 
that the government after the end of the Second World War was able to implement 
policies based on its plan and preference, including the introduction of the CPF in 1955. 
In Hong Kong, however, the colonial government faced serious difficulties in its 
capacity in the early years after the end of the Second World War. First, the public 
finance became a worry and the government found it difficult to maintain a balanced 
budget. In 1946, for example, the Governor pointed out in his policy address that "the 
annual ordinary expenditure for which we must provide cannot possible be covered by 
the revenue which we can reasonably expect to collect" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1946: 20). 
In that year, the total expenditure other than expenditure on rehabilitation was about 
HK$75 million, while the revenue was only about HK$ 40 million (Hong Kong Hansard, 
1946: 21). 
The necessity for the government to help the enormous number of refugees had further 
limited the government's capacity to expand public policies in other areas. In the 1950s, 
one-third of the Hong Kong population were refugees (Cheong-Leen, 1962: 71). These 
groups of people, as mentioned in Chapter Five, brought serious social problenls and 
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welfare needs. Therefore, the government, under its limited financial capacity. needed 
to distribute a significant proportion of its revenue in these matters. As a former 
Chairman of the Urban Council, Hilton Cheong-Leen, recalled in a public address, 
during the 1950s, directly and indirectly, about one-third of the Government's annual 
expenditure was being spent annually by the Hong Kong Government on the refugees 
(Cheong-Leen, 1962: 69). Even so, the government's effort was hardly sufficient to 
meet the challenges of huge social needs. As the Governor summed up in his policy 
address in 1971: 
"For many years, since the war, we have had to concern ourselves primarily 
with meeting needs of an urgent, basic nature: mass problems, which had to be 
met with massive solutions, and which left few resources available for anything 
I " e se ... 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1971172: 3) 
Therefore, although the government did not hesitate to take the responsibility to care for 
the refugees and other citizens in need, related social provisions needed to be provided, 
as the Governor indicated, "within the limits of what we can afford" (Hong Kong 
Hansard, 1960: 44). In addition, the shortage of skilled officials was also a major 
problem that worried the government, and it even limited the government's effort in 
social provision. The government, as indicated by the Governor, "has its problems in 
finding men and women with experience or qualifications required for the tasks in hand 
or in mind" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1969: 12). In 1965, the Governor clearly indicated 
that the lack of administrative capacity was the key factor that had resulted in the 
limitation of the development of social provision. He stated in his policy address: 
"Indeed, at this present time, the ability to organize new projects, constntct the 
necessary buildings and so on, and to find the staff are quite as much a limiting 
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factor on the more rapid extension of our social welfare services as is any 
immediate lack of money. The Financial Secretary has assured me that he has 
never in recent years had to turn down any worthwhile social welfare 
development within the terms of the approved policy, purely for lack of money,' it 
has been the lack of capacity to spend money any faster, and lack of trained staff, 
which have limited the rate at which we have been able to progress; and thereby 
governed the rate at which money needed to be provided. " 
(Hong Kong Hansard 1965: 53) 
The problems of state capacity made it difficult for Hong Kong to have a rapid 
expansion in social provision in the 1950s and the 1960s apart from the relief on the 
refugee problems. It was not until the 1970s when the capacity of the state strengthened 
that the government was able to introduced the major social security schemes. In fact, 
Hong Kong's public revenue had grown steadily with the high rates of economic growth 
since the 1950s. As the Governor pointed out in his policy address in 1971, from the mid 
1950s to the early 1970s, the annual economic growth was kept at a high rate of nine or 
ten per cent. In addition, in the ten years from 1961 to 1970, public revenue had grown 
by an average of 11 per cent annually (Hong Kong Hansard, 1971: 4). It was under these 
advantaged development that he declared in the same address that "we are ... coming out 
of an era of emergency action to ameliorate massive and immediate problems, and onto 
an era in which we can hope to think in terms of refining and sophisticating over a wide 
field the quality of the various services we try to make available to the public" (Hong 
Kong Hansard, 1971: 3). Two years later, in 1973, Hong Kong's first social security 
schemes, Special Needs Allowance and the Normal Old Age Allowance, were 
introduced. 
The state capacity of Hong Kong kept expanding through out the 1970s. As the 
Financial Secretary pointed out in his Budget Speech in 1980, over the ten years from 
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1970-71 to 1979-80, the average annual growth of expenditure on the Consolidated 
Account in real tenns was as high as 11.2 per cent (Hong Kong Hansard, 1980: 511). In 
addition, the relative size of the public sector, defined as the ratio of expenditure on the 
Consolidated Account to the GDP, increased from 13.0% in 1970-71 to 23.7% in 
1982-83 (Hong Kong Hansard, 1979: 350; 1981: 457). The bureaucratic system was also 
widely expanded. The total establishment of the public service had grown from 98,000 
posts in 1972 to nearly 170,000 post in early 1982 (Hong Kong Hansard, 1982: 32). In 
other words, the size of the governmental administration increased 74 per cent in ten 
years. Thanks to the growth in public revenue and bureaucratic personnel, when the 
expansion of the old age income security system attracted serious debates since the mid 
1980s, the state capacity was no longer regarded as a disadvantaged factor for future 
development. 
8.4.3.2 State autonomy and old age provision in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
As discussed in previous sections, the states in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all 
have the same preference in family cohesion as solutions to the ageing societies, and all 
have a centralised powerful administrative systems to put policies into effect. It is the 
difference in state autonomy that has brought about the divergence in these countries in 
tenns of the development of familisation or de-familisation after the 1980s. 
Before the end of the 1970s, the states in all these countries were able to dominate social 
sectors and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. This is attributed to a couple of reasons, 
including the lack of a fully elected legislature and significant opposition parties, 
political apathy of the public, and the lack of working class mobilisation. In Taiwan, the 
Temporary Provisions froze the re-elections for members of the Legislation Yuan and 
National Assembly, and, until the senior legislators retired and the all-round re-election 
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took place in 1991, the KMT government was able to pass all acts it proposed in the 
legislature. The legislature was actually only a rubber stamp and did not have any real 
power to challenge or veto the executive sectors' policies. On the other hand, the martial 
law eliminated the possibility for the opposition to form a political party and restricted 
political protest activities. The organisation of trade unions and the measures they could 
use for protest were restricted. The martial law also froze the number of newspaper 
licenses. The mass media was therefore controlled by the KMT and could not function to 
collect and broadcast dissentient views. These high-handed measures, coupled with the 
shadow of the slaughter in the "228 Incident" in 1947, resulted in a distant and apathetic 
political attitude. Until the end of the 1970s, the KMT had totally controlled the state and 
the society, including governmental executive bodies, the legislature, the press, and 
trade unions. The single-party and high-handed rule of the KMT was justified by the 
threat of the Communists and the need to maintain stability on the island (Johnson, 1987: 
144). During this period, there was only a pro-democracy opposition movement in the 
late 1950s that challenged the KMT government's dominance, and soon ended in failure 
(Rigger, 1999: 109). All these factors contributed to a high degree of state autonomy in 
Taiwan between the 1950s and the 1970s. 
The situations in state autonomy in Hong Kong before the 1980s were very much similar 
to those in Taiwan. The fact that the majority of the Hong Kong people were refugees 
from the mainland and did not have a strong sense of commitment and belongingness to 
this place provided a favourable foundation for political stability (Chan, 1996: 84). In 
deference to China's wishes, the colonial government had no intention to introduce a 
democracy and election system in Hong Kong (Scott, 1989: 82; Miner, 1995: 22; Lo, 
1999: 15). The widespread politically apathetic attitude, coupled with the support of the 
society and business elite who dominated executive and legislative sectors and feared 
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that a democracy system would damage their privileged status, delayed the progress to 
democratisation in Hong Kong (Lo, 1997: 20). Political power was monopolised in the 
hand of the Governor and the Executive Council, and all members of the Legislative 
Council were appointed by the government. Although there were some unofficials 
appointed to the Legislative Council, they only facilitated the smooth passage of 
government legislation and played no role in checking the powers of the executive (Lo, 
1997: 38). There was no significant political opposition power that could challenge the 
government's policy directions. In addition, ordinary workers tended to be uninterested 
in organizing or joining trade unions. The percentage of workers who were affiliated 
with trade unions was low. By 1966, the number of workers who joined trade unions was 
only 172,623, and most unions were fairly small and the main federations of trade 
unions were split into pro-China and pro-Taiwan and were not able to unite the 
developing working class (Butenhoff, 1999: 53). The average annual lost of working 
days between 1971 and 1990 was as little as 15,830 days, and trade unions were 
concentrated on mutual help, and social and leisure activities rather than fighting for 
improving wages and working conditions (Miner, 1995: 32). All pressure groups were 
required to register, and the consolidation of trade unions was restrained by 
governmental legislation. Although pressure groups existed in Hong Kong's relative 
liberal society, they were suppressed by the colonial government. These social and 
political features together provide a high autonomy to the state in Hong Kong before the 
1980s. 
Like the Taiwanese and the Hongkongese, the Singaporeans before the 1980s were 
generally apolitical, due to lack of a significant opposition party and low trade union 
affiliations. Therefore, the Singaporean State enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in 
policy making. Before Singapore's independence in 1965, although some of the 
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legislators were elected, they were just the minority in the parliament and did not have 
real power in policy making. As a result, the public did not bother to vote and turnouts in 
elections were low (Lee, 2000: 166-167). Since Singapore separated from Malaysia and 
became an independent country, the government had continually reminded the populace 
that a shift of emphasis from politics to economics was crucial for economic 
development and survival. Depoliticisation and the de-emphasis on competitive politics 
have become a conscious explicit philosophy (Chan, 1975: 295-6). The high economic 
growth and the rapid improvement in living standards also alleviated people's desire to 
participate in political activities. On the other hand, the high support from the populace 
resulted from economic success, and from the grassroots consolidated by widespread 
community centres operated by the ruling PAP party and worked closely with its MPs, 
had left little room for the development of any opposition power (Vasil, 1988: 150-154). 
In addition, the housing policies that, in the name of ethnic blend, scattered non-Chinese 
ethnic minorities who are more likely to vote against the PAP in elections helped to 
alleviate the concentration of an opposition cluster (Clammer, 1998: 219-220). 
Therefore, the government was able to monopolize political power. 
Between 1968 and 1980, the PAP won every single seat in the parliament in every 
general election, and had no difficulties in passing legislation of its preference in the 
parliament. Furthermore, trade unions were also powerless in terms of challenging the 
government's policies. The political unrest and dispute in industrial relations in the 
1950s and the 1960s resulted in a close relationship between the state and trade unions 
(Vasil, 1988: 143-4; Lee, 1988: 177). This tight relationship was later institutionalised, 
and, by the 1960s, the PAP-backed National Trade Unions Congress had successfully 
brought trade unions under control. The 1966 Trade Union (Amendment) Bill and the 
1968 Industrial Relation (Amendments) Act further restricted strikes and lock -outs (Lee, 
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1988: 176; Chua, 1995: 61). Trade uruons henceforth became an instrument for 
mobilising labour to coordinate the PAP's political aims, rather than an opposition 
power to challenge the authorities (Haggard and Cheng, 1987: 105). Moreover, having 
learned lessons from other Third World countries where ethnic conflicts and political 
unrest came after independence, the PAP government carefully avoided the emergence 
of any independent power centres in Singapore, and successfully integrated the civil, 
trade unions and society organisations under the subordination of the government (Vasil, 
1988: 120-4). This allowed the PAP government to exercise policy making without 
being challenged by other power from societal or industrial sectors. 
The high degree of state autonomy before the end of the 1970s allows Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore to channel their social security systems as a mechanism for nation 
building. The social insurance system in Taiwan, the limited means-tested and 
demo grant schemes in Hong Kong, and the CPF system in Singapore introduced during 
this period all reflected the states' preference. Although they all provided financial 
resources to older people other than their family, as discussed above, it is the effect of 
national integration rather than de-familisation that the states introduced these schemes 
for. The effect of de-familisation is an unintended result rather than a designed outcome. 
It is not unusual that the expansion of a welfare state comes about as an unexpected 
product. As Cox (1993) pointed out based on his analysis about the Dutch welfare state, 
this generous welfare state is an unexpected result of a series of expansions of welfare 
benefits which came without careful consideration about the consequence of expense. 
This rationale also explains the fact that, while placing a lot of emphasis on family 
cohesion, the states in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore before the end of the 1970s 
had all introduced western style de-familisation schemes for older people. 
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The situation in Taiwan and Hong Kong changed dramatically since the 1980s, and the 
states have lost their autonomy in policy making. This is mainly as a result of 
democratisation, which was an inevitable process for these countries. In Taiwan, with 
the loss of its international identity and support since the 1970s, the commitment to 
recovering the mainland had eventually proven unrealistic and the KMT Government 
had no choice but to launch political reform to secure its legitimacy (Rigger, 1999: 
16-19). On the other hand, the opposition that started concentrating since the 1970s had 
successfully formed a unified movement and cast significant votes in supplementary 
legislative elections since the early 1980s (Rigger, 1999: 29). A series of substantial 
political reforms mark the coming of an open and democratic society. These reforms 
include the KMT's tolerance of the establishment of the first significant opposition party 
in 1986, the lifting of martial law in 1987, the lifting of the ban on new newspaper 
licenses in 1988, the cancellation of the Period of Mobilisation for the Suppression of 
Communist Rebellion in 1991, the first full scale re-election for members of the 
National Assembly in 1991 and of the Legislative Yuan in 1992, and the first direct 
presidential election in 1996. 
As authoritative control had loosened, since the early 1980s, political and social 
organisations were formed, and large-scale demonstrations repeatedly appeared. By 
1989, more than 50 parties had registered with the government, and by 1996, 360 papers 
had at least a nominal presence in the market (Rigger, 1999: 129-132). Social 
movements aiming at improving the rights and interests of consumers, labourers, 
aborigines, farmers, the disabled, and women emerged (Lin, 2000). Taiwan soon shifted 
from an authoritarian one-party state to a nation with a plural political system. 
On the other hand, the KMT has faced severe competition especially from the main 
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opposition party, the DPP, in every election since the 1980s, and gradually lost its 
dominance in the making of public policies. Its number of votes in the Legislative Yuan 
has declined sharply since it first became a fully elected body in 1991. As Table 8.3 
shows that since the mid 1990s the KMT could no longer capture the majority of the 
vote in the elections. 
For the KMT, to win an election has become a more important goal than to implement a 
policy in accord with its ideology. This explains the contradiction that, in the 1990s, 
while its Prime Minister still insisted on emphasizing family cohesion, the KMT 
government introduced and expanded de-familisation schemes for older people and 
launched a campaign to establish a national pension system at the same time. 
Table 8.3 Percentage of the Vote Captured in Elections for the Parliaments (%) 
KMT DPP New Party Independent 
1980 (Legislative Yuan) 82.4 1.3 16.3 
1983 (Legislative Yuan) 87.5 3.1 9.4 
1986 (Legislative Yuan) 84.7 6.9 8.4 
1989 (Legislative Yuan) 65.5 19.9 14.6 
1991 (National Assembly) 71.2 24.0 4.9 
1992 (Legislative Yuan) 53.0 31.0 16.0 
1995 (Legislative Yuan) 46.1 33.2 13.0 8.4 
1998 (Legislative Yuan) 46.6 29.6 7.1 9.4 
Source: Lin, 2000: 110; Gigger, 1996: 303. 
Hong Kong's political system has also experienced large scale reforms since the 1980s. 
With the proceeding of the Sino-Britain negotiation about its future and the British 
desire to protect its political autonomy vis-a-vis China after 1997, democratisation in 
K t . d' e the early 1980s (Lo 1997' 20). The first election for the local Hong ong nggere SIne , . 
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advisory body, the District Boards, in 1982 and the first indirectly election of some 
members of the Legislative Council in 1985 marked the beginning of a democratic era. 
The "Tiananmen Incident" in 1989 further woke up Hongkongers' political awareness. 
Numerous political groups emerged in the mid-1980s and a civil society has exploded. 
In the 1990, the first party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong was established, and by 
1994, there were eight political parties in Hong Kong, which signaled the coming of a 
plural political competition (Lo, 1997: 152). In addition, democratisation has also 
brought Hong Kong a more pluralist policy-making process and the government has 
been aware of balancing the conflicting interests of the business elite and the working 
class when implementing policies (Lo, 1997: 22). The public's participation in politics 
has also increased dramatically. In the 1985 election for District Boards, only 16 per cent 
of the eligible voters voted (Miner, 1995: 37), while a survey of 672 respondents shows 
that 59.7% of them voted in the 1995 Legislative Council election (Lo, 1997: 196). In 
addition, frequency of political demonstrations also increased sharply in the 1990s. For 
example, police records of the number of marches showed a jump from 285 in 1993 to 
405 in 1995 (Chiu and Lui, 2000: 15). The increasing awareness and participation 
among the populace made it no longer possible for the government to implement 
policies without consulting or considering the Hong Kong people's point of view. 
Another clear sign that indicates the government's loss of total control in politics was the 
change of the result of the parliamentary motion to thank the Governor since the mid 
1990s. Conventionally, a member of the Parliament would move to thank the Governor 
immediately after he finishes his policy addresses to the Parliament, and this move 
would pass without any opposition. However, in 1996, this motion was rejected by a 
vote of 22 to 23 (Chai and Chai, 1998: 13-15; 186-188). Through this unprecedented 
vote, the Parliament had clearly demonstrated that it was not no longer a rubber stamp, 
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but had the real power to check the government's policies. 
All these developments were evidence that the executive-led Hong Kong state has been 
getting weaker, and a plural society has emerged. Therefore, the state could no longer 
always stick to its policy preferences and had to balance conflicting interests between 
different society groups. This explains the Hong Kong government's vacillation 
between a social insurance scheme and a central provident fund scheme since the late 
1980s. Eventually, it can no longer resist pressures from different social groups and had 
to implement a de-familisation scheme for old age in the late 1990s. 
In Singapore, by contrast, the state still enjoys a high degree of autonomy in policy 
making after the 1980s. Trade unions are still subordinate to the state and operate in 
coordination with rather than against the government. Between 1978 and 1999, it has 
been strike-free except for two days in 1986 (Singapore Government 2000: 243). On the 
other hand, the proliferation of state-sponsored associations and organisations signals 
that the civil society is also mainly dominated by the state. These associations and 
organisations have functioned to strengthen the support of the legitimacy of the PAP and 
to facilitate feedback from the grassroots to the government (Hill and Lian, 1995: 163). 
The most important grassroots organisations, Community centres, Citizens' 
Consultative Committees, and Residents' Committees, all come under the political 
control of the Prime Minister's Office. The PAP government has used these institutions 
to disseminate its ideology for nation building and to strengthen its monopoly in 
political space (Hill and Lian, 1995: 175-7). Under such circumstances, neither an 
autonomous civil society nor a powerful opposition party can thrive. The PAP has also 
enjoyed overwhelming control over the Parliament. It won all the seats in the 1980 
general election. In 1984, 1988, 1991, 1997 and 2001 general elections, non-PAP 
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candidates only won 2, 2, 4, 2 and 2 seats for the Parliament respectively. However, the 
percentage of votes cast in general elections fell significantly from 77.66 per cent in 
1980 to 64.83 in 1984, and to 60.96 in 1991, which is a clear signal that voters want a 
more open and less paternalistic government (Chong, 1991: 35; Chua, 1995: 76). In 
spite of losing popular votes in general elections, the PAP government still believes that 
a controlled democracy is necessary for this politically and economically small and 
vulnerable country, and a pluralist democracy with competitive politics is neither viable 
nor desirable (Vasil, 1988: 120; Chong, 1991: 109; Clammer, 1998: 218). The PAP 
continues to exercise all available legal and organisational means to hinder the 
mobilisation of any opposition, and makes it very difficult for an opposition to recruit 
promising new blood. Although there are as many as 23 registered parties active in 
Singapore, they hardly play the role of an opposition, and have practically no 
opportunity to make a serious impact on policy making (Sachsenroder, 1998: 11). It is in 
this climate that the state has secured its autonomy and has been able to implemented 
familisation schemes that reflect the states' preference since the 1980s. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore all have valued family cohesion as a fundamental 
element of their society and have put a lot of effort into advocating and strengthening 
family obligations. Especially, when the symptoms of an ageing society became clear 
and definite since the 1980s, these countries have been stuck with their preference for 
family cohesion as a prime measure for older people's income security. Although 
sharing the same familial cultural backgrounds, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
have gone through different processes and paths in their old age provision systems. 
Taiwan and Singapore introduced de-familisation schemes for old age in the 1950s, 
while Hong Kong still used family cohesion as an excuse for not implementing any 
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social security schemes for old people. On the other hand, Taiwan and Hong Kong's old 
age provision systems has clearly developed in a way to increase the degree of 
de-familisation in older people's income protection, while Singapore has used its social 
security and legal systems to strengthen its orientation of familisation. The main factor 
that has contributed to these differences is the state. The autonomy of the state, and the 
need for nation building and legitimacy together explain the divergence of old age 
income provision systems in these three countries in terms of timing and direction of 
familisation and de-familisation. 
The early establishment in Taiwan and Singapore and the laggard in Hong Kong in terms 
of introducing the first old age income security schemes are attributed to the different 
timing in their imperative for nation building. In the 1950s, the KMT's defeat in the civil 
war caused an urgent need for nation building in Taiwan, while the nature of a 
multi ethnic society in Singapore also called for measures for national integration during 
a period of decolonisation. On the other hand, the feature of an immigration society 
results in a lack of commitment and a delay in nation building in Hong Kong in the early 
decades after the Second World War. Since the 1980s, democratisation has resulted in 
the loss of state autonomy in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The governments in Taiwan and 
Hog Kong thus have to implement de-familisation schemes, which are against their 
preference of family cohesion. As to Singapore, the continuous high degree of state 
autonomy has allowed the government to enact legislation and to implement schemes 
that strengthen family ties In response to the ageIng society. 
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Chapter Nine 
Concluding Discussion 
9.1 Key findings of this research 
This research analyses the development of social provisions for older people in three 
Chinese societies, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, especially focusing on 
comparing their policy orientation toward familisation and de-familisation. This 
research reveals that governments in these countries, although sharing the same 
preference in family obligation, adopted different policy approaches in response to 
population ageing. This research also finds out that mainstream welfare state theories, 
including the approaches of industrialism, social democracy and diffusion, cannot 
explain the emergence and expansion of the social security systems in these three 
countries. It is the state centred approach that helps to offer explanations in these regards. 
The imperative for state-building and nation-building in Taiwan and Singapore in the 
1950s explains the introduction of their old age income protection system during this 
period. The expansion of old age benefits programmes in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 
1970s, on the other hand, is driven by the need for the states to improve their legitimacy. 
Since the 1980s, the difference of state autonomy in these countries has resulted in 
different directions of their policy orientations toward familisation or de-familisation. 
The connection of the state and the introduction of main schemes in these countries is 
illustrated in Figure 9.1. 
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Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Key factor 
l l 1950s De-familisation De-familisation State 
(Labour Insurance) ~ (the CPF) Building 
1970s-1 De-familisation De-familsation 
(Older People State 980s (Disability and l1li Welfare Law) Legitimacy Infirmity 
Allowance) 
1990s De-famili ation 1 De-familisation Familisation (MLIEA&OFA) l1li State (MPF) (Topping-up 
Autonomy 
scheme; 
Maintenance of 
parents Act) 
Figure 9.1 Factors contributing to the convergence and divergence of the old age income 
protection system in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
In micro level, this research analyses a panel data collected in Taiwan and finds out that 
the expansion of social security benefits can de-familise older people's income in a very 
short period of time. However, this expansion would not improve older people's living 
standards unless benefits are provided on a sufficient level. Relationship of supplements 
and substitution between state benefits and family support has also been found in the 
empirical analysis. In terms of older people's major income source, a clear stratification 
between socio-demographically advantaged and disadvantaged groups has also been 
identified, in which the former are more likely to enjoy social provisions and the latter 
are more likely to rely on the family in later life. 
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9.2 The significance of this research 
This research challenges existing understanding of so-called 'East Asia welfare model' 
in several ways. Firstly, the appropriateness of distinguishing it from Western models is 
doubtful. Welfare states in East Asian countries, especially in Japan and the four 'little 
Tigers' (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) are often been categorised as 
the same cluster. New terms have emerged to refer to this group and to distinguish it 
from Western models, including 'Oikonomic Welfare State' (Jones, 1990b), 'Confucian 
welfare state' (Jones, 1993), 'Welfare Orientalism' (White and Goodman, 1998). 
By these terms, the authors all emphasise the importance of family in welfare provision. 
This feature, however, is not unique to these East Asian countries. The emphasis on and 
the significance of family in supporting older people are not unusual in the Western 
history. The commandment of honouring parents is repeated in the New Testament 
(Shabar, 1997); and Catholic social teachings also value traditional familial function 
(Esping-Andersen: 1999: 51). In the era of ancient Greece, the care for older people was 
the legal responsibility of male members of the family. Also in the era of ancient Rome, 
children were expected to honour and care for their parents (Thane, 2000). Scherer 
(2003: 178) also points out that in European countries with a civil law tradition, the 
obligation to provide support to parents and grandparents has long been a feature of the 
civil law. Razi's (1981) research also shows clear evidence that in the thirteenth and the 
fourteenth century there was a common understanding in England that children should 
provide for older parents for their later life. The norm of family obligation for the young 
generation to look after their aged parents is also seen in social legislation in modem 
history. The most well-documented one which confirmed the obligation of family to 
look after their aged members is the English Poor Law of 1601. Also in Italy, some 
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communes made it a punishable offence to neglect an aged parent in the Middle Ages 
(Shabar, 1997). More recently, the incorporation of family obligation to support its older 
members in the law was also seen in New Zealand, where The familial obligations to 
support parents were not dropped until 1968 when it was repealed by the Domestic 
Proceedings Act (Thomson, 1998). In present days, the family is still vivid in welfare 
provision in Mediterranean countries (Leibfried, 1992). 
On the other hand, if including family into the 'welfare mix', resources available to 
individuals when they encounter social risks are not necessarily less in East Asian 
countries than in Western countries. The difference between these East Asian countries 
and Western countries in terms of individuals' need satisfaction is not the quantity of 
resource available, but the main mechanism that provides it. 
Even if we concentrate on state benefit system alone, discussions in early chapters have 
shown that social security programmes in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are similar 
to those in many Western countries. Taiwan's social insurance system before the 1990s 
was a typical case of Bismarck model; defined contribution retirement protection 
programmes in Hong Kong and Singapore are identical to those in Latin American and 
East European countries. In addition, defined contribution plans are increasing in 
number in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, the UK and the US, as occupational or 
personal pension plans (Turner, 2000). The design of social insurance pension 
programmes in other Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and China are also 
similar to those in Western countries. In this regard, it is doubtful that social security in 
these countries deserves to be clustered as a distinctive model. 
Second, content analysis in this research provides clear evidence that, at least for the old 
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age protection system, there is no homogenous model among East Asian countries. If \ve 
look at their welfare mix, Taiwan and Hong Kong's old age protection system have 
recently followed a clear trend of de-familisation approach, while Singapore has 
reinforced its familisation strategies. The expansion of old age benefits in Taiwan in the 
1990s substantially increases the role of the state for for old age protection. The 
establishment of a private-managed provident plan in Hong Kong links older people's 
retirement protection closer to their labour market participation and the performance of 
the financial market. In Singapore, the government reinforces older people's reliance on 
the family by introducing the Topping-up scheme and the Maintenance of Parents Act. 
In other words, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have increased the role of the state, 
markets, and the family, respectively, as their strategy in response to population ageing. 
If only focusing on public programmes, main old age income security programmes in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are also far from similar. According to the typology 
categorised by US DSSA (Department of Social Security Administration) (US DSSA, 
1997), they fall into different types. Taiwan's main old age social security programme is 
an earnings-related social insurance one, Singapore's is a public-managed provident 
programme, while Hong Hong's is a private-managed provident programme. These 
types of programme differ from each other not only by their design, such as principles of 
financing, conditions of entitlement, but also by their implications on redistribution and 
economy. The state plays a role as a provider in Taiwan, an operator in Singapore, and a 
regulator in Hong Kong. All these points indicate that we should rethink the 
appropriateness of clustering these countries into the same category of welfare regime. 
Third, this research adopted the notion of 'de-familisation', which had not been 
systematically addressed before, into the analysis and finds out that relationship between 
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state benefits and family support in Asian countries is similar to what has been observed 
in the West, i.e. state benefits substantially defamilise individuals' income. It is argued 
that Western countries use state benefits to defamilise people's income 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999), while Asian countries use them to reinforce individuals' 
reliance on their family (Chow, 1987). Analysis in this research, however, indicates that, 
in these East Asian countries, family support for older people withdraws when state 
benefits are available. In Singapore, the proportion of older people receiving family 
financial support is much lower among those who have CPF savings than those who 
have not. In Taiwan, the expansion of old age benefits in the 1990s resulted in a 
substantial proportion of older people shifting their major income source from the 
family to state benefits. The rapid de-familisation of older people's income after the 
expansion of the old age income protection system has also been observed in South 
Korea, where the proportion of older people reporting children's support as their major 
income source declined sharply from 63.7 per cent in 1988, the year when the National 
Pension Programme was introduced, to 44.3 per cent in 1994 (Yo on, et aI, cited in Lee, 
2002: 28). In other words, the importance of the family in supporting older people in 
East Asian countries is not a result of states' reinforcement, but of lack of state provision. 
Once state benefits are provided, they replace family support as older people's major 
Income source. 
Fourth, this research challenges existing arguments regarding relationship between the 
de-familisation and the de-commodification of people's income. Established Western 
scholars argue that individuals have to be de-familised before they can be 
de-commodified (for example, Orloff, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1999). They point out 
that, in the West, the gap between male and female in their social security rights is 
mainly due to females' low labour market participation. Therefore, they argue, for 
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females, de-familisation is generally a precondition for their capacity to commodify 
themselves. This research has provided clear evidence to reject these arguments. It is 
true that in a welfare regime where social security entitlements are strictly linked to 
individuals' employment records, people cannot enjoy decent state benefits unless they 
have a continuous labout market participation. However, in countries where pension 
rights are based on citizenship rather than contributions, state benefits can quickly 
de-familise people's income regardless of their experience in the household economy 
and in the labour market. 
9.3 Challenges to East Asian countries' old age protection system 
Social security systems in East Asian countries are now facing sever external pressure 
and domestic challenges. Externally, globalisation has brought enormous pressure to 
their economy, and influence their social security development. East Asian countries 
have been heavily depended on the world economy, and are vulnerable to acute changes 
of the international politics and economy. Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore all 
suffered heavily from the financial crisis in 1997 and the international economic 
recession in 2001. More recently, the outbreak of SARS (Sever Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome) has brought another disaster to these countries, with an estimated drop of 1.4, 
1.2, and 0.5 percentage points of GDP in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, 
respectively, for 2003 (Global Insight Inc., 2003). 
Despite all emphasising the importance of global competitiveness, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore have made different adjustment for public policies after the financial 
crisis. In Taiwan, the effects of financial crisis, international recession, and the move of 
many enterprises to China for cheaper labour have caused an increase in unemployment. 
As a consequence, tackling unemployment has become the government's top priority for 
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public policy. The Employment Insurance Scheme was introduced in 2002, which 
detached the Unemployment Benefit from the Labour Insurance Scheme and offered it 
an independent status. A total sum of NT$ 70 billion (about £1.4 billion) is made to 
temporarily accommodate the unemployed into public sector. On the other hand, due to 
tight government finance, the planning for the National Pension System has been 
suspended. Public concern about social security also seems to have changed from the 
establishment of a national pension system to the reduction of unemployment. 
In Hong Kong, due to the drop of government revenue caused by the economIC 
downturn and deflation, government finance has faced a deficit since 1998/99. Based on 
Government's projection, the deficit will amount to 5.5 per cent of GDP by 2004 (Hong 
Kong Government, 2003). In response to this situation, the Government has announced 
a comprehensive tax increase plan, which are unprecedented in Hong Kong where the 
government has been proud of their low tax tradition. According to the Government's 
2003-04 Budget plans, standard rates of salaries tax, corporate profits tax rate and 
property tax rate will increase, and tax allowances will decrease (Hong Kong 
Government, 2003). On the other hand, the Government also announces in this Budget 
that they expect to see a reduction in social security payments for HK$1. 7 billion a year. 
With respect to the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme, its operation will not be directly 
influenced by changes of government financial situation, as the government does not 
share the contribution. However, the government will soon face a dilemma between 
improving retirement protection and maintaining global economic competitiveness. The 
current contribution rate of 5 per cent for both employees and employers is low. An 
increase in contribution rate, however, will directly increase the cost for enterprises and 
is considered a disincentive for foreign investors and a disadvantage to global 
competitiveness. 
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In Singapore, CFP contribution rate for employers was reduced from 20 per cent to 10 
per cent after the financial crisis, and has yet reverted to its pre 1997 leyel. Facing 
economic downturn, the Government has chosen to sacrifice retirement protection for 
economic development. Thanks to its nature of funding, a temporary cut in CPF 
contribution will not substantially decrease members' savings for retirement. However, 
the government must deal with the situation where most of CPF members withdraw big 
proportions of their funds for housing and do not leave sufficient savings for old age. 
Radical measures are needed to force members to put more savings aside for later life. 
Domestic development in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore has also pressed sever 
challenges to their old age protection systems. Pierson (1999) has identified several 
domestic factors that challenge all kinds of welfare regimes, including population 
ageing, the transformation of the household, and the maturity of social security 
programmes. Pressures generated by these factors in these countries are no less than 
those in the West. In Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, changes of household structure 
and population ageing come together as a result of declining fertility rates. Proportion of 
households consisting of only older people and old age dependency ratio increase faster 
than the West. In Taiwan, the maturity of the social insurance system has resulted in 
enormous financial problems. 
Although measures have been adopted by these countries in response to these domestic 
pressures, they do not seem to be good solutions. In Taiwan, the MLIEA and the OFA 
were introduced as transitional arrangements before the establishment of the National 
Pension System. However, these tax-funded benefits will cause enormous financial 
burden to the government. The suspension of pension reforms also means that problems 
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facing current social insurance programmes will become worse before they are dealt 
with. In Singapore, the familisation schemes of Topping-up Scheme and the 
establishment of the Tribunal for maintenance of parents are not popular. Between 
October to December 2002, among the three million CPF members, only 250 of them 
used Topping-up, and the amount involved was only $5.4 million (CPF Board, 2003). 
With respect to the Tribunal, from June 1996 to October 2000, there were only 641 cases 
asking for maintenance order, and the number of cases is declining each year (Scherer, 
2003: 176). In other words, these familisation schemes do not have much practical effect 
on protecting older people's income. More reforms on retirement protection system are 
needed for the long run, including increasing retirement age, and increasing minimum 
sum retirement savings. 
Apart from economic and demographic factors, changes of domestic politics also press 
severe challenges to these countries, especially in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In the former, 
the opposition and the ruling parties compete viciously almost in every major policy 
area. In the latter, party politics has emerged since the 1990s and the public has showed 
increasing concerns toward public affairs. For these countries, a rational institutional 
arrangement is needed for social policy making. In this regard, South Korea offers a 
good example, where a tripartite corporatism was introduced for social policy making 
after the financial crisis, and has brought substantial reforms on social security (Shin, 
2000). 
Another urgent task for these countries is to expand their safety net. Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore's main old age income protection schemes are all designed based on male 
breadwinner assumptions. With increasing number of unemployed and rising 
employment in informal sector, an increasing number of people will be excluded from 
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these schemes. Traditionally, the family played a role as a buffer, which support people 
during economic hardship. However, the family now is less capable of doing so due to 
the transformation of households, especially when the unemployed is the breadwinner of 
the household. Government statistics in South Korea shows that the proportion of heads 
of household among the unemployed rose sharply after the financial crisis, from 34.5 per 
cent in 1997 to 43.6 per cent in 1998 (Shin, 2000: 91). In response to this situation, the 
Government expanded its unemployment benefit and social assistance system in 1998 
(Shin, 2000; Lee, 2002), which could be a good example for Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
9.4 Limitations of this research and directions for future research 
There are several limitations of this research, which leads to directions for future 
research. Firstly, this research adopts a small-N approach for comparison, and includes 
only three Chinese societies, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, into the analysis. 
There are some other countries sharing similar social and economic backgrounds and 
facing similar challenges with respect to population ageing, including China, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Among them, Japan's pension system has 
defamilised older people's income. The 1989 National Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure shows that social security pension benefits consisted of 78 per cent of older 
people's income (Takayama, 2002: 16). On the other hand, its pension scheme would 
face a deficit in 2003 if reforms were not proceeded (Takayama, 2002: 16). Potential 
financial insolvency of public pension scheme will also appear in South Korea by 2020 
(Lee, 2002: 38). In China, due to its one-child policy and increasing early retirement, the 
old age dependency ratio for the basic pension system (number of pensioners to number 
of active contributors) has increased from 1 :30 in 1987 to 1:3.5 in 2001 (Zhu, 2002: 42). 
Radical pension reforms are urgent for these countries. More research focusing on these 
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countries will be valuable for the understanding of their system, and for the management 
of their future. In addition, research focus should extend from state benefit system to 
'welfare mix', and bring the labour market and family into analysis to examine their 
interactions and the impact of these interactions on older people's living standards. 
Second, this research focuses on state benefits and family support and does not pay 
much attention to occupational and personal pensions. In fact, Singapore's CPF scheme 
and Hong Kong's MPF scheme are both public and occupational schemes. There are 
public schemes as they are mandatory and are managed or regulated by the state. They 
can also be treated as occupational schemes as they only cover those who participate in 
the labour market, and employees and their employers together share 100 per cent of the 
contribution. However, there are substantial proportions of employed population 
exempted from provident funds in Hong Kong (23 per cent in Hong Kong in December 
2001) and Singapore as their employers are providing better retirement protection plans. 
This exemption no doubt has enormous impact on the stratification of older people's 
income. On the other hand, future research should also pay more attention to incomes 
from personal pension plans to see their impact on older people's financial situation. 
Third, in this research, analysis on de-familisation focuses only on older people's 
income source and does not include the respect of expenditure and the household 
economy. The majority of older people in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore still live 
and share financial resources with their children. For older people in these countries, 
changing their major income source from family support to state benefit does not 
necessarily mean they no longer rely on their children to pay living expenses. Therefore, 
it is important for future research to bring the household economy into analysis for 
further understanding of the impact of social security on de-familisation. 
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Fourth, due to the availability of empirical data, micro analysis in this research only 
focuses on Taiwan. As Hong Kong and Singapore all adopted different type of schemes, 
the situation in Taiwan cannot simply be genealised. In Singapore, the government has 
conducted several nation-wide surveys on older people since the 1980s. Howeyer, these 
data offer little help to understand trends and changes of older people's financial 
situation on micro level, as they are not collected as panel data. In Taiwan, the 
government has conducted a series of surveys on older people's situation since the 1980s. 
However, longitudinal comparability of these data is doubtful, as methods of these 
surveys are not consistent. As population ageing has become the most severe challenge 
to social security in these countries, it is important for them to build up longitudinal data 
sets based on strict and consistent methods to support more empirical research and 
accumulate more knowledge in this field. 
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